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meanwhile, every 2 or 3 years, somebody in the academy, 
wanting to keep his place in the university structure 
(and if you think Vietnam is hell you ought to see what goes on between those 
 so-called brains in battles of intrigue and power within their own little cellblocks) 
brings out the same old collection of glass and gutless poetry and labels it THE  
NEW POETRY or THE NEW NEW POETRY but it’s still the same marked deck 
    Charles Bukowski 
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Preface 
Something has changed. The building at the other side of my room stares at me through 
my window as it has for the past three years, but something is different. It might be that 
the building is the same, but my perception of it has changed. Maybe I have changed. 
The past four years that I have spent writing this thesis, the first one just around the cor-
ner and the last three in this room, have been truly remarkable in my life. It is strange to 
look back now and think what I was back then and what I have become since. Many 
things have changed, indeed. One of the most obvious changes, however, is that this 
book is finally finished, although it turned out to be a very different book from the one I 
started out to write.    
   While I studied law at the University of Helsinki, I dreamt about writing a doctoral 
thesis one day, but I was not quite sure whether I believed in that dream. Once I gradu-
ated, however, I think that to continue to a doctorate was the only possible choice for 
me, since I really could not see myself as a lawyer back then. And since I really enjoyed 
writing my master’s thesis, to do a more serious piece of research seemed like a great 
idea. So I began my journey. Now that journey is finished. The making of his book has 
been an educational experience which has left a permanent mark on me. During the 
years that have passed since I graduated and made the decision to begin this research, I 
have learned a lot about life, not simply about doing research and writing a book. My 
undefined feelings, the failures and misfortunes of the past, and the broken dreams and 
failed expectations, all intertwine as I wistfully look back to that journey. I began this 
book with youthful enthusiasm and naivety, and ended up with a far more modest book 
than originally intended. In this case, however, I think that the journey was more im-
portant than the destination.   
   Although the writing of this book has mostly been solitary work, many people 
have helped me, providing support and guidance during the course of the writing, and to 
them I owe a great debt of gratitude. First and foremost I would like to thank my super-
visor, Professor Heikki Pihlajamäki, who has been truly a splendid mentor and advisor, 
and without whom this project would never have begun. I would also like to express my 
greatest gratitude to Professor Jukka Kekkonen, who first gave me the inspiration to 
begin my doctoral work, and who has since provided support and useful advice as well 
as critical comments. I would also especially like to thank my pre-examiners, Professor 
Emeritus Kjell Åke Modéer and Dr. Kaius Tuori, the first of whom has also agreed to 
act as my opponent. I also owe very special thanks to Dr. Mia Korpiola, whose critical 
comments in the final phase of my work proved very helpful, saving my manuscript 
from many errors. I would also like to thank my colleagues and co-workers at the legal 
history department of the University of Helsinki, Markus Kari, Suvi Kokkonen, Raija-
Liisa Komulainen, Dr. Toomas Kotkas, Toni Malminen, Aleksi Rantanen, Jussi Sallila, 
Dr. Jukka Siro, Marianne Vasara-Aaltonen, and Dr. Iisa Vepsä, who all have given use-
ful advice and made the work more pleasant. Furthermore, I am very grateful to Profes-
  
 
 
sors Niklas Bruun, Lars D. Eriksson, Antti Kivivuori, and Kaarlo Tuori, scholars who 
actually contributed to the critical scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s and thus were 
subjects of my study, but who nonetheless were kind enough to comment on my manu-
script. I am also greatly indebted to Dr. Roderick McConchie for revising the English of 
my manuscript. This book is now much better than what it would have been without the 
help of these and many other people. All the remaining mistakes and errors in the book 
are entirely mine, of course.      
   I would like to thank the Research Foundation of the University of Helsinki, the 
Finnish Lawyers’ Society, and the Aili & Brynolf Honkasalo Foundation for providing 
financial support and thus making this research possible.   
   There are also many people outside the scholarly community who have supported 
me over the years. Therefore, I would like to thank my family and friends, Niko Kilpi 
for providing the cover picture, as well as the people at the Artlab Studios. I have unfor-
tunately been too devoted to my work to show my gratitude and appreciation in the way 
I probably should have. Nevertheless, a great Cheers to you all!   
    Last, but most definitely not least, I will thank my wife, Taru Takamaa, who is the 
most important person in my life. Since I met her, she has given my life a whole new 
meaning, making me realize the beauty of existence, as well as the fact that life really is 
easier to bear when it can be shared with someone. I am not sure where I would be 
without her. All I am and have is because of her, and to her I owe everything; my life 
and love included. I know I should have dedicated this book to you, Taru, had I not 
been obsessed with my willful decision to not to dedicate it to anybody. I hope you’ll 
understand. 
 
Helsinki, October 2013 
Juhana Mikael Salojärvi 
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I Introduction 
1 Jurisprudence against the grain: The focus of the study 
 
Legal scholarship investigates law and its functions in society. Law creates the state, 
settles conflicts between individuals and between individuals and the state, provides a 
structural framework for public and private institutions and organizations, and pro-
nounces what is permitted, required, and denied in society. There are many forms of 
legal scholarship, but “conventional research is primarily, though not exclusively, fo-
cused on doctrine ─ cases, statutes, and treatises.” “Doctrinal analysis…is undertaken to 
establish a particular interpretation of case law on the basis of arguments and authority 
which would be acceptable to an appellate judge.”1 In the Continental European sense, 
doctrinal analysis produces information about and systematizes the law,
2
 which, alt-
hough different on the surface, is basically the same as the previous definition. Every 
once in a while, however, movements appear which criticize the traditional legal schol-
arship and try to trash both traditional scholarship and its object, the law. The criticism 
can be so radical that the most traditional scholar may feel that “the nihilist who must 
profess that legal principle does not matter has an ethical duty to depart the law 
school.”3 This study explores one of these occasions.  
   The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a major critical attack on law and legal scholar-
ship in various countries. The focus of this study is the critical legal scholarship of the 
1960s and 1970s in the United States and the Nordic Countries. The countries consid-
ered are the United States and Finland individually, and the Scandinavian countries, 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden collectively. Finland has been chosen for various rea-
sons. First of all, it is my home country. In addition, the history of the Finnish jurispru-
dence of the latter half of the twentieth century is still an unexamined field and thus in 
need of historical research. Furthermore, critical legal scholarship is a particular topic 
that needs a thorough examination because it can be considered as a truly significant 
epoch in the development of modern legal scholarship. The United States has been cho-
sen because of its global significance and because it provides an excellent point of com-
parison. Scandinavia, which will not be dealt with in such detail as Finland and the 
United States, follows naturally because it helps to understand Finland in context and 
                                               
1 Frank Munger and Carroll Seron, Critical Legal Studies versus Critical Legal Theory: A Comment on 
Method, 6 Law & Policy 257, 260 (1984).  
2 Aulis Aarnio, Essays on the Doctrinal Studies of Law (Dordrecht: Springer 2011), 19. Aarnio uses the 
expression “doctrinal studies”. Here the terms “doctrinal studies” and “doctrinal analysis” are used as 
synonyms.    
3 Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 Journal of Legal Education 222, 227 (1984).   
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because of the need to explore the development of the critical legal scholarship of the 
1960s and 1970s there as well. The time frame is from the mid-1960s to the end of the 
1970s because these were the pivotal years in the emergence of the critical scholarship. 
   The study has three main purposes. First, I will reconstruct the historical develop-
ment of critical legal scholarship. I will analyze how it emanated within the social and 
scientific circumstances and how it responded to them. The purpose is to understand 
critical legal scholarship in its context, as well as to analyze the reasons for its emer-
gence. Because this is a study of legal history, not of legal theory, I will concentrate on 
the historical development of critical scholarship and not examine its theoretical merits. 
In addition, because this is a study of academic legal scholarship, the changes in law are 
not considered. Only regarding Finland will I use a couple of noteworthy law reforms, 
the reform of the Constitution and the criminal law, as examples of the dimensions of 
critical legal scholarship and its impact on law. Second, I shall compare the movements 
of the various countries and analyze the factors explaining the differences and similari-
ties between them. The comparative analysis is rather general and abstract, but it will 
help us to understand the dimensions of critical legal scholarship. Relating to the two 
previous questions, I will investigate the main influences and the substance of critical 
scholarship in order to understand its purposes and to analyze the possible motives for 
the critical literature. I will not analyze all of the literature the critical scholars referred 
to in detail because the basis of their influence is vast and diversified. Rather, I will ex-
amine at a very general level the most important influences in order to clarify the devel-
opment and the substance of critical scholarship. The third purpose and the overall goal 
relating to my two questions is to understand the “essence” of the critical legal scholar-
ship of the 1960s and 1970s. The essence of this critical scholarship is crucial in under-
standing it as a historical phenomenon and in relating the three different areas to each 
other.   
2 “We are people of this generation”: The sixties and the law  
 
“We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in uni-
versities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.”4 Thus wrote the Students for 
a Democratic Society in their famous statement at Port Huron, Michigan, in June 1962. 
The world had recovered from the atrocities of the Second World War, and the 1960s 
was about to become the culmination of widespread social protests and a decade of tur-
bulence. The decade marked the formation of the New Left, a movement of young, of-
ten academic people against the conventional values and institutions of society and 
struggling for a new and better utopian society, as well as the culmination of a counter-
culture which also abandoned the traditional life-style and struggled against the conven-
                                               
4 Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society, 1962. 
<http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/huron.html> (last visited 23.9.2011).   
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tional social mores.
5
 The turbulence of the 1960s developed into a student revolt on a 
previously unseen scale, when students protested violently against the authorities,
6
 and 
the most turbulent year, 1968, came to be remembered as the “year that rocked the 
world.”7 The 1960s was also a time of various civil rights movements and social re-
forms.
8
 The protest movement in the universities was not simply a movement of stu-
dents revolting, but scholars also protesting against their tradition. Legal scholarship 
also faced an attack under which the authority of tradition was disputed and rejected.     
   The roots of modern legal scholarship both in the United States and Scandinavia 
are in the late nineteenth-century conceptualism which regarded law as science, stress-
ing the fact that law can be conceptualized in abstract concepts from which solutions 
can be derived.
9
 The conceptual tradition was contested by various sociological tradi-
tions around the turn of the century, and legal realism prospered within the universities 
in the 1920s and 1930s. Realism criticized conceptualism’s metaphysical nature and its 
assertion that legal reasoning could be understood in abstract and scientific terms. Real-
ism saw law as a man-made, positivist enterprise, and therefore legal scholarship ought 
to be social engineering exploring the social functions of law. The Second World War, 
however, brought changes, and Realism lost much of its authority. The realist lessons 
were domesticated and integrated into postwar legal scholarship, which hence was not 
conceptualist in the nineteenth-century sense, but it was neither realist in the extreme 
sense.
10
    
   The roots of modern Finnish legal scholarship are also in nineteenth-century Ger-
man conceptualism, but realism did not make significant headway in Finland in the 
                                               
5 Conventional stories of the emergence of the American New Left include Maurice Isserman, “If I had a 
Hammer…”: The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left (New York: Basic Books 1987); 
James Miller, “Democracy is in the Streets”: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago (New York: Si-
mon and Schuster 1987). For a revision of the movement, see John McMillian and Paul Buhle (eds.), The 
New Left Revisited (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 2003). On the New Left in Denmark and 
Sweden, see, e.g., Thomas Ekman Jørgensen, Transformations and Crises: The Left and the Nation in 
Denmark and Sweden, 1956–1980 (New York: Bergham Books 2008). On the Finnish new left, see, e.g., 
Marja Tuominen, “Me kaikki ollaan sotilaitten lapsia”: Sukupolvihegemonian kriisi 1960-luvun suoma-
laisessa kulttuurissa (Helsinki: Tammi 1997).      
6 On the student protests, see Cyril Levitt, Children of Privilege: Student Revolts in the Sixties (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press 1984); Sven-Olof Josefsson, Året var 1968: Universitetskris och studentre-
volt i Stockholm och Lund (Göteborg: Avhandlingar från Historiska institutionen i Göteborg 1996); Ta-
pani Suominen, Ehkä teloitamme jonkun: Opiskelijaradikalismi ja vallankumousfiktio 1960- ja 1970-
lukujen Suomessa, Norjassa ja Länsi-Saksassa (Helsinki: Tammi 1997).   
7 Mark Kurlansky, 1968: The Year that Rocked the World (London: Jonathan Cape  2004).     
8 Edward P. Morgan, The 60s Experience: Hard Lessons about Modern America (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press 1991); Søren Hein Rasmussen, Sære alliancer: Politiske bevægelse i efterkrigstidens 
Danmark (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag 1997); Terttu Pesonen, Vallatonta valtaa: Tutkielma 1960-
luvun radikalismista Suomessa (Helsinki: Helsingin Yliopisto 1992).      
9 William Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886–
1937 (New York: Oxford University Press 1998); Lars Björne, Den konstruktiva riktningen: Den 
nordiska rättsvetenskapens historia, Del III, 1871–1910 (Lund: Rättshistorisk bibliotek 2002).     
10 Morton J. Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 
(New York: Oxford University Press 1992), 169–268; Lars Björne, Realism och skandinavisk realism: 
Den nordiska rättsvetenskapens historia, Del IV, 1911–1950 (Stockholm: Rättshistorisk bibliotek 2007).     
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1930s.
11
 Finland thus remained more or less within the conceptualist framework of the 
nineteenth-century throughout the first part of the twentieth. The 1950s and 1960s wit-
nessed the birth of the Finnish analytical school of jurisprudence, which was a sophist i-
cated version of conceptualism, deriving its motives from the Scandinavian realist’s 
criticism of metaphysics and postwar linguistic philosophy, and dividing legal concepts 
into finer parts and examining their meaning in legal practice.
12
         
   In the 1960s and 1970s, critical legal scholarship entered the stage by arguing, 
roughly speaking, that law and legal scholarship were political. The criticism took vari-
ous forms. In the United States, for example, it was total criticism of knowledge,
13
 criti-
cism of the rational basis of legal reasoning,
14
 or analysis revealing the economic and 
political purposes of legal doctrine with respect to its historical development.
15
 In Scan-
dinavia, critical scholars opined that legal scholarship ought to be socially oriented,
16
 or 
Marxist analysis of law,
17
 or historical study revealing the economic and political pur-
poses of law.
18
 In Finland, critical legal scholars developed a program for a political 
jurisprudence paying attention to the political and social functions of law,
19
 argued that 
legal reasoning was merely rhetoric,
20
 or explored the historical development of law in 
order to reveal its social and economic purposes.
21
 As can be seen, there was no uniform 
basis of critical legal scholarship, but rather there were many critical legal theories.  
    By and large, critical legal scholarship in the various countries shared many simi-
larities. At the center of the criticism was liberal legalism.
22
 Critical scholars argued that 
                                               
11 See, e.g., Toni Malminen, So You Thought Transplanting Law Is Easy? Fear of Scandinavian Legal 
Realism in Finland, 1918─1965, in Jaakko Husa, Kimmo Nuotio, Heikki Pihlajamäki (eds.), Nordic Law: 
Between Tradition and Dynamism (Antwerp ─ Oxford: Intersentia 2007), 75–87.       
12 Heikki Pihlajamäki & Anu Pylkkänen, Suomalainen oikeustiede eurooppalaisessa traditiossa: Luentoja 
oikeustieteen historiasta (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto 1996), 127–137.     
13 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: The Free Press 1975).     
14 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harvard Law Review 1685–
1778 (1976).  
15
 Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press 1977).      
16 Per Olof Bolding, Juridik och samhällsdebatt (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1968); Carl August 
Fleischer, Grunnlovens grenser: For lovregulert fastsettning av erstatning ved eksproriasjon, ─ særlig ved 
verdistigning som ikke skyldes grunneiers innsats (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1968).    
17 Göran Elwin & Dag Victor, Rättsteori och dialektisk materialism, HfKS 4/1973, 21─38; Anders Fogel-
klou, Den orättfärdiga rätten: En studie över Hegels rättfärdigande och marxismens kritik av den moderna 
rättsordningen (Stockholm: P.A. Nordstedt & Söners förlag 1978).     
18 Torben Wanscher, Forsamlingsfriheden og “fælledslaget”: Studier til belysning af statens fastlæggelse 
af grænserne for arbejderbevægelsens forsamlingsfrihed 1872─1874 (Århus: Modtryk 1979).      
19 Antti Kivivuori, Politische Rechtswissenschaft (Helsinki 1971).   
20 Lars D. Eriksson, Rättslig argumentering och den dialektiska logiken, JFT 1966, 445–482.  
21 Antero Jyränki, Perustuslaki ja yhteiskunnan muutos: Tutkimus varallisuusoikeuksien ja taloudellisen 
toiminnan vapauden perustuslainsuojan kehittymisestä tulkinnan avulla v. 1863─1919 (Helsinki: Tammi 
1973).  
22 Critical scholars have had several conceptions of “liberalism” and have labeled people with different 
opinions as “liberal”. Here the concept of “liberal legalism” means that individual liberties are protected, 
everyone is equal before the law, the rule of law is considered necessary to protect liberties and to estab-
lish a government, law is not inherently biased toward any potential interests, and is a potential tool to 
change society. (On the definition of “liberal legalism”, see, e.g., Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of 
Legal Liberalism (New Haven: Yale University Press 1996), 42–43, 265 n. 52. She prefers the phrase 
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the rule of law was fundamentally flawed and structured to protect particular interests, 
and traditional legal scholarship was criticized for its inability to realize the ideological 
elements of law. According to the critics, traditional scholarship was influenced by so-
cial ideology and the biases of the scholar and could thus not provide realistic infor-
mation about the law. They thought that since legal reasoning was also influenced by 
social ideology and personal biases in addition to the fact that law was contradictory, it 
had no rational basis. Critical scholars emphasized the importance of analysis of the 
biases of law.   
   The development of critical scholarship was also basically the same. Criticism of 
law and the politicization of legal research, especially studies on criminal law, were 
significantly boosted in the 1960s. The critical criminology and sociology of law of the 
1960s were important antecedents to the more critical legal scholarship which emerged 
in the late 1960s and the 1970s, when the criticism took more organized and sophist i-
cated forms, turned more toward a philosophical criticism of law, and when critical 
scholars established forums for discussion on critical scholarship. In the United States, 
this appeared in the development of the Critical Legal Studies movement (CLS)
23
 and in 
the Nordic Countries as the rise of Marxist legal scholarship and the establishment of 
critical law reviews.
24
    
   The nuances and details of the critical legal theories of the various countries be-
come clearer after a comparative analysis, only after which can we achieve an under-
standing of the movements. For instance, CLS has often been criticized for its nihilism 
and lack of alternatives.
25
 It is true that it was more a movement of philosophical criti-
cism, whereas Scandinavian critical scholarship was often more constructive and polit i-
cal, providing alternative views for reforms. However, as will be seen, the conception of 
CLS as a merely critical and destructive movement is exaggerated and simplifies the 
theories.
26
 To a certain extent at least, American critical legal scholarship believed more 
in the deconstruction of doctrine than in the radical social reform through law, but this is 
                                                                                                                                         
“legal liberalism” instead, however. On the problem of liberal legalism in leftist scholarship, see, e.g.,  
Wendy Brown and Janet Halley, Introduction, 5–7, in Wendy Brown and Janet Halley (eds.), Left Legal-
ism/Left Critique (Durham: Duke University Press 2002), 1–37.)          
23 In general on CLS, see Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press 1987). CLS has since become one of the most influential jurisprudential 
“schools”. On the various symposiums held on the subject, see 36 Stanford Law Review 1–674 (1984); 
34 American University Law Review 927–1262 (1985); 6 Cardozo Law Review 691–1032 (1985); 52 
George Washington Law Review 239–287 (1985); 35 Journal of Legal Education 1–122, 157–298 (1985) 
[Symposium on legal education]; 31 St. Louis University Law Journal 1–132 (1986); 14 Journal of Law 
and Society 1–198 (1987); 81 Northwestern University Law Review 589–952 (1987) [Symposium on 
Unger’s theory]; 22 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 297–702 (1987) [Minorities cri-
tique of CLS]; 90 Georgetown Law Journal 127–252 (2001) [Symposium on the scholarship of Mark 
Tushnet]; 22 Cardozo Law Review 701–1190 (2001) [symposium on Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of 
Adjudication: {fin de siècle} (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1997)].         
24 In general, see Göran Elwin & Dag Victor (eds.), Rätt och marxism: Introduktion och material (Stock-
holm: Kontrakurs 1978).      
25 Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to be Radical? 36 Stanford Law Review 247, 249 (1984).  
26 See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stanford Law Review 293, 299–300 (1984). As will be noted, the 
“mainstream” CLS was mostly critical, but at the periphery of the movement scholars often provided 
alternatives to improve the situation.    
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not the whole picture. In addition, when we set the development in context, we will see 
that CLS grew out of an atmosphere in which critical and realist legal scholarship had a 
position,
27
 and the critical scholars were thus not the first to revive realist notions. Fur-
thermore, the fact that the criticism in Finland was relatively more radical than else-
where follows from the historical circumstances of Finnish society and scholarship.       
  The critical legal scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s has to be understood in con-
text, which is the first and foremost purpose of this study. The 1960s and 1968 in par-
ticular did not come out of nothing;
28
 neither did critical legal scholarship. It was a seg-
ment in a process, reflecting various levels of development and change. It is therefore 
important to understand this critical scholarship against its historical context and against 
its place in the history of legal scholarship because it was the jurisprudential tradition 
that the critical scholars attacked.   
   Of course, critical legal scholarship was not a particular phenomenon of the 1960s. 
On the contrary, in the course of history there have been several critical scholars and 
jurisprudential movements similar to those of the 1960s. In the late eighteenth century, 
Jeremy Bentham criticized the law of England in a radical manner by arguing that the 
whole common law system ought to be changed.
29
 Well-known attacks on legal scholar-
ship occurred in late nineteenth-century Germany, when the jurisprudence of concepts 
was criticized for being completely detached from reality. The critical scholars argued 
that legal scholarship should focus on the interests of law,
30
 and that legal reasoning 
ought to be free in accordance with social needs.
31
 In the United States, Roscoe Pound 
criticized the legal tradition in the early twentieth century,
32
 and in the 1920s and 1930s 
the legal realists launched heavy attacks on traditional scholarship.
33
 In fact, legal histo-
rian Harold Berman writes that late-medieval humanistic jurisprudence “was a fifteenth-
century parallel to the radical attack against traditional legal scholarship by ‘realist’ and 
                                               
27 See, e.g., Arthur S. Miller and Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 27 University of Chicago Law Review 661─695 (1960); Charles A. Reich, Toward the Humanistic 
Study of Law, 74 Yale Law Journal 1402─1408 (1965).  
28 Arthur Marwick has spoken about “the long 1960s”, ranging from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, 
1968 being merely a part of the period. (Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, 
France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958–c.1974 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998), 7–8, and see 
id. at 535, 656). His thesis, nevertheless, is that there was a period called “the sixties” in which several 
considerable cultural changes occurred.       
29 Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government (Edited with an Introduction by F. C. Montague, Lon-
don: Oxford University Press 1931) (1776).      
30 Rudolf von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag 1970) (1877─1883).   
31 See in general, e.g., Franz Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe ─ with particular reference to 
Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995), 453–458.    
32 Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, I–III, 24 Harvard Law Review 
591–619 (1911), 25 Harvard Law Review 140–168, 489–516 (1912); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Juris-
prudence, 8 Columbia Law Review 605–623 (1908).  
33 Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence ─ The Next Step, 30 Columbia Law Review 431─465 
(1930); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism ─ Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harvard Law 
Review 1222–1264 (1931); Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (London: Stevens & Sons 1949) 
(1930).    
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‘critical’ movements in American jurisprudence of the twentieth century.”34 Different 
times have had their share of critical legal scholarship, and the 1960s was no exception. 
Critical theories always reflect the currents of their time, and studies on particular times 
and places reveal something new about the dynamics of legal scholarship, which is the 
purpose of my historical reconstruction. The analysis of the “essence” of critical legal 
scholarship of a particular time, however, requires another perspective. 
3 Defining “critical legal scholarship”: Subject and sources  
 
This study concerns critical legal scholarship, but the concept of critical scholarship is 
broad and ambiguous. One could even argue that all scholarship is critical in some 
sense. Our subject, however, is scholarship that is somehow “more” critical than the 
usual sense of the word. What we are seeking here is a certain kind of “radical” crit i-
cism of law. In a dictionary sense, the word “radical” can mean going to the root of the 
problem or opinions far beyond the norm,
35
 and this is especially what we mean when 
speaking of radical or critical legal scholarship. Critical legal scholarship thus criticizes 
the fundamentals of law and legal scholarship. It goes to the root of the problem, and if 
it provides alternatives to change the situation, which it does not necessarily do, these 
are usually extreme proposals.   
   Critical legal scholarship is therefore critical in a fundamental sense.
36
 In this 
study, we are concerned with the way the critical discourse was manifested within the 
legal discourse. The conflict between traditional and critical scholarship can be illustrat-
ed by particular scientific concepts which reflect the ideas of the critical legal scholars. 
The theories below are used simply to clarify and explain the situation, and to illuminate 
the difference between traditional and critical scholarship. This is also necessary in or-
der to understand critical scholarship as a historical phenomenon, as will be noted. The 
theories used were originally developed for the natural sciences and do not therefore 
apply straightforwardly to legal scholarship. Their uses as examples, however, help to 
demonstrate our subject and to understand the scholarly controversy that was at stake.   
   In his well-known book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn 
launched the concept of the paradigm into the scientific language. Simply put, a para-
digm is the intellectual framework of a scientific community; its shared concepts, val-
ues, methods, and beliefs. A paradigm determines the way scientific problems are 
                                               
34 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution, II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2003), 103.    
35 http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definitions/radical (last visited 27.4.2012).    
36 On the various forms of legal criticism and its problems, see Kaarlo Tuori, Law, Power and Critique, 
22–28, in Kaarlo Tuori, Zenon Bankowski, Jyrki Uusitalo (eds.), Law and Power: Critical and Socio-
Legal Essays (Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications 1997), 7–29. As noted, this study is not con-
cerned about the theoretical merits or potential of critical scholarship.  
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viewed and defined, and offers methods for solutions.
37
 Traditional legal scholarship 
can be seen as the paradigm against which the critical scholars rebelled. The critical 
scholars viewed facts differently than the traditional scholars, which caused anomalies 
in their thought.
38
 These anomalies, however, did not follow discoveries which the par-
adigm could not explain, following rather the different style of perception, or episte-
mology, of the critical scholars. To illustrate this kind of anomaly, we can use another 
theory by another philosopher of science, Ludwik Fleck,
39
 and his theory on thought 
collectives and thought style, because it provides a better view of the historical, cultural, 
and social dimensions of scholarship.     
   According to Fleck, a thought collective is the common intellectual background of 
a scientific community, and a thought style is its particular way of scientific observa-
tion. Scientific facts are construed within a historical and social process. A thought col-
lective makes scientific observation and discourse possible, and a thought style deter-
mines the observation of problems.
40
 The nature of perception thus becomes important, 
because one has to distinguish essential from inessential and the image from the back-
ground. One has also to recognize the category to which the object belongs
 
.
41
 The criti-
cal scholars thus departed from the conventional though styles and viewed the subject of 
their scholarship with thought styles alien to the thought collective.  
   The change in thought styles and thought collectives occurs in an extensive con-
text.
42
 Cognition consists rather of what we learn than what we acknowledge, and prior 
knowledge conditions the formation of newer knowledge. A new epistemology has to 
be adapted to its social and cultural-historical context so that it will not fatally contradict 
the history of consciousness and practical every-day life.
43
 Studying critical legal schol-
arship in context provides us information on the ways the critical scholars received the 
scholarly tradition and their education, and how the consciousness they acquired 
through their education responded to the changes in society, culture, economics, and 
politics.   
   The interplay between the thought collective and the context is therefore at the 
heart of the critical epistemology, since, Fleck claims, “[a]lthough the thought collective 
                                               
37 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
1996), esp. at 10–13, 23–42, 92–95.    
38 Id. at 52–65. An anomaly occurs when the dominant paradigm is unable to provide solution to a prob-
lem.   
39 Fleck’s theory was originally published in 1935, but was mostly ignored and forgotten because it was 
published by a small Swiss publishing company, and furthermore, because most of his other writings 
were published in Polish. Nevertheless, Fleck's ideas did influence the theory of Kuhn. The theories of 
both Kuhn and Fleck are used here simply to illustrate the epistemological aspects of critical legal schol-
arship.   
40 Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1979), esp. at 9–11, 37–51, 64, 84–111.       
41 Ludwik Fleck, To Look, To See, To Know, 130, in Robert S. Cohen & Thomas Schnelle (eds.), Cogni-
tion and Fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company 1986), 129–151.     
42 The problem of how various thought styles come to exist is more a problem of theory of science rather 
than legal history, and therefore goes beyond the scope of this study.  
43 Ludwik Fleck, On the Crisis of ‘Reality’, 47–49, in Cohen & Schnelle (eds.) 1986, supra n. 41 at 47–
57.    
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consists of individuals, it is not simply the aggregate sum of them. The individual with-
in the collective is never, or hardly ever, conscious of the prevailing thought style, 
which almost always exerts an absolutely compulsive force upon his thinking and with 
which it is not possible to be at variance.”44 The story of critical legal scholarship is a 
story of scholars adopting alien thought styles and thus challenging the scientific com-
munity. By criticizing the paradigm of law, one stepped beyond the conventional 
boundaries of criticism. Within a paradigm, law was understood and approached in ap-
proximately the same fashion, but the criticism of the paradigm, on the other hand, 
meant criticism that did not approve the fundamental premises of law and legal scholar-
ship.  
   Critical legal scholarship thus deviated from the basic features of traditional schol-
arship. If we assume that traditional scholarship focuses on explaining the way the law 
responds to particular legal problems, assumes the autonomy of law to some extent, 
uses legal material, such as cases and statutes etc., as sources, and excludes considera-
tions of values and policies, then critical legal scholars perceived both the subject and 
the functions of scholarship in a different way than traditional scholars. This is what 
will be called the nucleus of critical or radical-critical legal scholarship. It disliked sim-
ple doctrinal analysis and rejected the possibility of objectivity, neutrality and rationali-
ty in legal research, reasoning, and law, and therefore encouraged the use of values and 
policies in these regards. Since critical legal scholarship often sought the problems of 
law in its roots, it can be called radical scholarship because it did not aim to correct de-
tails on the surface, but aimed to change the fundamentals.    
   These were the simple characteristics of critical legal scholarship, but there were 
differences. For instance, CLS, the form of American critical legal scholarship of the 
1970s, did not always have an instrumental view of law. Rather, it was characterized by 
pessimism about law as an agent of social change, and instead of social sciences it ap-
plied philosophical analysis to law. American critical legal scholarship before CLS bore 
a closer resemblance to the instrumental, social-scientific legal research. Nevertheless, 
critical legal scholarship in a more radical or more modest sense meant an alternative 
perspective on law. The difference between critical scholars and traditional scholars 
often originated from the epistemological differences between them. Critical and tradi-
tional scholars had a different way of perceiving legal phenomena, different way of 
dealing with their observations, and a different view of what the law ought to be. These 
fundamental differences in observation and consciousness laid the basis for critical legal 
scholarship.  
   Jurisprudential “schools” or “movements” are hardly ever unambiguous.45 Critical 
legal scholarship was not a unified theory but a network of scholars sharing a common 
basis.
46
 Critical scholars developed their own theories and often disagreed on details. 
                                               
44 Fleck 1979, supra n. 40 at 41.   
45 N.E.H. Hull, Networks & Bricolage: A Prolegomenon to a History of Twentieth-Century American 
Academic Jurisprudence, 35 American Journal of Legal History 307–322 (1991).    
46 A Conversation with Duncan Kennedy, 2/24 The Advocate 56, 56 (1994).    
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Furthermore, there were various scholars at the time who disagreed with the traditional 
scholarship to a certain extent but who did not adopt a radical view. The forms of schol-
arship that sought to change the nature of the tradition without however departing from 
it in a fundamental sense will be called alternative legal scholarship. If a paradigm re-
fers to methods of research, and thought styles refer to perception, then alternative 
scholarship sought to change the paradigm and critical scholarship perception and con-
sciousness. Thus, the core of critical legal scholarship took a radical distance from the 
tradition, and the periphery of critical scholarship sought to change certain aspects of 
the tradition while remaining more or less true to its fundamental tenets. In this study, 
the CLS movement and Marxist legal scholarship are at the core, and in the periphery 
are the various forms of sociological and realist jurisprudence. The core will be called 
“critical legal scholarship”, and the periphery “alternative legal scholarship”.    
   The sources consist of the published legal literature of the 1960s and 1970s, from 
which I have sifted the literature which adopts a critical stance toward law and tradi-
tional legal scholarship in the sense of this study. With respect to the United States, my 
starting-point is naturally CLS, even though it is very difficult to define it.
47
 The main 
focus is the literature listed in the CLS bibliography,
48
 although, as the authors write, 
the list is a bibliography only of the movement and does not include critical legal litera-
ture beyond that.
49
 CLS was not the only critical legal movement in the postwar United 
States, but since it was the most radical and influential, it is crucial here. In placing CLS 
in context, I have included much critical legal literature of the 1960s outside the list, but 
as the study progresses toward the 1980s, I will stick more closely to the literature it 
provides.       
   At the heart of American critical legal scholarship were C. Edwin Baker, Peter 
Gabel, John Griffiths, Morton Horwitz, Al Katz, Mark Kelman, Duncan Kennedy, Karl 
Klare, Mark Tushnet, and Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Many others might be included 
as well. CLS expanded tremendously in the 1980s, but I will focus on the earlier schol-
arship. Furthermore, there were many critical scholars in the 1960s and 1970s outside 
CLS, such as the radical Arthur Kinoy, the progressive liberal Charles Reich, the post-
realist Arthur Selwyn Miller, the radical activist Ralph Nader, the nihilist Arthur Leff, 
and many others who will be accorded less attention.    
   Various schools of alternative and critical legal scholarship preceded and sur-
rounded the CLS movement. I will note that the rise of feminist jurisprudence and crit i-
cal race theory were important aspects of critical legal scholarship, but these are also 
left somewhat aside. Scholarship such as political jurisprudence and law and society are 
considered as alternative scholarship and therefore play a smaller part in the book. For 
instance, Stewart Macaulay, a scholar of the law and society movement, is included in 
the bibliography of CLS and was a founding member of the Conference on the Critical 
                                               
47 See, e.g., Kennedy 1997 supra n. 23 at 8–11.    
48 Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 Yale Law Journal 461–
490 (1984).   
49 Id. at 462.  
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Legal Studies, but in this study he is considered rather as an alternative scholar than a 
critical scholar because of his stress on empiricism and lack of radical criticism.    
   The case of Finland and Scandinavia is somewhat challenging since there is no list 
of “Scandinavian critical legal scholarship”. There were, however, critical law journals, 
such as the Nordic Retfærd or the Finnish Oikeus, which help to define our subject. In 
order to sift the critical legal scholarship, I have leafed through the published legal liter-
ature of the time and selected as critical legal scholarship the literature that adopts a 
critical stance toward law or legal scholarship in the radical or alternative sense. In sort-
ing out the critical legal literature, my main sources have been, in addition to the critical 
journals, the most prestigious law reviews of the Nordic Countries, Lakimes, Svensk 
Juristtidning, Juristen, and Lov og rett. The further division between the core and the 
periphery of the critical legal scholarship is based on whether the scholar fundamentally 
criticized some aspect of the law, as well as on the amount of published literature. 
Therefore, a scholar who did not publish much critical literature may fall into the pe-
riphery despite having radical notions. With respect to Scandinavia, all Marxists are 
considered as critical scholars, whereas that alone does not suffice in Finland.      
   Among Scandinavian legal scholars, Swedish Per Olof Bolding, Göran Elwin, An-
ders Fogelklou, Håkan Hydén and Dag Victor, Danish Peter Blume, Ole Krarup, Torben 
Wanscher and Henrik Zahle, and the Norwegians Carl August Fleischer and Nils Kris-
tian Sundby are considered as critical scholars. The post-realists such as Vilhelm Aubert 
and Torstein Eckhoff, and sociological legal scholars such as Nils Christie, Jørgen Dal-
berg-Larsen and Thomas Mathiesen have a place as alternative scholars. Scandinavian 
Marxist legal scholarship was more encompassing than the names given would lead one 
to assume,
50
 but I have focused on the most essential literature because a detailed analy-
sis of Marxist legal scholarship in Scandinavia would have required space beyond the 
scope of this book. Alternative and critical legal scholarship in the Nordic Countries 
also includes various smaller “sub-schools”. There was no critical race theory in the 
Nordic Countries since there was no race problem. Feminist jurisprudence began to 
arise in Scandinavia in the 1970s, but not on any major scale. In Finland, however, fem-
inist jurisprudence did not emerge until the 1980s. 
   It is difficult to define the critical Finnish legal scholars because of the radical 
character of the scholarship. Nevertheless, the essential critical legal scholars in Finland 
are Lars D. Eriksson, Antero Jyränki, and Antti Kivivuori. Though not a legal scholar, 
Raimo Blom can also be included because of his considerable contribution to the crit i-
cism of law. There is a fine, thin line between radicals and not-so-radical critical schol-
ars, and further problems follow from scholars who did not produce much literature. 
Close to the core in one way or another were Eero Backman, Niklas Bruun, Matti Mik-
kola, Olli Mäenpää, Esko Riepula, Juha Tolonen, and Kaarlo Tuori. In addition, socio-
logical jurisprudence and alternative legal scholarship became more common in these 
years, which expands the list, and many scholars will not receive a detailed analysis. 
                                               
50 See, e.g., the authors of Juristen og samfundet (Udgivet af Fagkritisk Front ved Aarhus Universitet på 
Forlaget MODTRYK 1973). See also Elwin & Victor (eds.) 1978, supra n. 24 at 173–184.   
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Critical criminologists are considered as alternative legal scholars, although they are not 
to be identified with the critical scholars.              
   As noted, my sources consist almost exclusively of the published legal literature of 
the time. I have not conducted any interviews during my research. Some of the Finnish 
critical legal scholars have commented upon my text,
51
 but besides the comments, I 
have not relied on any oral information. The reason for this is that the literary sources 
on the subject are so vast that a historical reconstruction of the events on its basis is pos-
sible. Moreover, memory is never a very reliable source when studying events that oc-
curred over three decades ago. The literary sources exist as they were, but the authors 
may remember the reasons and motives behind the texts somewhat inaccurately. It is 
true that conversations with the authors may bring important information about the 
background of the scholars and open up their theories, as James Hackney’s brilliant in-
terviews with the American legal scholars of the latter part of the twentieth century 
demonstrate.
52
 Nevertheless, regarding the purposes of this study, all the relevant infor-
mation can be found in the published materials. 
4 The pursuit of legal history 
 
The purpose here is not to write a history of legal scholarship, 1965–1980, but to study 
one aspect of it; critical legal scholarship. As the Swedish historian Kim Salomon notes, 
much happened in the 1960s but it is the social turbulence of that decade that is often 
remembered.
53
 This study is also on the radical aspect of the 1960s and 1970s, and 
many interesting aspects regarding the development of legal scholarship are left out. In 
addition, the critical legal scholarship we are focusing on sprang mostly from the left in 
political terms. Radicalism and criticism can, of course, be either right or left in political 
terms, either conservative or reformist,
54
 but the critical scholarship that interests us was 
mostly leftist and reformist. In the 1960s, when the ideology of the left became more 
common within culture and politics, it became a mode of protest, antagonism, and re-
                                               
51 I am very grateful to the critical comments that Niklas Bruun, Lars D. Eriksson, Antti Kivivuori, and 
Kaarlo Tuori made on my manuscript. Their comments helped me to understand the context as well as 
some of the theoretical details of the critical scholarship.   
52 James R. Hackney Jr., Legal Intellectuals in Conversation: Reflections on the Construction of Contem-
porary American Legal Theory (New York: New York University Press 2012). Hackney’s book contains 
a few interviews which are interesting from the perspective of my study. These are especially Duncan 
Kennedy and Morton Horwitz, as well as Austin Sarat, Catherine Mackinnon and Patricia Williams. 
These interviews would be especially interesting if writing a personal history of the scholars involved in 
CLS. However, in a study such as this, they do not provide much further data that cannot be inferred from 
the published primary and secondary sources.  
53 Kim Salomon, Det mytiska 1968, 27–29, in Kjell Å. Modéer & Martin Sunnqvist (eds.), 1968 och 
därefter: De kritiska rättsteoriernas betydelse för nordisk rättsvetenskap (Københavns Universitet: Muse-
um Tusculanums Forlag 2010), 27–42.       
54 See, e.g., John A. Andrew III, The Other Side of the Sixties: Young Americans for Freedom and the 
Rise of Conservative Politics (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press 1997). Andrew 
focuses on the “New Right” and the origins of modern conservatism in the postwar decades.  
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formism. Our subject is therefore the leftist, academic, critical scholarship of the 1960s 
and 1970s.   
   Various aspects have to be taken into account in reconstructing the history of crit i-
cal legal scholarship. The rise of the criticism has to be situated within the context of 
society, politics, and the economy, on the one hand, and the tradition of jurisprudence as 
well as the changes in scholarship, philosophy, and culture on the other. In the pursuit of 
history, various interpretations are thus possible. For example, ever since Charles Beard 
argued that the drafters of the Constitution of the United States acted out of selfish in-
terests to protect the capitalist economy,
55
 the scholars of American constitutional histo-
ry have had to deal with the question of whether the Constitution was an economic doc-
ument protecting capitalism or political document establishing a true republican re-
gime.
56
 The conflict between material interests and intellectual goals therefore lies at the 
heart of legal history. These factors, of course, usually converge, and it is often difficult 
to stress one over another. This is particularly true when one considers the history of 
legal scholarship because it is different than legislation as the latter relates more closely 
to societal interests.  
   The variety of the historical analyses of CLS can be used as illustrations. For ex-
ample, CLS has been analyzed against its intellectual context,
57
 and has been depicted 
as a post-modern movement.
58
 It is true that critical legal scholarship was an application 
of the recent developments in various other disciplines in legal scholarship. The critical 
science that developed in the first half of the twentieth century became more popular in 
philosophy and social sciences in the postwar world and, from the 1960s onwards, 
Marxism was revived as a theoretical basis in various disciplines. The new trends in 
scholarship often emphasized the context of observation and knowledge. Legal scholar-
ship followed these trends selectively and with a certain lag, but the critical scholarship 
nonetheless contested the validity of empirical observations and stressed the importance 
of the structures of the observation. As Marxism entered the universities extensively, 
legal scholarship followed. Intellectual sources usually influence scholarship, but the 
scholars do not write in a vacuum. The legal historian G. Edward White notes that both 
                                               
55 Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: 
Free Press 1965) (1913).      
56 Pope McCorkle, The Historian as Intellectual: Charles Beard and the Constitution Reconsidered, 28 
American Journal of Legal History 314, 314–319 (1984); Shlomo Slonim, Motives at Philadelphia, 1787: 
Gordon Wood’s Neo-Beardian Thesis Reexamined, 16 Law and History Review 527, 527–528 (1998); 
Gordon Wood, “Motives at Philadelphia”: A Comment on Slonim, 16 Law and History Review 553–562 
(1998).   
57 James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 685–780 (1985); Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of 
Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 New York University Law Review 429–496 
(1987).  
58 Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century’s End (New York: 
New York University Press 1995), 1–2. But see Stephen M. Feldman, American Legal Thought from 
Premodernism to Postmodernism: An Intellectual Voyage (New York: Oxford University Press 2000), 
131–132. Feldman argues that CLS was a modernist movement.  
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the rise of the continental theory and the New Left politics affected the formation of 
CLS.
59
 The political and social context has to be included as well.    
   The political and social context has been present in various depictions of the histo-
ry of CLS, which is commonly linked to leftist politics. CLS has been described as a 
“political location” of leftist legal scholars60 and as a movement of utopian socialism.61 
It has often been viewed as an outcome of the radicalism of the 1960s,
62
 although it is 
also argued that the circumstances of the 1950s had more influence.
63
 It is obvious that 
the radicalism of the 1960s influenced the rise of critical legal scholarship, but the fun-
damental questions would be, however, what caused the radicalism in the first place, 
and why these particular scholars undertook that critical enterprise. I cannot delve deep-
ly into these questions, but I will analyze the relationship between the critical legal 
scholarship and the radical ideas of the 1960s.    
   Indeed, critical legal scholarship was in part a response to the social turmoil. Its 
methods and purposes aimed to criticize the established norms and institutions of socie-
ty. By applying the language of social criticism of the time, critical legal scholars chal-
lenged and ridiculed the authorities. In addition, as the labor movement gained a strong-
er foothold in society and the postwar economic growth descended into crisis, critical 
scholars explored the doctrines of law, pointing out the conflict between labor and capi-
tal and how the apparently neutral law protected the interests of capitalism. In general, 
just as the “other side” of society was recognized and pronounced more openly in the 
1960s, critical legal scholars contested the power hierarchies and sided with the under-
dog. It is obvious that critical scholarship had political connections, but it should not be 
reduced simply to political jurisprudence. Many of the impulses of scholarship come 
from outside academia, but the literature is produced within academia. In order not to 
reduce critical scholarship to its political assumptions, it has to be seen within the field 
in which the critical discourse took place.   
   The academic structures in which this happened are thus also important. CLS was 
mostly an academic movement.
64
 Critical scholars contested the prevailing forms of 
scholarship and education and sought to replace them with their own methods. As not-
ed, student radicalism was a major aspect of the social turbulence of the 1960s. Critical 
scholars were rarely student radicals, but they represented the junior faculty, which ob-
                                               
59 G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 South-
western Law Journal 819, 837–838 (1987).  
60 Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 Yale Law Journal 1515, 1516 (1991).  
61 Michael A. Foley, Critical Legal Studies: New Wave Utopian Socialism, 91 Dickinson Law Review 
467–496 (1987).  
62 Guyora Binder, On Critical Legal Studies as Guerrilla Warfare, 76 Georgetown Law Journal 1, 23 
(1987); John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the 
Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stanford Law Review 391, 406–407 (1984).  
63 Tushnet 1991, supra n. 60 at 1535.  
64 James Boyle, Introduction, xiv, in James Boyle (ed.), Critical Legal Studies (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
1994), xiii–liii.     
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viously sympathized with the radical students and, for one reason or another, identified 
with the radical cause.
65
  
   As an academic movement, CLS has been depicted as “an episode in the history of 
American legal education”66 and as a radical academic movement67 or simply as radical-
ism.
68
 As Bourdieu argued, academic discourses are parts of struggles for academic cap-
ital, which determines the authority and respectability of theories and scholars. Critical 
scholarship is thus often a struggle for a new theory and academic power.
69
 Critical le-
gal scholarship can also be seen as part of an academic power struggle, the pursuit of a 
new legal theory replacing the traditional paradigm and changing the generational struc-
ture of the academic elite, as a struggle of the junior faculty against the old, competing 
for university positions and governance, and methods of education, scholarship, and 
theory. Critical legal scholarship was an all-encompassing method of grasping and criti-
cizing society, scholarship, and academia. Seen in this way, it was more an attack on the 
academic tradition and establishment than on the society and politics, and the critical 
scholars sought more to acquire academic reputation than legal or social change. The 
academic power struggle is, however, only a part of the story, even if a considerable 
part, and critical legal scholarship should not be reduced to it either.       
   Reconstructing the history of critical legal scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s in-
volves several aspects. One problem in this regard is the search for rationality, or as 
Albert Camus wrote in 1951, “it is the desperate appeal for order that rings through this 
insane universe.”70 Thus, to ignore the irrational aspects simplifies the view. Critical 
legal scholarship was not a group of scholars with patterned behavior, driven by the 
same motives and seeking the same goal. They often shared a political viewpoint but 
that alone does not explain critical scholarship. The subject then needs to be understood 
in a context which can include all the relevant aspects.   
   A problem of legal history is that it often sees behavior as patterned and explains 
situations in abstract and general terms. Of course, people often act upon their immedi-
ate material needs and their behavior is patterned, but this is not always the case. People 
can see that there is something wrong with the world and act altruistically without hav-
ing any direct interest in the issue. People can do something simply because they think it 
is right, or cool, and sometimes their behavior is inexplicable even to themselves.
71
 The 
                                               
65 See Duncan Kennedy in Hackney 2002, supra n. 52 at 28–29.   
66 Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Studies as a Teaching Method, 35 Loyola Law Review 383, 385 (1989).  
67 Albert P. Cardarelli & Stephen C. Hicks, Radicalism in Law and Criminology: A Retrospective View 
of Critical Legal Studies and Radical Criminology, 84 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 502–553 
(1993).   
68 Johnson 1984, supra n. 25.  
69 Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press 1988), esp. at 
xvii–xix, 6–35, 61–62, 84–127.   
70 Albert Camus, The Rebel (London: Penguin Books 2010), 72 (1951).    
71 Take a look, for instance, at the words of J.D. Salinger. “A lot of people, especially this one psychoana-
lyst guy they have here, keeps asking me if I’m going to apply myself when I go back to school next 
September. It’s such a stupid question, in my opinion. I mean how do you know what you’re going to do 
till you do it. The answer is, you don’t. I think I am, but how do I know? I swear it’s a stupid question.” 
(J.D: Salinger, Catcher in the Rye (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1958), 220 (1951) (Italics original). 
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simple act of doing can be the goal in itself without any concrete interests or goals, and 
the interest a person has might even be the image the other acquires of the person. The 
ultimate motives of the action are then self-realization and recognition in the eyes of the 
other.     
   A scholar might thus become a critical scholar for various reasons. For instance, 
one may develop an alternative theory because one realizes that traditional scholarship 
is simply untenable or that it favors some interests at the expense of others, or one may 
simply want to create a new theory. A scholar might became a critical scholar because 
of political biases, because of the literature one reads, or out of the feeling that there is 
something wrong with the world and the traditional scholarship is partially to blame. 
One can choose the literature one reads because of one’s biases, or one’s interests may 
follow the literature one reads. One may even feel offended in the first year at law 
school by a professor and become a critical scholar because of a yearning for revenge 
against the tradition. We can never tell what the reason is for a particular scholar unless 
we psychoanalyze each and every scholar we are dealing with individually, and even 
then we could only have more or less convincing hypotheses.   
   Generalization is thus necessary, but we should find a point of reference that could 
summarize most of the relevant factors. The 1960s witnessed many things, but one of 
the most remarkable was the gulf between world views that caused a completely new 
way of perceiving reality. Robert Pirsig aptly describes this gulf writing in 1974 that “in 
recent times we have seen a huge split develop between a classic culture and a romantic 
counterculture ─ two worlds growingly alienated and hateful toward each other with 
everyone wondering if it will always be this way, a house divided against itself.”72 It 
was this split between the cultures, a split that also manifested itself within the tradition 
of legal scholarship, which was at the heart of critical legal scholarship, because the 
crucial issue was the difference in perceiving the law and scholarship. If the concept of 
“culture” is used to mean “the network or totality of attitudes, values and practices of a 
particular group of human beings”,73 then critical legal scholarship was an academic 
counter-culture rivaling the traditional culture.    
   Since the split between the traditional and critical scholarship occurred in the aca-
demic field, it could be viewed as a battle for academic capital. As Bourdieu writes, “the 
university field is, like any other field, the locus of a struggle to determine the condi-
tions and the criteria of legitimate membership and legitimate hierarchy, that is, to de-
termine which properties are pertinent, effective and liable to function as capital so as to 
generate the specific profits guaranteed by the field.”74 However, as Faulkner wrote, “no 
battle is ever won… They are not even fought. The field only reveals to man his own 
folly and despair, and victory is an illusion of philosophers and fools.”75 In the universi-
                                                                                                                                         
The quotation clarifies the fact that human behavior is not always rational and cannot be predicted in 
simple terms. Behavior can sometimes be inexplicable even to the actor.      
72 Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (New York: William Morrow 1974), 75.  
73 Marwick 1998, supra n. 28 at 11. (Inverted commas omitted.)  
74 Bourdieu 1988, supra n. 69 at 11.  
75 William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (London: Chatto and Windus 1931), 74.      
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ty the scholar faces his or her “folly and despair” and is forced to find a way to get 
along. Critical scholarship was not a calculated plot or conspiracy against the traditional 
scholarship, but an outcome of the changes in society, culture, and intellectual life, and 
of the drive of the scholars identifying themselves within the changed circumstances. In 
a sense, critical legal scholars were rebels against the system of law and legal scholar-
ship, pursuing authenticity and self-realization.   
   The final problem concerns the placing of the historical reconstruction into the 
comparison. In his study on the 1960s student radicalism in America, Seymour Lipset 
writes that “[a]ny effort to interpret the changing political behavior of American stu-
dents in recent years is subject to the difficulty that it is dealing with a local aspect of a 
worldwide phenomenon.”76 This is a problem I am facing too, because the rise of criti-
cal legal scholarship was a common phenomenon in the western world in the 1960s and 
1970s, meaning that I am also dealing with particular aspects of a universal phenome-
non. In a comparative analysis, the historical reconstruction of critical legal scholarship 
has to be situated in the various contexts. The comprehensive perspective and the com-
parisons that follow will help us to understand the essence of the critical scholarship. 
5 Critical legal scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s in legal history  
 
As we saw, CLS has been subjected to a vast amount of literature. However, it deals 
mainly with its theory, and the studies on the history of the movement are rather frag-
mentary and partial accounts. I will thus provide a comprehensive account of the history 
of CLS as well as of critical legal scholarship in the Nordic Countries. At the moment, 
the most comprehensive account of the historical origins of CLS seems to be Neil 
Duxbury’s,77 who has analyzed the new left and the scholarly origins of the movement. 
In addition, to mention a few, there is a detailed account of the people and their relation-
ships in the founding of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies,
78
 various studies on 
the intellectual origins of the movement,
79
 and a sketch for a political history.
80
 The 
development of the movement has also been explained against the context of the law 
                                               
76 Seymour Martin Lipset, Rebellion in the University: A History of Student Activism in America (Lon-
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1972), 3. (Footnote omitted.)   
77 Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995), 421–509.   
78 Schlegel 1984, supra n.  62.  
79 Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 Journal of 
Legal Education 505–517 (1986); G. Edward White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stan-
ford Law Review 649–672 (1984); White 1987, supra n. 59; Stuart J. Russell, The Critical Legal Studies 
Challenge to Contemporary Mainstream Legal Philosophy, 18 Ottawa Law Review 1–24 (1986). A com-
prehensive analysis on the theoretical basis of CLS literature is David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Struc-
turalism and Contemporary Critical Scholarship, 21 New England Law Review 209–289 (1985). Theoret-
ical aspects of some CLS literature are analyzed in detail in Donald F. Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 
60 Southern California Law Review 259–396 (1987).      
80 Tushnet 1991, supra n. 60.  
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school of the 1960s,
81
 the rise of the leftist faculty in the 1970s,
82
 as a radical academic 
enterprise,
83
 in its epistemological context,
84
 and as a movement toward a new construc-
tion of reason in law.
85
 Important preliminary studies on the institutional
86
 and jurispru-
dential
87
 context of the development of CLS have also appeared. There are also several 
general introductions to CLS theory which often take a stand on the historical develop-
ment of the movement in one way or another.
88
 In addition to the reconstruction of the 
history of CLS, this study is a synthesis of the previous literature.   
   With respect to Scandinavia and Finland, the situation is quite different because 
there seem to be relatively few studies on the subject. A valuable collection of autobio-
graphical essays by the scholars who participated in the critical scholarship has been 
published,
89
 but it seems that no comprehensive study has been done. There is a short 
but informative introduction to Scandinavian Marxist legal scholarship,
90
 a good ac-
count of the theories of Danish critical legal scholarship, without a historical analysis 
however,
91
 and general introductions to the critical legal scholarship
92
 and the legal sci-
ence of the time.
93
 The Finnish legal culture of the 1960s and 1970s has been thorough-
                                               
81 Binder 1987, supra n. 62.   
82 Nathan Glazer, Marxism and the Law School: A Nonlegal Perspective, 8 Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 249–253 (1985); Maurice J. Holland, A Hurried Perspective on the Critical Legal Studies 
Movement: The Marx Brothers Assault the Citadel, 8 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 239–247 
(1985).  
83 Cardarelli & Hicks 1993, supra n. 67.  
84 Williams 1987, supra n. 57.  
85 Boyle 1985, supra n. 57.     
86 Laura Kalman, Yale Law School and the Sixties: Revolt and Reverberations (Chapel Hill: The Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press 2005), 281–291.  
87 Kalman 1996, supra n. 22 at 82–88.   
88 As will be seen later, there is no theory of CLS, but rather a range of various theories. There is a tre-
mendous amount of literature on CLS. The most comprehensive account of the theory of CLS is Kelman 
1987, supra n. 23, but its interpretation of the theory has been contested. (Richard Michael Fischl, The 
Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 Law & Social Inquiry 779–820 (1992)). A good one is also 
Minda 1995, supra n. 58 at 106–127, who links CLS to the postmodern tradition of late twentieth-century 
scholarship. See also Boyle 1994 supra n. 64. For critical accounts on CLS, see, e.g., Andrew Altman, 
Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1990); 
Louis B. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 Stanford Law Review 413–
464 (1984); Johnson 1984, supra n. 25; Foley 1987 supra n. 61. For an attempt to resurrect CLS from its 
criticism, see, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 University of 
Miami Law Review 505–532 (1987). For recent attempts to resuscitate CLS see E. Dana Neacsu, CLS 
Stands for Critical Legal Studies, if Anyone Remembers, 8 Journal of Law and Policy 415–453 (2000); 
Motoaki Funakoshi, Taking Duncan Kennedy Seriously: Ironical Liberal Legalism, 15 Widener Law 
Review 231–287 (2009).       
89 Modéer & Sunnqvist (eds.) 2010, supra n. 53.    
90 Elwin & Victor (eds.) 1978, supra n. 24 at 173–184.   
91 Jørgen Dalberg-Larsen, Dansk retsfilosofi: Udviklingslinjer og portrætter (København: Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets forlag 2006), 85–183.  
92 See, e.g., Jørgen Dalberg-Larsen, Four Phases in the Development of Modern Legal Science, 23 Scan-
dinavian Studies in Law 77, 97–101 (1979); Rune Slagstad, Norwegian Legal Realism Since 1945, 35 
Scandinavian Studies in Law 215–233 (1991). See also Jørgen Dalberg-Larsen, Retsvidenskab som sam-
fundvidenskaben: Et retsteoretisk tema i historisk og aktuel belysning (København: Juristforbundets for-
lag 1977), 506–545.   
93 See, e.g., Stig Strömholm (ed.), Svensk rättsvetenskap, 1947–1997 (Stockholm: Nordstedts juridik 
1997).    
19 
 
ly examined,
94
 and there are fragmentary notions about the critical legal scholarship of 
the 1960s and 1970s in a general introduction to the Finnish legal science of the twenti-
eth century.
95
 There are also several shorter comments on the debates on the nature and 
functions of legal scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s,
96
 but a larger examination is lack-
ing. Moreover, the characterizing feature of all of the literature is that it has been written 
by scholars with personal experiences of the time. A study from an outsider’s perspec-
tive is required to explore the critical scholarship without any personal biases. Whereas 
the history of CLS needs a synthesis, the history of Finnish and Scandinavian critical 
legal scholarship needs a complete reconstruction.     
   As to the question of the historical analysis, my purposes are twofold. Regarding 
the United States, I will analyze and evaluate the previous studies on the history of CLS 
in order to sort out whether they can be considered plausible. With respect to the Nordic 
Countries, on the other hand, I will conduct an authentic historical reconstruction and 
compare it to the analysis of CLS. The vast amount of literature on CLS seems to be 
based more on the personal intuition of the authors than a historical interpretation of the 
sources, and, furthermore, the writers always stress one factor over the others in ex-
plaining the rise of the movement. I, on the other hand, will conduct an extensive analy-
sis of the original literature in order to provide a historical interpretation. I will also 
show that the best way to understand critical legal scholarship is to see it as a cultural 
movement, and not to reduce it to one single factor. It is one thing to have an opinion 
about something, whether based on personal experience or intuition, but quite another to 
conduct thorough and authentic research on it. The same applies to the Nordic critical 
legal scholarship, but here the question is more about the fact that there are no previous 
studies. This book thus lays the foundation for historical analysis of critical scholarship. 
A purpose of this book is to examine whether the previous literature on CLS is correct 
and whether the several intuitions about the critical legal scholarship in the Nordic 
Countries actually hold true.  
   In addition, there is no comparative history between critical legal scholarship in 
the United States and Scandinavia, although there are few short articles focusing mostly 
on theoretical aspects and the scholarship of the 1980s.
97
 Therefore, I will also create a 
                                               
94 Jukka Kekkonen, Suomen oikeuskulttuurin suuri linja 1898–1998 (Helsinki: Suomalainen lakimiesyh-
distys 1998), 100–126. 
95 See Urpo Kangas (ed.), Oikeustiede Suomessa 1900─2000 (Juva: Werner Söderström Lakitieto 1998). 
See also Lars D. Eriksson, Mina Metoder, in Juha Häyhä (ed.), Minun metodini (Porvoo: Werner Söder-
ström Lakitieto 1997), 57–73; Antero Jyränki, Toiset työt, toiset metodit, in Häyhä 1997 id. at 74–89.  
96 A good one is Jaakko Husa, Oikeustieteen suuresta tieteellisyyskeskustelusta: Julkisoikeudellinen nä-
kökulma, Oikeus 1992, 367–380, which examines the various arguments on the paradigm of Finnish legal 
scholarship in 1960s and 1970s and provides a sketchy analysis for the context. The debates are also ana-
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97 Juha Pöyhönen, The Critical Legal Studies Movement ─ yhdysvaltalaista vaihtoehtoista lainoppia, 
Oikeus 1984, 90─106; Martti Koskenniemi, Superliberalismin oikeusteoriaa, Oikeus 1987, 303─307; 
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comparative history through the reconstruction of the historical development of critical 
legal scholarship in the United States, Scandinavia, and Finland in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The comparative analysis will provide fruitful insights into the nuances of and the simi-
larities and differences between the movements.    
   The historiography of the 1960s has been placed under revision in the twenty-first 
century. Various studies have, for instance, pointed out that the civil rights movements 
were not systematic strategies aiming at civil rights and that there were activists outside 
the major organizations.
98
 Regarding the New Left, the revision argues that the radical-
ism of the 1960s should not be reduced to the New Left because the protest movement 
was diversified and broad phenomenon consisting of various groups.
99
 In a certain 
sense, this study is also a revision, because the point is to show that even if the 1960s 
was a major break from the tradition, it did not come out of nothing but was rather a 
culmination of a long process after the war. The dynamics of change intensified consid-
erably in the 1960s. Critical legal scholarship arose out of a long process in which the 
1960s and 1970s were the most significant decades, and it too was a diversified phe-
nomenon. For example, CLS radicalized the previous critical notions partly because 
civil rights activism was frustrated, the critical scientific consciousness increased, and 
the scholars wanted to create a new critical legal theory.     
   A further problem confronting any study focusing on relatively recent occurrences 
is that of distance. The 1960s was relatively short time ago, and it is therefore not easy 
to find the right distance from the subject. Moreover, there are people among us who 
experienced those times. The history of the critical legal scholarship of the 1960s and 
1970s is largely written by people with personal experience of the issue, and who will 
often be skeptical about the re-interpretations of that decade.
100
 In aiming at a historical 
reconstruction, one has to bear in mind the brief time that has elapsed since the 1960s, 
the presence of the people who made the decade, and the presence of the ideas emanat-
ing from those days. It is easy to glorify the sixties as a golden age in which the young 
challenged the establishment and created the modern world, but it is just as easy to pic-
ture the radicalism as a pointless rebellion of privileged youngsters with nothing better 
to do than to rebel just for the sake of it.
101
 The sixties were a complex decade and it 
should be treated neither with nostalgia nor the criticism of hindsight. Only a compre-
hensive analysis that includes a variety of perspectives will do justice to the subject. By 
                                                                                                                                         
Kaarlo Tuori, Vaihtoehto vai kritiikki, suppea vai laajennettu doktriini? in Ari Hirvonen & Kaarlo Tuori 
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situating critical legal scholarship within a detailed and comprehensive historical analy-
sis, we can obtain a historical perception of it and understand it in a proper context. 
Even if I do not examine its theoretical merits, the historical reconstruction will provide 
a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the critical legal scholarship in its early 
phase and help us to comprehend the underpinnings and purposes of the critical theo-
ry.
102
  
   The hypotheses of this book are as follows. Critical legal scholarship of the 1960s 
and 1970s is best understood as a cultural phenomenon that comprehends all of the as-
pects of the time. It should not be reduced to a single factor, such as political activism, 
scholarly renewal, or academic radicalism. Critical legal scholarship was all of these 
combined, a cultural phenomenon that drew all these elements in, the most important 
factor being different for every scholar. The epistemological difference between the 
traditional view and the critical view was, however, the one aspect that covered all the 
others and was common to all scholars. The basic premises of critical legal scholarship 
were the same in the United States as in the Nordic Countries, but the differences in 
theories and argumentation varied depending on the local social, political, and scholarly 
circumstances. The approaches to legal problems were nonetheless the same.  
   Common aspects in all of the countries studied here were the rise of leftist thought, 
the focus on the rights of the citizen, criticism of the social and economic order, the ex-
pansion of the methods of legal scholarship, the social and political orientation of schol-
arship, and the division of the academy into the traditional and the critical blocs. All 
these were apparent in the rise of the critical legal scholarship of the 1960s. At the be-
ginning, critical legal scholarship was socially oriented jurisprudence that endeavored to 
reveal social problems and provide arguments for reform. Later it transformed into a 
philosophical criticism of legal scholarship, law, and society. The political aspect, the 
pursuit of change in society, never vanished, always remaining in the deep structures of 
the critical scholarship.  
   The biggest differences were that the critical legal scholarship of the 1970s in the 
United States kept most distance from the sociological jurisprudence of the 1960s and 
turned more toward a philosophical criticism of doctrine. In the Nordic Countries, crit i-
cal legal scholarship remained closer to sociological and empirical jurisprudence than in 
the United States, even if there also the 1970s marked a turn toward a more theoretical 
                                               
102 Although this is not a book on legal theory, the historical analysis will also illuminate the theoretical 
aspects and thus help to understand the theory of critical jurisprudence. This is also needed since beyond 
the experts on legal theory, the general image of CLS in Finland seems to be somewhat simplified. See, 
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Oy ─ Lakimiesliiton kustannus 1997). The book is the most comprehensive analysis of CLS in Finnish 
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ment, merely repeating what have been said in other studies and lacking an original perspective. A Finn-
ish reader may thus begin with this but is advised to look for further studies as well. My book will hope-
fully encourage more Finnish scholars to familiarize themselves with the original literature of CLS in 
order to understand it as an alternative theory of law. On the other hand, critical legal scholarship in the 
Nordic Countries lacks a systematic presentation, and my historical account will provide a useful insight 
into the theory as well.    
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criticism of law. And during the 1970s, scholars began more explicitly to explore the 
possibilities of Marxism in legal scholarship. Sociology of law eventually diverged into 
an individual discipline. The critical legal scholarship in Finland was closest to political 
radicalism. 
6 The structure of the study 
 
The time frame of this study is from the mid-1960s till the end of the 1970s. I will not 
examine the critical legal scholarship that preceded the radical scholarship emerging in 
the latter part of the 1960s or the development of critical and alternative legal scholar-
ship in the 1980s in any detail. A study that dealt with the alternative legal scholarship 
of the United States, Finland, and Scandinavia from the end of the Second World War 
to the beginning of the twenty-first century would require volumes. Thus, in order to 
keep the book a tolerable length I will have to be strict with the time exclusions.      
   The structure of the study is as follows. Before going into the actual study, I shall 
take a short and sketchy look at the history of legal thought in the United States and the 
Nordic Countries because an understanding of this helps the analysis. I shall also take a 
quick look at the social, cultural, and scientific development of the postwar world in 
order to understand the historical context of the development of critical legal scholar-
ship. In chapters three, four, and five, the main chapters of the book, I shall reconstruct 
the development of critical legal scholarship in the United States, Scandinavia, and Fin-
land respectively. The three main chapters are rather individual because this is the easi-
est way for the reader to understand the history of the movements. The chapters can also 
be used separately as guides to the histories of the critical movements in these countries.    
   First, in chapter three, I will examine the history of CLS, exploring the social and 
legal turbulence of the 1960s and analyzing the law school context in which the critical 
mood was developed. We shall see how students unsatisfied with legal education, grow-
ing up in a culturally, scientifically, and socially unstable atmosphere, adopted an alter-
native perspective on law and, by applying various theories, elaborated a critical view 
that eventually came to be known as the critical legal studies movement. The movement 
radicalized the preceding criticism, established a distance from the empirical underpin-
nings of alternative legal scholarship, and developed into a complete philosophical crit i-
cism of law.     
   The examination of the history of CLS and the analysis of the literature on the sub-
ject will function as a basis for the historical reconstruction of critical legal scholarship 
in the Nordic Countries. Thus, after reviewing its history, I will examine the critical 
legal scholarship in the Nordic Countries. In chapter four, I will examine the develop-
ment of Scandinavian critical legal scholarship. We shall see that the postwar legal 
world inherited a methodological eclecticism and a sociological view of legal scholar-
ship, and that these were blended with a new sociological approach that was very influ-
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ential in criminology. The 1960s thus witnessed a rise in sociology of law, critical crim-
inology, and eventually critical legal scholarship, which developed into Marxist legal 
scholarship in the 1970s. Chapter four is less detailed and more general than chapters 
three and five.  
   Third, in chapter five, I explore the development of the Finnish critical legal 
scholarship. We will see that Finnish legal scholarship in general was more traditional 
and less realist than in Scandinavia, but alternative views became more common in the 
1960s. Hence, Finland in the late 1960s witnessed a radical attack on the traditional le-
gal scholarship, an attack that was more radical than in the other countries at the same 
time. In Finland, too, sociological jurisprudence and critical criminology in particular, 
as well as a critical discourse on the purposes and functions of legal scholarship and 
education emerged in the 1960s. In the 1970s, the theoretical basis of critical scholar-
ship became refined and the critical movement took more organized forms. By the end 
of the decade, however, the radical tone of the criticism was attenuated.    
   Fourth and finally, chapter six will compare the development of critical legal 
scholarship of the countries concerned and summarize and conclude the study. The 
comparative analysis is rather general and abstract, but it provides productive insights 
into the “essence” of critical legal scholarship, which the theoretical aspect will also 
illuminate. It will be shown below that critical legal scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s 
was a complex phenomenon consisting of social, political, cultural, scientific, academic, 
and legal factors; it was an effort of scholars realizing themselves, their scholarship, and 
their position within it at the intersection between these fields, and doing their best to 
achieve something in life. Critical legal scholarship was therefore not simply a reflec-
tion of the social changes of the sixties but also a philosophical and cultural movement 
and a form of academic criticism and antagonism. Some scholars later gave up the crit i-
cal enterprise whereas others continued, the reasons for this being just as diversified as 
the reasons for adopting the critical attitude in the first place. The end of the story, how-
ever, goes beyond the scope of this book and will not be dealt with in any detail. Never-
theless, there was no “rise and fall” of critical legal scholarship, even if it lost much o f 
its popularity in the eighties and nineties, earlier in Scandinavia than in the United 
States. Many of the themes of the critical legal scholarship have continued to our time, 
even if not on a major scale. In a sense, critical legal scholarship became domesticated 
and absorbed into the traditional scholarship, and has become a part of the tradition.  
   The historical reconstruction aims at understanding the rise and the substance of 
critical legal scholarship without evaluating its significance. Thus, words such as re-
formist, progressive, conservative, and traditional bear no reference to any value except 
those in the eye of the beholder. Reformist and progressive simply mean that one pre-
fers change to tradition and, accordingly, to call someone traditional or conservative 
refers only to the preference for tradition, nothing more. Nevertheless, since books do 
belong to the reader as much as they belong to the author, the pages that follow are also 
meant to provoke, stimulate the reader to think and, despite whether he or she agrees or 
disagrees with them, to encourage a search for the truth. As to whether the “truth” is an 
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objective or rather a socially constructed concept
103
 is not a concern of this study. In 
order to do justice to the subject, however, one has to aim at the truth. 
                                               
103 On the problem of “truth” as an objective concept or something relating to power, see Michel Fou-
cault, Truth and Power, 67–75, in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (New York: Vintage Books 
2010), 51–75. 
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II Background 
1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter we shall take a look at the historical origins of the critical legal scholar-
ship of the 1960s and 1970s. I will provide an outline of the development of legal 
thought and society in the United States and the Nordic Countries. As will become ob-
vious later, the critical legal scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s and the differences be-
tween the movements in the different countries have to be understood in the context of 
the history of scholarship, culture, and society. Because the critical legal scholarship of 
the 1960s originated within a historical process, we need to understand the forces of 
change in scholarship in order to understand the dynamics within which the critical 
scholars grew up and acquired their scholarly identity.   
   The chapter runs as follows. In the second section I will briefly review the history 
of American legal thought, and in the third section I shall provide an outline of the his-
tory of Scandinavian jurisprudence. In the last section, I will take a brief look at the so-
cial, cultural, and scientific currents that followed the aftermath of the Second World 
War. These years witnessed many changes, when new forms of scholarship were devel-
oped and older forms elaborated. The development of the New Left changed the politi-
cal arena, and the development of the youth culture and counter-culture changed culture 
and society. The short sections below will provide a general understanding of the con-
text of the world of the 1960s so that we can begin the more detailed account of critical 
legal scholarship.  
   The descriptions of the histories of legal thought that follow are inevitably 
sketchy, general, and rather conventional. Although there were no pendulum swings in 
legal thought,
1
 the focus will be on the changes, as well as on the general “schools”, 
even if the jurisprudential theories represented various scholars with differences in opin-
ion and approach.
2
 The characterizations of the main the trends simply help us to under-
stand the development of the legal thought. 
                                               
1 Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995), 2.   
2 N.E.H. Hull, Networks & Bricolage: A Prolegomenon to a History of Twentieth Century American 
Academic Jurisprudence, 35 American Journal of Legal History 307, 308–310 (1991). Hull points out that 
categorizing may distort our images of the theories and, furthermore, that scholars often put old ideas to 
new uses.   
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2 A history of legal thought in the United States   
 
American law originates from European law, mostly from the English common law that 
was adapted to the colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The intel-
lectual background of legal thought followed the natural law theory and enlightenment 
philosophy, which gained their most explicit expression in the revolutionary ardor of the 
late eighteenth century. The backbone of American legal thought was thus engraved in 
the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the political writings of the 
founding fathers.
3
 The early nineteenth century was a time of growing enterprise and the 
rise of capitalism, which were reflected in the changes in law. As the new republic took 
its first steps as an independent nation, the common law was Americanized and adapted 
to the new constitutional order, and the modern legal doctrines and the legal profession 
were established.
4
   
   Legal thought began to take a modern shape in the late nineteenth century. This 
was in general a time of massive economic expansion, urbanization, and labor union 
activity.
5
 It was also the time of legal formalism, which involved both the academic 
scholarly tradition of conceptualizing law and the laissez faire constitutionalism of the 
judiciary.
6
 Academic legal scholarship began in the 1870s when the dean of Harvard 
Law School, C.C. Langdell, developed the case method to suit the purposes of legal 
education.
7
 Formalism in this sense meant a scientific conception of law. Langdell’s 
purpose was to create a teaching method for academic legal education. He elaborated a 
conception of law as a scientific discipline which constructed fundamental legal princi-
ples from which neutral and logical solutions to particular cases could be derived 
through Socratic logic.
8
 The formalism of the case method instilled the modern notion 
of neutrality and rationality into American legal thought. Even if the formalists of the 
late nineteenth century did not consider law simply as a comprehensive system of ab-
                                               
3 G. Edward White, Law in American History, Volume 1: From the Colonial Years Through the Civil 
War (New York: Oxford University Press 2012), 16–108; Stephen M. Feldman, American Legal Thought 
from Premodernism to Postmodernism: An Intellectual Voyage (New York: Oxford University Press 
2000), 49–50.     
4 Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (Third Edition, New York: Touchstone 2005), 
105–249.  
5 Id. at 254.   
6 Duxbury 1995, supra n. 1 at 11. American late nineteenth-century jurisprudence has been called “for-
malism”, “classical legal thought”, “legal classicism”, and “legal orthodoxy”. (William Wiececk, The 
Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886–1937 (New York: Oxford 
University Press 1998), 3). I have decided to use the word formalism despite its negative connotations. 
On the various uses of the word “formalism”, see Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale Law Journal 
509–548 (1988). Laissez faire constitutionalism means that the courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme 
Court, invalidated legislation that constrained the liberty of private persons.   
7 Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century’s End (New York: New 
York University Press 1995), 13.    
8 Duxbury 1995, supra n. 1 at 15–25; Minda 1995, supra n. 7 at 13–16: Wiecek 1998, supra n. 6 at 79–
122; Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press 1983), 52–54; Feldman 2000, supra n. 3 at 91–94.   
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stract principles from which one could logically deduce the correct solution to every 
case in an absolutely neutral and rational way,
9
 they significantly strengthened the idea 
of legal reasoning as logic rather than rhetoric, which has since dominated American 
legal thought.   
   The formalism of the judiciary meant a rigid judicial review of the constitutionali-
ty of legislation in order to preserve the fundamental principles of the Constitution. The 
main trend was to protect the freedom, liberty, and equality of the citizen, and thus to 
minimize all kinds of redistribution. The courts also sought to maintain a strict division 
between the state powers, as well as between the federal and the state governments.
10
 
The formalist legal reasoning and the idea of the fundamental legal concepts converged 
in the laissez faire practice of the courts, abandoning instrumental reasoning and ap-
proaching legal problems as questions of fundamental principles and categories. Law 
and politics thus became detached both at the practical and the scholarly level. 
   The basis of American legal thought and scholarship was established in the late 
nineteenth century. Whether formalism originated in the desire to create an academic 
science of law,
11
 the efforts of the courts to protect and preserve the economic and polit-
ical ideals,
12
 the morals and ideologies of the legal profession,
13
 or even the ante-bellum 
slavery cases,
14
 it was a modern way to understand and teach law, providing a rational 
basis for legal reasoning that conformed to the values and ideals of society. Moreover, it 
gave a permanent characteristic to American legal thought. As Robert Stevens has not-
ed, “[t]he lasting influence of the case method was to transfer the basis of American 
legal education from substance to procedure and to make the focus of American legal 
scholarship ─ or at least legal theory ─ increasingly one of process rather than doc-
trine.”15 Case method has persisted as the dominant teaching method to our days, and it 
has molded American legal thought extensively. Whereas the modern doctrines of 
                                               
9 Brian Tamanaha has recently argued that the formalists held many realist notions. (Brian Z. Tamanaha, 
Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Priceton: Princeton University 
Press 2010).) Although many of his arguments are convincing, he seems to put too much emphasis on the 
details and forget the big picture. The formalists of the nineteenth century were not formalist in the ex-
treme sense but they did realize the fact that courts make law and legal reasoning is not purely logic. 
However, they sought to depict it in as rational terms as possible, and thus push the balance within legal 
reasoning in a more formal direction. Thus, even if Tamanaha’s book is excellent in clarifying the formal-
ist-realist divide, he seems to have a rather narrow conception of realism in focusing simply on the as-
pects of adjudication, apparently giving too much weight to details without placing them in their histori-
cal context, and he seems to have a narrow conception of “balanced realism”, because he seems to ignore 
the fact that one can be more realist or formalist in balanced realism depending on how much weight one 
puts on either the process or the substance of adjudication.       
10 Michael Les Benedict, Laissez Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Lais-
sez Faire Constitutionalism, 3 Law and History Review 293, 327–331 (1985); Matthew J. Lindsay, In 
Search of “Laissez Faire Constitutionalism”, 123 Harvard Law Review Forum 55, 70–77 (2010).  
11 Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 1–45 (1983).  
12 Benedict 1985, supra n. 10.  
13 Mark Warren Bailey, Guardians of the Moral Order: The Legal Philosophy of the Supreme Court, 
1860–1910 (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press 2004).   
14 Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University 
Press 1975).     
15 Stevens 1983, supra n. 8 at 56.  
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American law were basically created during the first part of the nineteenth century, the 
basis of modern legal thought and jurisprudence were created during the latter half.     
   As the nation grew wealthier and the working class and other non-elite groups of 
society became stronger, the old order of the previous century faced a serious threat. 
This was the beginning of the progressive era. The conflicts between the old and the 
new ways of thinking were seen in the rise of sociological jurisprudence and in the crit i-
cism of certain Supreme Court decisions that were seen to represent the unrealistic for-
malism of the nineteenth century,
16
 the most notorious decision being Lochner v. New 
York.
17
 In this case, the court invalidated a maximum hours law for bakery workers be-
cause it violated the liberty of contract and because bakery work was not considered to 
be in need of public protection. A central argument of the sociological jurisprudence of 
the early twentieth century, as articulated by Roscoe Pound, was that law was a social 
instrument and hence was to be studied and taught accordingly.
18
 Since Pound drew 
heavily on German jurisprudence,
19
 his criticism probably followed the critical thought 
of the time more than the legal reality, but it nevertheless reflected the social, political, 
and legal tensions.  
   A broader attack on the traditional legal scholarship and law emerged after the 
First World War. The 1920s produced a major economic growth. Legal scholars re-
sponded to the changed circumstances by encouraging empirical legal research, particu-
larly in the law schools of Columbia and Yale. This empirical research led to the emer-
gence of the jurisprudential school, or mood as Neil Duxbury calls it, which was to be 
known as American legal realism.
20
 Legal realism was another effort to attack the tradi-
tional paradigm and initiate a program of legal scholarship that would bring law and 
legal research closer to social reality. It was not a uniform theory, but an approach to 
law including various aspects. At the heart of realism was criticism of traditional juris-
prudence and adjudication. The realists argued that the notion of adjudication as neutral, 
rational, and apolitical was unfounded because law was political from the beginning 
and, furthermore, the biases of the judges had a considerable impact on judicial deci-
sion-making. Thus, they concluded, there was no legal certainty because rules could be 
                                               
16 G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in 
Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 Virginia Law Review 999, 1000–1012 (1972). On the jurispru-
dence and the Supreme Court in the early twentieth-century America in general, see Stephen A. Siegel, 
Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 North Carolina Law Review 1–
111 (1991); Paul Kens, The Source of a Myth: Police Powers of the States and Laissez Faire Constitu-
tionalism, 1900–1937, 35 American Journal of Legal History 70–98 (1991); Aviam Soifer, The Paradox 
of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888–1921, 5 Law and 
History Review 249–279 (1987). See also David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 Texas Law 
Review 1–64 (2003).         
17 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner is indeed one of the most controversial decisions in 
the legal history of the United States. For a synthesis and revision of the case and the scholarship on it, 
see Bernstein 2003, supra n.  16.  
18 Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 Green Bag 607–615 (1907).  
19 James E. Herget, The Influence of German Thought on American Jurisprudence, 1880–1918, 221–227, 
in Mathias Reinmann (ed.), The Reception of Continental Ideas in the Common Law World, 1820–1920 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1993), 203–228.   
20 Duxbury 1995, supra n. 1 at 79–93.  
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applied to provide conflicting results.
21
 The realists thus criticized the ideal that legal 
reasoning could produce logical conclusions from principles without being affected by 
any extra-legal factors.    
   In addition to the critical aspect, there was also a more constructive, reformist as-
pect of realism. As was the case with the critical notion, a basic tenet was also to bring 
law and society in touch with each other. The problem was not so much that law was 
political, but rather that it ought to pursue different kinds of political aims. Legal real-
ism was also a project of integrating empirical social sciences into legal scholarship to 
provide data for progressive legal reforms,
22
 and of changing legal education and its 
academic context to create lawyers as social engineers.
23
 In this respect, it followed the 
sociological jurisprudence of the early century
24
 but was more critical and a more gen-
eral movement. Realism was not simply legal criticism, but a mood, an approach to law 
that sought to strip away the myths and create an instrumental concept of law that could 
promote particular political goals. It was an enterprise of adjusting legal scholarship to 
the forms of society, the economy, and scholarship of the early twentieth century.    
   Besides realism, the inter-war era also marked a more general change in legal 
thought. Although the origins of realism were in the prosperous times of the 1920s, its 
ideas achieved new purposes with the great depression of the 1930s and in New Deal 
politics. Although the connection between realism and the New Deal is problematic and 
sporadic at best, many of the realists did find a place in the Roosevelt administration 
during the depression years.
25
 The Great Depression and its treatment required a politi-
cal conception of law that could be used as an instrument to put the wounded economy 
back on track and help the nation back to the path of prosperity. Even if the realists of 
the law schools were not the architects of the New Deal, the ideas of the new politics 
and legal scholarship coalesced.      
   Thus, the origins of the modern regulatory state and legal liberalism emerged in 
the late 1930s. The Supreme Court withdrew from the formalism of the laissez faire 
notions and began to uphold economic regulation by refraining from reviewing the pur-
poses of legislation and paying attention instead to its factual circumstances. The rea-
sons for the change of the Supreme Court may have been the political turbulence or in 
                                               
21 Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 
(New York: Oxford University Press 1992), 193–208; Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 
California Law Review 465, 477–499 (1988). Legal Realism was also influenced by German legal schol-
arship. See James E. Herget and Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the Source of 
American Legal Realism, 73 Virginia Law Review 399–455 (1987).   
22 John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (Chapel Hill: The Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press 1995).  
23 Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960 (Union New Jersey: The Law Book Exchange 
2001).  
24 This is so even if the appearance of realism is often seen in the debate between Roscoe Pound, a socio-
logical legal scholar, and Karl Llewellyn, a famous protagonist of realism (Horwitz 1992, supra n. 21 at 
170–172).  
25 Duxbury 1995, supra n. 1 at 149–158. Duxbury notes that the realists who entered the New Deal ad-
ministration did not bring their realist theories with them.  
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the changes in legal doctrine, but the change occurred nonetheless.
26
 Many noteworthy 
trends in the development of law were set in motion during the inter-war years. The 
connection between legal scholarship and the social sciences was strengthened, tradi-
tional legal education was questioned and reconsidered, the idea of formalistic legal 
reasoning was weakened, the modern conception of legal instrumentalism and the regu-
latory state were consolidated, and legal liberalism, the idea of law as a tool to organize 
society and to help the people in need, was becoming a reality.  
   Although the general line of development continued after The Second World War, 
many changes also occurred. The atrocities of the War and the fascist governments 
turned the academic mind against the extremism of realism which was accused of nihil-
ism and of being a “might makes right” ideology.27 Postwar jurisprudence sought to 
correct the extreme arguments of realism and to bring rights and liberties back to the 
center of legal thinking. Scholars began once again to stress the importance of the rule 
of law as a guarantee of rights and a free society. Essential topics for scholarship were 
rights and the processes with which they were to be protected. Whereas realism had 
emphasized the role of the legislator and the unpredictable nature of adjudication, post-
war legal thought began to stress the inalienable rights inherent in law and to define 
clear boundaries of legal reasoning.
28
 The postwar legal thought revitalized the claims 
of rationality and neutrality. There was no return to formalism, but the old ideas were 
resuscitated in the changed circumstances. The mainstream postwar legal thought simp-
ly emphasized the rationality of legal reasoning and the fact that certain rights followed 
naturally from the structure of society and the rule of law.  
3 An outline of a history of Scandinavian and Finnish legal thought 
 
The basis of Scandinavian legal scholarship was established in the nineteenth century, 
when the elements of positive science and law pushed aside the natural law theory of 
earlier times. The nineteenth century was a time of industrialization and population 
growth on the one hand, and nationalism and romanticism on the other. The old order of 
absolute monarchy was dethroned and parliamentarism and democracy began to devel-
op, and the old community of the estates was transformed into a class society. Democra-
tization and rule by the people began when economic growth helped the bourgeoisie to 
claim a strong social position and to challenge the rule of the monarchy and the nobili-
                                               
26 For two different interpretations of the constitutional change of the 1930s, see William E. Leuchten-
burg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt (New York: 
Oxford University Press 1995); Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of Con-
stitutional Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press 1998).     
27 Edward A. Purcell Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & the Problem of Value 
(Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky 1973), 159–178.    
28 Horwitz 1992, supra n. 21 at 250–252; Minda 1995, supra n. 7 at 33–36; G. Edward White, The Path of 
American Jurisprudence, 124 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1212, 1248–1249 (1976).   
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ty.
29
 Changes in the economy, society, and governance led to the liberalization of the 
economy, which created a need for a clear and predictable law.
30
 Following the trends in 
society, culture, and science, historical and pragmatic legal philosophy, particularly in 
Denmark and Norway, made its way to the center of legal scholarship in the first half of 
the century.
31
  
   Legal positivism strengthened its position in the latter half of the century. The 
times also witnessed the rise of the German-based conceptual jurisprudence, the purpose 
of which was to construct a comprehensive system of abstract legal concepts from 
which one could draw more particular rules. It emphasized coherence, systematics, log-
ic, predictability, and reason at a time when society required a rational law and the posi-
tive law became the sole legal authority. Although constructivism achieved a dominant 
position, mostly in Norway and Denmark, it was threatened by various forms of socio-
logical jurisprudence by the turn of the century.
32
 Despite variations in nation and in 
degree, conceptual jurisprudence brought an element of logic to Scandinavian legal 
thought.     
   Being a part of Sweden, fundamental elements of Finnish legal culture had their 
origins in the Swedish tradition. For instance, the strong position of the state, national 
law, and legalism were adapted to Finnish legal thought before the nineteenth century.
33
 
The tradition of legal scholarship was practically nonexistent in Finland until the late 
eighteenth century, and early legal thought followed the Swedish tradition by placing 
emphasis on national positive law with the justification of natural law.
34
 The centuries-
long unity between the countries established a strong link between their legal systems, 
which however the later events shaped.     
   Finland was annexed by Russia in 1809 which did not, however, mark any obvious 
change for law or legal scholarship because the established institutions were pre-
served.
35
 The first half of the nineteenth century was a time of slow change in Finland 
                                               
29 T.K. Derry, A History of Scandinavia: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press 1979), 220–248.  
30 Heikki Pihlajamäki & Anu Pylkkänen, Suomalainen oikeustiede eurooppalaisessa traditiossa: Luentoja 
oikeustieteen historiasta (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto 1996), 81.   
31 Lars Björne, Brytningstiden: Den nordiska rättsvetenskapens historia, Del II, 1817–1870 (Lund: Rätts-
historiskt bibliotek 1998), 31–43, 109–119, 229–348, 427–433. Swedish legal scholarship was in a poor 
condition from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the 1870s (id. at 151–159) and, since Danish 
culture had a significant position in Norwegian scholarship until the latter half of the nineteenth century 
(id. at 111), Denmark was the leading country in legal scholarship in the nineteenth century (id. at 428–
429). In addition, the stress on pragmatic and historical factors did not mean an uncritical acceptance of 
the historical school (id. at 234–241).   
32 Lars Björne, Den konstruktiva riktningen: Den nordiska rättsvetenskapens historia, Del III, 1871–1910 
(Lund: Rättshistoriskt bibliotek 2002), 208–230, 240–335, 454–460. To a certain extent, constructivism 
was in its turn a counter-reaction against the dominant traditions of the first half of the century. (Id. at 33, 
85, 456.)   
33 Pihlajamäki & Pylkkänen 1996, supra n. 30 at 2.    
34 Lars Björne (ed.), Suomalaista oikeustiedettä Caloniuksesta Zittingiin, osa I (Turku 1981), 1–2; Hannu 
Tapani Klami, A History of Finnish Legal Science: An Outline, XIX Oikeustiede ─ Jurisprudentia 125, 
137–174 (1986); Pihlajamäki & Pylkkänen 1996, supra n. 30 at 68–77.  
35 Jukka Kekkonen, Suomen oikeuskulttuurin suuri linja 1898–1998 (Helsinki: Suomalainen lakimiesyh-
distys 1998), 21. Hannu Tapani Klami has emphasized the significance of the relationship with Russia to 
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because of the lack of parliamentary activity.
36
 Legal scholarship took on a historical 
orientation by focusing on the study of the history of positive law in Sweden and Fin-
land.
37
 Social and economic development in Finland lagged that of its Scandinavian 
neighbors, but in the latter half of the nineteenth century Finland also began to industri-
alize. In 1855–1880, the economic structure of Finland was liberalized, and the growth 
of the economy and industry was set in motion.
38
  
   The latter part of the century was also significant for the development of legal 
scholarship. Finland followed the Scandinavian example and turned toward German 
conceptual jurisprudence as the basis of legal scholarship. Because of the lack of a 
strong national basis for jurisprudence, constructionism became very influential. It 
helped the legal scholars to systematize the law into a comprehensible whole that could 
be adapted to the needs of the growing industry, and it also suited the needs of science 
and scholarship.
39
 Finland had long been a relatively backward country and it remained 
so even after the reforms of the late nineteenth century. Conceptual jurisprudence, nev-
ertheless, conformed to the complex problems of industry, and suited the legalistic tra-
dition of Finland. Whereas the Scandinavian countries adopted forms of sociological 
jurisprudence in the late nineteenth century, Finland remained closer to the conceptual-
ist tradition.
40
 Because of the legalist tradition of legal scholarship, the political tensions 
with Russia, and the relative backwardness of the society, Finnish legal scholars were 
not ready to adopt sociological perspectives in legal scholarship. Thus, whereas Scandi-
navian legal scholarship moved toward pragmatism, Finnish legal scholarship main-
tained a more formalist approach.  
   Scandinavian legal scholars had paid increased attention to empirical and social 
facts in legal studies from the late nineteenth century onwards. The early twentieth cen-
tury witnessed a more extensive transformation of the methodology and basis of legal 
scholarship, when a remarkable new school of jurisprudence, which became to be 
known as Scandinavian legal realism, was developed in Sweden.
41
 The early twentieth 
century and the inter-war era were marked by the growing welfare measures in Scandi-
                                                                                                                                         
Finnish legal scholarship of the nineteenth century. (Hannu Tapani Klami, Oikeustaistelijat: Suomen 
oikeustiede Venäjän vallan aikana (Porvoo: Werner Söderström osakeyhtiö 1977); Klami 1986, supra n. 
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36 Henrik Meinander, Suomen historia: Linjat, rakenteet ja käännekohdat (Helsinki: Werner Söderström 
Osakeyhtiö 2006), 104–138.     
37 Björne 1981, supra n. 34 at 12–13; Björne 1998, supra n. 31 at 199–203.  
38 Jukka Kekkonen, Merkantilismista liberalismiin: Oikeushistoriallinen tutkimus elinkeinovapauden 
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39 Björne 2002, supra n. 32 at 169–179, 230–239; Klami 1977, supra n. 35 at 68–81; Björne 1981, supra 
n. 34 at 24–25; Klami 1986, supra n. 34 at 202–205.   
40 Klami 1977, supra n. 35 at 173–174.  
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navia.
42
 The development of Scandinavian realism responded to the needs of society as 
well as to the changes in philosophy and science.   
   Scandinavian realism was based on the early twentieth century Swedish realist 
philosophy, known as the Uppsala School, which sought to purge philosophy of meta-
physics.
43
 The purpose was to analyze reality without subjective values or inconsisten-
cies in thinking and language, and hence to analyze concepts logically in order to reveal 
their true meaning in objective reality. Realists also criticized the position of values in 
observation because values were derived from emotions and therefore had no place in 
objective reality.
44
 With the emergence of realism, Scandinavian legal scholarship dis-
tanced itself from the conceptual jurisprudence of the nineteenth century. The focus was 
shifted from the construction of concepts to the analysis of whether concepts corre-
sponded to empirical reality. This was important since otherwise, the realists argued, the 
concepts had no significance.    
   Scandinavian realism rejected natural law theories as metaphysics because there 
were no natural laws or rights. It also rejected positivist legal theories because the will 
of the legislator could not determine the meaning of law alone.
45
 Law was seen as an 
institution, as an organized man-made force to arrange social life and to influence the 
behavior of people.
46
 There was no law beyond the will of the legislator because there 
was no metaphysical reality and the will of the legislator did not create any independent 
“legal reality”. Realists stressed the fact that law was something observable from the 
behavior of the people, on which legal scholarship should focus. There was thus an in-
strumental relationship between law and society, and since law was not metaphysics, 
legal studies and arguments ought to be based on the realities of life.
47
   
   Realism bolstered the pragmatic elements of Scandinavian jurisprudence. By the 
first half of the twentieth century, there was a strong realist tradition within Scandinavi-
an legal scholarship, which Finland, however, remained mostly outside. The impact of 
realism on Finnish legal scholarship was very different than in the Scandinavian coun-
tries. There were relatively realist legal scholars in Finland in the early twentieth centu-
ry, who endorsed sociological or realist notions and criticized the conceptualist tradition 
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of legal scholarship, but their ideas received a hostile reception from the legal profes-
sion. Their influence thus remained rather insignificant at the time.
48
 The recent devel-
opments in Scandinavian legal scholarship found no firm ground in Finland, where the 
immediate influence of realism was rather in the counter-reaction it caused. Therefore, 
the Finnish jurisprudential tradition remained more conceptualist than the Scandinavian 
tradition.   
   Several reasons can be advanced for the rejection of realism in Finland in the first 
part of the twentieth century. Because of the history of Finland, there was not much 
“authentic” national legal scholarship, the tradition of Finnish legal scholarship being 
based on German tradition.
49
 Furthermore, the social history of Finland differs signifi-
cantly from that of the Scandinavian countries. In 1918, in the aftermath of independ-
ence, a civil war broke out in Finland between the working class and the bourgeoisie. 
The war ended in the defeat of the working class, and despite the few social reforms of 
the inter-war era, Finland remained largely a conservative country with a hostile attitude 
to any socialist tendencies.
50
 Realism has also been seen as an expression of the prag-
matic nature of the legal profession,
51
 and the Finnish legal profession has been less 
pragmatic than the Scandinavian ones.  
   Many factors thus distinguished Finland from other Nordic countries. Because of 
the civil war, private property was paramount and socialism was abhorred. Finland was 
also religiously more conservative than other Scandinavian countries, and the legal pro-
fession was more insensitive to the problems of the lower social classes. Therefore, real-
istic jurisprudence had no place in Finnish legal tradition before the Second World 
War.
52
 Because of the historical development of Finnish society, and the legal tradition 
and profession, realist jurisprudence and legal scholarship as social engineering were 
not adaptable. Conceptualism had a strong position in the scholarly tradition, and socio-
logical jurisprudence suited neither the Finnish society nor the legal profession. Despite 
the few efforts to change the paradigm, Finland remained mostly constructivist.   
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   The first half of the twentieth century was marked by pluralism in Scandinavian 
legal scholarship.
53
 Some scholars remained more conceptualist, whereas others adopted 
a more realistic approach. In general, however, Finland remained more formalist than 
other Nordic Countries, in which a more pragmatic and realistic orientation in legal 
studies and theory prevailed. After the Second World War, realism began to have more 
influence in Finnish legal scholarship, which began to pay more attention to the particu-
lar circumstances of practical legal problems.
54
 The Second World War, however, 
stripped all the extreme forms from society and science, and the scholarly tradition was 
headed in a more consensual direction. A couple of decades had to elapse before severe 
criticism could once again strike the tradition of law.  
4 The World the War made 
4.1 The legacy of the Second World War 
 
The world was in a confused state after the Second World War. The atrocities of the war 
and the totalitarian governments that had arisen before it forced the leaders of the allied 
nations to consider the means to prevent any recurrence of such an event. Europe was in 
ruins and in need of social and economic reconstruction. And so was the international 
community that had realized its weakness before machinery that could turn a national 
policy into a world disaster. Thus, the war and its aftermath turned out to be a signifi-
cant turning point in the history of the world.
55
  
   Not too long after the war, the economy of the Western world began to prosper. 
The United States stood out as the economic giant, while the ruined economy of Europe 
stagnated at first but began to grow in the 1950s. The Soviet Union also rose to promi-
nence with a different economic system than that of the Western World. The postwar 
economic expansion brought with it the growth of large transnational business and in-
ternational economic organizations, which transformed the economic and industrial ba-
sis of the world.
56
 Market capitalism and consumer society were about to bloom.    
   In addition to economics, internationalization involved global politics. In a need of 
a strong international organization for cooperation, the United Nations was founded to 
maintain peace and international cooperation.
57
 Europe began to structure the European 
Community in order to create close ties to the politics and economies of the European 
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great powers and to maintain peace.
58
 Internationalization and the legacy of the war 
awakened a sense of universal community and equality. The organizations established 
after the war later became important sources for international human rights, although it 
took some time before the dream came to materialize.  
   World politics also faced a serious challenge. The winning nations of the war were 
driven into the conflicting camps of the Western and Eastern parts of the world, led by 
the United States and the Soviet Union. The two super-powers had conflicting visions 
of dealing with postwar Europe. The Soviets aimed at strong control over politics and 
the economy and a socialist ideology, whereas the United States promoted democratic 
governments and an international, free-market economy and a capitalist ideology. Be-
cause of this inability to agree, Europe was divided into two blocs, with the military 
treaty organizations NATO and the Warsaw Pact as the images of the divided world. 
Thus began the Cold War and the world became divided between the liberal-capitalist 
and socialist ideologies. The nuclear threat, the emerging arms race, and the liberaliza-
tion of the colonial world only intensified the conflict that was about to have a major 
impact on world politics in the following decades.
59
   
   The Cold War and the balance of terror between the superpowers marked much of 
what happened during the postwar decades, and the events of the times were often 
dressed in ideological rhetoric following the conflict. The Cold War had its impact on 
both cultural and political issues. The United States sought to create an atmosphere 
amenable to its culture in order to prevent the spread of socialist ideology. Thus, besides 
the imperialist policies preventing the spread of communism, the American mass cul-
ture and the trend known as Americanization followed.
60
 American influences intruded 
with various aspects of social life and mass culture and consumption became essential 
elements of the Western world. 
4.2 Changes in scholarship 
 
In addition to society, politics, and the economy, philosophy, science, and scholarship 
also changed significantly. During the war, there was a mass emigration of European 
scholars to the United States, which had by then become an influential center of schol-
arship. Furthermore, during and after the war, scholars increasingly participated in han-
dling social problems, which meant new purposes for the sciences. The growing en-
couragement for cross-disciplinary research contributed to the development of research 
methods, and the social sciences began to emphasize the importance of theory and posi-
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tivism in their pursuit of dealing with reality.
61
 The times marked a reorientation of the 
social sciences, which became a major part of academic scholarship with the purpose of 
investigating social reality in order to provide data for reform.   
   Important philosophical changes also occurred. The coming of the linguistic turn 
directed the interest from reality toward language. Whereas realism had stressed that 
reality could be comprehended through empirical observations, the new direction began 
to emphasize that reality could be comprehended only through language; because there 
was no truth beyond it, the focus ought to be placed on the concepts of language instead 
of nature as such.
62
 Mere observations were not adequate because they were linguisti-
cally constructed.
63
 After the linguistic turn, the main interest of philosophy was in lan-
guage instead of nature, but the turn acquired new dimensions when it faced other de-
velopments in philosophy and scholarship.    
   A remarkable scientific development was that of anthropology. Its status before 
the War was ambiguously somewhere between archeology and ethnology, and linguis-
tics and phonology. After the war, however, the interest in primitive tribes increased.
64
 
Anthropology contributed to the understanding of differing societies and cultural rela-
tivity, and it encouraged seeing the contingency of the social order. A significant school 
was structuralist anthropology, which combined the analysis of language and cultural 
studies into a theory of structures, meaning that the notion of reality was within struc-
tures, beyond the individual reason.
65
 Structuralism became highly influential in the 
early 1960s, arguing that language was a mechanism that was its own truth. “Society 
was hence decentered from the whirl of human subjectivity and shifted to the objectivity 
of structure.”66 Structuralism pointed out that reality could not be comprehended 
through simple observation but one had to comprehend the structures of observation. 
   The image of the transformation of scholarship after the war would not be com-
plete without two further occurrences. These were the rise of Critical Theory and neo-
Marxism. It is difficult to describe briefly the Marxist scholarship that follows the theo-
ries that the German philosopher, sociologist, and historian Karl Marx
67
 developed in 
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the latter half of the nineteenth century. Roughly speaking, the essential concepts of 
Marxist theory are dialectical historical materialism, class struggle, the relation between 
the basis and the superstructure, and the relation between being and consciousness.
68
 
The central tenets of Marxism can be summarized as follows.    
   In a central position is history, which is dialectical and driven by materialist mo-
tives. Historical change follows from the conflict of opposing motives that derives from 
the materialist reality, and because materialist interests are the main motives of change, 
economic relations are the most influential motor of development. Economic develop-
ment had created the modern relations of production that had initiated the struggle be-
tween the modern social classes, namely, the owners of the means of production and the 
working class. Economics and the class struggle form the basis, the civil society, on 
which the superstructure, the state, is built. Because the role of the state is to guarantee 
the reproduction of the economy and the social order, it legitimizes the status quo by 
making it appear rational, just, and necessary. This leads to reification and false con-
sciousness, which mean that social relations appear as something other than what they 
actually are.    
   Western Marxist scholarship had been already revived in the inter-war years.
69
 
These were also the times of the emergence of the Frankfurt School following the estab-
lishment of the Institution for Social Research in 1923 in Frankfurt, often linked with 
the names of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse. Scholars work-
ing at the institute developed Marxist theories during the 1920s and 1930s but, because 
of their mostly Jewish background, their work became practically impossible after the 
Nazis came to power. This led to their emigration, eventually to the United States. Dur-
ing and after the War, the scholars of the Frankfurt School developed the Critical Theo-
ry that was based on Marxism. Essential to the theory was the abhorrence of idealism, 
closed philosophical systems, and doctrinaire research. According to the theory, there 
was no absolute truth, which was rather something that was constructed in society ac-
cording to social values and norms. Social analysis was a part of society, and a scholar 
was always conditioned by the society within which he or she worked. Thus, the critical 
element of the theory was that a scholar was to disclose and analyze the influences the 
society imposed on him, and thenceforth to critically review the influences.
70
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   Critical Theory provided a framework for scholarship to study social ideologies 
and their influence on science and scholarship. A scholar was not an outsider, a neutral 
observer of empirical facts but rather a participant in the creation of social reality. Ob-
servations were preconditioned by social values and also contributed to their creation. 
The legacy of the Frankfurt school for science was persistent skepticism towards facts 
and the adaptation of Marxism to contemporary circumstances. It was an interpretation 
of Marxism without its orthodox or communist grip, which therefore provided a useful 
basis for social criticism from various perspectives.  
   Critical Theory was, however, only a part of the wider turn in philosophy and the 
social sciences. From the 1960s onwards, there was a general reaction against positiv-
ism and the use of the methodologies of the natural sciences in social science.
71
 Scien-
tific positivism began to lose its position at the center of the social sciences, and schol-
arship such as structuralism, hermeneutics, and psychoanalysis became more popular. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, structuralism was in turn criticized for being conservative and 
more radical criticism of positivism appeared. An important development was the 
Kuhnian theory of the paradigm, which pointed out the historicism of knowledge. Vari-
ous theories began to place structuralism under a critical historical and social analysis.
72
 
The new theories helped to understand the connection between science and social de-
velopment. Although the impossibility of comprehending reality was realized earlier, 
the new critical scholarship began to analyze the construction of reality against its par-
ticular historical and social context. During the first postwar generation, scholars began 
to turn to explore the reality behind empirical reality. Knowledge was thus not only 
constructed, it was argued, but was constructed for a purpose.    
   Although the significance of the turn was not unambiguous,
73
 the feature its fol-
lowers shared was the emphasis on “the importance of the local and the contingent, a 
desire to underline the extent to which our own concepts and attitudes have been shaped 
by particular historical circumstances”.74 Thus, besides the linguistic turn there was also 
an “epistemological turn” that followed the fact that reality could not be comprehended 
as such but was constructed through the use of language which in turn was also a social 
and cultural construction. After the epistemological turn, the world was not simply to be 
observed but the observation was to be reviewed against the context.   
   In addition, Marxist scholarship was adapted to various philosophical branches.
75
 
Various forms of existentialist and structuralist Marxism emerged in France,
76
 and new 
developments in Marxism also occurred in Germany and Italy.
77
 The new epistemology 
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and Marxism proved to be a suitable combination. Marxism became a popular method 
that could be adapted to many kinds of theories, a method of criticism that could be 
used in evaluating the causes and impacts of the flaws in modern society. Scholars and 
intellectuals who were interested in the leftist agenda and the critical potential of sci-
ence advocated Marxist methods in their scholarship to meet the social and scientific 
needs.  
   The postwar years witnessed a considerable change in philosophy and scholarship. 
Society needed new kinds of engineering in the form of scholarship, which led to the 
development of the social sciences. Positivism followed the need to provide data for 
social engineering, and the cooperation between scholars in different disciplines devel-
oped the methods of scholarship further. The linguistic turn in philosophy, scholarly 
schisms, and the rising social turbulence, however, gave rise to critical views of positiv-
ism. The world was not to be taken at face value, but the limits and preconditions of 
observation were to be analyzed in search for authenticity. Following the changes in 
society, politics, and culture, the young turned toward radicalism, leftism became a 
powerful force in society, and hence Marxism became an important method in scholar-
ship. Revision of Marxism provided tools for criticizing capitalist society without how-
ever idealizing Soviet socialism. In order to fully understand the scientific change and, 
furthermore, the change in postwar society, we still need to take a look at the change in 
political ideology. 
4.3 The rise of the New Left: Intellectual and social criticism 
 
The Cold War divided the world between the liberal capitalist and socialist blocs. The 
conflict had a considerable impact on western politics as well. In the postwar Western 
Europe, communist parties became stronger than they had been before the war. In the 
United States, on the other hand, the 1950s marked the anticommunist hysteria and 
witch-hunts which significantly paralyzed radical leftist activities. However, the prob-
lem of the western left was that it sought to find a forceful opposition and alternative to 
the liberal capitalism but did not want to succumb to the socialism of the old left, the 
Soviet Union, or orthodox Marxism.  
   The New Left therefore emerged in the late 1950s. Although it was also the begin-
ning of modernization, secularization and moral liberalization, the first full decade fol-
lowing the war was a relatively conservative time and marked a general distrust of so-
cialism.
78
 What came to be known as “the New Left” arose out of the tension between 
the communist and non-communist left. Already in the late 1940s and early 1950s, in-
tellectuals in the universities of Western countries criticized the American-dominated 
liberal capitalism of the western world, while they also avoided glorifying Stalinism and 
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Soviet authoritarianism.
79
 In these times, the movements promoting peace and opposing 
nuclear weapons, as well as the civil rights struggle also began to emerge.
80
 Powerful 
impulses for the development of the new left were also the Hungarian revolt and the 
Suez Crisis of 1956, which demonstrated the imperialist tendencies of both the Western 
and Eastern super-powers and encouraged the dissenters of capitalism to find a third 
solution between the ideologies. The emergence of the New Left culminated in Great 
Britain with the founding of the New Left Review.
81
  
   The people of the Western nations, and most of all intellectuals and writers, no-
ticed the failure of the promises of the postwar society in the 1950s and the early 1960s, 
since poverty and misery persisted despite national economic prosperity. In addition, the 
growth of international big business alienated the working class from their labor and 
exposed the inequalities of social power structures. The dissatisfaction with society 
grew, and the tensions of decolonization and the fear of the nuclear disaster inflamed 
the dissent.
82
 A critical mood toward the political establishment developed all over the 
western world. The upheaval began from the peace protests and domestic dissatisfac-
tion, and the international crises intensified the antagonism. An atmosphere critical of 
the political and social order continued to grow, and the political elite became unable to 
tame the critical mood.  
   The New Left thinkers were particularly irritated by the liberal rhetoric and the 
End of Ideology debates. Conservatives presented the American society and culture as 
being the best without any real alternatives, and critical thought did not accept this. 
Thus, in his Letter to the New Left, C. Wright Mills criticized the ideological rhetoric 
that saw no alternative to the liberalism of the west and encouraged the young intelli-
gentsia around the world to fight for a utopian future. He also gave his definition to the 
terms right and left. According to him, right meant “celebrating the society as it is…”, 
while the left meant “structural criticism and reportage and theories of society…”. 
Hence, “[t]o be ‘Left’ means to connect up cultural with political criticism, and both 
with demands and programmes.”83 Leftism meant not taking society at face value but 
criticizing it from various points of view and then connecting these criticisms with 
agendas of political change. The search for reform had begun, but it had to wait for a 
more appropriate moment to finally burst out at its maximum capacity. 
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   By the beginning of the 1960s, critical leftist thought and various theories associ-
ated with it had developed.
84
 One of the most influential writers of the New Left was 
Herbert Marcuse, whose One-Dimensional Man (1964) became the image of the rebel-
lion against the liberal capitalist society.
85
 In the book, he articulated how society dic-
tated and imposed the notions of freedom and the criteria of good life on the people, and 
how the false idea of freedom had overwhelmed everyone beyond the capacity of au-
thentic thinking.
86
 Although the direct impact of the book on the social protests was not 
decisive,
87
 it nonetheless described the dissident thought and the angst about society 
well. The book painted the image of a society that had absolute values, reified reality, 
and where everyone was indoctrinated into the social consciousness. In addition, it ar-
gued that modern science was one-dimensional in the same way the people and society 
were,
88
 reflecting the critical science that was on the rise in the early 1960s. The book 
depicted the critical image of the liberal western society well. The people who were not 
willing to adapt to society felt alienated and were thus urged to find another possibility 
that could guarantee the potential for real freedom and personal authenticity. The crit i-
cal mood was present in the first part of the 1960s but the most radical events were yet 
to come. 
4.4 1968: “The Year that Rocked the World” 
 
The sixties were indeed a transformative decade in many ways. The rising counter-
culture and the critical atmosphere toward the authorities and social order that had 
emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War reached their zenith in 1968. After 
the postwar economic growth and the baby-boom, the sixties were times of economic 
prosperity, but they were also times of struggles against the dominance of capitalism 
and for civil rights. Despite the great expectations, western societies had not succeeded 
in establishing a truly equal and free society. The sixties were also times of the youth 
and alternative culture. Rock music, free love, drugs, and rebellion against authority 
were parts of the new culture of the young that the conservatives abhorred. Literature 
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like Beat and existentialism represented the yearning for authenticity and alienation of 
the society. The resistance was cultural, intellectual, and political.
89
  
   The year 1968 was the culmination of the rising turbulence. The decade was 
marked by the conflicts beginning with the Cuban revolution, but no event raised such a 
general protest movement as the Vietnam War, which provided the final spark for the 
radical protests of the late 1960s.
90
 The War symbolized the capitalist oppression of the 
poor and the imperialism of the American hegemony, and the media disseminated the 
images of U.S. planes bombing the fields of Vietnam and the sufferings the war caused.  
   In 1968, violent and massive protests occurred not only in the United States and 
Western Europe, but also in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, Brazil, and 
Mexico. In addition to the Vietnam War, the protests also concerned domestic and aca-
demic affairs.
91
 The protest movement was worldwide and involved the dominant ide-
ology. As an American New Left activist and a future critical legal scholar, Karl Klare 
noted, the New Left struggle in the Western world emerged “as a resistance to ad-
vanced, welfare-state capitalism, and in Eastern Europe as a revolt against bureaucratic 
and authoritarian regimes.”92 The Soviet suppression of Prague in August, 1968, turned 
the radical youth more against the socialist imperialism. What began as mostly student 
rebellion at the universities turned into widespread protest against the society, the most 
radical example being France, where a nationwide strike was initiated to support the 
protests.
93
 The turbulent 1960s came to a violent end in 1968. The youth rebellion re-
flected the serious dissatisfaction with social politics and the hatred of imperialism and 
warfare. The dominant ideologies in both capitalist and socialist countries were chal-
lenged and the social consciousness was not what it had been for the previous couple of 
decades.  
   It goes beyond the scope of this study to contemplate the reasons of the rebellions 
of the 1960s, but some suggestions can be made. Historians have stressed the signifi-
cance of the large generation that abandoned its respect for traditional authorities, the 
war in Vietnam and the nuclear confrontation, the strengthening civil rights movement 
and the recognition of the other side of the society, and the media that brought the vi-
sions of miseries and the actions of the rebels to the eyes of the whole world.
94
 The uni-
versity is also important, because the student population grew rapidly from the late fif-
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York: Basic Books 1072), 3–33. On the dissenter culture of the 1960s in Russia and China, see Suri 2003, 
supra n. 81 at 105–121.  
93 Kurlansky 2004, supra n. 91 at 218–237, 290–305.  
94 Isserman 1987, supra n. 80 at xvii; Kurlansky 2004, supra n. 91 at xviii; Suri 2003, supra n. 82 at 164.  
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ties onwards and because it was the students in particular who rebelled. Higher educa-
tion institutions were places where critical notions were introduced to young people, 
and where a large number of them could communicate and organize groups.
95
 Universi-
ties provided a fertile ground for radicalism to grow. Young people of the sixties read 
critical literature, talked with each other, and formed groups. Thus, the radical spirit was 
further cultivated in the universities.   
   The radicalism and the student rebellion of the 1960s were not simply cultural but 
also political events.
96
 They were complex phenomena arising out of the social, politi-
cal, cultural, and scientific changes in the postwar world, converging with the events of 
the period as well as with the large generational cohort and student population, which 
contributed to the scale of the radicalism and protests.
97
 1968 was the culmination of a 
long process, a point where the radicals had simply had enough and resorted to action. 
By idolizing rebels like Che Guevara, people not pleased with the contemporary society 
felt like freedom fighters rebelling against an unjust system. Whatever caused the un-
rest, the period produced a remarkable gulf between the old and the new generation, a 
gulf that caused a huge difference in the perception of the world between the traditional 
and the alternative cultures, a gulf that was not simply about age, but rather about world 
view and orientation toward life and society.  As a consequence of the changes in socie-
ty, culture, politics, and scholarship, the three decades after the Second World War pro-
duced two opposing perspectives on the world.    
   The sixties ended with a ray of hope when the pictures of the earth taken from 
space were shown through a satellite to the whole world.
98
 The decade had raised many 
hopes and left a troubled legacy. Student radicalism dissolved around the change of the 
decade from 1960–1970, but its political, social, cultural, and intellectual commitments 
survived in the forms of social and political activism.
99
 Otherwise, the following dec-
ades meant a slight but steady return toward a more conservative politics.
100
 With re-
spect to legal scholarship, too, critical scholarship blossomed in the 1970s. The follow-
ing chapters deal with the evolution of critical legal scholarship in the United States, 
Scandinavia, and Finland. The year 1968 is a beacon for the study. I shall concentrate 
on the years that preceded it and then continue through the years that followed.
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III Alternative and critical legal scholarship in the United 
States, 1965–1980 
1 American society in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
The United States entered the 1960s as the most powerful nation in the world. The 
postwar baby-boom and economic growth had produced considerable wealth and pros-
perity for the nation, whose infrastructure had escaped the devastation of the war. Alt-
hough the economic expansion was slowing in the 1960s, the decade was marked by 
prosperous big business and profits, general increase in wealth, and urbanization and 
sub-urbanization. Mass culture developed as more and more people had the opportunity 
for mass consumption and the general living and working conditions were improved. 
Increasing crime rates, juvenile delinquency, unemployment, and inequalities in distri-
bution of wealth were, however, the downsides of this development.
1
      
   Foreign affairs were more problematic from the outset. The Cold War emerged as 
a legacy of the Second World War, disrupting the foreign politics and the ideological 
atmosphere of the United States.
2
 The red scare and the anticommunism that followed 
tamed any leftist tendencies and produced a more conservative atmosphere.
3
 The Cuban 
revolution produced a communist regime near the American border, and the missile 
crisis drove the world close to a nuclear war.
4
 The crisis was a terrible reminder of the 
potential for super-power conflict exacerbated by nuclear weapons. In addition, interna-
tional conflicts arising out of the ideological schism occurred further from the borders. 
The Korean War troubled Asian affairs in the fifties,
5
 but the sixties brought the Vi-
etnam War that had remarkable political effects across the entire western world. The 
war had begun in the decolonization after the Second World War with the United States 
supporting the French troops in their former colony in the struggle against the North 
Vietnamese communist regime.
6
 The United States entered the war in 1964 and re-
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(London: Chatham Publishing 2000).  
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Press 1990), 1–36, 59–202.  
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1991), 91–117, 420–663; Friedman 2000, supra n. 3 at 213–214, 275–282.  
5 Patterson 1996, supra n. 1 at 208–242.  
6 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books 1984), 135–239; George C. Herring, 
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mained in the field till the mid-1970s.
7
 The war became the most hated war in history 
and an image of the 1960s, when mass protests against American participation were 
held world-wide.
8
 The War was an image of capitalist oppression and a reminder of the 
imperialist past of the western world, and the expansion of the media brought the imag-
es of the war home so that everyone could watch the massacres.  
   On the home front, poverty and racism were especially pressing problems.
9
 The 
war on poverty was initiated in the 1960s to bridge the gap between the rich and the 
poor, and many legislative and social welfare measures were enacted aiming to improve 
the conditions of the poor.
10
 African Americans, on the other hand, had struggled 
against inequality and discrimination at least since the beginning of the century.
11
 Their 
social status had improved somewhat since the war but the situation was still bad in the 
fifties.
12
 The United States Supreme Court invalidated racial segregation in 1954
13
 and 
raised hopes for a better future, but the situation did not improve as expected. In protest-
ing against discrimination, African Americans became pioneers in the civil rights strug-
gles. The peaceful protests of the 1950s and early 1960s became more violent as the 
situation persisted.
14
 The federal government sought to improve the situation with civil 
                                               
7 Karnow 1984, supra n. 6 at 365–426. The Tonkin incident, in which the United States accused the Viet-
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(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi 1991), 13–39. After the War, voting rights were improved, 
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rights legislation. Improvement was achieved, but the problem remained unresolved.
15
 
Social problems and the responses to them were significant aspects of the sixties. The 
war on poverty was a sign of the recognition of the “other side” of American prosperity, 
which showed that social problems at least were not ignored. Civil rights struggles and 
the policies that followed made an important contribution by pointing out the realization 
of social problems, the activism of the citizen, and the willingness of the government to 
try to correct the social evils.    
   Another important aspect was the revitalization of the American left.
16
 The left 
was, indeed, in a need of new impulses, since there had never been a strong political 
working-class coalition in the United States despite a few upward periods and strong 
labor unions,
17
 and “[t]he postwar years frustrated the American Left, which faced in-
creasingly harsh Red-baiting after 1945.”18 After the war, the left began to prosper, es-
pecially among intellectuals. Social dissenters began to criticize the fact that suburbani-
zation created circumstances which turned people into uncritical, conformist mass-
consumers without a notion of individuality
19
 and, during the late fifties, the generation 
that had grown in the anti-communist and conservative postwar society began to feel 
alienated from the traditional norms and institutions of society.
20
 These disaffected 
youth identified themselves more with the otherness of the social misfit than with the 
lifestyle of their parents and thus deviated from that lifestyle. Labor unions also did 
quite well, even if the anti-communism did tone down the leftist tendencies of the un-
ions, and the civil rights legislation of the 1960s improved the conditions of the workers 
and kept them quiescent.
21
 Since there was no strong working class left in America at 
the beginning of the 1960s, the left had to find another place to prosper.      
   The leftist tendencies were most apparent in the radicalism that emerged. The New 
Left emanated from the civil rights movement and social dissatisfaction. It was a 
movement of radical students criticizing the university administration and society. 
Campus activism had begun in the late forties and intensified in the early sixties in the 
protests against the red witch-hunts, racial discrimination, and restrictions on freedom 
of speech on the campuses.
22
 The Students for a Democratic Society organization was 
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founded in 1960, and in 1962 its members gathered in Port Huron to create a project for 
the future. Thus, the American New Left emerged, distancing itself from the Marxism 
of the old left, emphasizing participatory democracy, and trying to adapt the leftist ide-
ology to modern circumstances.
23
 The escalation of the Vietnam War only intensified 
the activism. The zenith of radicalism was reached in the siege of Chicago in August 
1968 when the leftist radicals protested at the Democratic Party convention. The pro-
tests ended up in a violent confrontation with the police.
24
  
   Besides student radicalism, women also became more aware of their oppression. 
The rising gender consciousness contributed to the legislation regarding equality be-
tween the genders, but the radical branch of feminism went further in its criticism of the 
male domination of society. Women within the New Left and civil rights movement 
were resentful because of male domination and because the radicals cared more about 
Vietnam or the civil rights of African Americans than the deprived status of women. As 
a consequence, modern radical feminism rose during the sixties.
25
 The New Left was 
mostly a movement of radical students who protested against the inequalities of the so-
ciety. It did not succeed in cooperating with the labor unions or the civil rights move-
ments because of its agenda, but it was a culmination of the protest atmosphere and cul-
tural rebellion.         
   The critical spirit of the 1960s did not last long. In general, “[t]he late sixties was a 
time of strong antibusiness sentiment in the United States,”26 and movements such as 
consumer protection and environmentalism emerged.
27
 People were dissatisfied with the 
way things were governed and dealt with, and various dissenting movements began to 
demand changes in politics. The end of the 1970s, however, meant a slow but steady 
general turn toward more conservative politics.
28
 Since the liberal reforms of the 1960s 
had not been radical, no fundamental change had occurred in spite of the many chang-
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es.
29
 Nonetheless, widespread radicalism and New Left activism came to an end in the 
early 1970s.
30
 It was also a time of an economic downturn, largely due to the Vietnam 
War and the oil crisis, and the economic recession increased unemployment and income 
disparities, encouraging labor union activity and strikes.
31
 Workers, however, never 
identified themselves with the radical left.
32
    
   The conservative turn was also reflected in the Supreme Court. The sixties had 
been the heyday of the liberal Court known as the Warren Court. School desegregation 
in 1954 was the first significant liberal decision and along with the 1960s came several 
decisions which improved the protection of civil rights and the procedural rights of the 
accused.
33
 At the early 1970s, the Court also began slowly to withdraw from its liberal 
stance. Of course, liberal decisions, such as the legalization of abortion in 1973, contin-
ued sporadically.
34
 The liberal decisions of the Warren Court were reflections of society 
that contributed to the people’s awareness of rights,35 but the rulings, and in particular 
the decisions concerning the rights of the criminal procedure, were also severely criti-
cized.
36
 Nevertheless, the Court both reflected the social atmosphere and influenced it. 
Whatever were the causes of the decisions, they reflected the liberal spirit of the 1960s 
and strengthened the citizen’s awareness of rights, but they also caused a counter-
reaction, which contributed to the decline of the liberalism.    
   Neither social, intellectual, and cultural criticism from the left, nor the liberal ac-
tivism, of course, ended in the 1970s even though the large-scale radical-liberal front 
faded. Liberalism and radicalism continued in many forms of activism in later years,
37
 
although what was known as the New Right emerged more strongly in the 1970s. The 
deeply hated Vietnam War ended in 1973, and the Watergate scandal produced a wide-
spread distrust of public authorities. People were still struggling for their rights but ma-
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jor protests were rare. The cold war also thawed in the 1970s, and although the conflict 
continued, the all-encompassing ideological tension became more moderate.
38
    
   The sixties had a significant impact in academia and intellectual life, which was 
seen in the 1970s. Critical thought in American academia was rare before the 1960s. 
The academic counter-culture of the sixties rebelled against traditional values and 
sought to create a new, critical intellectual establishment,
39
 but it was not until the 
1970s that a broad critical tradition emerged. For instance, Marxism made its way into 
American scholarship in the 1960s, but it was widely contested and was often a disad-
vantage in academic competition. In the 1970s, however, Marxism became a more 
common form of critical scholarship.
40
 The New Left found a new home in academia 
and adopted neo-Marxism as its method of criticism.
41
 The rise of Marxist scholarship 
also encouraged conflicts within the universities, which became divided. The gap be-
tween the liberals and the conservatives that was so immense within society also be-
came marked within the universities, as the scholars who identified themselves with the 
radicals sought to create new theories and fields of research to criticize and surpass the 
academic tradition.      
   The two decades of the 1960s and 1970s were remarkable, indeed. The United 
States experienced a revival of its left after the politically conservative period of the 
fifties, but the radicalism faded slowly at the end of the decade. The war raged for over 
a decade in Asia, and it was hated around the globe and ignited unexampled protests 
everywhere. Liberalization of society had begun in the fifties and continued at an accel-
erating scale in the 1960s, but at the beginning of the seventies, the problems of the 
poor and the minorities persisted. Although social radicalism faded, critical scholarship 
of the 1960s and the 1970s continued the radical project in the universities. Neverthe-
less, radicalism was a counter-culture, even if it became more popular and influential. 
The majority were not campus radicals, leftists, or social critics and, moreover, the ma-
jority supported the Vietnam War till the late 1960s and voted for Nixon in 1968. Thus, 
despite the fact that the 1960s did change society considerably, the liberal and pro-
social-justice tendencies were currents of criticism.    
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2 Alternative legal scholarship and critical lawyers of the 1960s       
2.1 Introduction  
 
In this section I will analyze some currents of alternative legal scholarship of the 1960s 
and 1970s in order to reconstruct the context in which the Critical Legal Studies move-
ment (CLS) emerged, and to bridge the gap between legal realism and CLS. As we saw, 
realism lost much of its prestige in the postwar years, but this does not mean that there 
was no alternative legal scholarship before the 1970s. I will demonstrate that there was 
no unanimity on legal thought, and that alternative legal scholarship emerged as a coun-
ter force to the tradition that remained mostly doctrinal and emphasized rationality and 
neutrality. However, the alternative jurisprudential movements of the 1960s only rarely 
challenged the basis of law or legal scholarship, or society.  
   The field of jurisprudence was far from simple in the 1960s. I will examine this 
complex situation in the following sections. First, I shall examine the nature of the legal 
thought of the 1960s. As will be shown, there was mainstream thought, but there was 
also serious disagreement regarding it. Second, I will briefly explore the alternative le-
gal scholarship. The “schools” of jurisprudence analyzed here are political jurispru-
dence, law and development, and law and society respectively, which reflected the intel-
lectual and social changes of the postwar decades. Political jurisprudence was a diversi-
fied and nuanced movement which applied political and behavioral sciences to legal 
research. The law and development movement related to the development mission in the 
third world and investigated law in different cultures, thus contributing to the cultural 
and structural understanding of law. The law and society movement focused on law in 
its social context and was important in the development of interdisciplinary and socio-
logical jurisprudence. These movements encouraged legal studies beyond doctrinal 
analysis with the application of social sciences. They also developed a social theory of 
law that could bridge the gap between law in books and law in action. In a certain sense, 
they paved the way to a more critical legal scholarship, and the last two particularly had 
a more or less direct relationship with it. Furthermore, in the last sub-section I will point 
out that some lawyers of the 1960s also adopted critical and even radical perspectives 
on their profession. In general, then, there was a widespread dissatisfaction within the 
legal profession with the tradition and various alternative ways to practice the profes-
sion were sought. The movements dealt with below were of course much more diversi-
fied and nuanced than the descriptions indicate, but my purpose is to analyze the general 
situation.  
   In addition to examining the main currents of alternative legal scholarship, I will 
clarify the context of the development of CLS. I will demonstrate that the radical critical 
legal scholarship grew up amid a legal crisis, but efforts to alter the fundamental basis 
of the profession were rare. I will show that many of the realist insights survived the 
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postwar retreat from extreme realism, and that the state of legal scholarship was compli-
cated and far from formalist. CLS developed in a kind of consensus in which the realist 
notions were domesticated and where radical notions of law were largely neglected.  
2.2 Neutral principles and the dynamics of legal reasoning: A prelude to criticism 
 
American jurisprudence needed revitalization after the Second World War. Realism had 
dethroned classical legal thought in the inter-war years, but after the war realism was in 
a crisis. The postwar era witnessed a revival of reasoned theory on judicial decision-
making and, during the 1950s, jurisprudence known as the process theory, or reasoned 
elaboration, arose. This theory stressed the rationality of the legal process and the fact 
that judicial decisions ought to be reasonably elaborated in order to guarantee just out-
comes and the maintenance of the rule of law.
42
 At the heart of reasoned elaboration 
was the process through which judicial decisions were reached. Its essential elements 
were principled and reasoned decision-making, judicial restraint, technical and profes-
sional abilities in reasoning, and an emphasis on strict separation of state powers, but it 
nevertheless encouraged the interpretation of law in context.
43
  
   Besides meeting the social and jurisprudential challenges, reasoned elaboration 
was also a response to the liberalism of the postwar Supreme Court. A problem of legal 
scholars was that the decisions appeared morally just but “jurisprudentially unsatisfacto-
ry.”44 Thus, an important task was to define rational boundaries for judicial review. In 
1958, Learned Hand published his lectures on constitutional adjudication in which he 
endorsed strict judicial restraint and argued that the courts should not intervene in the 
business of the legislator.
45
 In a response that was to become the best-known expression 
of reasoned elaboration, Herbert Wechsler developed his theory of neutral principles 
that permitted judicial review if it occurred according to neutral reasoning and an analy-
sis of constitutional law that would transcend contemplation on the results of the deci-
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sion.
46
 The purpose of neutral principles was to base judicial decision-making on ration-
al grounds so that decisions would appear neutral and objective without the personal 
input of the judge.  
   Wechsler’s article was followed by an intense debate.47 While many scholars ac-
cepted the theory to a certain extent,
48
 many also criticized it. Among the fiercest critics 
were Arthur Miller and Ronald Howell, who argued that neutral principles were a tradi-
tional way to mask the arbitrary nature of judicial decision-making, which was always 
affected by values and considerations on the result. Therefore they endorsed a teleologi-
cal jurisprudence that would focus on the results rather than doctrine because it was 
“more useful to search for the values that can be furthered by the judicial process than 
for allegedly neutral or impersonal principles which operate within that process.”49 Mil-
ler and Howell represented the post-realist jurisprudence that paid attention to the policy 
implications of law.
50
 They did not like the formalist tone of neutral principles that ne-
glected the aspects of policy under legal adjudication. Whereas Wechsler was arguing 
for the rationality of principle and doctrine, his realist critics were denying the possibil-
ity of neutrality of principle and arguing for the rationality of policy and consequence.   
   The controversy over neutral principles reflected the conflicting views of adjudica-
tion the legal scholars espoused in the early 1960s. Those who criticized the concept of 
                                               
46 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harvard Law Review 1–35 
(1959). Anthony Sebok has argued that Wechsler’s theory was a conservative interpretation of reasoned 
elaboration and has thus given a conservative character to the whole theory. Moreover, the theory of 
Wechsler gained the attention it did because of its critical review of the civil rights decisions. (Sebok 
1998, supra n. 42 at 180, 183. See also Duxbury 1995, supra n. 42 at 267–268.) The creative and under-
standing aspect was thus more pronounced in process theory than in neutral principles, but it is difficult to 
define every detail of the theory. (For differences in interpretation of the theory, see, e.g., Wells 1991 
supra n. 43 at 627–628, 641–642, and compare to Fallon 1994, supra n. 43 at 973 n. 85, n. 86.)   
47 Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 Vanderbilt Law Review 503, 507–530 (1997); 
Sebok 1998, supra n. 42 at 179–199  
48 Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 5 (1960); Henry M. Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 
Harvard Law Review 84, 99, 125 (1959); Erwin N. Griswold, Of Time and Attitudes ─ Professor Hart 
and Judge Arnold, 74 Harvard Law Review 81, 88 (1961); Louis Henkin, Some Reflections on Current 
Constitutional Controversy, 109 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 637, 652–655 (1961). Pollak, 
for instance, accepted that decisions ought to be based on neutral principles but disagreed as to whether 
the civil rights decisions Wechsler criticized were incompatible with the idea. (Pollak 1960, id. at 2, 5.) 
Later, however, Pollak turned to criticize the concept of neutral principles. (Louis H. Pollak, Constitu-
tional Adjudication: Relative or Absolute Neutrality, 11 Journal of Public Law 48, 61 (1962).) Wechsler 
did not criticize the decisions but the way they were reasoned. Henkin, too, argued that the civil rights 
cases were, in fact, neutrally reasoned. (Henkin 1961, id. at 653–654.) Hart and Griswold were writing 
about constitutional adjudication in general and both called for rational and neutral decision-making, 
while only Hart referred to Wechsler’s article.     
49 Arthur S. Miller and Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 
University of Chicago Law Review 661, 661–664, 671–672, 684, 690–693 (1961), quotation at 661. Pur-
posive jurisprudence was not “a device to provide the answers to a given set of circumstances. Rather, it 
is a method ─ a mode of inquiry, a way to approach constitutional questions.” (Id. at 693.) It is interesting 
that in Sweden, Ekelöf was also developing a teleological jurisprudence in the early 1950s.  
50 See Harold D. Lasswell, and Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional 
Training in the Public Interest, 52 Yale Law Journal 203–295 (1943). Miller and Howell wrote that they 
were influenced by McDougal’s literature. (Miller and Howell 1961, supra n. 49 at 663, 690–692.)   
54 
 
neutral principles argued that the theory either ignored the social effects of law
51
 or 
could not take into account the complex context of judicial decision-making.
52
 They 
noted that legal cases sometimes involved such important civil rights problems that they 
required contemplation on values and policies and could not be left to simple logic,
53
 
and that principled decision-making was not effective in protecting constitutional 
rights.
54
 The old realist Charles Clarke and David Trubek, a contemporary sociological 
legal scholar, argued that blind faith in neutrality mystified judicial decision-making 
and stabilized it into a conservative force. Therefore, in order to make law evolve ac-
cording to social change, the judges should openly contemplate values and policies.
55
 
Scholars more favorable toward the idea of neutral principles argued that since judicial 
decision-making was supposed to be strictly principled and restrained in order to avoid 
arbitrary decisions,
56
 principled decision-making was the only way to guarantee the le-
gitimacy of the courts.
57
 The disagreement as to the nature of the judicial process was 
evident. The critics of neutral principles thought that contemplation on the factual social 
circumstances guaranteed that decisions would be socially just, whereas those who fa-
vored principled decision-making opined that law dictated what was just and the med-
dling of the courts could only produce arbitrary decisions.    
   The debate also reflected scholarly views on constitutional decision-making. If the 
Supreme Court was viewed, as Martin Shapiro did, “as part of the American political 
process, rather than as a unique body of impervious legal technicians above and beyond 
the political struggle,”58 then judicial decision-making ought to be understood in its po-
litical context.
59
 As will be seen in the following sections, in the 1960s scholars began 
to develop theories of judicial decision-making that would pay due regard to its context 
to an increasing extent. Legal scholarship in general became more socially oriented. The 
debate on neutral principles pointed out that the legal profession was divided regarding 
legal reasoning and there were differing views with respect to legal theory.       
   The division between traditional scholars and scholars searching for new ap-
proaches was also obvious. The proponents of neutral principles emphasized the im-
portance of process while the critics were more concerned about the substance. The 
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question was not about the typical formalist-realist controversy. Scholars of reasoned 
elaboration were well aware of the fact that judges made law but they wanted to create 
definite boundaries for it.
60
 They sought to “incorporate legal realist intellectual sophis-
tication into the mainstream of American legal discourse while avoiding the most corro-
sive aspect of the realist message ─ that there was no analytically defensible way to 
distinguish law from politics.”61 Even Wechsler admitted that law evolved within socie-
ty, and thus Theodore Becker argued that the critics had “cast Wechsler into a tradition-
alist form, where he does not belong.”62 Reasoned elaboration was, of course, a tradi-
tional response to radical realism and an effort to underline the rational aspects of legal 
reasoning. It was neither formalism nor realism in any extreme form. Nevertheless, vir-
tually every legal scholar in the 1960s acknowledged the personal input of the judge in 
the development of law, and disagreement arose as to whether this was to be principled 
and restrained or open. There were scholars who were more realist or formalist, alt-
hough the extremes were rare.    
   In any event, process theory could be characterized as the dominant form of legal 
thought of 1950–1980.63 American jurisprudence of the 1960s was more about process 
than substance and more about reason and principle than value and policy, and at the 
end of the decade scholars were still trying to define the boundaries of legal discretion.
64
 
As noted, however, the legal profession was far from unanimous on the place of neutral-
ity and rationality in legal reasoning and, as will be noted in the following sections, the 
1960s brought various forms of alternative legal scholarship that challenged the domi-
nance of principle, doctrine, neutrality, and rationality in legal reasoning. It was, none-
theless, this context where the law students of the 1960s were educated.       
   The educational aspect is important. It is a common observation that the legal pro-
cess school and the anti-leftist atmosphere of the 1950s affected many of those who 
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studied then and later became critical scholars.
65
 Education and mainstream jurispru-
dence obviously were very conservative and this did disturb those students who yearned 
for a more critical and reformist perspective on law. The legal profession at large, how-
ever, was not unanimously traditional, more critical and realist tones already prevailing 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The leap from reasoned elaboration to critical legal 
scholarship was not straightforward, but a process which involved the evolution of so-
cial awareness as well as the jurisprudential thought. The following sections will illumi-
nate this process in more detail. 
2.3 Political jurisprudence 
 
Political jurisprudence was a movement that focused on the behavioral and political 
aspects of judicial decision-making.
66
 Although its foundations were laid in the realism 
of the early twentieth century, studies of political jurisprudence began in the late 1940s, 
increased during the 1950s and became quite popular in the 1960s.
67
 The Supreme 
Court had always been an interesting and controversial topic for American legal schol-
arship, but only by the fifties did systematic studies on Supreme Court decision-making 
from the perspectives of social and behavioral sciences and policy analysis gain solid 
ground.
68
 The new approach considered judicial decision-making in its political context 
systematically and with a theoretical basis. Even if earlier scholars acknowledged the 
connection between politics and the courts, it was not until the postwar years that this 
connection came to the forefront of the research on the judiciary.  
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   By the mid-1960s, political analysis of the courts was relatively popular and its 
methods and purposes were more specifically defined. Martin Shapiro, for instance, 
wrote that political jurisprudence was “essentially an extension of certain elements of 
sociological jurisprudence and judicial realism, combined with the substantive 
knowledge and methodology of political science.”69 A prominent scholar of behavioral 
studies on judicial decision-making, Glendon Schubert noted that the behavioral ap-
proach was interested in theoretical realistic jurisprudence and empirical fact gathering, 
combining these in a scientific manner.
70
 Political jurisprudence was a mixture of socio-
logical jurisprudence, realism, and new social and behavioral sciences. It thus sought to 
revise old themes in a modern context. 
   Besides scholarly innovations, political jurisprudence was also a critical enterprise 
against the establishment. Shapiro wrote that political jurisprudence represented “a re-
volt against the traditional approach to the Supreme Court through the study of history 
and Constitutional law”71, although Schubert noted that “[t]here is nothing novel in the 
idea that the decisions of judges on questions of public policy are strongly influenced by 
their personal beliefs.”72 Even if the profession at large acknowledged that judicial deci-
sion-making was also influenced by other sources than law, the approach was not unan-
imously accepted, at least not at face value. The critics of the behaviorist approach ar-
gued that it drew unconvincing generalizations on judicial decisions and downplayed 
the role of law.
73
 Political jurisprudence sought to bring to the forefront of research the 
notion of political influence on law. The legal profession was aware of this notion but 
did not want to stress it. Legal scholars were balancing between more and less realist 
views on legal reasoning and political and social scientists were eager to promote alter-
native views on legal scholarship.      
   In the pursuit of expanding the methodologies of legal studies, various forms of 
political jurisprudence became widespread during the 1960s.
74
 Cross-disciplinary schol-
arship was making its way into legal research, which meant that legal phenomena were 
not simply examined from a legal point of view according to the traditional methods, 
but rather as parts of the society. In Justice in America,
75
 Herbert Jacob conducted a 
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political analysis of the administration of justice in America in a text-book manner, but 
instead of simply describing the system he also placed it in its social and political con-
text. Thus, the reader learned about the social and political aspects of the legal system, 
not simply about its normative function.      
   At the heart of political jurisprudence was the understanding that courts were not 
simply deciding legal conflicts. The courts were also political arenas in which one could 
pursue one’s interests and power,76 and there was no judicial objectivity because courts, 
like legislatures and executives, responded to social pressures, although indirectly and 
to a lesser degree.
77
 Therefore, judges were often analyzed on the basis of their past 
decisions by collecting quantitative data to predict their decisions,
78
 scaling them on a 
liberal-conservative axis,
79
 or analyzing their opinions as value-responses to the social 
stimuli the cases brought up.
80
 The purpose was to understand the ideological and polit-
ical values and attitudes of the judges according to how they responded to the cases. 
According to political jurisprudence, one had to go beyond the written opinions in order 
to understand judicial decisions.       
   The problems of political jurisprudence became more evident as the scholarship 
expanded. Even if it was noted that the attitudes of the judges were difficult to infer 
from the decisions, studies of political jurisprudence were regarded as useful.
81
 There 
were various approaches to judicial behavior with both benefits and problems.
82
 Judicial 
decisions were reviewed, for instance, against the social background of the judges,
83
 
according to behavior as members of groups,
84
 according to game theories,
85
 and as 
responses to certain combinations of facts.
86
 The various aspects sought to establish a 
distance from the traditional method and extend the scope of judicial research with so-
cial sciences in the background of the decisions. But legal scholars were not convinced 
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of the usefulness of the social sciences in analyzing the judicial process. The legal phi-
losopher Lon Fuller criticized these approaches, arguing that since they could not expli-
cate the motives behind the written decisions, the scholars were merely imposing their 
own views on those of the judge.
87
 For legal scholars with a traditional perspective, it 
seemed absurd to argue simply on the basis of the decisions that they were motivated by 
extra-legal factors. The difference between the legal and non-legal perspective on the 
judiciary was that the former stressed normative aspects and doctrine, whereas the latter 
stressed political and social aspects.    
   In any event, legal scholars also endeavored to understand the judicial process be-
yond doctrine. Theodore Becker, a scholar of political jurisprudence with a more legal 
perspective noted that the “legal scholar tends toward a far more normative posture than 
the political scientist-behavioralist.”88 Since Becker also had a legal education, he 
sought to combine aspects of political jurisprudence with traditional jurisprudence
89
 
because he opined that the combination was also useful for lawyers in understanding the 
judicial process.
90
 Political jurisprudence was mostly an enterprise of scholars of politi-
cal and behavioral sciences, but the cross-disciplinary approach was gaining more 
ground. When legal scholars became acquainted with the movement, they took the anal-
ysis closer to the legal perspective instead of emphasizing simply the behavioral and 
political aspects.     
   Even scholars of political science noted that political factors could not directly ex-
plain the decisions, and the scholarship itself was placed under scrutiny.
91
 Jacob wrote 
that there was no certainty regarding judicial discretion, “but when judges consistently 
favor one principle over another, it becomes clear that they are employing their own 
values and attitudes as well as their expertise.”92 According to Shapiro, courts were 
supplementary policy-makers who made policies within the context of law.
93
 Scholars 
knew that there was more to judicial decision-making than simply law, but the problem 
concerned the way the extra-legal factors and their impact was to be examined and how 
far they were to be stressed, as it did in the neutral principles debates. Traditional schol-
arship realized the problem but sought to rationalize legal reasoning as far as possible, 
whereas the alternative scholars stressed the irrational aspects.  
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   As the sixties progressed, political jurisprudence began to resemble balanced real-
ism more than the behaviorist determinism of its early phases. The scholars argued that 
since qualitative or quantitative analysis alone missed certain elementary aspects, re-
search needed both of the approaches.
94
 Furthermore, court decisions had to be exam-
ined in context,
95
 and not simply according to the stare decisis as the taught tradition 
did.
96
 In short, one was not to study what the judges ought to do but what they were 
most likely to do.
97
 Although the approaches varied,
98
 political jurisprudence aimed at 
understanding law and court decisions in the context of the society and politics within 
which they functioned. This was important during the time of social turbulence and the 
controversial court-cases, because these provided the scholars with interesting topics to 
deal with.     
   The recent controversial decisions of the Supreme Court and the public opinion on 
them increased interest in studying the context of the decisions. Scholars who tackled 
the problems argued that public opinion regarding the judiciary mattered more than the 
opinion of professionals.
99
 Studies showed relatively low confidence in the Supreme 
Court;
100
 confidence in the Court as such but disrespect for particular cases,
101
 and the 
fact that people of high social status appreciated the Court more than the lower clas-
ses.
102
 The impact of the rise of empirical and behavioral sciences was obvious in the 
studies, but so were the socioeconomic changes that increased the need to have a grass-
roots perspective on elite institutions. As the prestige of legal doctrine and principle 
diminished in the late 1960s, studies regarding elite institutions such as the Supreme 
Court began to pay more attention to the impact the institutions had on society and the 
way people understood them.        
   Reflecting the importance of social and cultural elements, as well as the interna-
tionalization of scholarship, comparative studies on judicial behavior became more 
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common in the late 1960s.
103
 Besides creating international connections and networks 
and increasing their academic credibility, scholars sought to point out that studies on 
judicial behavior were common elsewhere too and could therefore be endorsed within 
the American universities, in addition to the fact that comparative data could be used in 
legal politics. Comparative studies also reflected the rise of anthropology and cultural 
studies in political and legal scholarship. Scholars with alternative perspectives on legal 
problems became more interested in their specific meaning in an international context.  
   The expansion of the studies to the comparative field also brought up the discipli-
nary controversies. Schubert, for instance, wrote that contributions of legal sociology by 
legal scholars had not yet been noteworthy either to law or to sociology, although this 
was the case in other countries.
104
 Although legal scholars were becoming more inter-
ested in the sociology of law in the late 1960s, scholars of political and behavioral sci-
ences argued that they carried the burden of the new discipline. The stakes here were the 
scholarly schism between legal scholars and political scientists who sought to downplay 
the role of legal scholars in modern research by pointing out their lag in sociological 
studies on law and emphasizing their own success in the field.    
   As the scholarship was growing in the early 1970s, its significance to legal schol-
arship increased.
105
 The foreword of a 1973 symposium on the subject noted that 
“[u]nlike legal scholars, who have approached the judicial role from a normative per-
spective, political scientists have sought to understand the judge as a behavioral organ-
ism whose input has a discernible effect on the law.”106 Thus, it was argued, since adju-
dication was also law-making, and since there was discretion allowing various factors to 
affect the decision-making,
107
 studies on the impact of extra-legal and personal factors 
could bring new perspectives on the courts.
108
 Recent research had shown that certain 
characteristics of judges explained the variability in criminal sentencing
109
 and that the 
influence of political attitudes was an ordinary aspect of judicial discretion.
110
 Some 
judges, however, criticized political jurisprudence, arguing that it was uncertain specu-
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lation,
111
 and distorted the general image by concentrating on unanimous decisions.
112
 
Judges, of course, had a different perspective on the issue, because they were the sub-
jects of the studies and felt that their profession was being ridiculed. Although they 
were aware of the discretion of adjudication, they regarded themselves as as loyal to the 
law as possible.   
   Political jurisprudence was a cross-disciplinary, court-centered jurisprudence, and 
it reflected the conflict of the 1960s between the traditional and the alternative approach 
to legal reasoning. Its basic tenets were that the courts were political institutions serving 
particular functions in society
113
 and the presumption was that the personality of the 
judge affected the decisions.
114
 Studies on judicial roles showed that the judges differed 
in their opinions about their role as the interpreters of law. In these survey studies, some 
judges replied that they would make law when it was appropriate while others saw that 
they ought merely to interpret the law.
115
 While Becker noted that the studies had point-
ed out merely a “scant correspondence between any judicial role position and any gen-
eral political orientation,”116 studies on the political background of the judges became 
more common nonetheless, and it was argued that there was a connection between polit-
ical attitudes and judicial roles.
117
    
   Political jurisprudence rose to prominence in the late forties, gained more support 
during the fifties, and established its position among the schools of judicial research 
during the sixties. It was a part of the rise of cross-disciplinary
118
 research and the “be-
havioral revolution” that occurred in American political sciences in the 1950s and 
1960s.
119
 It focused on the behavior of judges in context, theorized it, and sought empir-
ically to verify the theories by using elements of sociology, psychology, and political 
science. The purpose was to understand the judicial process and to predict the outcome 
of legal cases by defining the theoretical framework in which the judges operated and 
made their decisions. It also responded to the controversial decisions of the Supreme 
Court and to the expanding demands of the people to participate in public affairs. Be-
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cause of these impulses, political jurisprudence was more a scholarly methodology than 
reality, but it grasped parts of the contemporary opinions and criticism of the functions 
of the courts.          
   In general, political jurisprudence endorsed and encouraged the notions of socio-
logical jurisprudence and realism in judicial studies. It sought to define theories of judi-
cial decision-making that could transcend the normative approach of traditional juris-
prudence and then test these theories in practice in order to make them scientific. It was 
a response to the postwar changes in scholarship and society, and sought to participate 
in jurisprudential controversies and hence to legitimize its position in the field between 
law and political science. The aim of the studies was to describe and explain the human 
and political aspects of judicial decision-making. By going beyond the written opinions 
and emphasizing the factors behind them, new concepts of courts and judicial decision-
making were needed. The concepts came from the realists, but in the sixties the legal 
profession was not as ready as the political scientists to adopt extremist views on the 
courts. By adapting the realist agenda in the contemporary research, the scholars of po-
litical jurisprudence became pioneers of judicial behavior and contributors to the sociol-
ogy of law.  
   Legal scholars were also struggling with the problem of how much realism there 
ought to be in legal scholarship in the 1960s. They, too, were to an increasing extent 
adopting the methods of realism in their scholarship. Their concerns, however, had a 
different emphasis. As Maveety notes, legal scholars paid relatively little attention to 
political jurisprudence because of its “law avoidance”.120 The realism of the legal pro-
fession of the 1960s was not extreme, and although realist legal scholars considered the 
literature of political jurisprudence interesting,
121
 they nevertheless considered behav-
ioralism as “half-Freud and half-fraud.”122 As legal scholars were elaborating their own 
theories of judicial-decision making in the 1960s, the literature on behavioral and politi-
cal sciences began to seem ever more determinist and absurd. Moreover, political juris-
prudence was court-centered. Its focus was simply on judicial decision-making, which 
made its perspective relatively narrow and hence not very interesting to legal scholars 
who needed a more comprehensive theory of law and society. Thus, although political 
jurisprudence contributed to the studies of the courts, its significance for legal scholar-
ship remained slight. Legal scholars looked elsewhere for influences for new theories, 
and to these we shall now turn.     
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2.4 The Law and Development movement: A cultural approach to law 
 
Law and development was a movement relating to the American efforts to aid the de-
velopment of the third-world countries in the 1950s and 1960s. The scholarship matured 
in the 1960s when legal scholars began to take a great role in the process. The purpose 
of the project was to support social and economic development through improving the 
legal institutions of the third-world countries, and the purpose of the scholarship was to 
investigate the potential for social development through law. What began as an optimis-
tic effort at improvement turned into skepticism in the late 1960s, and by the early 
1970s the majority of the law and development scholars realized that their project was 
in crisis. Rising in the wake of the postwar reconstruction and Cold War atmosphere, 
law and development was an image of its time; in part honest humanitarian assistance, 
legal missionary work, international power struggle, and cultural imperialism.
123
 
   At the center of law and development was an instrumental conception of law. Its 
focus was on the possibilities of law as a tool in promoting social and economic devel-
opment.
124
 As the events of the 1960s weakened optimism for improvement, scholars 
also became more critical of their efforts and particularly of the formalist conception of 
law. They noted that law had long been a tool of imperialism, and since Western legal 
institutions were difficult to manage in foreign countries, westernized law was a more 
stabilizing than stimulating factor.
125
 Even if the development perspective was more 
optimistic, the difficulties of development without fundamental reforms in the legal sys-
tem and education were acknowledged.
126
 There were also difficulties in making the 
changes in formal law effective in legal practice, besides the fact that there had to be a 
balance between legal reform according to the foreign model and indigenous law.
127
  
   Experience proved that the potential of law as an instrument of change was rather 
vague and facing particular difficulties in foreign cultures. Even the less critical views 
noted the differences between the legal systems of different societies, which meant that 
law was to be understood in its cultural and social context. Changes in legal institutions 
were not possible without fundamental changes in society, and Western law could not 
be adapted to countries with fundamentally different social and cultural structures. 
Scholars realized that transplanting law was not simple and good intentions often led to 
negative outcomes, which made them reconsider the basis of their task.   
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   The mixed motives of both the aid and the scholarship caused further problems in 
the enterprise. While acknowledging the problems of development but encouraging the 
research nonetheless, Seidman and Thome wrote in the late 1960s that there were seri-
ous business interests in the third world which also affected the scholarship because, as 
they argued, “the researcher usually hopes the results will contribute to the solution of 
actual problems.”128 The scholarship was advanced more in the universities and dealt 
with important issues, but it also faced problems that drove the scholars to criticize and 
to elaborate their work.    
   The problems of cultural differences were indeed pressing. This became obvious 
once the scholars began consistently to contemplate the conception of legal culture. One 
of the most promising young scholars of sociological jurisprudence, Lawrence Fried-
man, wrote that if the legal scholar “believed completely in the cultural relativity of law, 
he would know he had no business abroad.”129 There were ambiguous concepts such as 
“development”, “legal system,” and “modern,” the meaning of which was uncertain. 
Furthermore, scholars had merely assumed the impact of law on society without thor-
ough cultural analysis.
130
 Here the scholars faced the problem of investigating a particu-
lar phenomenon in various contexts. This revealed the importance of the structures 
within which the law operated, and increased the awareness of the fact that law was the 
construction of a society rather than something that could be instilled into it.   
   Thus, the concept of legal culture became important. As we saw, anthropology 
rose to prominence in the postwar years, and hence in the 1960s, together with the prob-
lems of law and development, legal anthropology was also attracting more interest.
131
 
Studies on the anthropology of law reflected the notion that different people perceived 
reality, and law, differently. Law was therefore not to be regarded as formal rules with 
specific consequences, but rather as something that depended on the structures of the 
society it was part of. Studies on the law of foreign societies required specific infor-
mation on that society and culture. This, then, led to the more specific elaboration of the 
concept of legal culture.
132
 Scholars began to attend more to the prerequisites of the 
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functioning of law and to the unconscious impacts of law. It also encouraged cross-
disciplinary and comparative studies of law because it broadened the perspective on the 
function of the law.    
   In the early 1970s, law and development scholars became more critical of the pos-
sibilities of development and were often either very pessimistic about their scholarship 
or sought to elaborate their theories.
133
 Reformers sought to create more nuanced theo-
ries that would be more particular about the circumstances of society, expand the dis-
tinction between law in books and law in action in the governmental agencies, and place 
the public in a structural and behavioral context.
134
 This kind of theory was useful be-
cause rules that worked in some legal systems did not necessarily have the same effects 
in others.
135
 The problems with development had pointed out that what was needed was 
a theory of law that was sensitive to the law in action in particular structures. Simple 
observation was not adequate, a more critical and comprehensive perspective being 
needed.  
   A devoted law and development scholar, and a future critical legal scholar, David 
Trubek, took the critique of law and development to a more fundamental level, noting 
that there was a serious need for a fundamental analysis of law and society. Since law 
had failed to produce the desired effects, it was rather the social circumstances than law 
that was to be investigated.
136
 The failures of the development programs had revealed 
the inability of law to have an impact on social structures. Rather, Trubek noted, law 
reflected the social, political, and economic power structures of society and then con-
tributed to their preservation. Law did not produce change but, consciously or uncon-
sciously, protected the existing structures, and the fact that problems were characterized 
as legal only denied the fact that they also included political questions.
137
 Trubek’s fun-
damental analysis of law and society took the structural biases into account. A major 
problem for the scholars studying law in different cultures was to elaborate a theory of 
law that would be generally applicable. The realization of the structural connections 
made the critical scholars examine the construction and manifestation of legal phenom-
ena in different cultures. Thus, by the early 1970s, the attention of critical legal scholars 
was shifting towards the preconditions of the legal system.    
   The failure of law and development was thus reflected back on the paradigm of 
law. Trubek and Marc Galanter, both of whom had been disappointed by the experienc-
es in law and development, argued that a reason for the failure was the faith in liberal 
legalism that underlined the consciousness of the United States. They thought that 
scholars had uncritically assumed that law could bring social change, even though law 
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in fact had certain economic and political biases and therefore unwanted and undesira-
ble effects.
138
 The failure was thus more in the consciousness of the legal scholar than in 
the efforts as such, since, as Trubek and Galanter argued, law and development scholars 
sincerely believed in liberal legalism, and it took some time to understand this false be-
lief. “Law and development scholars did not, however, create the critical perspective on 
the social role of law in the United States; they merely responded to it.”139 As will be 
seen later, there was a crisis of law in the early 1970s, which law and development 
formed part of. Scholars within the movement came to realize that their work was pre-
conditioned by ideological factors to an extent they scarcely credit. The criticism sought 
to point out that development itself was an open concept determined by the western 
consciousness. One of the notions with which law and development was particularly 
influential was that law and legal ideals were products of a particular society.    
   At a time when former colonies gained independence, western countries sought to 
provide assistance with benevolent, political, and economic reasons. The hopes were, 
however, proven false with the continuous failures. At the same pace as the disappoint-
ment with the developing mission, the critical consciousness of law spread. Even if law 
and development did not produce the critical perspective on law, it nevertheless con-
tributed to it. It failed many young leftist scholars
140
 and encouraged the creating of 
alternative paradigms to modern law.
141
 It also contributed to the evolution of legal an-
thropology, studies on legal culture, comparative legal studies, the structural conception 
of law, and the notion of law as imperialism. Scholars lost their faith in the neutrality of 
law and began to observe legal matters in a different way. Critical scholars were set to 
search for a completely new understanding of law in society. 
2.5 The Law and Society movement: A social approach to law 
 
Law and society was a jurisprudential movement that examined law in its social con-
text. Although theories within the movement varied, its fundamental premises were that 
law was a human product which served certain functions in society, and the purpose of 
scholarship was to understand these functions.
142
 The movement developed in the 1950s 
and early 1960s as a counter movement to the more doctrinal and value-neutral schools 
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of jurisprudence. Its purpose was to bring more realist notions into legal scholarship and 
examine law in its social context as an instrument mediating conflicting social interests 
and arranging social institutions.
143
 The movement developed at the same time as soci-
ology of law was becoming a major discipline. The cradle of law and society is none-
theless often seen to be the University of Wisconsin Law School, where the scholarship 
of James Willard Hurst was particularly important. At least from the 1950s onwards, he 
had emphasized the instrumental conception of law and combined elements of realism 
and modern process jurisprudence, thus creating what has been termed “an alternative 
process tradition in American jurisprudence”.144       
   The interest in inter-disciplinary studies in law led to the establishment of the Law 
and Society Association in 1964. A section in Wisconsin Law Review functioned as its 
publication channel at first, and its own journal, Law & Society Review, was founded in 
1966.
145
 The law and society movement was born during a time when the impact of le-
gal realism was waning because it was absorbed into the mainstream scholarship, and 
its interest in the early days was concentrated on the civil rights struggles and liberal 
reforms of contemporary society.
146
 Research responded to the changes in science and 
society, bringing sociological and realist elements back into legal scholarship and focus-
ing on the important contemporary social and legal problems.  
   Among other things, the development of law and society relates to the rise of the 
sociology of law, whose origins are in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
but it did not emerge as a systematic field of study until the postwar years. By the mid-
1960s, there was a lively and sophisticated tradition of sociology of law in America.
147
 
Even if sociology of law had a firm basis, many legal scholars and lawyers either argued 
that it was not very useful for legal scholarship,
148
 or that they had difficulty in under-
standing the rambling expressions of sociology.
149
 Legal scholarship had thus to adapt 
itself to sociological studies in order to create a comprehensive sociological theory of 
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law that could be used in legal studies, and in the 1960s legal scholars combined sociol-
ogy, sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, behavioral and political jurisprudence, 
and various social theories into their sociological approach to law.
150
 Legal scholarship 
had to meet the social changes, and law and society scholarship was a response to them. 
Since legal scholars felt the need to pay closer attention to the ways law corresponded to 
social institutions and norms, they had also to adopt alternative methods for research. 
By stepping beyond the boundaries of traditional scholarship, the sociologically orient-
ed scholars sought to analyze the ways law responded and reacted to social practices.     
   Law and society was also a critical movement. Its purpose was to investigate the 
functions of law in society in realistic and critical terms, as well as to explain the gap 
between law in books and law in action. As the war on poverty and the Great Society 
program were initiated in the 1960s, legal scholars examined the problems of poverty 
and the inability of law to bring relief. They noted that “[t]he contention is that today as 
in the past the law primarily serves to protect and enhance the rights and interests of 
property holders and those in positions of wealth and authority.”151 The critical view of 
the 1960s held that problems of inequality originated in society, law often maintained 
these inequalities, and when the law set out to correct the evils, the reality was some-
thing else. Alternative scholars opined that traditional doctrinal analysis ignored these 
problems but the alternative studies explored them.  
   For instance, racial discrimination and inequality were serious problems in the 
1960s with which the alternative legal scholars struggled.
152
 The Supreme Court had 
invalidated racial segregation in 1954, but segregation and racial discrimination were 
still the reality in the mid-1960s. In this regard, then, law did not have a marked im-
pact.
153
 Studies also pointed out that the racist atmosphere of southern societies affected 
the judges in a way that made it difficult to enforce civil rights law.
154
 The scholars ar-
gued that even if formal law forbade discrimination, it continued in social reality, and 
although the law was not biased toward the powerful, it in fact preserved the discrimina-
tory and unequal practices. Alternative legal scholarship sought to reveal the problems 
that lay behind legal doctrines and principles, which were seen as incapable of solving 
social problems alone.      
   Thus, the “life of law” was at the center of law and society scholarship. As one 
study pointed out, the rules of contract law were not often followed in relations of busi-
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ness exchange, and legal practice did not thus necessarily follow the normative aspects 
of law.
155
 Research also concerned the impact of law in society,
156
 the behavior of judg-
es,
157
 and the effects of various kinds of regulations in order to evaluate their appropri-
ateness.
158
 Alternative legal scholars considered it important to study the way the deci-
sions of the courts were actually met in social reality because “[a] particular decision 
may rest upon a legally impeccable rationale; at the same time it may be rendered nuga-
tory or self-defeating by contingencies imposed by aspects of social reality of which the 
lawmakers are themselves unaware.”159 The aim was to provide information on the ac-
tual social functions and effects of law. At stake in the law and society scholarship was 
that if legal rules and principles on paper did not match the rules and principles of ac-
tion, there was something wrong with the system that had to be revealed.  
   Law and society was also responsive to other alternative legal scholarship, which 
can be seen, for example, in the importance of legal culture to it. Law and development 
with its emphasis on the law in action in cultural and social contexts was closely similar 
to law and society scholarship,
160
 but even if many of the law and development scholars 
continued their careers in the law and society movement, the latter did not directly grow 
out of the former.
161
 They developed at the same time, and law and development simply 
contributed to the evolution of law and society. In addition, survey studies on legal cul-
ture which contributed significantly to the amount of information on people’s concep-
tions of law grew significantly after the mid-1960s
162
 contributing to the understanding 
of law as a relative phenomenon.      
   Many of the scholars of political jurisprudence were also in contact with law and 
society and became even more attached to the movement when the competition within 
political science and political jurisprudence became more intense.
163
 Schubert, who was 
advertising behavioral studies for legal scholars, wrote that for a long time “the science 
of law has been a dull esoteric subject, with traditional logic its long suit and the syllo-
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gism its ace in the hole.”164 He concluded that recent currents in political science could 
be used in legal scholarship to turn it into a science with cross-disciplinary theories, 
empirical research, and sophisticated scientific analysis.
165
 A common feature of the 
various forms of alternative legal scholarship was the fact that they encouraged cross-
disciplinary research and sought to go beyond legal doctrine in order to analyze law in 
action. Differences between law and society and political jurisprudence were that the 
latter focused on the judiciary and speculated on the behavior of the judges, whereas the 
former focused more on the social functions and the effects of law in a broader sense. 
Whereas political jurisprudence applied behavioral and political sciences to judicial 
studies, law and society was an effort to elaborate a systematic theory and research on 
the social functions of law.      
   History, society, and culture were all important to law and society scholarship, but 
it was nonetheless legal scholarship. Lawrence Friedman noted the importance of legal 
rules for research since they were “important social facts.”166 There were different kinds 
of rule formulations, and studies on the historical and social context of rules were im-
portant in explaining the purposes of the rules.
167
 It was also considered important to 
study the concept of legalism which, according to Friedman, was a dynamic type of 
legal reasoning and a part of all kinds of legal systems, followed social trends, provided 
reasons for difficult decisions, and served “to legitimize arbitrary decisions where pref-
erence for particular alternatives is difficult to justify through reason or policy.”168 In 
addition, in an empirical, historical, and realist analysis of a legal doctrine in action, 
Stewart Macaulay analyzed the contractual duty to read the private terms of a contract 
with respect to cases of credit card losses, and considered the relationship between so-
cial policy, contract law, and private business terms.
169
  
   Thus, historical and social dimensions helped to analyze legal rules and doctrines. 
As Friedman and Macaulay argued, one could obtain a critical perspective on the legal 
practices through interdisciplinary research on law in society.
170
 This was important 
because in reality legal rules were discretionary and law might be biased in fact,
171
 and 
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new regulations might prove insignificant.
172
 While the critical aspect was fundamental 
to the research, the purpose was to understand how law functioned, not to criticize it. 
The formulation of rules and their application both described the way law reflected so-
ciety and an analysis of law in context pointed out the fallacies of law and helped to 
understand the legal reality.  
   The academic aspect was also important, since teaching law in context was an el-
ementary part of law and society from the beginning. The educational aspect was ad-
vanced in a book published in 1961 that was meant to be an introduction to the legal 
system for law students and other advanced students interested in law. The book gath-
ered cases and materials from American law combined with legal literature, much of 
which was realist literature, the purpose being to provide an introduction to law in its 
social context, “not to teach legal doctrines in any particular area of substantive law, but 
rather to present methods and processes… common to all areas… examined in ac-
tion.”173 The aim was to provide a comprehensive account of the legal system in its his-
torical and social context so that the reader could understand the causes and purposes of 
legal institutions. The publication of the book reflected the nascent expansion of the 
alternative legal scholarship as well as the emergence of law and society.   
   The purpose of the alternative legal scholarship was to point out the use of other 
sciences in legal studies. Arising in the University of Wisconsin, history was in a crit i-
cal position in law and society scholarship apart from sociology.
174
 History was often 
used in law and society legal analysis, and was also an important factor in the dynamic 
that was significant in the evolution of critical legal studies, as will be seen later. In ad-
dition, other disciplines, such as social and behavioral sciences, were mixed in with le-
gal studies in law and society scholarship. The combination of disciplines was seen in 
the study book by Friedman and Macaulay, published in 1969,
175
 in which the authors 
issued a collection of studies on law that applied some alternative methods to doctrinal 
analysis, aiming to show that alternative approaches revealed important facts about legal 
reality and were therefore important for lawyers.  
   Law and society, a movement of legal scholarship that applied interdisciplinary 
methods in legal analysis, developed during the fifties and reached an established posi-
tion in the sixties. Its development occurred just as political jurisprudence and law and 
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development were pushing forward. Law and society shared much with them, but it was 
more “legal” than political jurisprudence and more specific than law and development. 
It did not reduce law to values and ideologies but rather examined it in its historical, 
social, and cultural context. It also extended the field of research away from the judici-
ary to society more generally. Political jurisprudence was court-centered and investigat-
ed the behavior of judges and the policy implications of decisions, but law and society 
explored various aspects of law, analyzing legal doctrines in action.  
   Law and society also challenged the tradition of legal scholarship by denying the 
neutrality of law, perceiving it as a human product, an instrument of social organization. 
With its emphasis on context, it distanced itself from the postwar urge toward reasona-
bility and the logic of process, being thus more a jurisprudence of substance than pro-
cess. It had a critical aspect, but it did not stretch the criticism to the extreme, seeking 
rather to understand the purposes and functions of law. As law and development, law 
and society also had an education agenda through which it tried to challenge the main-
stream legal education with a more realist curriculum. Of the alternative legal scholar-
ship of the 1960s, law and society related most closely to the actual social problems. It 
thus contributed to the awareness of social failings as well as to the critical understand-
ing of law, society, and scholarship.   
2.6 Critical perspectives on law in society 
 
Problems of the 1960s caused new concerns for the legal profession. Social problems, 
the war on poverty, and the project for a great society gave new ideas to both young and 
more experienced lawyers. As the interests of the underdog became recognized, lawyers 
began seriously to contemplate alternatives to deal with the social problems and to pro-
vide legal services to those who needed them but lacked the means to obtain them.
176
 
Courts had been used as forums of social change before, but the sixties brought a re-
markable change,
177
 when the needs of the poor were better recognized,
178
 and groups 
of radical lawyers dedicated their careers to assisting them.
179
 The new orientation of 
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lawyers was an exception to the tradition, since the legal profession was traditionally 
skeptical of the efforts to extend the basis of legal aid because it was concerned with 
protecting its own interests.
180
 Lawyers were traditionally an elitist group, close to the 
powerful classes, so that they had not in general been concerned about the rights of the 
less-privileged. The civil rights struggle transformed the self-image of the lawyer who 
felt alienated from the traditional profession or wanted to work for the rights of the cit i-
zen. The changes in the practical legal profession reflect the wider transformation of 
society and consciousness, which were significant in shaping its critical consciousness. 
Part of the dynamic leading to the formation of the critical thought was therefore the 
rising critical attitude of the practical lawyer.    
   The lawyers who were concerned for inequality with respect to legal representa-
tion argued that inequality meant a denial of justice. They claimed that the problem was 
not simply a matter of income, but consisted of complex socio-structural problems that 
needed fundamental reform.
181
 Various changes were needed in order to make legal 
services available to the poor. Among the new alternatives were neighborhood law 
firms,
182
 group legal services,
183
 communal law firms
184
 and public interest lawyers.
185
 
Even if legal representation was not a “panacea for poverty”, there were many things 
lawyers could do for a more equitable society,
186
 and even if lawyers had faith in assist-
ing the needy, they were aware of the limits of civil litigation.
187
 Social problems gave 
rise to legal problems, and a portion of the profession was not satisfied with the way the 
problems were typically dealt with. From the 1960s onwards, lawyers began to take a 
larger role in social activism. 
   New methods were needed in the struggle for the rights of the citizen. Lawyers, for 
instance, attacked public agencies in order to change the system.
188
 At first, government 
had been part of the struggle against inequality, but as matters evolved, radical lawyers 
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realized that the government was part of the system and thus part of the problem. In 
addition, new strategies of litigation, such as consumer protection
189
 and environmental-
ism
190
 came into existence as the interests of consumers and the environment began to 
attract public interest. Critical lawyers and scholars went to the root of the problem in 
order to bring change about. They noted that the problems were fundamental and at-
tacked it in various ways. The critical lawyers of the 1960s and 1970s sought to fight 
social inequality in the courts, which indicates that they still had faith in the potential 
for reform through litigation.  
   The changes in the profession also left their marks on scholarship. Charles Reich, 
a liberal scholar with an alternative perspective, noted that the rise of the welfare state 
had expanded the government and caused undesirable side-effects, since governmental 
control over private life had increased in an inequitable manner, burdening the poor 
more than the rich. Privacy and governmental largess did not enjoy the protection that 
private property rights did. Therefore, in order to increase equality, the interests of the 
poor should be regarded as the new property.
191
 He also argued that the myth of neutral-
ity of law distorted the purposes of the public interest because the values and policies 
underlying the concept were hidden behind the ostensible neutrality of law.
192
 The al-
ternative concepts of property were aimed at attaining the reality behind the legal doc-
trine. The concerns of the scholars were precisely those that concerned the law and so-
ciety scholars as well, and the Zeitgeist of the alternative scholar was to study law in 
action as a response to social problems. Scholars elaborated new legal concepts to make 
law correspond with modern society and paid more attention to the previously neglected 
social problems.  
   Legal scholarship on social problems was also increasing significantly. In addition 
to the Law & Society Review, The Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review was 
founded in 1966 to promote scholarship on the rights of the citizen,
193
 and the Columbia 
Survey of Human Rights Law, later the Columbia Human Rights Law Review, was 
founded in 1967. Civil rights issues were important and scholarship on them was lively. 
As noted, racial inequality was an especially serious concern. For instance, Paul Brest 
criticized the national government for its inability to protect the rights of African Amer-
icans in Southern societies,
194
 and McCarty and Stevenson analyzed the effects of the 
1965 Voting Act by examining the actual problems concerning the voting of African 
Americans in the southern states, reviewing the changes the new law had made, and 
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considering the potential for policy change.
195
 These studies were concerned with the 
legal problems in society, but the interest in the functions of the profession also in-
creased. An expression of the growing self-awareness of the legal profession was Je-
rome Carlin’s sociological study on the ethics of the legal profession, which aimed at 
understanding the position of the lawyer in society.
196
 Studies on the contemporary con-
cerns were popular in the 1960s, and the problems were often approached from an alter-
native perspective with alternative methods. Alternative legal scholarship was a meth-
odology of criticism and reform.  
   The 1960s was still marked by a reliance on social planning, as long as the plan-
ning was done right.
197
 Later the critical bloc of the younger generation became more 
pessimistic about the possibility of reform. During the latter half of the sixties, several 
reform-minded, leftist young lawyers started to work for a better society by denouncing 
the traditional practice and seeking to work for the oppressed and the less privileged. 
These lawyers noted the political aspect of law and acted upon it in order to change so-
ciety.
198
 They struggled against the myths of the heroic nature and neutrality of law
199
 
and, whereas the traditional purposes of legal work were to solve conflicts and analyze 
doctrine, the radicals thought that “[t]he major objective of work in law, however, ought 
to be to clarify its outside limits and its history; to show that bourgeois law is not only 
hypocritical, but based on inequality and therefore, in our eyes, illegal.”200  
   Social unrest and the awakening of the “other side” of society had left their mark 
on the legal profession. Students had protested with an increasing intensity since the 
beginning of the decade, and African Americans had protested throughout the century. 
In the late 1960s, the legal profession was finally ready to respond to the social upheav-
als on a large scale. Lawyers had fought for the rights of the less privileged for a long 
time, but the decade brought a remarkable change in the situation. Because of the large 
profession and the larger number of radically minded lawyers, there were better oppor-
tunities for the legal profession to develop a radical branch to serve the radical aims. 
Truly radical lawyers were students of the sixties starting their professional careers at 
the end of the decade. Youthful enthusiasm drove them to take a more critical stand on 
the law than their older colleagues. 
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2.7 Concluding remarks 
 
The decisive point for American jurisprudence of the 1960s was the pursuit of rationali-
ty and neutrality in legal reasoning. Although the most radical notions of legal realism 
had faded, it had left a permanent legacy with which the postwar legal scholars had to 
cope, and which had to be adapted to the tradition. Legal interpretation and the creative 
input of judges had thus to be set in the context of a rational process in order to enable 
the development of law in accordance with social change. At the same time, however, 
arbitrariness had to be avoided, neutrality maintained, and the protection of individual 
and fundamental democratic rights guaranteed. There were also scholars who criticized 
the common consensus on rationality. The mainstream was not without an opposition 
and the profession at large was not unanimous about the nature and purposes of juris-
prudence.  
   The 1960s had also changed the field of legal scholarship to a significant extent 
and various forms of alternative legal scholarship and practice had an established posi-
tion by the mid-decade. Political jurisprudence worked on the impact of the personal 
and political biases of judges on judicial decision-making since the late 1940s and its 
literature increased considerably during the succeeding years. However, it was a move-
ment of political and behavioral sciences. Interdisciplinary legal studies had also begun 
to prosper. Law and society had grown since the 1950s, examining the relationship be-
tween the law and various social phenomena. In many ways it was critical scholarship, 
but it did not go beyond the observable reality or endorse any extreme notions. Studies 
on culture and law as well as on legal anthropology were encouraged by the American 
projects in developing countries, which had also revealed the imperialistic nature of law 
and the fact that law had relatively little direct impact on society. In addition, practicing 
lawyers were paying more attention to the impact of their profession. Lawyers were 
finding ways to help people in need of assistance and change society through their prac-
tice, and lawyers and legal scholars began to pay more attention to the fundamental 
rights of the citizen.    
   The legal tradition was challenged from various directions as the social turbulence 
was reaching its peak and law schools were also becoming forums for student rebellion. 
Despite the alternative scholarship, mainstream jurisprudence and legal education in 
general emphasized the rationality and neutrality of the legal process and failed to pay 
attention to the relationship between law, society, and politics. Moreover, in spite of the 
fact that the tradition was criticized, the critical scholarship of the 1960s only rarely 
challenged the ideology informing the tradition. With the exception of the radical law-
yers who thought that bourgeois law was illegal, the alternative scholarship of the 1960s 
simply tried to expand the methodological basis of legal scholarship and to acquire a 
better understanding of the social functions of the law. The interplay between the tradi-
tion, jurisprudential criticism, social radicalism, and changes in scholarship was at the 
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center of the radical critical legal scholarship of the 1970s, and it will be the focus of the 
following section. 
3 Critique radicalized: The evolution of CLS 
3.1 The origins of CLS: From sociological jurisprudence to critical legal scholarship 
3.1.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous sections we have seen that there were realist elements in legal scholar-
ship in the 1960s and 1970s, but that these were not in a major position. The law school 
tradition remained more true to the process theory than to any policy analysis. However, 
society was in continuous turmoil and civil rights movements were on a roll, cultural 
radicalism and leftism marked the critical intellectual thought, and social sciences made 
their way into legal scholarship. As the 1960s progressed, realist elements and alterna-
tive approaches began to get more attention from legal scholars. The Critical Legal 
Studies Movement (CLS) was thus a movement with several connections. Its basis was 
in the radicalism of the 1960s, it had law and development and law and society as 
sources of inspiration, and the taught tradition was its enemy.   
   In this section, I shall explore the development of CLS in the 1970s. As Duxbury 
notes, CLS grew out of the conflict between the alternative legal scholarship of the 
1960s and the more radical-left orientation that eventually became CLS.
201
 It is true that 
CLS was a reaction to the failures of the alternative jurisprudence of the 1960s to meet 
the needs of legal reality, as well as the failures of reasoned elaboration to come to 
terms with the problems of legal reasoning. However, it was also much more, and this 
can be seen precisely in the conflict if we take into account the various aspects relating 
to culture, epistemology, world-view, and consciousness. The general account on CLS 
does not include the larger, cultural element in the development of the movement. 
Therefore, my purpose is to demonstrate how CLS was a complex phenomenon of 
combining various aspects within the academic field.  
   In this section, I will demonstrate how the various transformations culminated in 
the CLS movement in the late 1970s. I will begin at the law school, because it was the 
place where the radical scholars acquired their identities as scholars and where the clas-
sical tradition was most pronounced. A central thesis is that some of the law students of 
the 1960s and 1970s felt alienated from the tradition and began to seek an alternative 
paradigm. I shall then analyze the development of the criticism of legal thought and 
critical scholarship in legal history, constitutional law, and criminal law. The first con-
ference on critical legal studies, held in 1977, can be seen as the birth of the CLS 
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movement. That will also function as a point of departure in the study, and our analysis 
will cease at the beginning of the 1980s. After taking a brief look at race and feminist 
scholarship, the analysis turns to the historical perspective at the end of the section. 
 
3.1.2 Radicalism and the law school: The evolution of critical thought 
 
The best manifestation of the spirit of the 1960s was campus radicalism. Radical stu-
dents attacked the structures and administration of the university. Radicalism also in-
vaded the law school in the late 1960s. Although relatively late and small as compared 
to the other disciplines,
202
 the discomfort with legal education was nonetheless wide-
spread, in particular among first-year students.
203
 Like their fellow students, law stu-
dents protested against the grading system and their lack of power in the university ad-
ministration.
204
 The law student population had increased greatly during the postwar 
decades. By the 1960s, a significant portion of the law students were liberal leftists who 
supported civil rights and social justice, whereas the majority of the legal profession 
remained rather conservative.
205
 Law students also adopted the critical spirit of the time 
and wanted their education accordingly. Since law has been traditionally a relatively 
conservative and elitist field, law students were not at the forefront of the student radi-
calism, but as the number of the liberal students increased and the disappointment with 
education grew, radicalism entered the law school as well.    
   The critical spirit of the 1960s changed the law school atmosphere significantly. 
Unsurprisingly, CLS has often been linked to the experiences of the leftist students in 
the law schools of the time. Common observations are that CLS “was born during the 
late 1960s among a group of student activists and younger faculty at Yale Law School 
who believe that using legal reasoning to justify the rules of society can make outcomes 
that are oppressive appear to be inevitable, logical and inherently fair,”206 and that its 
origins are in the “dissonance between the student political experience of the sixties and 
the law school curriculum of the sixties and seventies.”207 One of the most important 
figures of critical scholarship, Duncan Kennedy, wrote in 1991 that “I started law 
school in 1967 with a sense that the ‘system’ had a lot of injustice in it, meaning that the 
distribution of wealth and income and power and access to knowledge seemed unfairly 
skewed along class and race lines. I thought law was important in the skewing process 
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and in efforts to make distribution fairer, but I had no clear idea how or why.”208 As the 
students felt disbelief in the society, they also felt betrayed by the law school and pow-
erless within the university. The law school thus provides the arena for the synthesis of 
the critical thought that eventually led to the formation of the critical legal studies 
movement. It was the place where the traditional and the new models of legal thought 
collided. 
   It was not simply student radicalism that stirred the law school atmosphere. 
Alongside the rise of student unrest, the faculty also debated education. Legal education 
had been widely debated since the time of legal realism, and the 1960s intensified the 
debates. Although the curriculum was revised, no fundamental changes occurred, and 
the education at least during the first year was still based on the case method.
209
 Prob-
lems of legal education were widely acknowledged. Even professors who were pleased 
with the education opined that there ought to be some social material in the curricu-
lum,
210
 but the more critical scholars endorsed more fundamental changes. A common 
concern among the critics of legal education was that the students were not prepared for 
real-life circumstances. What was needed, then, was more attention to the substance,
211
 
a functional approach to law,
212
 or more material on the social consequences of law in 
the text-books.
213
 Students were also often irritated by the emphasis on rationality and 
the apolitical nature of the education.
214
 The criticism of the traditional education clear-
ly reflected the disagreement on the methodologies of legal research. The focus on law 
in action was becoming more common in the 1960s, and the alternative approach was 
clearly articulated in the critical arguments about legal education. The criticism of the 
education thus emanated more from the alternative scholarship than from the radical 
students.  
   Besides the substance of education, the scholars criticizing it also endorsed the 
methods of alternative legal scholarship. A common argument was that there ought to 
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be more interdisciplinary education in legal training.
215
 Because of the stress on the so-
cial problems, law was not to be understood as a closed and autonomous discipline. On 
the contrary, there ought to have been more philosophy,
216
 history,
217
 social science,
218
 
and empirical data
219
 in legal education, because these would help the would-be lawyers 
to understand legal classifications and social functions and the effects of the law. It was 
often scholars with connections to law and society scholarship who most encouraged 
the inclusion of social science in legal education. The critical opinion of the 1960s was 
that law was an integral part of society and therefore could not be understood inde-
pendently. 
   The functional approach toward legal education also concerned policy issues and 
social planning. The radical activist lawyer Ralph Nader argued that legal education 
traditionally promoted the needs of the big corporations and therefore often served to 
maintain the status quo.
220
 Many scholars argued that legal education did not pay due 
attention to contemporary problems
221
 although the purpose of education should be to 
inform the students of the potential for using law as a tool of social reform.
222
 The post-
realist scholar Arthur Miller even argued that law schools ought to be turned into cen-
ters of policy analysis where the potential of law to promote human values and solve 
contemporary problems could be analyzed.
223
 And since urban problems were pressing, 
David Cavers argued that law schools should pay attention to the contemporary urban 
crisis in both research and education.
224
 Specialized education was also proposed so that 
students could obtain deeper knowledge on certain topics.
225
 The functional approach 
and the emphasis on values and policies were parts of the alternative perspectives on 
law. Critical scholars and lawyers worked to resolve social problems and promote liber-
al values, and these insights were accentuated in the criticism of education.      
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   The concern over legal education involved broad aspects of alternative legal 
scholarship. Miller, for instance, encouraged a very realistic education that would in-
clude the impact of extra-legal factors in judicial decision-making and the way judges in 
fact decided cases, as well as the aspects of law as a tool of social control.
226
 The criti-
cism marked a more dramatic shift in the paradigm of legal education. The aim of the 
criticism was to combine recent trends in alternative scholarship in legal education and 
bring the level of realism in the behavioral sciences into the law. Alternative legal 
scholarship of the 1960s challenged the traditional scholarship, and the struggle struck 
at the essence of legal education.   
   A major vice of legal education, the critics claimed, was the Socratic method. 
Many of the students found the method very stressful,
227
 and Paul Savoy noted that a 
real interaction between teachers and students would “never happen until we remove 
our academic masks and put an end to those degrading ceremonies we politely call the 
‘Socratic method.’”228 Notwithstanding the realist period, American legal education had 
done well until the mid-1960s, and no major reforms had occurred.
229
 Part of the critical 
thought of the 1960s, however, was to demonstrate that the case method was boring and 
reifying, and thus had to be replaced by more realistic approaches. The alternative legal 
scholars endorsed alternative methods to traditional scholarship and heard the cries of 
the student radicals, and they attacked the legal tradition in the effort to change it.    
   The critical debates show that legal education and legal paradigm are intertwined. 
The problem was deeper than simple controversies over educational policies. Friedman 
argued that legal education had long been a closed discipline and recent times had wit-
nessed a counter-revolution following the realist period, which had moved legal theory 
and education in a more conservative direction.
230
 In an unsigned article titled “Legal 
Theory and Legal Education” it was argued, after noting that studies on law in action 
had again become common, that “[m]any of the current proposals to establish empirical 
research about particular socio-legal problems in the law schools carry with them an 
implicit paradigm which attempts to serve these general professional functions.”231 As 
the debates on neutral principles showed, there was an urge to maintain the traditional 
prestige and rationality of the profession even though the alternative bloc was present. 
A problem concerning change was, however, that the “genius” of American democracy 
was the “readiness with which its legal institutions and practices have accommodated 
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shifting objectives without profound or radical change in the fundamentals.”232 Society 
and legal scholarship were in turmoil but fundamental changes were difficult to achieve.    
   Because of the turmoil and the criticism, scholars were talking about a crisis in le-
gal education in the early 1970s.
233
 Those who were very critical of the education felt 
that there was a need for fundamental reform,
234
 but the proposals varied and some not-
ed the difficulty of combining them.
235
 The rising resistance within both the faculty and 
among the students had in any event transformed the law school, even if major changes 
had not occurred. Many law students grew up and received their education in the critical 
atmosphere of the 1960s and, as has been noted, the new left found an afterlife in the 
American academy in the 1970s.
236
 The crisis of education was thus a culmination of 
scholarly and student discomfort with the traditional paradigm.     
   While emphasizing the connection between the disappointing experiences with le-
gal education of the 1960s and the origins of CLS, Robert Gordon writes that “[m]ost 
activist students of the 1960s who were involved in radical or left-liberal politics found 
the studiedly antipolitical teaching of that time simply irrelevant to their concerns. They 
scrounged such slim practical pickings from law school as they could, got the degree, 
and moved on. But the 1960s law students who went on to form the core of CLS mostly 
became teachers themselves and so were motivated to engage with the content and style 
of orthodox doctrinal teaching and scholarship.”237 For some students, radicalism was a 
passing phase, a part of youth, which passed when the period of studying was over. For 
others, however, radicalism became a part of identity, and they continued their critical 
enterprise in their professional lives. Critical legal scholarship was partly an expression 
of the student dissatisfaction with the law school experience and a willingness to im-
prove, or simply criticize, the system they felt was seriously flawed.    
   The crisis in legal education and the critical social ideology built a fertile ground 
for critical legal scholarship. Duncan Kennedy, who later became one of the most emi-
nent critical legal scholars, noted the inconvenient atmosphere in his criticism of the law 
school. According to him, professors were often narcissistically self-assured of the su-
periority of the legal method over other disciplines. The worst part was, however, the 
hostility of the law school, because many students “feel the socratic method… is an 
assault” and, furthermore, they “see professors as people who want to hurt them; profes-
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sors’ actions often hurt them, deeply.”238 People felt alienated in both the society and 
the university. Traditional structures of power and authority were felt to be oppressive, 
suffocating, and humiliating, something that a better world would not include. And as 
was typical of the critical mind, the fault was seen in the structures of the system. The 
problem was not about certain old, egoistic professors who would not tolerate the young 
and acted as if they could do as they pleased. Nor was the problem about the young 
people themselves being unable to adapt to society like many people had done before 
them and many people still did. The problem was in the structures, and that is what crit-
ical scholars realized, and therefore Kennedy attacked the institution in his criticism.  
 
3.1.3 Crisis meets jurisprudence: Fundamental criticism of legal thought 
 
By the end of the 1960s, the crisis in the social order had become evident. The crisis in 
legal education of the early 1970s reflected the wider crisis of the legal profession,
239
 
which also concerned the law and the legal system. In general, for the anti-
establishment people the crisis concerned also the ecological and economic system of 
the world.
240
 Law, too, was a field which faced the problem of adapting the tradition to 
the changed circumstances. The critical notions of the realists were emphasized once 
again, and by the late 1960s the critical legal scholars noted that the legal profession had 
learned hardly anything from the lessons of legal realism of the 1920s and 1930s which 
“was a short-lived enthusiasm that in fact has left a legacy of expectation rather than 
accomplishment.”241 Scholars who in the 1960s endorsed the realist agenda, such as 
Arthur Miller, argued that realists had done much to “pierce the fog of ritual and myth” 
that surrounded the legal profession, yet the Blackstonian theory still “ruled from the 
grave”. Therefore, the tradition had to be changed to deal with the inevitable connection 
between law and politics.
242
 Indeed, scholars of political jurisprudence stressed that it 
had become virtually impossible to maintain the distinction between law and politics,
243
 
and professors of law with an alternative perspective argued that because values were 
connected to facts, legal research needed empirical science.
244
 In the eyes of the alterna-
tive scholar, traditional legal scholarship was in crisis, and the baggage that thwarted the 
realization of the connection between law and politics had to be stripped out and re-
placed by new methods.   
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   Although the crisis was obvious, legal scholars responded to it in various ways. In 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, legal professionals were increasingly discussing the cur-
rent situation of law and legal scholarship.
245
 In general, faith in the law among the legal 
profession and the public at large was waning. People within and outside the legal pro-
fession considered law as conservative and protecting the social and economic status 
quo,
246
 and demystification of the law, meaning the efforts to understand it as it is with-
out its ideological mystique, became more popular.
247
 The problems of law were widely 
recognized, but the solutions were far from clear. The critical thought that was emerging 
both theoretically and in practice was about to challenge the majority who remained true 
to the tradition. Critical scholars, however, were about to search for alternative ways to 
think about society and law.   
   The Yale law professor Charles Reich grasped the spirit of the crisis of law and 
modern society very well in his The Greening of America,
248
 first published in 1970. 
Here he pictured the gloomy image of the corporate state that had turned people into 
mindless machines and spread false consciousness that upheld the consumption capital-
ism on which society was based. People had become mere consumers, indoctrinated 
into the system through education to serve the machine. Production and consumption 
had destroyed the authenticity of the self and nature, and had thus led to the decline of 
man and society. Reich’s book was indeed an image of the critical mind of the late six-
ties; a jeremiad of the mind of a rock-and-roll dissenter in a modern society. It was a 
philosophical analysis of the system, law, and the consciousness of the people. By using 
the theories of Marx, Marcuse, and Galbraith, and by referring to contemporary litera-
ture, such as Catcher in the Rye, Reich developed an image of the society where life had 
lost its meaning and everything served production. He was, however, neither a nihilist 
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nor a socialist,
249
 but a liberal progressive who had faith in the potentiality of change in 
American society.  
   According to Reich, law in modern society, although capable of transforming, was 
a medium of power and a guardian of the status quo.
250
 More radical scholars than 
Reich also made this argument, for the role of the radical scholar was, as Arthur Kinoy 
put it, to study the particular contradictions within law in order to understand the way 
law operated in society and reproduced social inequality, and hence to defend the true 
purposes of law.
251
 Critical scholars considered law as a conservative force and a hin-
drance to social reform,
252
 and biased against the poor,
253
 racial minorities,
254
 and wom-
en.
255
 They felt that law, like American democracy, had betrayed its original purpose of 
protecting freedom and equality and turned instead to preserve the system and the pow-
erful. The purpose of radical action was to expose the fallacies of law and, if possible, 
contribute to change. The unrest confused the legal profession and produced an all-
encompassing tension within it.  
   The political and social turbulence and the conflict between the tradition and the 
alternative were evident in the law faculties. As noted, it was often the younger faculty 
who endorsed alternative education and scholarship. The tension became clear in the 
early 1970s when Yale law school failed to offer tenure to six young faculty members 
on an occasion that became to be known as the “purge.”256 Many of the participants in 
the incident in fact shared leftist sympathies and endorsed alternative approaches. David 
Trubek and Richard Abel were obviously critical scholars and became later founding 
members of CLS, and John Griffiths can also be considered as a critical scholar.
257
 
Now, it has been argued that the denial of tenure was due to the leftist and critical nature 
of these scholars.
258
 Although the occasion may not be so simple,
259
 it nevertheless sug-
gests the tensions within the law school. Young scholars eager to change the curriculum 
and scholarship did not always receive a hospitable reception, and the disappointments 
that students felt while studying continued in the early phase of their academic careers.   
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   The tension was also obvious in legal theory. In the 1960s and 1970s, various 
forms of interdisciplinary legal scholarship came to prominence, as did theories of 
rights revitalizing the liberal paradigm.
260
 Indeed, rights entered the core of legal theory 
in the 1970s. The journal Human Rights was founded in 1970. It was considered appro-
priate because human rights were threatened by “extremists who show contempt for 
society’s laws”, “the politics of polarization”, and politicians who push “repressive laws 
which erode constitutional and individual liberties.”261 Rights were a concern of the 
whole legal profession, and all kinds of extremist politics were considered as threats to 
them. Legal scholars thus became interested in human and civil rights in the late 1960s 
and, as the crisis of law and society intensified in the early 1970s, these aspects became 
even more important.  
   The perceptions of and responses to the crisis varied, however. A major response 
was the theories emphasizing rights.
262
 One of the reformers in the rights direction was 
Ronald Dworkin. According to him, both the radical and the conservative perspective 
on the crisis were based on a positivist conception of law. He thought, therefore, that an 
alternate theory of law was needed that could connect law to the social and ethical inst i-
tutions and reduce the ideological conflict. Everyone would thus be committed to the 
same social convention and principled argument.
263
 The alternate theory would recog-
nize the distinction between rules and principles and be flexible when needed,
264
 and 
place the greatest emphasis on individual rights.
265
 Dworkin’s attack on positivism was 
an attempt to point out the impossibility of strict rule positivism and the inevitable 
amount of discretion, and to synthesize these assumptions in a way that would preserve 
the idea of the rule of law, adapt judicial discretion within rational boundaries, and pro-
duce liberal outcomes. It was a theory of legal liberalism maintaining the faith both in 
the rule of law and in the glories of the Warren Court.  
   The reactions to the contemporary problems revealed the tension within the pro-
fession. Many legal scholars developed alternative theories but remained true to the 
claim of neutrality and rationality. Even if the majority accepted the fact that there was 
discretion in judicial decision-making and that the courts did sometimes legislate, they 
sought to elaborate objective standards for the reasoning in order to minimize subjective 
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discretion.
266
 Even if many of the realist insights were incorporated into legal thought, 
the emphasis on the neutrality and rationality of the legal process was great, and legal 
theory aimed at minimizing the personal input in legal reasoning. 
   The persistent commitment to neutrality and rationality provoked more critical re-
sponses, too. Critical scholars labeled the defense of the tradition as liberal legalism, 
and attacked the foundations of legal thought. Those who were more willing to revise 
the tradition argued for a more realistic scholarship, and were skeptical of the possibility 
of neutrality in judicial decision-making.
267
 Arthur Miller argued that values and ideo-
logies were necessary parts of law and legal scholarship and therefore had to be openly 
explicated.
268
 With respect to legal theory and reasoning, faith in liberal legalism distin-
guished radical scholars from alternative scholars. The frustration with legalism was 
evident in Lester Mazor’s critique, for whom legalism was “a law-worship which 
ma[de] law into ideology,” and hence law was “equated with justice and order or it 
[was] at least assumed to be the principal vehicle of their accomplishment.”269 Accord-
ing to the critical view, the “crisis of liberal legalism” followed the fact that law and 
social ideology were connected and law was thus part of the problem rather than a solu-
tion. As legal scholars were developing theories to make law a powerful tool of rights, 
critical scholars became pessimistic and argued that the problems of law could not be 
overcome if the problems of society were not resolved first.  
   For the radicals, the crisis of contemporary law was fundamental. As scholars of 
law and development had realized, law followed the development of society and created 
a framework for capitalist ideology.
270
 Thus, the critical scholars argued that there were 
more fundamental problems to solve than to figure out how law could guarantee peace 
and equality.
271
 With the help of the theory of Max Weber, David Trubek pointed out 
that since modern Western law was an outcome of the development of capitalism and a 
major contributor to its preservation, it opposed democratic interests.
272
 The rise of the 
Marxian-Weberian scholarship and social criticism, as well as the disappointments with 
the social reforms and the development mission led to the realization of the fundamental 
bias of law towards the interests of capitalism. The critical notion, then, encouraged 
elaboration of a theory that could decode the structures of the legal system. The 1960s 
had been a time of the development of critical thought, and in the early-1970s, critical 
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legal scholars began to analyze the fundamental problems of law in order to point out 
the futility of the liberal paradigm.   
   The critical attitude of the 1960s, the legacy of the New Left, and the vast crisis of 
society, the economy, science, and law produced the rise of the critical legal academy. 
By the early 1970s, there were many young scholars who grew up during the turbulence 
of the previous decade, and acquired a strong basis of critical theoretical knowledge. 
The revision of Marxist and critical scholarship occurred later in America than in Eu-
rope, and European Marxism was still relatively unknown to the American intelligentsia 
in the early 1970s. When the American scholars realized the need of neo-Marxism for 
critical thought, they began to introduce the European revision to their colleagues,
273
 
since it was considered as a useful basis for a critical theory that could analyze the ele-
ments of society in a critical and dialectical fashion. As the young neo-Marxist scholar, 
New Left activist, and a future CLS scholar, Karl Klare, wrote in reviewing Marxist 
science and the conception of totality within it, “[d]ialectical analysis discovers the es-
sence, the universal content or meanings implied in concrete existence.” This was im-
portant because “[t]he whole gives meaning to the parts, which are the particular deter-
minants of the whole.”274 Dialectical analysis was essential to critical legal scholarship 
because the problem of liberal legalism regarded “precisely the combination of formal 
legal equality and extreme economic inequality which is the distinctive characteristic of 
the liberal state.”275 Recent scholarship had produced lots of evidence on the social 
problems, but the reasons for the problems needed further clarification. As activism was 
waning and the radicals were building careers at the universities, the theoretical under-
standing of the deep structures and consciousness became the key word of the critical 
enterprise.       
   The recent development in legal scholarship, debates about legal education, and 
the social and legal crisis converged in critical legal scholarship. Richard Abel, for in-
stance, called for a legal scholarship that would explore the gap between law in books 
and law in action, be open with values, and advocate inter-disciplinary methods,
276
 be-
cause “an explanation of change in legal standards must involve not only the element of 
behavior outside the legal arena, but also behavior inside it, the structure of legal institu-
tions, ideology, attitudes toward law, and the social and political structure of the larger 
society.”277 The fundamental elements resembled law and society scholarship, but the 
stress on the ideological and structural factors as well as the relative autonomy of law 
brought more critical elements to the theory. The transformation of the thought struc-
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tures of the critical scholars directed their interest in the construction of law as well as 
the legal consciousness both within and outside the legal profession.  
   In emphasizing the deep structures of law and consciousness, the constitutive as-
pects of law also became important. In a lengthy article on the institutions of dispute 
resolution, Abel analyzed the structures and functions of the Western judiciary, arguing 
that the western dispute resolution system produced social isolation, depersonalization 
and abstraction of social relations, and inequalities in access to justice.
278
 He noted that 
structural analysis and comparative studies “compels us to recognize the contingency of 
our own ways, and leads us to look for explanations.”279 Western law was pictured as a 
social construction which contributed to the preservation of social ideology. The com-
bination of the sociological approach to law with the notion of law as a cultural con-
struct and a perspective on the law's ideological aspects was an important theoretical 
element on the way toward fundamental criticism of law. It directed the attention toward 
the notion that law was contingent, yet it served certain purposes, and the relationship 
between these needed examination and explanation.   
   The irrationality of law and its ideological nature were the two most fundamental 
points of the critical legal scholarship that was developing in the early 1970s. These 
were the times when Duncan Kennedy began his criticism of legal reasoning. In 1973, 
he articulated the view that there was no rational basis for judicial decision-making. 
Since adjudication was also an act of legislation, there was no justification for the coer-
cive action of the courts. Rules were simply the standards of the mechanics of compro-
mising conflicting interests and had no individual purpose.
280
 Kennedy’s article was one 
of the first steps toward a sophisticated philosophical critique of legal reasoning. Using 
a detailed analysis he sought to point out the inconsistencies in the concept of law and 
rules and the irrationality of their application. The claim of the irrationality of law was 
becoming a theory instead of simple criticism.   
   Kennedy’s article was innovative at least in a certain sense. The idea of the irra-
tionality of legal reasoning of course followed from the realists, but Kennedy also re-
flected on the coercive nature of the legal process, writing that “[t]he process of rule 
application itself has nothing to do with ‘justice’ or ‘right.’” Rather, it was merely “an 
unfortunate necessity of the perverse structure of the state of nature, and can neither 
generate nor implement any value except the value of abiding by the results of the sub-
stantively rational postulated legitimate legislative compromise.”281 Here Kennedy was 
pointing out the circular character of the legitimacy of law. Besides being irrational, 
Kennedy declared, a purpose of law was also to compel its self-proclaimed legitimacy 
through the process of rule application. Thus, besides criticism, he also participated in 
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the recent debates on the nature of law
282
 by criticizing the efforts to create rational 
boundaries for judicial discretion.
283
 As we saw, the contemporary efforts to place legal 
reasoning within rational boundaries caused a serious counter-reaction from the radical 
side. The insistence on rationality appeared to be an effort to maintain the legitimacy of 
liberal legalism which, for the critical scholars, was the origin of the problem.   
   The radicals aimed at the roots of the legal system since the problems were seen to 
originate there. Law and poverty was a common topic for legal scholars in the 1960s. 
While the critical theory was acquiring a more fundamental character, the critical obser-
vation that law was structurally biased against the poor became more powerfully ex-
plained.
284
 Marc Galanter, who had learned about the repressive nature of law in the law 
and development enterprise, also followed the criticism, arguing that since the position 
of the parties, institutional settings, and the construction of rules all favored those in a 
better social position and made it more difficult for the less privileged to achieve their 
rights, equal opportunities required a fundamental restructuring.
285
 Scholars of the pre-
vious decade had already noted that there was structural bias against the poor, and the 
critical scholars of the 1970s continued this tradition with more theory in their research 
and more fundamental reforms in their sights.   
   As the criticism was becoming fundamental, it also attacked the new paradigms of 
legal scholarship which were alternatives to the tradition. Besides rights theories, law 
and economics was another major jurisprudential trend of the 1960s and 1970s,
286
 its 
purpose being to use economic theories in legal analysis.
287
 Critical legal scholarship 
responded to these schools of jurisprudence by pointing out their impossibility. As we 
saw, the argument against rights theories was that they were unable to provide a rational 
basis for adjudication. C. Edwin Baker, who was about to attack law and economics, 
noted that both traditional utilitarianism and modern rights theories legitimized state 
intervention in the market economy in order to promote social equality. Thus, he 
thought that these two approaches combined could provide a theoretical justification for 
delimiting individual wealth maximization for the sake of the general good.
288
  
   This social theory only preceded the more critical response to law and economics 
which was seen as a justification of modern capitalism. The nihilist Arthur Leff argued 
that law and economics were based on irrational social observations and on its self-
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proclaimed values,
289
 while Baker, continuing his social theory, argued that if efficiency 
was the determining criterion, the rich had the most rights, and law and economics fa-
vored them. Moreover, values within economic analysis of law were derived from mar-
ket capitalism, which meant restrictions on individual freedom and its subordination to 
capitalism.
290
 In addition, Thomas Heller noted that in environmental questions, the 
emphasis on efficiency excluded essential aspects of values and policies which had to 
be included to make legal analysis rational in this respect.
291
 With the analysis of poli-
cies and rights it became usual to consider law and economics as just as irrational as 
traditional jurisprudence and, furthermore, as a guardian of the dominant ideology since 
it derived its values from it and applied them in legal analysis. In tracing the one-
dimensionality and false consciousness of modern legal thought, critical scholars saw 
that the criteria of values used in traditional jurisprudence and in law and economics 
were embedded in the social and economic structures. According to the critical scholars, 
these schools thus simply legitimized the status quo and excluded the possibility of crit-
icism beyond the structures. A crucial point was to go beyond the standards of society 
so that one would not be constrained by its norms.   
   In touching the fundamentals, the criticism of ideology and structures of law be-
came central propositions of critical legal scholarship. In the search for authenticity, the 
critical legal scholars aligned themselves with the New Left intelligentsia at the acade-
my. At the heart of critical scholarship was the need for a new legal consciousness; just 
as at the heart of the counter-culture was the emancipation of the consciousness of the 
self. The Beats, existentialists, and hippies, for example, yearned toward authenticity 
and nature.
292
 The non-conformist wanted to escape the madness of society, become 
free, and acquire an authentic awareness of the self. Law and economics and the rights 
theories were critical in pointing out the inadequacy of traditional scholarship, but they 
did not criticize the inner logic of law itself or the whole basis on which it was con-
structed. The fundamental questioning of the values of society in critical legal scholar-
ship reflected the divergence from the traditional way of life of the counter-cultures.    
   For some part of critical legal scholarship, then, there was a move from structures 
to consciousness. Charles Reich wrote in 1970 that the “real target [was] not a structural 
enemy but consciousness”, and therefore “[t]he creation of a new consciousness [was] 
the most urgent of America’s real needs.”293 Echoing this notion, Lester Mazor called 
for a “renewed understanding of our common humanity” that could lead toward a “defi-
nition of freedom which is not merely a liberty from, but liberation to; a definition of 
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equality which does not rest with the evenhanded administration of opportunity to une-
quals, but demands a distributive justice which compensates for inequalities, whatever 
their origin; a definition of participation which is not satisfied with representation, but 
claims the right to direct involvement in the determination of common good.”294 In the 
same spirit, Baker wrote that there was a need to develop a “new understanding as to 
how law can be used to structure the social arena in a way that promotes human welfare 
and human sovereignty.”295 The shift toward consciousness meant a new understanding 
of humanity, and law in the pursuit of it. A central tenet was to criticize the traditional 
legal consciousness and develop a new one.  
   The fundamental element of the critique required a concept that could grasp the 
consciousness of the legal profession and relate it to society. One of the most famous 
conceptions of legal consciousness was the one Duncan Kennedy developed in the mid-
1970s in The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought,
296
 which remained unpublished. 
According to him, legal consciousness was “a set of concepts and intellectual operations 
that evolve[d] according to a pattern of its own, and exercise[d] an influence on results 
distinguishable from those of political power and economic interests.”297 The concept 
referred to common legal thinking, which was essentially a legal consciousness, but its 
autonomy was relative to the extent that it mediated law with political and economic 
ideologies. Legal consciousness was thus a concept that unified the legal profession, 
and linked it to the political and economic elite.
298
 Legal consciousness was a concept 
with which one could describe the traditional legal thought, and incorporate the domi-
nant economic and political values into legal thinking while maintaining its autonomy. 
It also helped to analyze the differences in legal reasoning within the dominant legal 
thought, since scholars and lawyers could disagree on particular problems while sharing 
the fundamental thought structure.  
   The concept of legal consciousness reflected structuralism and the contemporary 
studies on the genealogy of ideas. In the 1970s, Thomas Kuhn’s concept of the para-
digm was a trend, and talk about “paradigm shift” was popular in law and other disci-
plines.
299
 Legal consciousness was a means of grasping the shared concepts of the pro-
fession within its context and point out the structural biases of the profession, and it thus 
was a necessary concept for critical scholarship. It was a part of the elaboration of a 
conceptual apparatus that could grasp the totality of the social order and place it under 
investigation.  
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   The criticism of the consciousness behind the law as well as the project of so-
called total criticism became crucial tasks for critical legal scholarship. The books Rob-
erto Mangabeira Unger published in the mid-1970s represent essential stages in the de-
velopment of new way of thinking and criticism of contemporaneous.
300
 Unger’s 
Knowledge and Politics began with a proclamation: “I have written this essay as an act 
of hope. It points toward a kind of thought and society that does not yet and may never 
exist.”301 Unger developed a full critique of the society that could reveal its ultimate 
irrationality and ideology and establish a context for an alternative ideology for a better 
society. He argued that liberalism contained antinomies, or paradoxes that caused con-
tradictions and conflicts within consciousness, society, and law.
302
 These “antinomies 
ar[o]se out of an identical conception of the way universals (theory, reason, and rules) 
[we]re related to particulars (fact, desire, and values).”303  
   Unger’s theory was a synthesis of the critical thought of the 1960s, expressed in 
philosophical language. At the heart of his theory was the notion of polarities between 
the universal and the particular, and the fact and the value, and the contradictions, or 
antinomies, between them. Unger sought to demonstrate that liberal consciousness kept 
the form and the substance of thought and political activity separated, and this caused 
paradoxes that were impossible to resolve. Unger argued, however, also that there could 
be no particular without the universal, and vice versa, and there could be no facts with-
out values. Hence the legal system was also both substance and process, and these two 
could not be kept separate without logical inconsistencies. The purpose here was to tie 
all of the elements of law and society together, and thus to produce a theory of total crit-
icism.   
   The aim of the total criticism was to point out that the legal process could not 
function the way it was supposed to under modern western liberal democracy. As Unger 
explained, the antinomy of rules and values in legal justice was that it could neither dis-
pense values nor be made compatible with them. Adjudication in the sense of the rule of 
law was thus a paradox, because values, which were subjective, were always present 
within it and there were no standards of rational decision-making. The subjectivity of 
values ought to be included in law so that it could promote the true good of human na-
ture.
304
 By pointing out that rules and facts as well as the processes of thought in which 
they were connected were always tied to values, Unger sought to demonstrate that legal 
rules and principles were always preconditioned by the person applying them and by the 
society that created them. This total criticism was an articulation of the idea that law 
was bound by the social structures and consciousness, and therefore an understanding of 
the deep structures and a fundamental alteration was needed to provide real alternatives.   
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   Besides being the most ambitious effort to produce a critical legal theory, Unger’s 
book also demonstrated the problems of criticism. The theory was difficult to under-
stand and its reception varied from skeptical to critical. Some scholars argued that Un-
ger stretched his criticism too far,
305
 or that he did not take his analysis far enough.
306
 In 
a very critical response, the book was called confusing, superficial, unconvincing, and 
too abstract and thus empty.
307
 In addition, the critics noted that Unger had used subjec-
tive values of good and bad in assessing modern consciousness, and drawn conclusions 
without solid logic,
308
 and that he had delved into basic problems of philosophy without 
however providing any novel solutions to them and thus falling into the traps of which 
he accused liberal thought.
309
 Total criticism involved a new mode of thinking, but Un-
ger’s critics claimed that he was not able to build his theory on a basis any more con-
vincing than the liberal tradition he criticized. Nevertheless, Unger’s book was the first 
attempt to elaborate a systematic and sophisticated theory of total criticism of society 
and law.  
   Despite the critical response, Unger developed his theory further by concentrating 
on the role of law in modern society in a book titled accordingly. Its fundamental prem-
ise was that modern society required a certain kind of formalist and rational law. The 
development of society and the paradoxes within law, however, had turned the law into 
a threat to the prerequisites of society and to the rule of law which, nonetheless, myst i-
fied and legitimized the prevailing inequalities. Hence there was “the sense of being 
surrounded by injustice without knowing where justice lies.”310 The relationship be-
tween the form of society and law was crucial because the form of social life “is a 
meaningful whole of the most comprehensive kind. Each embodies an entire mode of 
human existence. And for each the law plays a crucial role in revealing and determining 
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the relationship of belief to organization.”311 Traditional social theories had either rei-
fied consciousness or disregarded it. Therefore, there was no way to escape the dilemma 
of the fact that the rule of law could not keep its promises. Social theory had thus to 
become both metaphysical and political.
312
  
   Criticism of Unger’s theory pointed out the huge split in the ways of thinking. The 
famous sociologist, Talcott Parsons, argued that Unger’s conception of the relation be-
tween law and the state, and the significance of formalism for the rule of law were too 
rigid and not completely applicable to modern society. Unger had not understood the 
development of society or the role of law within it.
313
 Unger’s theories were interesting 
depictions of their time and legal scholarship. Unger reflected the general social crit i-
cism and the concepts of false consciousness and one-dimensionality, and sought to 
point out that the modern liberal theory in its simplest sense was untenable. He dressed 
these thoughts in very sophisticated and scientific language, and analyzed the scientific 
aspects of law and society instead of simply criticizing them from his subjective point 
of view although, according to his critics, he was not able to completely detach himself 
from subjectivity.  
   Sometimes even labeled as the “master theoretician” of CLS,314 Unger managed to 
capture many of the essentials of the critical thought of the time in his theory. His books 
represented the most systematic and sophisticated form of critical legal thought at a time 
when it was turning into a broader academic movement. By using a multi-disciplinary 
analysis, Unger sought to point out that the institutions of modern society were based on 
relative values, and that the legal system that was meant to protect these values was in 
fact in contradiction to them. Criticism of law was thus moving from the stress on the 
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biases of law towards the notion that law was not simply political, but also contradictory 
beneath the surface of apparent rationality.     
   From the mid-1970s onwards, the major tenet of criticism was to articulate the im-
possibility of the modern system and to call for a thoroughgoing alternative. Duncan 
Kennedy also elaborated his theory on the contradictions and inconsistencies of law. 
These consisted of the fact that values were inherent in law and their presence depended 
on the form. Therefore, values and rules, and form and substance were connected. This 
resulted in the contradiction between individualism and altruism in law. The former was 
manifested in formal and neutral rules which supported freedom of individual choice, 
while the latter was manifested in flexible standards which were used to promote the 
common good. The problems were, however, that, first, there was no rational way to 
choose between these two and, second, both of them could be used in similar cases to 
obtain contradictory results.
315
  
   In this “indeterminacy thesis”, Kennedy sought to demonstrate the inherent irra-
tionality of legal reasoning. At the basis of his argument was the notion that both rules 
and standards, both individualism and altruism, were biased and, moreover, could be 
used in similar cases to obtain contradictory results. Thus, legal arguments could be 
manipulated to mean contradictory things. This was a response to the legal theories that 
sought to construct a rational basis for legal reasoning since, as Kennedy wrote, “we 
cannot ‘balance’ individualist and altruist values or rules against equitable standards, 
except in the tautological sense that we can, as a matter of fact, decide if we have to.”316 
By arguing that conflict was inherent in law and contradictory decisions could always 
be made, critical scholarship could point out that recent theories had not solved the 
problems of formalism but had merely brought new, apparently neutral but equally irra-
tional ideas to legal thought.  
   Critical scholars analyzed the irrationalities of the modern legal system and 
thought in various respects, although not always in the radical sense of Duncan Kenne-
dy. They argued that alternative dispute resolution should be used in assisting the poor 
because the flaws in the system made traditional legal aid inefficient,
317
 and that the 
relationship between law and society caused both the inequalities in the health care ser-
vices and the inability of the government to deal with the issue.
318
 In addition, James 
Atleson, who focused on labor law, noted that traditional policy and scholarship had 
neglected the realities of labor
319
 and supported the biases of the law.
320
 The early criti-
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cal legal studies reflected the “law is politics” argument by suggesting that legal stand-
ards originated in political processes which in turn reflected social and economic inter-
ests. It was then further argued that law forced the legitimacy of the existing biased in-
stitutions and reshaped the consciousness of people. By demonstrating that law was a 
social construct but also had a constitutive aspect, the critics reflected the New Left ide-
as of one-dimensional society and the alienation of the individual.    
   Critical legal scholarship was a diversified phenomenon, but at its heart lay the 
idea of analyzing the paradoxes and inconsistencies of modern law. Critical legal schol-
ars did not consider the prevailing legal theory formalist in the extreme sense but they 
nonetheless noted that the formalist elements in legal reasoning maintained the idea of 
the neutrality and rationality of law.
321
 Rather than formalism, it was the structures and 
the consciousness that had to be criticized. As noted by David Nelken, whereas the var-
ious forms of sociological jurisprudence analyzed law in context, critical scholarship 
analyzed the context by studying the ways law created rationality from irrationality and 
by analyzing the values and policies underlying legal doctrine.
322
 For the critics, the 
relationship between law and society was complex and the ideological functions of law 
had to be studied as well, because the rule of law, as Morton Horwitz declared, created 
formal equality but promoted substantive inequality, encouraged the wealthy to oppress 
the weak by endorsing procedural justice, and depersonalized human relations through 
rational legality.
323
 Critical analysis was set to extirpate these contradictions reflected in 
law which then shrouded them in the language of formality. By the mid-1970s, critical 
legal scholars had become convinced that modern law was unable to fulfill its promises, 
and they took it as their task to reveal this situation.  
   Critical legal scholarship developed during the 1970s when the general social at-
mosphere was becoming more conservative following the radicalism of the 1960s. This 
reflected the legacy of the New Left in the academy. Just as the New Left had searched 
for a participatory democracy that would fulfill the promises of the American Revolu-
tion, critical legal scholarship sought to transcend the false consciousness of liberal le-
galism. As the young would-be scholars who grew up in the New Left atmosphere ma-
tured, they began to set out their critical thoughts in the form of scholarship. As Duncan 
Kennedy has since described the situation, he was a bohemian youngster in a black tur-
tleneck reading French existentialism and philosophy, and then, as a young teacher he 
was influenced by the critical scholarship of Roberto Unger, Morton Horwitz, Karl 
Klare, and Al Katz.
324
 Critical scholars were people identifying with the New Left cause 
and the non-conformist ideology of the 1960s. The impulses of critical scholarship came 
from society, and the development of the theory reflected the currents of philosophy and 
science. The question was also of young scholars who were disappointed with the tradi-
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tional academy and wanted to challenge the authority of the old faculty and traditional 
scholarship.     
   As the critical scholars began to pay attention to the causes of the legal crisis, they 
started to examine the dynamics of legal thought and to criticize its ideological aspects. 
Critical legal scholarship did not simply criticize law but sought to analyze its deep 
structures and to point out their impact on the social reality and the law. The radical 
criticism was a synthesis of social radicalism and the recent critical and alternative 
scholarship both in law and the academia in general. It developed in the early 1970s by 
turning critical and sociological jurisprudence into a more systematic critical theory, and 
even though there still were only a few articles in the mid-1970s, the latter part of the 
decade witnessed a tremendous increase in the critical legal literature and the organiza-
tion of the critical movement. Nevertheless, the image of the development of critical 
legal scholarship would be inadequate without a look at some particular aspects of its 
development. Thus, I shall briefly examine the development of the critical thought in 
legal history, constitutional law, and criminal law, because these insights provide fur-
ther perspectives. 
 
3.1.4 Critical perspectives on legal history 
 
Since alternative scholarship endorsed inter-disciplinary legal studies, legal history was 
an important part of the law and society movement. It was also important for critical 
legal scholarship because of the need to point out the development of law in order to 
reveal its social functions. Sociological legal history had been developing since the 
1950s, and by the 1970s, there was a tradition of alternative legal history that studied 
the history of the social functions of law
325
 and the general context in which the legal 
changes took place.
326
 Willard Hurst, law and society scholar, and a remarkable figure 
in American legal history, criticized traditional legal history for its emphasis on courts 
and doctrines and for its neglect of social factors, arguing that legal history had to focus 
on law in action and relate law to other spheres of society, such as the economy, reli-
gion and social class.
327
 Hurst, however, distanced himself from the Marxist tradition. 
The difference between the history of law and society on the one hand, and Marxist his-
tory on the other, was that the former “stress the economic (in the broad sense) but do 
not ignore the complementary role of other factors.”328 The difference between the criti-
cal-dialectical method of Marxism and the functionalism of law and society scholarship 
was not tremendous, but it reflected the dynamic between sociological and critical juris-
prudence. It was this dynamic from which critical legal history originated.  
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   Critical legal history emerged from the notion that law withheld aspects of con-
sciousness and power which sometimes functioned autonomously and sometimes re-
flected the tensions from which law originated back on society. For instance, in an arti-
cle on the emergence of the instrumental conception of law in Antebellum America, 
Morton Horwitz argued that law did not simply respond to social change, but judges had 
also used law to encourage social change and promote commercial interests.
329
 In addi-
tion, in an analysis of the theory of law and society legal history, Mark Tushnet noted 
that Willard Hurst’s conception of law was based on an optimistic presumption of social 
consensus and ignored the relation between the social class struggle and law.
330
 Critical 
analysis of the history of law had to acknowledge the complex interdependence between 
law and society because the functional perspective, it was argued, provided too rational 
an image of legal history.    
   As in critical legal theory, legal consciousness and the structures of law were es-
sential aspects of critical legal history. This was clear in the scholarship of Morton 
Horwitz, the most important figure in the critical legal history of the 1970s. He thought 
that traditional legal history was very conservative because it focused on the doctrine 
and the profession, emphasized origins and continuity, and had neglected the relation-
ship between law and politics, as well as the various conflicts that had characterized the 
history of law. Thus, wrote Horwitz, traditional legal history “never conceives of legal 
change as the result of political struggle but only as a result of changes in the received 
tradition brought about as jurisprudential thought progressively unfolds new truths.”331 
Horwitz criticized traditional legal history, not law and society legal history, but the 
point was that legal history should analyze the inner conflicts of law and see law as a 
result of social and political conflicts.  
   In the course of the decade, Horwitz continued his project of combining the in-
strumental conception of law with Marxist elements. He noted that the changes in prop-
erty law responded to the needs of the developing economy in the early nineteenth cen-
tury,
332
 and that the changes in contract law reflected the rise of market capitalism at the 
same time.
333
 If Marxism means stress on the economy and class struggle in explaining 
social inequities,
334
 then Horwitz’s legal history was Marxist to a large extent even 
though he did not underline the fact. He analyzed the changes in law against their eco-
nomic background and noted that as the instrumental conception of law developed, legal 
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doctrines were changed to promote the interests of the markets and to support economic 
growth. The studies on the historical origins of the law propped up the critical argument 
that the law favored the rich over the poor.  
   American historiography in general was changing at the time. There was a long 
tradition of critical revision of the past of the republic,
335
 and in the 1970s, historians 
revised Marxism to suit the modern circumstances and to cleanse it from the stigma of 
socialist demagoguery.
336
 Largely because of the scholarship of Hurst,
337
 legal history 
also had turned toward social history to a significant extent,
338
 which led “one to doubt 
Horwitz’s conclusion that the conservative tradition is dominant in the writing of Amer-
ican legal history.”339 Moreover, the early response to Horwitz’s articles was relatively 
positive.
340
 The target of the criticism seems to have been more the general scholarly 
tradition than contemporary legal history in fact. Horwitz felt that the legal history writ-
ing in general was conservative, and his scholarship inspired students who felt the same 
way.
341
 His methods were unconventional, at least to the extent that there was no similar 
legal historian in the 1970s even if socially oriented legal history in general was becom-
ing more widespread. It is obvious that critical scholars viewed the tradition in carica-
turized terms but this followed from the way they felt the tradition at the time. 
   Whatever the state of the general scholarship in the 1970s, the connection between 
modern capitalist consciousness and law became pronounced in the critical history writ-
ing. Horwitz focused on the modern origins of the connection, noting that the formalism 
of the latter part of the nineteenth century resulted from the convergence and synthesis 
of the professional need to create scientific jurisprudence, the need of the economic elite 
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to stabilize the law, and the fact that the interests of these two groups coincided.
342
 His-
torical development had also produced the radical separation between law and politics 
and the unfounded belief in neutral legalism.
343
 Historical studies expanded the critical 
notions on the conflicting nature of law. Thus, the biases and inconsistencies beyond the 
apparent neutrality and rationality were seen as historical consequences.   
   The literature and approaches of critical legal history increased after the mid-
1970s, the purpose often being to go beyond the social context of the law and society 
history.
344
 In a Marxist analysis of the employment at will rule, Jay Feinman argued that 
the rule had developed apart from contract law in order to promote the domination of 
the labor force by the capitalists.
345
 Marxist analysis was often used to point out the 
myth of neutrality and the class biases of law, as was evident in the study by Mark 
Tushnet, who analyzed the inner dynamic of law. Relying on Weber, he pointed out that 
the law on slavery evolved from complex situations into a unified body of law. A con-
cept of formal rationality emerged, allowing the judges to apply the law in the best in-
terests of the slave-owners while maintaining a humane ideology.
346
 The purpose of the 
analysis of the connections between the relative autonomy and inner dynamic of law on 
the one hand, and the social circumstances and ideology on the other, was to point out 
how law affected people’s consciousness and was a reason for false consciousness. Crit-
ical legal history acquired the aspect of ideology and the relative autonomy of law, both 
of which marked its difference from the functionalist histories. 
   The clash between a modern, functionalist legal history and critical legal history 
came into the open after the mid-decade in the wake of the publication of Lawrence 
Friedman's A History of American Law. Friedman, himself a law and society scholar, 
sought to write a history of law in its social context. According to him, law was a “mir-
ror of society”, and hence legal history took “nothing as historical accident, nothing as 
autonomous, everything as relative and molded by economy and society.”347 This, how-
ever, did not please the critical scholars. Lester Mazor argued that Friedman provided 
“neither a social history of law in the United States nor the means from which we might 
construct one.”348 And Mark Tushnet criticized Friedman for neglecting the relative 
                                               
342 Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 American Journal of Legal History 251, 256 
(1975).  
343 Morton J. Horwitz, The Legacy of 1776 in Legal and Economic Thought, 19 Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics 621, 624–627, 631–632 (1976).  
344 Gordon 1975, supra n. 337 at 51–55. Gordon has called the legal history of Hurst realist-functionalism, 
thus characterizing it as a variation of the traditional legal history. (On the differences between realist-
functionalist and critical legal history, see Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stanford Law Re-
view 57, 64, 67, 100–102, n. 120 (1984).)  
345 Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 American Journal of Legal 
History 118, 131–134 (1976).   
346 Mark Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery, 1810–1860: A Study in the Persistence of Legal Auton-
omy, 10 Law & Society Review 119, 152–153, 160, 177–180 (1975).  
347 Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (New York: Simon and Schuster 1973), 10.  
348 Lester Mazor, Book Review [A History of American Law], 60 Minnesota Law Review 147, 158 
(1975).  
103 
 
autonomy and the ideological function of law and for applying a certain kind of vulgar 
Marxist theory that provided only partial explanations.
349
  
   We saw that structures and consciousness were essential to critical legal scholar-
ship and history, and the neglect of them was what differentiated sociological approach-
es from it. Tushnet concluded that Friedman’s book was to be regarded as “the last great 
work of the 1950’s, not as the first work of the 1970’s or 1980’s.”350 Critical legal histo-
ry marked another turn in the writing of American legal history. It was an important part 
of the development of critical legal scholarship, providing many arguments on the histo-
ry of modern legal institutions. Its purpose was to analyze the history of the rule of law, 
but, as Horwitz wrote, it was to do more than “simply to pile on evidence of the hypo-
critical character of its claims to political neutrality.”351 Critical legal history analyzed 
the development and changes in law in a complicated manner in order to reveal its true 
nature, origins, and purposes. It was not scholarship simply for the sake of history, but 
had a role in contemporary times as well. It pointed out the origins of modern institu-
tions and thus contributed to the demystifying of ideology. It did not seek to legitimize 
the authority of the modern state but to delegitimize it.   
   Critical legal history developed within the dynamic of legal thought in the late 
1960s and during the 1970s. The realistic instrumentalism of law and society and recent 
historiography contributed to its development, and it rose out of the conflict between the 
different approaches. Critical scholars were dissatisfied with the functionalism of the 
law and society legal history, and pursued a more complicated theory of the develop-
ment of law. Critical legal history did not simply criticize, but also sought to explain the 
development and changes in law in order to gain a better understanding of them. In do-
ing so it applied the methods of Marxism and critical revision of history, and thus relat-
ed the methods of history to the recent trends in critical legal scholarship. Horwitz 
greatly developed the methodology and substance of critical legal history in a series of 
articles published in the 1970s and, as will be seen later, his book became one of the 
most important pieces of critical legal studies literature. 
 
3.1.5 Constitutional law and criticism 
 
The situation in constitutional law was quite confused in the mid-1960s.
352
 Constitu-
tional law was often at the center of jurisprudential debates because of the central posi-
tion of the Constitution and the Supreme Court. Recent Supreme Court decisions had 
provoked lots of comment, such as the debate on neutral principles which had exposed 
the vulnerable state of constitutional doctrine. Scholars could thus lament that even after 
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a thousand years of history there was “no accepted conception of the nature of the judi-
cial process.”353 At least since the time of legal realism, almost every legal scholar 
acknowledged that courts made law in accordance with the changes in society. Howev-
er, the traditional view nonetheless held that the courts should declare “as law only the 
most widely shared values” or principles that will “gain general assent,”354 and main-
tained the ideals of the rule of law and neutrality of law because of their important sym-
bolic functions.
355
 The Warren Court era made the traditionalists stress the division be-
tween legislative and judicial functions,
356
 as well as reason and consistency in judicial 
decision-making,
357
 while a more critical view held that the faith in neutrality and ra-
tionality merely perpetuated many myths,
358
 and thus jurisprudence and the courts ought 
to advocate value arguments to promote social good.
359
 
   There was no extreme formalism in constitutional scholarship but, according to the 
traditional view, law was to be as rational and neutral as possible. While the traditional-
ists wanted to maintain these notions, alternative scholars of the 1960s and 1970s en-
dorsed a more social jurisprudence. Critical legal scholarship emanated from the tension 
between the traditional and the alternative views. Although comprehensive critical con-
stitutional theory was not developed until the end of the 1970s, there were critical con-
stitutional scholars before that.
360
 The criticism of constitutional law evolved during the 
1960s and 1970s through a series of various forms of criticism and articles pointing out 
the flaws in the traditional constitutional theory and thus contributing to the develop-
ment of the critical thought.  
   Realist notions with respect to constitutional law were clear in the late sixties. For 
instance, Arthur Miller, who participated widely in the legal debates of the time and 
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who was one of the most prominent realist and critical constitutional scholars of the 
1960s, encouraged an impact analysis of the Supreme Court decisions.
361
 Later he de-
veloped a jurisprudence of consequences that would openly allow policy considerations 
in judicial decision-making and incorporate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
into the Constitution of the United States.
362
 The realist insight on the Supreme Court 
stressed the impact of the Court’s decisions on society and therefore encouraged policy 
analysis over certainty and neutrality. Political jurisprudence was the main realist analy-
sis of the courts, but legal scholars became more interested in the issue as well.   
   Policy analysis of the Supreme Court increased in the 1960s. Scholars of political 
jurisprudence had suspended “belief in the whole web and myth of specialty, mystery 
and tradition that surrounds and supports the judge.” Rather, the purpose was to consid-
er the judge as “one of many government employees, operating in a bureaucratic struc-
ture, performing certain governmental services and generally engaging in the same po-
litical processes as his fellow public servants.”363 Legal scholars were not, however, 
pleased with the behavioralism or political determinism of political jurisprudence be-
cause the Supreme Court was “concerned with formulating and promulgating juristic 
theories of politics.”364 Legal scholars had to pay attention not only to the policy func-
tions of the courts but also to their legal limits and formulations. Critical constitutional 
theory was about to be formed as the notions of the political scientists were adapted to 
the contemporary legal debates.   
   The constitutional status of contemporary problems was naturally an interesting 
topic for legal scholars and communitarian values became important arguments. Popular 
subjects were the typical problems of concern, such as welfare rights,
365
 poverty,
366
 and 
the discrimination against the African Americans
367
 and women.
368
 Scholars were often 
concerned with the ambiguous status of the constitutional protection of the rights of the 
less privileged classes, arguing that constitutional adjudication in fact discriminated 
against them or that the law should be changed to guarantee equal rights better. The 
concern of the alternative scholars was that the traditional doctrinal analysis did not 
examine the law in action while emphasizing rationality. They therefore took the factual 
problems as their subjects and developed methodologies to explore them.   
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   Critical scholars were not pleased with the pursuit of rationality and neutrality in 
judicial decision-making because they thought that it concealed the motives for the de-
cisions and thus contributed to the persistence of the problems. For instance, Mark 
Tushnet argued that inconsistent doctrines and discriminatory practices followed the 
policy motives behind the decisions
369
 and the need to obtain a majority for the con-
servative ideology.
370
 David Shapiro also considered the conservative ideology behind 
the decisions,
371
 and William Clune analyzed how individualist and formalist interpreta-
tion weakened the protection of the constitutional rights of the poor.
372
 The proposition 
following the criticism was that the courts should not simply protect but also promote 
economic equality.
373
 According to the critical scholars, the apparent neutrality of legal 
reasoning exacerbated social inequality because law and legal thinking were structured 
to favor the powerful classes. Constitutional scholars followed the critical argument that 
since there was no rational basis for the judicial decision-making which always promot-
ed certain interests, policy considerations should be taken into account.  
   The schism between the traditionalist’s drive toward rationality and the critics’ 
urge toward policy analysis became obvious in the commentaries on the Supreme 
Court’s opinions. Indeed, the rights of the individual citizen and the right to personal 
liberty were very controversial issues. The abortion case, in which the Court had opined 
that it violated the Constitution if abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy was 
criminalized, was probably the most controversial decision of the 1970s, bringing up the 
controversies over rational and arbitrary decision-making.
374
 While the point of the tra-
ditionalists criticizing the Court was to limit the revival of substantive due process and 
create rational and neutral structures for judicial decision-making, the alternative and 
critical scholars sought to put legal reasoning on terms with modern society. It was ar-
gued, for example, that the abortion decision was distinguished from the infamous sub-
stantive due process decisions of the early twentieth century by the fact that it con-
formed to the opinion of the majority of the people.
375
 Furthermore, although not writ-
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ing about the abortion case, Tushnet sought to create standards for substantive due pro-
cess, claiming that it was acceptable when the right in question was socially important, 
recognized in practice, had close connections to constitutional rights, was ordinarily 
exercised in legal analysis, and was important in terms of common sense.
376
 Alternative 
scholarship encouraged flexible legal reasoning that would acknowledge the values and 
policies the case concerned. Whereas traditional legal scholarship sought to increase the 
rationality and neutrality of legal reasoning, alternative legal scholarship sought to adapt 
the policy and value aspects into terms of a more just society and, whereas the former 
was concerned with the flaws in legal reasoning, the latter paid attention to the motives 
behind the reasoning.  
   The critical notions entered the constitutional analysis in the various studies. Al-
ternative constitutional scholarship took a stand on many modern topics. Some scholars 
stressed the obligations of man toward nature,
377
 while others noted that the increase in 
presidential powers was harmful to democracy.
378
 Environmentalism began to interest 
legal scholars in the 1970s, and participatory democracy was still an important topic. 
The ideological elements also became apparent in some of the critical analyses. Com-
menting on freedom of expression and commercial interests, C. Edwin Baker argued 
that commercial speech should not be constitutionally protected because it was not in-
volved in the self-realization of the individual that freedom of speech was meant to pro-
tect and, furthermore, it coerced people and promoted selfishness and inequality.
379
 
Even critical scholars stressed the significance of individualism, but their concept of 
individualism differed from the traditional one, and they also emphasized the communi-
tarian context in which it was pursued. Following the spirit of Marcuse, they argued that 
modern individualism was coerced by the economic structures and was therefore not 
authentic. Critical scholars thus reconsidered old concepts, such as freedom of expres-
sion, in the changed context so that they could be used in the pursuit of true individual 
rights and equality. 
   The critical constitutional literature of the 1960s and 1970s was closer to realism 
and progressive liberalism rather than radical. Nevertheless, the connection between 
critical legal scholarship and constitutional law was clear. Traditional scholarship was 
criticized for its urge toward rationality and neutrality which, the critical scholars insist-
ed, masked the real motives and impact of the law. Critical scholarship was not simply 
destructive but also sought to develop alternative doctrines that would promote the val-
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ues and policies the scholars considered important, and thus it often took a stand on 
controversial contemporary problems. Criticism of constitutional law reflected the criti-
cal thought of the time in various ways and, by the mid-1970s, the elements of the ide-
ology of constitutional law were obvious in the discourse. 
 
3.1.6 Critical scholarship on criminal law 
 
Criminal law was an important part of legal scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s. This 
was largely due to the growing crime rates and juvenile delinquency. Aside from the 
war on poverty there was a war on crime.
380
 In addition, the Supreme Court made some 
of its most controversial decisions with respect to criminal procedure.
381
 Thus, at the 
time of social turbulence, rising crime, controversies over criminal policy, and the rise 
of alternative scholarship, problems of crime became an interesting topic for academia.  
   During the 1960s, alternative criminology became popular. The first decades of 
the century had already witnessed efforts to produce sociological criminal law scholar-
ship, but no fundamental change of paradigm occurred until the 1950s, when the com-
bination of legal scholarship and social science was once again on the rise.
382
 The rise of 
“critical criminology”, which occurred with the rise of critical sociology, criticized both 
the scholarship and its object, having a critical perspective on crime both as a social and 
as a legal phenomenon.
383
 Although critical criminology expanded enormously in the 
1970s,
384
 critical legal scholars remained relatively uninterested in criminal law.
385
 Crit-
ical criminal law scholarship, mostly a scholarship of sociology and criminology, fo-
cused more on the functional and procedural aspects of law than on doctrine. In any 
event, changes in the scholarship provide a valuable perspective on the development of 
the critical thought.  
   Critical scholarship on crime and criminal law was boosted in the 1960s. The in-
creased attention to the biases of law against the poor was also apparent in criminal law 
scholarship. A common notion amongst the alternative scholars was that “in reality the 
law regularly works to the disadvantage of the already more disadvantaged classes.”386 
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The scholars noted that poor people were more likely to be incarcerated because they 
were often unable to raise bail,
387
 were discriminated in hearings and bail settings,
388
 
and the defense system was unfavorable to them.
389
 It was also noted that the sentence 
often depended on the race of the accused.
390
 Studies on self-reported crime had re-
vealed that crime is general in all social classes, which directed attention to discretion in 
the administration of justice,
391
 the general notion being that there were various dispari-
ties within the administration of criminal justice, some of which were unjustified.
392
 
Empirical studies supported the critical opinion by pointing out that the “perception of 
unequal treatment [was] the single most important source of popular dissatisfaction with 
the American legal system.”393 The studies reflected the rising importance of social 
equality and the rising awareness of the biases of law as well as the fact that empirical 
and sociological studies were appearing more frequently. Alternative scholars wanted to 
apply alternative methods in legal research, criticize the system, and participate in polit-
ical debates.  
   The discrepancy between the ideal and the reality of the administration of criminal 
justice was the main concern of the critical studies. The critical argument held that 
“[t]he reality of sanctioning in the American criminal court, in short, is a far cry from an 
idea-typical formal-rational administration of justice in which a determination is 
reached by measuring the facts of the case against the sole yardstick of an abstract, gen-
eral category of legally proscribed acts.”394 An empirical study on the impact of the no-
torious Miranda decision on the interrogation procedure revealed that in fact the deci-
sion had very little impact.
395
 Furthermore, another study pointed out that the psycho-
logical context of the interrogations undermined the effects of simple information on 
rights which meant that an advocate was needed to make the rights of the suspect effec-
tive.
396
 Besides discrimination, the researchers sought to point out that the rights of the 
suspect did not hamper the criminal procedure. Since the structures of the administra-
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tion of criminal justice caused problems that were difficult to solve on the surface level, 
the studies and further measures were needed.  
   The functions of punishments were also analyzed, since the fundamentals of the 
criminal justice system were concerned. Scholars studying the impact of punishment 
argued that the stigmatizing effect of legal sanctions varied according to the social sta-
tus of the defendant.
397
 They also noted that the deterrent effect of punishment varied 
according to the type of crime and offender, but the criminal system imposed the most 
severe punishments on those least likely to be deterred while punishing those who could 
be deterred more leniently.
398
 Thus, the whole basis of the criminal system was placed 
under scrutiny, general deterrence often being an important topic.
399
 A critical notion 
was that the direct deterrent effect of legal sanctions was modest, and the indirect effect 
through informal control mechanisms was much stronger. Therefore “the imposition of 
severe sanctions is a visible sign of action in response to failure in the system of social 
control.”400 Critical studies revealed that severe sanctions did not have decisive effects 
in preventing crime, social factors being more important in crime control. Thus, the al-
ternative scholars could argue against harsh punishment and for a more flexible system 
of criminal sanctions.  
   Studies on the deterrent effects of sanctions were frequent since they illuminated 
the functioning of the system. There were studies on the deterrent effects of the severity 
of sanctions in general
401
 and in particular on such as parking violations
402
 and tax 
laws.
403
 Whereas the conservative view maintained the faith in the deterrent effect of 
capital punishment,
404
 the alternative view denied its practicability, morality, and effica-
cy and argued for abolishing it.
405
 The question was not simply about general deter-
rence, but rather its conformity to social policies and its relation to other forms of social 
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control. A conservative view was more willing to uphold severe punishment given the 
faith of their effect on deterring people and decreasing crime, whereas the reformist 
view approached the problem from a different perspective and sought to find alternative 
ways because crime was a social problem in need of social responses. The general trend 
of alternative scholarship was to move away from a legal point of view and toward a 
more social approach to punishment.   
   The criticism of the criminal justice system reflected the rising critical conscious-
ness towards law and society. On some occasions, the faith in the modern criminal sys-
tem was very low. A psychiatrist noted that law was not able to encourage social order 
or morals, and faith in criminal law in these respects was a “cynical disregard of the 
individual which has so frequently permitted the official institutions of the administra-
tion of criminal justice to become more immoral, more irresponsible, and more unjust 
than any single criminal would dare to be.”406 The lack of faith in the criminal system 
followed in part from the notion that the traditional system and scholarship were based 
on false assumptions. Al Katz, for instance, noted that the question of punishment ought 
not to be what the criminal sanction is for, but rather for whom the criminal sanction is. 
In this sense, “the existing structure of the criminal law is useless, and… only a struc-
ture consistent with a rehabilitative model makes any sense.”407 The felt crisis of law 
was evident, and the legal scholars who noted this began to develop theories for restruc-
turing the system to fit the modern needs.  
   Al Katz was one of the critical legal scholars who contemplated on the theories of 
completely remodeling the criminal law. To him, the traditional system of criminal jus-
tice was logically inconsistent and socially inefficient and lacked a legitimate basis for 
punishment. Therefore, criminal law was to be based on the concept of dangerousness, 
meaning a “direct threat to the person or property of others”, and the function of pun-
ishment was to eliminate potentially dangerous behavior in the future,
408
 the crucial 
point being that criminal law ought to promote social solidarity.
409
 The traditional sys-
tem excited feelings of helplessness, rejection, solitude, and hostility, but to be socially 
appropriate and legitimate, the criminal system ought to excite feelings of solidarity and 
rehabilitate the wrong-doer back into society.
410
 Katz’s theory was a comprehensive, 
critical theory of law, including the aspects of fundamental, conceptual criticism and 
social reformism. He began with the notion that the traditional law was inconsistent and 
without a legitimate basis because it could not serve the functions it was supposed to, 
and then he fostered liberal social values by encouraging rehabilitation and social soli-
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darity as the main purposes of criminal law. The reconstruction of criminal law pro-
ceeded from conceptual criticism to social politics.  
   By the end of the 1960s, criminal law theorists were also adapting to the critical 
thought, in which context the idea of total criticism appeared. John Griffiths also at-
tacked the traditional criminal law scholarship. He did not simply criticize the law or 
scholarship in general, but also Hebert Packer in particular, a legal scholar who repre-
sented traditional scholarship.
411
 Griffiths argued that both law and traditional scholar-
ship were constrained by the prevailing ideology. It did not matter whether the criminal 
process was “modeled” according to crime control or due process; it was always a battle 
between the state and the offender and it always promoted the ideology of modern soci-
ety and degraded the defendant. Therefore, he argued, criminal process should be com-
bined with the purpose of criminal law so that individual needs could be taken into ac-
count. The “fundamental change in criminal procedure must begin with the develop-
ment of ideological self-consciousness and speculation about the possibilities of ideo-
logical change.”412 Griffiths sought to demonstrate that the connection between law and 
the prevailing social ideology limited the opportunities for change and distorted legal 
ideals; differences in process that appeared to be fundamental turned out to be minimal 
when perceived critically, since different models of process pursued the same ideologi-
cal goals. The element of ideology was important for the critical legal scholars because 
they opined that traditional scholars could not go beyond the contemporary society, and 
thus merely maintained the existing circumstances.   
   The pursuit of an alternative ideology was evident in Griffiths’ harsh criticism. 
The legal profession in general appreciated Packer’s scholarship and its realism,413 and 
his book “received the triennial Coif Award, the highest honor that can be bestowed on 
a work of legal scholarship, in 1970.”414 It was thus no futile scholarship which Grif-
fiths attacked, although Packer himself wrote that his book was “somewhat old-
fashioned.”415 Griffiths, nonetheless, argued that because of its logical inconsistency, 
lack of intelligence and sophistication, conceptual ambiguity, and unsystematic ap-
proach the book was “very, very bad indeed”.416 Furthermore, argued Griffiths, Packer 
did not even try to understand the problems of criminal law outside the traditional mode 
and proceeded in the lawyer’s fashion, “as if anthropology and sociology, political theo-
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ry and psychology, even history and philosophy and theology, barely existed.”417 Alt-
hough Griffiths has later expressed a dislike of being associated with the critical legal 
studies movement,
418
 his articles did represent critical thought. He criticized the ideo-
logical basis of law and legal scholarship, and criticized traditional scholarship for ne-
glecting social realities and furthering only the lawyer’s perspective on the issue. Grif-
fiths’ fierce critique was after a total overhaul of the criminal system and criminal 
scholarship.  
   Moreover, the question was also both about the methods and the goals. Packer was 
a supporter of general deterrence and, although he did encourage decriminalization, his 
views on social and criminal policy were more conservative than those of Griffiths, who 
also endorsed rehabilitation as the basis of criminal sanction.
419
 Critical scholars con-
sidered traditional scholarship as conservative. Critical scholars, if they took a stand on 
values and policies, attempted to promote social reform and liberal politics. They saw 
that the formalist conceptualism of traditional scholarship prevented any review of the 
problems in modern society and in their individual circumstances.  
   In any event, scholars of criminal law reflected the critical spirit in many ways. 
Both Katz and Griffiths criticized traditional law and their scholarship constructed fun-
damentally new approaches. They argued that the contemporary system was fundamen-
tally flawed, unjust, and inefficient and wanted to elaborate a system of criminal law 
that would promote liberal values. Whereas Katz wrote about criminal punishment, 
Griffiths wrote about the process, and whereas Katz began from the inconsistency of 
law, Griffiths began from law’s ideological connections. In the end, they focused on the 
basis of the system, which was a general concern of critical scholarship.   
   The focus on the basis of the criminal system became evident in Marxist criminol-
ogy. Marxist theory was revived in criminal studies in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
420
 
In his study on the legal repression of the ghetto revolts of the 1960s, Isaac Balbus de-
veloped a critical theory of criminal repression. According to him, the dilemma of liber-
al law was the conflict between repression and legalism; the state had to frustrate as 
much violence as possible but at the same time minimize the revolutionary potential of 
the violent behavior. Therefore, the criminal system depoliticized and delegitimized 
collective violence and made riots appear as a set of individual crimes. This then influ-
enced the awareness of the public and the rioters.
421
 The impact of Marxist theory in 
criminal law directed attention towards the notion that law was a major contributor to 
the preservation of ideology, not simply a reflection of it. In the critical sense, repres-
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sion had to seem legitimate, and the legal system was a mediator between law and soci-
ety.   
   The Marxist turn was apparent in criminology and the social theory of crime. Crit-
ical theory held that criminal law protected certain interests and repressed others, and 
this conflict was a pervasive factor in the administration of criminal justice.
422
 Crime 
was a social construct reflecting the power relations,
423
 and the task of scholarship was 
to analyze the functions of law in this regard.
424
 Critical scholarship gained more signif-
icance at the turn of the decade,
425
 and critical criminology and theory of crime were 
major contributors to critical thought in the early 1970s. Criminal law scholarship had 
long analyzed discretion and discrimination in law, but there was not much systematic 
critical theory of criminal law. Criminologists then accepted the challenge.   
   Politics was at the center of the critical theory in viewing crime as a social con-
struct and as an expression of conflicts. For the critical scholars, law-making represent-
ed “the translation of specific group interests into public policy”, and the administration 
of justice was “by its very nature political.”426 Consciousness upheld the myths that law 
represented the values of the society and was neutral,
427
 but the critical theories chal-
lenged the notion of objective reality and thus sought to force people to “consider liber-
tarian ideals.”428 At the turn toward a more radical theory of crime, scholars began to 
concentrate more on the way crime was constructed. Since both the contemporary form 
of society and the conception of crime were created in the course of history, the critics 
endorsed an analysis of the fundamental dynamics of the concept of crime in society.   
   The turn of the decade extended the basis of critical scholarship on crime. Many of 
the characteristics of the changes reflected the turn in critical thought towards a more 
comprehensive one. Radical Marxism entered criminology in the 1970s.
429
 Critical the-
orists saw that the need for a radical theory was great because the control over crime 
was tighter and social thought had become more conservative.
430
 The purpose of radical 
criminology was “one of demystification, the removal of the myths ─ the false con-
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sciousness ─ created by the official reality.”431 The conflict approach perceived crime 
as a result of conflicting social interests and law as the mediating factor
432
 but radical 
criminology saw law as a tool of oppression which contributed to the preservation of the 
dominant ideology.
433
 Critical theorists argued that modern consciousness rejected thor-
oughgoing reforms as utopian,
434
 and the “lack of a historical and dialectical perspec-
tive” had weakened the critical potential of the scholarship.435 Marxist theory was need-
ed to “break out of the ideology and conditions of the age.”436 By the mid-1970s, critical 
criminology had an established position.
437
 Neo-Marxism had become an accepted albe-
it marginal methodology in academia, and alternative scholars were applying various 
theories in radical criticism of the society.  
   The radical turn in the theory of crime followed the general trends in critical 
thought. The purpose of the critical criminal theory was to analyze the consciousness of 
modern society and to point out the factors that created and maintained false conscious-
ness, and that the law oppressed the poor and the minorities and criminal law supported 
these ends. As society was turning in a more conservative direction, critical scholars 
became still more radical. The 1960s had laid the foundation for radical scholarship and 
the 1970s was a time for it to enter the academic field. This turn occurred in various 
disciplines, reflecting the frustration of the radical intellectuals with the politics and the 
university, both of which had failed to realize the dreams of a better future that had aris-
en during the turbulence of the 1960s. In addition, critical scholars noted the fact that 
the attack on the prevailing paradigm required more weighty means than had been used 
earlier. Now the field was ready for such an attack and there were ambitious scholars 
taking the task on.   
   Research also participated in the resolution of contemporary problems. For in-
stance, studies pointed out that crime reflected relative poverty, which meant that fun-
damental social changes were needed to combat crime.
438
 Furthermore, it was argued 
that criminal concepts should be replaced with human-rights oriented concepts, and vio-
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lations of economic, sexual, and racial equality should also be considered as crimes.
439
 
Poverty was a pressing problem despite the efforts of the government. Critical studies 
thus sought to point out the need to reform the structures of society in the fight against 
crime. Another concern was the crimes that occurred behind the official stage, namely, 
crimes against equality. Scholars attempted to point out the arbitrariness of the concept 
of crime that focused simply on the traditional crimes but ignored the modern crimes 
against equality. As the struggle against inequality intensified in the 1970s, scholars 
also began to stress equality in their theories.    
   Criminal law provides an interesting perspective on the development of critical 
thought in legal scholarship. Critical scholarship on criminal law began to flourish in 
the 1960s. Studies on the reality of crime and the administration of criminal justice fo-
cused on law in action and sought to point out that the reality of criminal law was not 
the ideal of neutrality, equality, rationality, and efficiency. The aim of these studies was 
to reveal that the social inequalities were reflected in law which then contributed to the 
preservation of the problems. As in all critical scholarship, studies on criminal law 
sought to demonstrate how law reflected social structures and ideology, and the critical 
scholars argued that law was not an efficient way to change society without fundamen-
tal reform. Although radical criticism was mostly by criminologists, the scholarship of 
Katz and Griffiths shows that criminal law scholars also shared the critical conscious-
ness. They focused on the illogical and irrational aspects of criminal law and elaborated 
theories to transform the system of criminal justice to meet the needs of modern society. 
The radical criminology following the Marxist turn of the 1970s reflected the more ni-
hilist and destructive nature of the radical criticism of the 1970s, whereas earlier critical 
studies and theories on crime, including those of Griffiths and Katz, had been more con-
structive.  
   Criticism of criminal policy and criminal law scholarship followed the same pat-
tern as the development of critical legal thought in general. Early forms of alternative 
scholarship focused on the gap between law in books and law in action and studied law 
in context in order to point out the arbitrary and discriminatory nature of criminal law. 
Critical theories of the early 1970s tried to restructure both the law and the scholarship, 
and the radical criticism focused on the fundamental basis of society. The basic premis-
es of critical thought were present in criminal law even if it was not at the heart of crit i-
cal legal scholarship.
440
 Nevertheless, by the mid-1970s, critical legal scholarship had 
developed to the point where it was about to become a considerable part of the academ-
ic legal profession. 
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3.2 The creation of CLS, 1977–1980 
3.2.1 The evolution of critical thought: The Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 
1977 
 
Critical legal scholarship developed in turbulent times. Sociological studies on law had 
continued since the realist period on a small scale and intensified in the 1960s. At the 
same time, social and political turmoil and the student protests also increased. People 
studying law in the late sixties grew up in an atmosphere in which a large part of the 
student population was raging and realist scholarship was increasing, but the dominant 
jurisprudence remained relatively traditional. Social inequalities persisted and even es-
calated, and the war in Vietnam ravaged the world and expressed the imperialist nature 
of the nation. In addition, the scholarly tradition was expanding and covering new areas 
of research as well as new methodologies. Critical legal scholarship was about to bloom 
by the mid-1970s. The 1960s laid the ideological foundation of CLS, and its theoretical 
basis was elaborated in the 1970s.  
   The experiences of the 1960s had considerable effects on the young and even older 
jurists and law students, who eventually began to seek a career outside the traditional 
path. As David Kairys, a civil rights lawyer of the 1970s, wrote in 1978 in explaining 
his motives for becoming a critical lawyer and a scholar: “[t]he ability of our leaders 
and the society as a whole to justify or accept extreme poverty in the midst of extreme 
affluence, racism and the slaughter and terror we visited on the peoples of Indochina led 
me to seek an explanation and understanding of our society that goes beyond estab-
lished thinking, which could explain neither what our society was doing nor why it was 
so difficult to change.”441 Reasons may vary depending on the scholar in question, but 
ultimately it was the complete disappointment in the established order and the law that 
drove scholars to seek alternatives. The dominant consciousness was seen as a legit i-
mizing ideology for the status quo, and this notion forced these scholars to go beyond 
the traditional concepts. In a sense, critical legal studies consisted of scholars who 
shared the radical views of the 1960s because during that decade they realized or were 
convinced that there was something very wrong with the society and the law had some-
thing to do with it.  
   The 1970s was a complicated decade for academia. In general, it marked a step in 
a more conservative direction. Student radicalism and the New Left waned, law and 
economics became a powerful paradigm, and the conservative student bloc became 
stronger.
442
 In 1978, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy was founded “to pro-
vide a forum for alternatives to the liberal establishment law review perspectives.”443 
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On the other hand, Marxist theory was revised,
444
 and emerged as a theory in various 
academic disciplines.
445
 Critical legal studies (CLS) grew out of the conflict between 
the fading radicalism of the 1960s and the conservative counter-criticism of the 1970s. 
In many respects, it was a synthesis of the critical and radical thought of the 1960s 
combined with the revision of Marxism and the antagonist spirit of the 1970s. 
   CLS has often been linked to the radicalism of the 1960s,
446
 although Mark Tush-
net has emphasized the importance of the 1950s.
447
 Both of these matter because schol-
ars built their identity in different times and for different reasons. In general, however, 
the 1960s was the formative period because it was then that the critical scholars entered 
the legal profession from which they later felt alienated. During the decade, the would-
be critical scholars matured into early adulthood and adopted their critical attitude to-
ward society, law, academia, and scholarship. Critical scholars built their scholarly 
identity during the turbulence of the 1960s, and they built their professional identity 
during the more conservative 1970s and within the academic controversies.  
   In the wake of the radical 1960s, there were many scholars yearning for a critical 
legal scholarship but the academic world had become a difficult place for alternative 
traditions. Law and society was an alternative establishment, but many critical scholars 
were displeased with it because of its ties with the tradition.
448
 In the early 1970s, then, 
radical scholars sometimes had difficulty in finding a position in the university.
449
 Criti-
cal legal thought thus grew in an atmosphere where it was difficult to find a place. But it 
grew nonetheless, and “[b]y 1977, there existed in the American law schools a small but 
significant group of tenured professors who identified with the political left but who did 
not align themselves with the law and society tradition.”450 Various factors had contrib-
uted to the evolution of critical legal scholarship, but in the late 1970s it had reached the 
point where it felt alienated from many of its influences but where there was also a sig-
nificant amount literature that could meet the needs of the critical scholar.  
   Critical legal scholarship had expanded, but it was still fragmented and incoherent 
and without a forum of intellectual exchange. Thus, a need arose to bring the scholars 
with critical inclinations together to discuss critical scholarship. The first conference on 
critical legal studies was held at the University of Wisconsin law school in May, 1977, 
gathering young critical legal scholars, law and society scholars, and legal scholars with 
realist or leftist perspectives. The organizing committee of the conference consisted of 
Richard Abel (b. 1941), Thomas Heller (b. 1944), Morton Horwitz (b. 1938), Duncan 
Kennedy (b. 1941), Stewart Macaulay (b. 1931), Rand Rosenblatt (b. 1945), David 
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Trubek (b. 1935), Mark Tushnet (b. 1945), and Roberto Unger (b. 1947).
451
 Obviously, 
most of them were active in alternative and critical legal scholarship during the years 
before the conference. Abel and Trubek participated in law and development and later 
in law and society scholarship, Macaulay was a law and society scholar, Kennedy and 
Unger were well-known critics of legal reasoning, Horwitz was known for his critical 
legal history, as was Tushnet, who had also written about constitutional law.  
   Although CLS was a combination of scholars with diversified backgrounds, they 
all shared sympathy for the radical left,
452
 and most of the participants at the conference 
were in some kind of connection with each other.
453
 From the beginning, CLS was a 
gathering of scholars sharing a similar world view, albeit differing on methods and the-
ories. As Mark Tushnet writes, more than a movement, critical legal studies was “a po-
litical location for a group of people on the Left who share[d] the project of supporting 
and extending the domain in the Left in the legal academy.”454 At first it was probably 
more a gathering of scholars discussing similar intellectual interests, but it later evolved 
more into a political location.  
   The radical element of CLS was evident in the diversity of the conference. The 
people of the older law and society branch especially were not radicals like the younger 
critical scholars, which came to mark the split between the alternative and the critical 
legal scholarship. The conference had a sociological approach focusing on the gap be-
tween law in books and law in action, an ideological approach focusing on the indeter-
minacy and inconsistency of law, and a Marxist approach. Many of the critical scholars 
disliked empirical social science, however.
455
 The conference continued many of the 
preceding forms of critical scholarship but also departed from them.
456
 At the founda-
tion of the conference, critical legal scholarship was moving in a more radical direction, 
abandoning empiricism and endorsing an analysis of ideology and consciousness. This 
move was apparent in the critical legal literature of the early 1970s and was strength-
ened as the decade approached its end.  
  The evolution of CLS was closely connected to the radicalism and critical theories 
of the 1960s that were reflected in the rise of the Marxist academia in the 1970s. As 
CLS scholars have noted, “[t]he work of the Critical Legal studies Conference is closely 
allied with the neo-Marxist social theory that has gained increasing influence in the 
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United States and Western Europe since the rise of the New Left in the 1960’s.”457 By 
1977, American critical legal scholarship had reached the stage where it had enough 
proponents and substance to assemble a conference on the themes and theories of crit i-
cal scholarship, and it was at this point that the so-called Critical Legal Studies Move-
ment came of age. At the first conference scholars could gather and talk about the agen-
da for changing legal scholarship and academia, and the core of CLS scholarship was 
about to crystallize.   
   The development of the critical legal scholarship culminated in the foundation of 
the conference. CLS arose out of the legal debates of the 1960s, during a time of polit i-
cal and social turbulence. Many law students were dissatisfied with an education that 
seemed to give an unrealistic picture of law, and even if education was reformed, the 
mainstream curriculum remained more or less traditional without a critical approach. 
Dissatisfied with legal education, critical students and scholars of the 1960s developed 
later theories which questioned the rational basis of modern social order and law. These 
scholars sought to point out that since the dominant consciousness prevented people and 
the legal profession from understanding the true nature of law, it was the traditional 
legal consciousness that was to be attacked. CLS scholars developed theories pointing 
out the irrationality of modern law, and in doing so were more constructive than is often 
assumed. The conference of 1977 was only the beginning of the movement, and in the 
following sections we shall take a look at CLS in the last years of the 1970s. 
 
3.2.2 Critical legal scholarship coming of age: CLS in the late 1970s 
 
Critical legal scholarship had evolved during the 1970s from sociological and realist 
jurisprudence into more philosophical critical theories of law. The first conference on 
critical legal studies marked the beginning of the movement but did not mean much to 
the scholarship; it turned from fragmentary literature into an organized conference but 
there was no unified school or anything that could be called the theory of CLS. Never-
theless, critical scholarship was distancing itself from its realist predecessors and focus-
ing more on the deep structures of law and on legal consciousness and ideology. In the 
late 1970s, critical legal literature began to blossom and various theories were elaborat-
ed.  
   In general, critical legal scholarship was moving toward criticism of the deep 
structures of law. Belonging to the empirical wing of CLS, David Trubek had been a 
participant in the law and development project and had contributed to the social theory 
of law. Thus, his “Critical Social Thought about Law” represented a synthesis of critical 
theory, neo-Marxism, and empirical approaches to law. Beginning from the premises 
that law mediated social conflicts and formal rationality covered the contradictions 
within law, Trubek concluded that legal scholars had to study legal ideals and the gap 
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between them and reality as well as the social structures that caused the gap.
458
 Trubek 
had based his theory partly on the criticism of a study by Isaac Balbus, who then crit i-
cized Trubek for the fact that his theory accepted the values of capitalism as standards 
of criticism and therefore conformed to the prevailing ideology.
459
 With a background 
in the more traditional forms of alternative scholarship, Trubek represented the more 
empirical branch, whereas Balbus as a neo-Marxist scholar stressed the ideological 
functions of law. According to the latter view, the simple criticism of the way law func-
tioned was insufficient because the ultimate point of criticism was the motives behind it.   
   The general trend among alternative legal scholars and lawyers of the 1970s was 
to seek alternatives for the legal system. For instance, the public interest law movement 
continued its efforts to provide legal aid for the general public,
460
 and, in addition, there 
was an increased interest in alternative dispute resolution
461
 and access to justice
462
 
which all sought improvements to the legal system outside the traditional methods. 
Since scholars had become more skeptical toward the idea that law could bring social 
change, alternative solutions to legal problems came under scrutiny, as well as the social 
structures and the causes of those problems,
463
 while the attitude toward the simple in-
strumental conception of law became more skeptical.
464
 Trubek argued that critical legal 
scholarship had to be “critical without being cynical, empirical but not positivistic, 
normative but not subjective, detached yet not disinterested.”465 However, critical legal 
scholarship was often pessimistic about empiricism and interest was then directed to-
ward the legal structures and ideologies. The philosophical and theoretical basis of CLS 
developed and expanded at the end of the decade as scholars elaborated new theories 
and developed older theories further.   
   Various philosophical analyses became useful in examining law beneath the sur-
face. They also meant a break in the previous realist tradition. In a phenomenological 
analysis of law, Peter Gabel wrote that the realist focus on what judges did in fact mis-
took “the behavior for the meaning within which the behavior [was] lived.”466 The basis 
of his theory was, then, the interpretive structures within which the behavior of judges 
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was conducted and perceived. Since law was manifested in these structures, which were 
reified to suit the needs of traditional legal discourse, a philosophical analysis helped to 
understand and analyze the behavior within them.
467
 The emphasis on continental phi-
losophy introduced new elements into American critical legal scholarship. By applying 
the philosophy of Sartre and Heidegger, Gabel defined an existentialist-
phenomenological context within which legal discourse and practice took place, and 
which pointed out the limits of interpretation and the process of reification and aliena-
tion. Critical scholars did not regard law simply as arbitrary behavior, but rather as a 
manifestation of social-legal phenomena within certain structures, and it was not simply 
the behavior that was to be analyzed but the preconditions of that behavior.  
   Paradoxes and contradictions in legal thought remained an interesting topic for 
critical scholars. Karl Klare demonstrated how the necessity to conform to legalism 
turned legal reasoning into a formalism that excluded the possibility of radical reform. 
Modern legal consciousness was thus a kind of “social conceptualism” which noted the 
social circumstances but preserved the formalist conceptualism that maintained the dis-
tinction between law and politics. This “characteristic of modern legal consciousness”, 
Klare argued, preserved and obscured “the contradictions of legal thought, which re-
flect[ed] the contradictions of social life in late capitalist society.”468 The point was to 
show that realist reforms were more apparent than real and that the necessities of the 
capitalist economy still had great significance in legal reasoning. In the late 1970s, as 
left ideology was fading, scholars felt the need to show that liberal ideology had pro-
duced a false consciousness that stimulated faith in law. They thought that modern legal 
thought was aware of the impact of social factors on legal reasoning, but nonetheless 
maintained the ideals of legal rationality and neutrality and thus contributed to the 
preservation of the ideology of the ruling class.  
   The focus on structures brought up the complicated relationship between CLS and 
Marxism. CLS scholarship was closely related to neo-Marxism, but the scholars did not 
often regard orthodox Marxism as useful in legal analysis
469
 although there were also 
more hospitable approaches.
470
 Nonetheless, despite ambiguities in interpretation,
471
 a 
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revision of Marxism that had occurred in other social sciences since the late 1960s was 
part of the development of CLS. Critical scholars had to explain the relationship be-
tween the basis and the superstructure without however being deterministic, and they 
had to analyze the relative autonomy of law and give it meaningful substance.
472
 The 
studies of the legal structures and consciousness reflected the neo-Marxist pursuit to 
avoid economic determinism and any other kind of simple explanation of legal phe-
nomena. Recent years had witnessed several efforts to help the underprivileged, which 
itself spoke against the simple concept of law as a ruling-class tool of oppression.  
   Critical theory thus faced the problem of explaining the relationship between law 
and society. The relative autonomy of law was a concept with which one could avoid 
determinism and reductionism. According to Tushnet, a theory of the relative autonomy 
of law had to explain the relationship between social conflicts and the contradictions in 
the economy and law on the one hand, and the relationship between these contradictions 
and the instrumentalist and structuralist view of law on the other.
473
 Since law was a 
part of the incomplete hegemony of capitalism, analysis on the ideological functions of 
law could explain the contradictions.
474
 Klare emphasized that ideological functions of 
law also alienated people from their real-life circumstances. Through law, people bal-
anced the conflicts between social interests and hence created and defined the society, 
but the form of modern law prevented them from realizing this.
475
 For instance, since 
labor law legitimated the un-freedom of the work place, “the struggle to emancipate 
labor must also be a struggle to emancipate law itself.”476 A serious problem for the 
critical scholars was the question of whether law legitimated unequal and unjust cir-
cumstances, and their goal was to demystify law to realize the potential of reform. Since 
the critical scholars wanted to distance themselves from the Soviet Union, they did not 
use socialist rhetoric in criticizing the capitalist hegemony. Nevertheless, they argued 
that in capitalist society freedom and democracy were possible only to the extent that 
they suited capitalism, and thus they wanted to disclose the ties between ideology and 
law.   
   Because of the drive to emancipate law from its structural chains, critical scholars 
attacked the liberal legal theory that appeared to defend the rights of the citizen. For the 
critical scholars, however, the liberal defense of rights was more apparent than real. In 
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1977, Ronald Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously,477 a book that developed a non-
positivist legal theory to protect rights, was published, but the liberal ethos of the book 
did not please the critical scholars. According to Gabel, Dworkin’s theory was “a justi-
fication of contemporary American legal practice expressed in abstract and universal 
terms.”478 The critics thought that the problem of the liberal scholars was that they ne-
glected the analysis of values and policies in their efforts to provide a rational basis for 
legal theory. Values, however, derived from the preferences of the powerful classes and 
law often protected these preferences.
479
 Fact-value analysis was necessary because 
“[j]ustice, freedom and equality have no meaning outside of a particular system of so-
cial relations.”480 Liberal scholars, however, took the present as given and thus “they 
confuse a historically contingent social experience with human nature, reifying ‘man’ in 
their own alienated self-image and constructing imaginary ‘communities’ which are 
simply idealized representations of the alienated social relationships they have known in 
their own lives.”481 From the critical perspective, liberal theory was a justification and a 
mystification of the contemporary social and legal order and made the values of modern 
society seem inevitable and natural. Like the radical spirit of the 1960s, the theory was 
going beyond the observable reality and challenged the standards of modern society. 
Society and its institutions were not seen simply as the subjects of observation but ra-
ther as something that was constructed in history and society.  
   The problem of values was of central importance to critical legal theory, and its 
basic premises held that facts and values were connected.
482
 Baker noted that modern 
rights theorists had not been able to develop a theory that could convincingly argue why 
some values ought to be preferred to others. Therefore, the inequalities in social struc-
tures were reflected in the inequalities in policy-making.
483
 Indeed, the critics continued, 
there were no absolute values, although that was often assumed by the traditional theo-
ry, values being socially constructed,
484
 and because there was no consensus on values 
in society, there could be no uniform theory of justice.
485
 The problem of values took 
the critical legal scholarship beyond the surface of legal problems. The critical notion 
was that legal reasoning did not pay attention to the fundamental problems, whether it 
was understood in formalistic or realistic terms. For the critical understanding, values 
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were always contingent and biased, but they were expressed in neutral terms. Further-
more, values were always present in legal reasoning. Thus reflecting the ideology of the 
counter-cultures, the critical scholars sought to demonstrate that values could be any-
thing, but the traditional legal consciousness took the contemporary system as given and 
neglected any possibility of real alternatives.   
   The fundamental attack on the tradition of legal thought was evident in the crit i-
cism of values. This can be seen in Kenneth Casebeer’s analysis of judging. He argued 
that values were inherent in legal materials, as well as in perception and interpretation, 
and these values reflected certain social interests. Thus the dynamics of legal reasoning 
could not be understood correctly if values were neglected.
486
 This fundamental criti-
cism distanced CLS from the other critical schools of jurisprudence. Duxbury writes 
that CLS “evolved as a reaction against the individualism and consensus-orientation” of 
the postwar American jurisprudence.
487
 As the debate on neutral principles demon-
strates, CLS was rather a radicalization of the dissenting voices than a reaction against a 
complete consensus. Although there were competing schools, none of them questioned 
the basis of jurisprudence. CLS, however, emerged from a different kind of intellectual 
background, and as a result of a complex process, it ended up criticizing the very basis 
of law.  
   In the search for the roots of the problems of law, CLS scholars sought to show 
that other alternative schools of jurisprudence shared the same fundamental problems as 
the tradition. Another major school, law and economics, was also criticized for its ina-
bility to provide a rational basis for legal analysis. Mark Kelman worked to demonstrate 
that law and economics was illogical and false in reality. He debunked the Coase Theo-
rem,
488
 and argued that the law and economics premise that freedom of choice maxim-
ized welfare was incorrect because people were not similar atomistic concepts but indi-
vidual persons, and, moreover, several factors affected the choices in market situations. 
In addition, there was no universal concept of welfare.
489
 Further, C. Edwin Baker ar-
gued that law and economics was flawed in analyzing whether a law was “efficient.” 
This was so because law and economics took the existing distribution of wealth, desires, 
and values as given, and therefore simply legitimized the status quo, reified reality, pro-
tected the interests of the economy and big business, and excluded the possibility of 
alternatives.
490
 The elements of neo-Marxism and critical theory were evident in the 
critical pursuit to point out the way the traditional legal scholarship reified reality and 
protected the contemporary system. These aspects encouraged the critical scholars to 
analyze the origins and purposes of values and ideologies in the law.    
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   A central argument was that values were construed and built into law in history, as 
became evident in critical legal history. Indeed, one of the most remarkable events in 
the critical legal scholarship of the late 1970s was the publication of Morton Horwitz’s 
book The Transformation of American Law, 1780─1860 in 1977.491 Horwitz had con-
ducted critical studies on legal history throughout the 1970s, and the book was a culmi-
nation of his scholarship thus far, gathering the most important elements of some of the 
already published articles and providing new insights and data. The treatise was a thor-
ough analysis of the historical development of American law during its constructive 
period in the antebellum years, its central arguments being that the development of the 
legal doctrine conformed to the economic interests of the time, courts were the motors 
driving change, and that there was a connection between the legal profession and the 
economic interests the law promoted.
492
 The book was typical critical legal studies liter-
ature. Through historical analysis, it sought to point out that the law was biased toward 
the economic elite and that the legal profession also conformed to these interests. Be-
sides being a manifestation of the critical notions in actual cases, the significance of the 
book was also in the discussion that followed its publication.
493
  
   The response of the legal profession in general toward Horwitz’s book was crit i-
cal. Indeed, reviewers noted that a “[c]ynical criticism, economic determinism, and aca-
demic nihilism have come of age in legal-history writing,”494 depicting a view of law as 
a ruthless battle for selfish interests in a “dark and Dostoyevskyan” world.495 Horwitz 
was criticized for ascribing legal changes simply to economic factors, creating thus a 
plot in which the legal profession together with the economic elite shaped the law to fit 
their interests.
496
 The critics of Horwitz argued that the development of law was more 
autonomous than instrumental,
497
 and that he had generalized and simplified issues be-
yond the scope of his research.
498
 As a neo-Marxist scholar even argued, he had 
“walked into a reductionist trap,”499 which had turned his interpretations into economic 
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determinism
500
 or ideological history.
501
 With respect to history, the critics argued that 
Horwitz’s material did not support his conclusions,502 and that he had failed both on 
evidence and analysis at numerous points.
503
  
   The critical response towards Horwitz’s book describes the cliff between the tradi-
tional and the critical legal thought well. Most of Horwitz’s critics disagreed with his 
methods of emphasizing economic factors in legal development. Since legal history is 
an interpretative discipline, disagreement comes naturally, but it was the economic de-
terminism that was so obvious in the book which particularly attracted the criticism of 
legal historians. Although most of the profession agreed that economics had influence 
on the development of law, they could not accept the argument that it was the most im-
portant or even the only factor. The criticism pointed out the vulnerability of the critical 
theory’s thesis of the economic biases of law, which was precisely why critical scholars 
were developing more nuanced theories at the same time.  
   The criticism also concerned evaluations in legal history. In an otherwise relatively 
hospitable review, Grant Gilmore criticized Horwitz for presenting the transformation 
as a “bad” thing,504 and others also noted that it was highly questionable as to whose 
benefit the legal changes aided.
505
 Blackmar also emphasized that because of the signif-
icance of legal doctrine, the legal profession was not systematically biased toward any 
one interest.
506
 In order to highlight the impact of history on the present day, critical 
scholarship stressed social conflicts and their impact on legal change. By doing this, the 
critical scholars obviously sought to contextualize contemporary problems, but also to 
expand the basis of legal scholarship.  
   The fiercest critique expressed the general attitude of the traditional profession to-
ward critical legal scholarship. Teachout criticized the “new school” for misunderstand-
ing and downgrading the role of the rule of law in history and in society by reducing 
law to an instrument of economic repression.
507
 John Reid considered Horwitz’s book 
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as desacralizing, “conspiratorial materialism” without evidence. Therefore, he contin-
ued, the scholarly profession was to be aware of it, because “[a] generation of law stu-
dents, many predisposed to arguments of Machiavellian intrigue explaining business 
success or rights of private property, are about to be subjected to a legal history that 
must be made to prove its case or be driven from the marketplace.”508 Traditional schol-
ars did not like the cynicism and pessimism that critical scholars often represented. 
Since they thought that critical legal scholarship attacked fundamental legal premises 
without solid evidence for its arguments, they demanded rationality from it.   
   Although not completely rebutted, Horwitz’s book raised lots of criticism and 
many scholars were eager to debunk his thesis.
509
 There was something about the book 
that horrified the legal profession because another book of Marxist legal history was 
also published in 1977, but which attracted much less attention. In Law and the Rise of 
Capitalism, Michael Tigar and Madeleine Levy argued that the development of law 
followed the development of capitalism. By going through the development of law from 
medieval times, the authors sought to point out that the modern legal ideology and the 
state were meant to protect the interests of the ruling class and to maintain the existing 
economic system.
510
 In a review, Judith Kofler, herself a critical scholar, was pleased 
with the idea of the book but disappointed in its execution because of the lack of histor-
ical evidence and the synthesis of the forces of legal change.
511
 It was not simply Marx-
ist legal history but Horwitz’s book in particular that raised the criticism.  
   Laura Kalman has argued that the critical reaction toward Horwitz’s book pointed 
out that the spirit of process jurisprudence was still strong and that the legal profession 
disliked the idea that law was structurally flawed.
512
 These arguments seem plausible. 
Horwitz indeed argued that law was not neutral but promoted certain interests at the 
expense of others, and that the biases of law followed from judicial decision-making 
and were structured into legal thinking. It was also a part of the critical legal studies 
which at this point did not get the attention the Transformation did. Neither diffuse the-
ory nor abstract generalizations bothered legal scholars, but Horwitz’s book did because 
it was written in plain language and it concerned the American judiciary in the age of 
the building of American law. It was a critique of doctrine, analyzed in the light of its 
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historical development. The book thus hit the weak spot of the legal profession in a way 
that could not have been ignored.  
   The significance of the critical legal studies of the late 1970s was precisely that 
they pictured serious problems in everyday matters. Another significant event of the 
early CLS literature was the publication of Duncan Kennedy’s The Structure of Black-
stone’s Commentaries.513 The article continued Kennedy’s theories on the indetermina-
cy of legal reasoning
514
 and on the collective consciousness that structured legal 
thought.
515
 The article was particularly important because it introduced the concept of 
fundamental contradiction, which meant that the freedom of the individual was at the 
same time both dependent and incompatible with the others, and this contradiction both 
constituted and distorted the relations between people. With respect to law, it was the 
“very essence of every problem.”516 For years, the critical scholars had worked to show 
the fundamental flaw in modern law, and Kennedy’s postulate was a powerful and con-
cise articulation of this notion.     
   Kennedy sought to demonstrate how modern legal and social consciousness both 
included the fundamental contradiction and denied it. He argued that in modern liberal 
thought, “civil society” was considered as “a realm of free interaction between private 
individuals who are unthreatening to one another because the other entity, ‘the state’, 
forces them to respect one another’s rights. In civil society, others are available for good 
fusion as private individual respecters of rights; through the state, they are available for 
fusion as participants in the collective experience of enforcing rights. A person who 
lives the liberal mode can effectively deny the fundamental contradiction.” Thus, ac-
cording to Kennedy, legal thought subdued by the fundamental contradiction was apol-
ogetic because law was biased toward certain social interests, and this affected the way 
law mediated and denied the fundamental contradiction.
517
   
   Fundamental contradiction was at the heart of law and of legal scholarship, not on-
ly reflecting the inner contradictions and incompatibilities within society, law, and legal 
thought, but also involving every aspect of human consciousness and interaction. Ac-
cording to Kennedy, the purpose of critical legal scholarship was to realize the contra-
diction and analyze its impacts on law and consciousness.
518
 Fundamental contradiction 
was a milestone in critical legal scholarship because it combined much critical potential 
into one concept. The concept covered the relative autonomy of law by pointing out the 
structural biases within it, and through it one was able to point out how the legal con-
sciousness made the reality seem natural and just, but also justifying inequalities. In a 
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sense, these were not novel ideas in critical thought but it was not until this point that 
the idea was expounded in a lucid, albeit rough, concept.   
   In addition to the concept of fundamental contradiction, Kennedy’s article had at 
least two dimensions. First, in his historical analysis, Kennedy sought to explicate how 
Blackstone’s Commentary legitimized the status quo and distorted the reality to appear 
rational, and how it still affected modern American legal thinking.
519
 The purpose was 
to point out that even if law and legal theory had changed greatly since the days of 
Blackstone, his defense of liberalism still had a major impact on the American legal 
consciousness. Second, Kennedy’s analysis contributed to the CLS critique of rights, 
since, according to him, the defining characteristic of liberalism was that rights mediat-
ed the fundamental contradiction. Rights made conflicts and the solutions to them seem 
rational.
520
 In the critical thought, rights were only a way to reify capitalist oppression 
and social inequalities, and an acceptance of rights would have turned one into a sup-
porter of the prevailing order. The criticism of rights was thus fundamental criticism of 
law and society that did not accept the premises of the society at face value. It was a 
reminder of the radical critique of the 1960s at a time when the society in general was 
moving in a more conservative direction and an acceptance of the status quo through the 
emphasis on rights.      
   The consensus on the superiority of modern American society was a major motive 
behind the urge to point out the impossibility of distinguishing between right and 
wrong. The problem of choosing between alternatives in law, which reflected the inde-
terminate and conflicting nature of law, was an important feature of critical legal 
thought. In an analysis of the contradictory relationship between the vagueness of law 
and the rule of law, Al Katz and Lee Teitelbaum argued that law regulated complicated 
situations with imprecise language. The vagueness of law and the conflict between for-
mal and substantive justice on the one hand and the rule of law on the other caused an-
tinomies in law which threatened the personal autonomy of people.
521
  
   Katz developed this notion further in his boundary theory, in which he argued that 
whenever there was a legal conflict, it was resolved either by balancing the contradicto-
ry alternatives or by choosing one of them. In either case, however, the solution was 
made without an objective method, and hence always represented moral absolutism and 
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the irrationality of decision-making, both of which the modern consciousness denied.
522
 
The general presumptions behind both Kennedy’s and Katz’s recent theories were that 
“law is relative to social theory and social practice; that contemporary jurisprudence is 
an obfuscating apologetic” and, furthermore, “that the notion of legal autonomy is a 
lie.”523 In order to point out the indeterminacy of law and the impossibility and irration-
ality of modern values, critical scholarship was moving from structures to conscious-
ness and from philosophy to psychology, but the basic conceptions were the same as 
they had been throughout the 1970s. By the end of the decade, however, CLS literature 
had grown to a considerable degree and its theories had become more diversified and 
sophisticated.  
   Critical legal scholarship had come a long way from the utopian idealism of the 
early 1960s to the pessimism of the late 1970s. The question was not so much whether 
the courts ought to promote certain values and policies, but rather how these values and 
policies should or could be defined in the first place. The nihilism of the 1970s stressed 
the impossibility of determining the content of law and rights. As Arthur Leff argued, 
neither critical nor any other positivist legal theory had defined the basis of law, which 
was always arbitrary and open to discussion.
524
 Traditional legal scholarship, whether 
conservative or liberal, often sought to define a definite basis for rights, but the critical 
scholars denied the possibility of such a basis. Critical legal scholarship, as distin-
guished from the nihilism of Leff, however, sought to point out the ways legal struc-
tures and consciousness limited the freedom of choice.  Nevertheless, critical scholars 
struggled against the general trend towards a rational basis for modern law.   
   Despite the fact that the nucleus of CLS was theoretical criticism, critical scholars 
also focused on practical matters with a more constructive approach. Since legal schol-
ars had accepted that their profession had been one factor in allowing the economy to 
rule society,
525
 they had to struggle against the traditional norms. The critical insights, 
however, forced them to seek the solutions outside the conventional boundaries of legal 
reform. In any event, fundamental reforms were needed; for instance, with respect to 
legal aid.
526
 Richard Abel, who had previously analyzed the structures of the legal sys-
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tem, noted that redistribution of legal services was often inefficient and, in addition, 
sometimes contributed to the preservation of the myth that social justice could be ob-
tained under capitalism. Reforms thus required fundamental analysis and consideration, 
since the problems of social inequalities were within the structures of society and 
law.
527
 William Simon, on the other hand, criticized the ideology of advocacy which, he 
argued, alienated the parties from the process, furthered social inequality, and helped to 
maintain the status quo. He concluded that advocacy should pay attention to ethics and 
the individuality of others so that dispute-resolution would be closer to the people and 
promote social equality and justice.
528
 
   As the general trend in alternative legal scholarship and the profession was toward 
an alternative dispute resolution, critical scholars also emphasized research into and 
reform of social and legal structures, because the legal system, even in its most liberal 
sense, was seen to be constrained by the dominant ideology and thus excluded profound 
changes. In these cases, however, critical legal scholarship was often constructive and 
provided alternatives for the legal system even though its premises were based on radi-
cal criticism.  
   A major concern of the critical scholars was legal education, which was still 
haunted by the same problems that had haunted it for the whole century.
529
 Despite the 
reforms of the 1960s, case books dominated the curriculum,
530
 legal education lacked a 
thorough analysis of the relationship between law and society and therefore conformed 
to the dominant ideology,
531
 and it focused mostly on abstract skills which promoted 
social inequalities.
532
 To make good lawyers, the critics argued, students should be pre-
pared with theoretical training and with a “wide range of historical, socio-economic, and 
political literature” as well as “diverse modes of political analysis and argument.”533 Of 
course, legal education was a wider problem in the late 1970s,
534
 not just a concern of 
the critics, and there were scholars favoring a more traditional education.
535
 Neverthe-
less, problems of legal education were the same as they were almost two decades, even 
half a century earlier, and the responses thereto were still basically the same. While the 
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tradition stressed doctrine, critical scholars argued that lawyers did not understand the 
function of their profession.    
   The conflict between traditional and radical legal education became most obvious 
in Wythe Holt’s radical polemic. Holt argued that since legal education was a part of the 
dominant power structure, there was a need for a radical law school that would “expose 
the myth of law”536 and which would “shake off all the shackles of liberal ethos”537 and 
the “harsh arbitrariness of the so-called Socratic method.”538 Radical law school would 
have no formal requirements or hierarchies, and the students would be educated to un-
derstand the connection between law and society, think authentically, and decide the 
course of their profession without indoctrination into modern society.
539
 Holt’s criticism 
reflected the earlier responses to the crisis of legal education but it radicalized them. It 
was also inspired by the radical thought of the 1970s that stressed the ideological char-
acter of law and therefore encouraged radical reforms. Although the majority of the pro-
fession did not recognize the crisis of law of the early 1970s even by the end of the dec-
ade, it was still existent for the critical scholars who were also becoming more radical 
about it. On certain occasions, the critical scholars were very radical, whereas on others 
they modified the radical argument to suit a more constructive approach.   
   Besides the legal profession and education, the critical scholars also dealt with 
other problems. For instance, in an empirical study on the court structure, Wolf 
Heydebrand argued that they functioned in a social, political, and economic context, and 
the changes in the structures of the context were reflected as changes in the function of 
the courts.
540
 Rosenblatt continued his criticism of the health-care system by pointing 
out that the gaps between the regulation and the practice followed from structural bias-
es.
541
 The structures of the administration of justice were naturally an important object 
of research, because the argument was that law in action could not be understood with-
out understanding the context of the action. Although the premises were basically the 
same, the approaches varied. In the respects dealt with here, Heydebrand’s analysis was 
closer to critical law and society scholarship whereas Rosenblatt's article was more of a 
structural criticism.  
   Criticism of law was moving from the simple demonstration of the indeterminacy 
of law to analysis of the origins and nature of the problem and the possibility of change. 
Janet Lindgren analyzed the structure of judicial decision-making which, she claimed, 
included an inherent choice, but the theories and values on which the choice was based 
were never articulated. On the contrary, the basis of decision-making was assumed to be 
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given, although it was, in fact, chosen. Her alternative theory related the public and the 
individual interests to the particular interests of a person in a particular case, and the 
decision was to be made directly for the parties because courts determined the special 
and particular meaning of the general decision of the legislator.
542
 Lindgren’s analysis 
reflected the impossibility of giving a precise meaning to the law and choosing between 
conflicting alternatives. However, it was also an effort to show that critical premises 
could function as a basis for alternative doctrines.   
   In addition, critical scholars tackled many contemporary legal problems from a 
critical yet constructive perspective. They argued, for instance, that judicial decisions 
had undermined the possibility of prison reform and authorized discrimination within 
the processes of prison administration,
543
 tax deductions in fact helped the rich although 
the tax system ought to redistribute wealth,
544
 juries ought to be composed of people 
with the same backgrounds as the parties to the case to guarantee understanding of the 
circumstances,
545
 and that the connection between society and jurisprudence had con-
tributed to the uncertainty of the legal protection of racial equality.
546
 Critical scholar-
ship always concentrated on the vagueness of doctrine and on the gap between law in 
books and law in action which followed from the argument that law was conditioned by 
social structures and consciousness. On some occasions, these theoretical premises were 
used to construct alternative theories, doctrines, and models for law and jurisprudence. 
Hard-core critical legal scholarship was not often constructive, but the periphery was, 
even though they shared the basic assumptions on the theoretical basis.  
   The crisis of law that was obvious in the mid-1960s and became widely acknowl-
edged at the turn of the decade continued till the end of the 1970s. At the same time, 
critical legal scholarship changed from realistic critique and sociological legal studies to 
fundamental criticism and philosophical critical theory. It had also acquired a central 
organization, the CLS movement, which was developing its own identity and establish-
ing a position within the field of jurisprudence. The 1970s was the formative period of 
CLS, but it kept expanding and transforming throughout the 1980s. Before analyzing 
the critical legal scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s historically, I will extend our scope 
for a bit to fully understand the dynamics of critical legal thought. In the following two 
sections, I will lay out the basic outlines of critical legal scholarship on the problems of 
race and gender. These were problems that the legal scholars tackled in the 1960s and 
1970s, were submerged into the general critical legal scholarship in the late 1970s, and 
developed into individual theories in the 1980s. 
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3.2.3 The emergence of the Critical Race Theory  
 
The central point in Critical Race theory is the element of color in law.
547
 The problem 
of race in America originates from the time of slavery, and hence racism and racial ine-
quality were one of the most pressing social problems in the United States in the twenti-
eth century. Thus, too, the civil rights movement that escalated in the 1960s was one of 
the most important elements of the decade. Besides the civil rights struggle, race con-
sciousness within various academic disciplines had developed during the twentieth cen-
tury,
548
 and enthusiastic black students who had entered the law schools in the 1960s 
and 1970s were willing to adapt to the critical atmosphere of the turbulent university 
and learn from the methods of critical scholarship.
549
 A central tenet for them was, how-
ever, the assumption that formal equality reinforced racist attitudes. The evolution of 
race consciousness in this respect was a response to the conservative atmosphere and 
emphasis on the color-blindness of law.
550
  Thus, Critical Race Theory (CRT) emerged 
“in the mid-1970s with the realization that the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s had 
stalled and that many of its gains, in fact, were being rolled back.”551   
   The roots of critical race theory are in the mid-1970s, although the theory as such 
developed only in the early 1980s.
552
 The increasing scholarship on the relationship 
between race and law with the civil rights movement in the 1960s
553
 also contributed to 
the general awareness of the race problem. However, people of color were not always 
pleased with the civil rights movement because they thought it did not completely un-
derstand their problems.
554
 At the beginning of the 1970s, African American scholars 
noted that, despite the promises of the 1960s, society had not been able to transform 
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itself. A journal was thus needed to focus on the current problems of the blacks, and the 
Black Law Journal was founded in 1971, focusing on scholarship on legal problems and 
race.
555
  
   Critical Race theory developed parallel to CLS. There was the increased civil 
rights activism and scholarship on the one hand, and the continuing social inequality of 
racial minorities despite the civil rights legislation on the other. In addition, there was 
the critical scholarship emphasizing the ideological function of law. Race consciousness 
had arisen within scholarship, and the African American scholars were highly interested 
in legal problems, especially as the civil rights movement was fading. Scholars interest-
ed in civil rights issues and wanting to explain why the efforts had failed had much to 
deal with, and they could use the methods of critical legal theory in explaining the situa-
tion. Critical race theory thus borrowed from other critical disciplines of the time, such 
as critical legal studies and critical criminology, and applied these approaches to the 
problems of race. In the opinion of the critical race theorists, it was not simply the liber-
al ideology that distorted the images of reality, it was also the racial aspect.      
   The fundamental concerns of CLS and critical race scholars were very close to 
each other. Indeed, at first, critical scholars interested in race problems could participate 
in the general critical legal scholarship, but soon realized that their white colleagues 
were often looking at the problems from a non-minority perspective.
556
 Derrick Bell, the 
most significant of the early race theorists, who was familiar with the critical approach-
es, noticed the systematic racial bias of law in the early 1970s and argued that the tradi-
tional scholarship had denied the fact that the aspects of slavery were still present.
557
 He 
also noted that discrimination within the judicial process was so pervasive that it was 
impossible for blacks to receive fair treatment.
558
  Whereas traditional civil rights schol-
arship had faith in legal doctrine and the courts in combating racial discrimination,
559
 
critical race scholars were more pessimistic about the ability of law to bring improve-
ment and went beyond the doctrine in their analysis of the legal situation. According to 
Bell, the administration of justice was unable to promote equality
560
 and legal reforms 
were merely statements in the interests of white people to make the situation look bet-
ter.
561
 Furthermore, he continued, legal remedies were modest attempts in the struggle 
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for equality because law had no serious impact on reality and could be interpreted to 
mean various things.
562
 
   Race consciousness was the most important thing for the critical legal scholars 
who were interested in race problems. Just as the critical legal scholarship stressed the 
fact that law reified reality to seem rational, critical race theory stressed that the tradi-
tional legal consciousness created the illusion of color-blind law and a racially equal 
society. This, however, was regarded as a mere illusion, since the irrationality and inde-
terminacy of law functioned to produce systematic discrimination against racial minori-
ties because of the inherent ideological and structural biases. For the race theorists, rac-
ism in law was much more than few discriminating practices and some bias within the 
administration of justice; it pervaded the whole system. Therefore, one had to study the 
historical and social context of particular circumstances in order to understand the dy-
namics of racism.  
   As the vagueness of legal remedies intended to improve racial inequality became 
more obvious in the late 1970s, critical race theorists also turned toward pessimism, and 
began to consider the legitimizing aspect of law. Alan Freeman argued that antidiscrim-
ination law was constructed from the perspective of the perpetrator instead of the vic-
tim, and therefore paid no due attention to the circumstances of the victim which, how-
ever, were crucial. Thus, the law legitimated the prevailing situations and made things 
appear as if discrimination and inequality were being dealt with.
563
 Just like the critical 
legal scholars, critical race theorists also argued that law reified reality to appear as if 
improvement was achieved. The critical argument in this regard was that law shaped the 
consciousness of the people to believe in equality. Critical race theorists simply turned 
this Marxist argument to concern the problems of race.    
   Critical race theory arose out of the dynamics of race problems in America and the 
rising critical thought. Race problems and the law had been pressing questions for a 
century, and the postwar years had only intensified them. What the 1960s changed was 
that there was a legal doctrine invalidating racial segregation and civil rights acts pro-
hibiting discrimination. There were also more African Americans in the universities 
receiving higher education and prepared to do scholarly work. The 1960s had been a 
time of great expectations for the African American but, by the beginning of the 1970s, 
those hopes had proven false. Scholarship had pointed out the fact that the administra-
tion of justice discriminated against the blacks, but, according to the critical race schol-
ars, the traditional civil rights scholarship focused too much on the formal aspects of the 
problem which was not a solution for the minorities experiencing the inequality. There-
fore, racial problems demanded more explicit and critical research. The critical legal 
scholarship rising at the time provided a temporary solution but the critical scholarship 
was not sufficiently concerned with racial inequality. In the 1970s, critical race theorists 
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still cooperated with CLS. The frustration came in the 1980s when scholars wanted to 
develop a theory that would take the problems of race seriously in legal analysis. 
 
3.2.4 The rise of feminist jurisprudence 
 
Another important branch of critical legal theory also arose out of the turbulence of the 
1960s, namely, feminist jurisprudence. The legal status of women was long deprived. 
After a long and fluctuating struggle toward equality between the sexes, the social up-
rising of the 1960s brought new forms of women’s movement. Women’s consciousness 
of their role in society was rising during the postwar decades,
564
 but it was not until the 
1960s that the large-scale women’s movement appeared.565 Women’s activism brought 
changes in the legislation concerning women’s rights in the 1960s and especially in the 
1970s with the help of women’s rights litigation.566 Women had also had difficulty in 
obtaining legal education, but by the early 1970s they had full access to all law schools 
in America, which meant improved opportunities for a legal career both in a practice 
and in academia.
567
 Discrimination had caused trouble for women in beginning a career, 
which, partially inspired by the civil rights struggle, had increased the critical con-
sciousness of women.
568
 Thus, inspired by the political movement, feminist jurispru-
dence was developed in the universities during the 1970s.
569
       
   Women’s status in the society, academia, and professional life was poor, and as 
women became more aware of this fact they started to struggle against inequality be-
tween the sexes. The rise of the women’s movement in the 1960s increased the concern 
for equality, and encouraged studies on the legal status of women in society
570
 and with-
in the legal profession.
571
 As the critical attitude toward the neutrality of law in general 
intensified, critical feminists noted that “[t]he popular assumption that the law is even-
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handed does not hold true in the area of women’s rights.”572 The poor status of women 
became apparent particularly to those going for a career in the male-dominated busi-
ness. A Harvard graduate, Brenda Fasteau, noted that only after she had entered the 
Harvard Law School did she “became fully aware of the extent to which women are 
oppressed in this country.”573 Critical scholarship was thus an attractive choice for those 
who wanted to go beyond the problems and analyze their causes.  
   Scholarship on women’s rights intensified in the 1970s. The Women’s Rights Law 
Reporter was founded in 1971 and the Harvard Women Law Journal in 1978.
574
 In the 
late 1970s, female scholars participated actively in the work of critical legal studies. 
However, as were the critical race scholars, critical scholars on the status of women also 
became frustrated with the male aspects of CLS.
575
 In general, “feminist radicals chal-
lenged not only liberalism but also the gender hierarchies imbedded in both theory and 
practice on the Left,”576 which was also what they did in legal scholarship. Feminist 
jurisprudence attacked legal formalism and the apparent neutralism that were seen to 
protect and reinforce male domination.
577
 For feminist jurisprudence, too, law was an 
aspect of power, but this power was dominated by men. At its heart were the presump-
tions that, first, society was dominated by men and therefore gender was more a social 
than biological construction, and second, that because women were subordinated to men 
in society, law protected and reproduced this subordination. 
   From the beginning, feminist jurisprudence struggled toward equality between the 
sexes. Women’s rights scholars had noted the ambiguity in the legal status of women 
and wanted to end the discrimination by creating a doctrine and praxis of equal treat-
ment.
578
 An important topic for women’s rights scholars was an equal rights amendment 
to the Constitution.
579
 They argued that the discrimination against women both in law 
and in practice was so pervasive that constitutional reform was needed,
580
 and that gen-
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der was not a necessary legal category for individuals.
581
 Traditional scholars who sup-
ported equality but were skeptical of the equal rights amendment opined that differenti-
ated treatment of the genders was sometimes reasonable and amending the Constitution 
would only cause further problems.
582
 Feminist theory was still optimistic about reforms 
through law and thus pushed a radical reform. Traditional scholars, on the other hand, 
were concerned about doctrine and were therefore modest regarding reform. Besides 
illuminating the rise of women’s consciousness, the controversy over the equal rights 
amendment reflected the split between the traditional and the critical points of view, 
since the critical scholars appealed to the ideological and constitutive elements of law.     
   To the critical feminist scholars, the problem of gender was of such fundamental 
importance that only extreme measures would do. As Barbara Cavanagh argued, the 
subordinated status of women was so deep within the structures of the society that the 
law protected and reproduced the images of women as weak and fragile people, destined 
to child-rearing and house-work and therefore incapable of doing the men’s work. Thus, 
legal changes were needed to delegitimize the repression and to contribute to the cultur-
al change.
583
 The feminists did not, however, take law at face value. Even the laws 
meant to protect women were often regarded as paternalistic measures upholding the 
traditional image of women, or their influence was seen to be undermined in practice.
584
 
Historical, social, cultural, and psychological data were often used to point out the per-
vasive factors behind the law that prevented change having the desired effects. The em-
phasis on the context was essential because the problems were not in the letter of the 
law. Critical feminist legal scholarship utilized the recent trends in legal scholarship to 
analyze the deep structures of law.  
   Constitutional analysis was also an important topic for the feminist scholars be-
cause in the 1970s the Supreme Court handed down many decisions concerning sex as a 
reasonable criterion for different standards.
585
 Feminist scholars criticized the Supreme 
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Court for exercising paternalistic notions toward women and refusing to attend to the 
real motives behind the laws or to the real-life circumstances of modern society.
586
 Fem-
inist jurisprudence of the 1970s often endorsed formal equality. According to the femi-
nists, although the Court noted “realities”, it did this in a conservative and out-of-date 
style. Women were not to be treated differently because that upheld the image of wom-
en as housewives. Critical scholars thus favored a doctrine according to which gender 
would be no basis for classification because it would affect the ideology behind the law.  
   To the feminists and critical scholars, the problem of discrimination was deeper 
than simply in the physical differences between the sexes. In a call for emancipation, 
John Johnston noted that law was not supposed to coerce people to live by some by-
gone roles,
587
 and in a more radical feminist sense, everything, even sports, was to be 
integrated under equal rights.
588
 Equality, however, required more than changes in doc-
trine. It required fundamental changes in law and society,
589
 and the aspects of sex-
based discrimination should be included in legal education.
590
 Critical feminists had 
adopted critical thought and applied it to the gender issue. Legal change was considered 
as merely one step toward emancipation, and changes in the society and consciousness 
were also required.   
   Scholars considered various legal remedies in seeking equality. As affirmative ac-
tion became important in the late 1970s, scholars of critical gender studies tackled the 
issue. They argued that affirmative action ought to be permitted when its purpose was to 
improve the access of women to social positions they had difficulty entering because of 
historical circumstances.
591
 Women’s rights were considered to be in a need of special 
critical scholarship that could understand the problem because old-school realism
592
 and 
the Supreme Court
593
 were indifferent to them. By the late 1970s, the critical feminist 
thought in law had become obvious. Women felt that traditional theory as well as crit i-
cal theory without awareness of gender was insensitive to their problems.    
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   Indeed, the problem was pressing because, as the eminent feminist lawyer Nancy 
Gertner noted, “distinctions drawn solely on the basis of sex are not treated as wholly 
impermissible, as are distinctions drawn solely on the basis of race.”594 Interest in wom-
en’s rights and gender studies in law had increased in the 1970s,595 but women still felt 
discriminated against as the decade approached its end, and scholars noted problems of 
discrimination regarding such matters as pregnancy
596
 and work.
597
 For the feminists, it 
seemed obvious that sex-based discrimination was a pervasive problem that could not 
be dealt with in traditional ways.  
   By the late 1970s, critical feminist jurisprudence had developed greatly. In 1979, 
Catharine MacKinnon published her book Sexual Harassment of Working Women, in 
which she argued that harassment equated to sex-based discrimination and had been 
long tolerated because of the social and legal structures.
598
 Although the response was 
not totally uncritical, MacKinnon’s book was a major step in the development of femi-
nist jurisprudence.
599
 Her book was a thoroughgoing critique of ideology since, as was 
typical of critical gender studies in law, she pointed out that the contemporary con-
sciousness was male-based and therefore law could not understand problems of women. 
The target was the traditional practices of the societies which were seen to produce 
harmful effects.  
   Women, like African Americans, struggled for equality in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This struggle was also seen in civil rights legislation, formation of movements, and liti-
gation. The problem and its legal hindrances also initiated some lively scholarship. 
Feminist jurisprudence grew out of the critical scholarship on the legal status of women 
and the ambiguity of the legal doctrine on gender issues. According to the feminists, the 
inequality of the sexes was so pervasive that traditional scholarship simply could not 
grasp it, and the roles of the genders were inherent in the structures of the society and 
consciousness of the people, thus preventing change and causing ambiguities in law. 
The critical feminist scholars sought to elaborate theories that could transcend the law 
and analyze the factors behind it by taking the problem of gender into account. Like 
critical race theorists, scholars of the early critical gender studies were often associated 
with the critical legal studies movement, but they were disappointed at the male domi-
nance of that movement too, and were later to set up a movement of their own. Both 
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critical race theory and feminist jurisprudence were adaptations of critical thought to 
particular problems. 
4 Historical perspectives on CLS 
 
The development of critical legal scholarship from the 1960s to the end of the 1970s has 
now been analyzed. It should be obvious that the theoretical reorientation and the matur-
ing of the scholars in the 1970s radicalized sociological jurisprudence and the benevo-
lent thought of the 1960s. The historical analysis of the development involves, however, 
several aspects, which will all be dealt with in this section. Furthermore, I will review 
the conventional accounts of the history of CLS in order to make a critical analysis and 
a synthesis of them. I will point out that we should not reduce CLS to any one single 
factor, nor should we criticize it as sheer radicalism. Rather, it should be understood as 
a complicated cultural movement, pursuing an authentic understanding of the law in 
both a practical and scholarly sense.  
   The origins of the CLS movement are in the law school of the 1960s. As Robert 
Gordon has written, CLS “started for most of us in the late 1960s or early 1970s out of a 
sense of extreme dissatisfaction with our own legal education.”600 These disappointed 
students then wanted to find alternative ways to practice law that would respond better 
to the inequalities in society.
601
 Although it has been argued otherwise,
602
 CLS scholars 
had a background in the university radicalism of the 1960s which had some resem-
blance to the style of the critical literature.
603
 By the 1970s, there already were radical 
blocs in the faculties of the humanities and social sciences, and thus in an institutional 
sense, CLS was a collection of young, radical scholars forming a bloc in the law school 
                                               
600 Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 Florida State University 
Law Review 195, 196–197 (1987).  
601 Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, 282–283, in David Kairys (ed.), The Politics 
of Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Pantheon Books 1982), 281–293.  
602 Anthony Chase writes that “[t]he frequent characterization of CLS professors as 1960s hippies or radi-
cals who have gotten tenure in the law school could not be farther off the mark.” (Anthony Chase, A Note 
on the Aporias of Critical Constitutionalism, 36 Buffalo Law Review 403, 418 (1987).) This is because 
“most leading CLS scholars were either too old or too young in the period of critical resistance to the 
Vietnam War, about 1967–1972, to have been undergraduate college students involved in groups like 
Students for a Democratic Society.” (Id. at n. 32.) In a sense this is true, but it seems to be an over-
interpretation. CLS scholars obviously were not typical “student radicals”, but this does not mean that 
they were not identified with the radical spirit of the time. Just because they did not participate in radical 
activities does not make them non-radicals. Furthermore, in my opinion the ages between 16 and 32 are 
neither too young nor too old to participate in radical activities. Perhaps the CLS scholars were not mem-
bers of SDS but they might nevertheless have identified with similar causes. Besides, the founding mem-
bers of SDS were basically the same age as the early CLS scholars.   
603 Maurice J. Holland, A Hurried Perspective on the Critical Legal Studies Movement: The Marx Broth-
ers Assault the Citadel, 8 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 239, 243–244 (1985); G. Edward 
White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stanford Law Review 649, 658–660 (1984).  
144 
 
faculty,
604
 since it consisted of those radical students who made careers as teachers.
605
 
Traditionally, law professors were mostly lawyers who taught, but the institutional 
changes in the universities led many scholars of other sciences to law schools “to fulfill 
their academic inclinations as law professors.”606 Society and academia were in turmoil, 
but legal education was mostly traditional, and students identifying with the radical 
cause felt that it did not conform to their notions about justice and right. Some students 
might have also been disappointed with the anxious, conservative atmosphere and with 
their stressful experiences of the case method.   
   The critical legal scholarship of the 1970s thus originates from the social circum-
stances and radicalism of the 1960s and from the student experiences with legal educa-
tion. Whatever the reason, some law students of the 1960s just could not see any ration-
ality in traditional jurisprudence. When the disappointed students graduated and entered 
the faculty, they took their experiences with them and, determined to change the tradi-
tion, they continued their critical enterprise but often found it hard to do critical scholar-
ship. They nevertheless did not want to jump on the traditional bandwagon and there-
fore continued to antagonize it. However, the fact that the origins of the critical legal 
scholarship are in the radicalism of the 1960s does not mean that it explains this schol-
arship entirely. The bad experiences with legal education, social turbulence, and the 
ideological orientation of the critical scholars were only the beginnings of the move-
ment.   
   Because of the experiences of the 1960s, critical legal scholarship developed from 
realist criticism and sociological jurisprudence into radical critique. Even if weakened 
after the Second World War, realism had left a permanent mark on American jurispru-
dence. Realism was then revised to a certain extent, as the interest in sociological and 
cultural legal research, and criticism of the society and law, increased in the 1950s and 
early 1960s. The tradition of alternative legal scholarship of the 1960s stressed the con-
nection between law and society but did not challenge the fundamental basis of the tra-
dition or the society. There was thus a shift in critical thought in the 1970s. As G. Ed-
ward White notes, experiences with the Vietnam War pointed out that consciousness 
was more important than expertise.
607
 Critical scholars began to move away from social 
engineering to philosophical analysis. As noted by Jaff, the faith in reform was lost be-
cause it did not go to the root of the problem.
608
 Critical scholars had to begin a project 
of total criticism, for, as Bickenbach wrote, “[t]he Realists were concerned to change 
laws and legal institutions to live up to the ideal of the rule of law; the CLS-ers [we]re 
concerned to convince us that the Rule of Law is a political trap we must escape.”609 
Radicals had lost their faith in the system and sought the roots of the problems in the 
                                               
604 Nathan Glazer, Marxism and the Law School: A Non-Legal Perspective, 8 Harvard Journal of Law 
and Public Policy 249, 249 (1985).  
605 Gordon 1989, supra n. 237 at 393.  
606 Holland 1985, supra n. 603 at 244–245, quotation at 245.   
607 White 1984, supra n. 603 at 669–670.  
608 Jaff 1984, supra n. 471 at 1145. 
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structures of law and society, as well as in the human and legal consciousness. Because 
of the loss of faith in the civil rights struggle and the utopian ideals of the 1960s, critical 
legal scholarship turned toward the deep structures and total criticism. This also turned 
attention from the reality of law to critical analysis of it.    
   Critical legal scholarship turned toward total criticism, but the project was difficult 
and has been one of the most controversial aspects of CLS. Unger writes that “one can 
begin to imagine the rudiments of a better alternative to the liberal doctrine, but this 
alternative should not be mistaken for the liberal view set upside down.”610 Because 
many of the radical CLS scholars had not defined the elements of the alternative, they 
have often been criticized for criticism without offering alternatives.
611
 Many CLS 
scholars have pointed out that this is not true,
612
 and rightfully so, for much of the early 
literature relating to the movement was in fact reformist.
613
 Hard-core CLS was often 
mostly critical, but the periphery was not. However, as Richard Fischl has emphasized, 
the point of this radical criticism was rather to examine the basis of law in order to find 
the potential for alternatives, not to provide the alternatives.
614
 In a certain sense, critical 
legal scholarship followed the trend in Kuhnian paradigm studies, and tried to create a 
“scientific revolution”. Scholarly conventions and the modes of scientific observation 
were of intellectual interest during these times and naturally influenced the young 
scholars who disliked the tradition. Total criticism helped to expose the ideology that 
lurked beneath the surface of law and also provided a way to participate in the discourse 
on paradigms.  
   The turn toward philosophy and total criticisim distinguished CLS from its prede-
cessors and from the contemporary critical movements. For instance, CLS has often 
been linked to realism,
615
 but it has also been argued that it was in fact antagonistic to 
realism.
616
 The usual account, which seems plausible on the evidence piled up above, 
                                               
610 Unger 1975, supra n. 301 at 7.   
611 Philip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to be Radical? 36 Stanford Law Review 247, 281 (1984).  
612 Guyora Binder, Beyond Criticism, 55 University of Chicago Law Review 888, 889 (1988); Mark 
Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stanford Law Review 293, 299–300 (1984). See also Ed Sparer, Fundamental 
Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal 
Studies Movement, 36 Stanford Law Review 509, 511, 568, n. 5, n. 6, n. 161 (1984).   
613 See the references in supra n. 612, and see, e.g., Heller 1976, supra n. 291; Rosenblatt 1975, supra n. 
318; Atleson 1975, supra n. 320; Lindgren 1979, supra n. 542; Alexander 1978, supra n. 543; Kelman 
1979, supra n. 544.  
614 Richard Michael Fischl, The Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 Law & Social Inquiry 779, 
802, n. 51, n. 61 (1992). According to Fischl, much of the misunderstanding of CLS follows from the fact 
that CLS literature has been read with the question, what would you put in its place? in mind. (Id. at 782, 
784–785.) CLS was, however, a paradigmatic movement and did not therefore seek an alternative vision. 
(Id. at 802.) Thus, many of the accusations that CLS has endorsed a socialist utopia have been construc-
tions of the critics of CLS rather than of CLS scholars. (Id. at 790–792, 795–805, 810–818.)   
615 Russell, for instance, writes that “[CLS] does have a very pronounced ancestral relationship with Legal 
Realism.” (Stuart J. Russell, The Critical Legal Studies Challenge to Contemporary Mainstream Legal 
Philosophy, 18 Ottawa Law Review 1, 5 (1986).) See also Duxbury 1995, supra n. 42 at 424–426.   
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goes that CLS radicalized the realist project and turned it from reformism to a radical 
political agenda.
617
 Thus, to say that “[i]n many ways CLS is a direct descendant of 
American Legal Realism,”618 means that it was a critical, academic movement with sim-
ilarities in methods, purposes, and theories to those of realism, but these differed be-
cause the context of the movements was different, and, moreover, the differences be-
tween these movements were noted.
619
 According to Tushnet, the similarity was that 
CLS “too attack[ed] from the left the complacency of the existing center; it too denie[d] 
that law is autonomous; it too insist[ed] on the contradictions within the rule system,”620 
but this was “not what the Realists actually did, but what they should have done had 
they carried out the implications of their insights.”621  
   CLS was an heir of realism in a sense, but the differences were obvious and the 
inheritance involved the movement more than the theory.
622
 They both were critical 
academic movements, attacking the traditional profession and challenging the dominant 
paradigm. Realism was not particularly influential, but it had to be taken into account 
because of its legacy for legal scholarship. Scholars did not become enlightened after 
                                                                                                                                         
each other. In many ways this is true, but it reduces CLS to one theoretical premise and does not take into 
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Legal Education 505, 505 (1986).  
619 CLS scholars have interpreted legal realism and noted how they have been construing some argu-
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620 Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 Stan-
ford Law Review 623, 626 (1984). Tushnet refers to both realism and law and society.  
621 Id. at n. 16.  
622 Duxbury writes that in their challenge to the tradition, “critical legal scholars have re-invoked the 
realist tradition of challenging accepted jurisprudential wisdom” but CLS was “not simply realism repeat-
ed,” and, furthermore, “while realism was a mood, critical legal studies has evolved very much as a 
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reinterpretation and re-application of the realist insights.  
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reading realism and felt compelled to fulfill its mission, but rather they had to settle ac-
counts with it because of the similarities in theories. Nevertheless, critical theory has 
always to be adapted to the times it prospers in and therefore two movements of very 
different ages can hardly share anything but the basis. It was thus natural that critical 
scholars of the 1970s reinterpreted the realism of the 1930s.  
   The interest in metaphysics and fundamental criticism also distinguished CLS 
from other critical movements of the time. Law and society was criticized for its em-
phasis on empiricism. As White argues, “[o]f all the issues that were to demarcate Crit i-
cal Legal Studies from the Law and Society movement, the association of objective em-
piricism with positivism was the most explosive and the most clearly joined.”623 Since 
critical scholars were interested in the connection between ideology, values, and facts, 
they were not interested in empirical approaches. Of course, empirical sciences mattered 
to the less radical critical scholarship. Critical scholars did not pay much attention to 
political jurisprudence, but obviously its determinism in behaviorist or political terms 
was much too simple for a detailed legal analysis and could not provide a basis for legal 
scholarship.
624
 Law and economics and rights theories were attacked on the basis that 
they accepted the dominant ideology at face value. Therefore, the critical scholars 
thought that they provided the most useful methodology to analyze law without any 
ideological baggage. The purpose was to transcend the contemporary society in order to 
explore the origins of the values and policies behind the law and to emancipate both the 
law and the people from the chains of modernity.  
   The theoretical basis of CLS was diversified, which was also reflected in, and a 
consequence of, its complicated and comprehensive aims. In general, the theory of criti-
cal legal scholarship was a combination legal realism, critical theory, neo-Marxism, 
Hegelian philosophy and continental philosophies such as structuralism and existential-
ism, New Left radicalism, liberal sociology and empirical social sciences, and neo-
progressive historiography.
625
 Critical legal scholarship developed at a time when sci-
ence and scholarship in general were changing, which provided considerable theoretical 
potential, combining several elements with no one single element being superior to any 
other. It was an elaboration and a mixture of philosophical pieces and concepts integrat-
ed into the critical thought of the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, different scholars fa-
vored different theories and drew influences from many sources that could contribute to 
the critical arguments. Criticism itself both followed the influences and encouraged 
more; some scholars were critical before reading the philosophy and thus chose the lit-
erature to get more inspiration for their ideas, whereas others became critical because of 
the literature they read.  
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   Ideas and theories often resembled those of the Frankfurt School, and it is obvious 
that it had some impact on the development of critical legal scholarship, but the extent 
of the impact is difficult to explicate. David Kennedy notes that the impact of critical 
theory has not been marked in American jurisprudence,
626
 John Schlegel writes that the 
members of the first conference on critical legal studies had read very little of its litera-
ture,
627
 and Pierre Schlag argues that “the tenor of most early CLS thought owed much 
more to the activist and existentialist ethos of Sartre than to the pessimistic theories of 
the Frankfurt School.”628 It is true that the references to the Frankfurt School were in-
frequent and there were no systematic efforts to build theories on it. Nevertheless, even 
if the direct impact of the Frankfurt School was not great, it might have had more indi-
rect impact because it contributed to the critical postwar scholarship notion on the con-
nection between research and ideology, and laid the foundation for the criticism of natu-
ralism and positivism. Critical theory was a scholarly background that to a certain ex-
tent at least structured the critical thought.  
   The criticism of epistemology and the construction of facts also followed the gen-
eral trends in the philosophical and cultural criticism. Continental philosophy started to 
influence American legal scholarship in the 1970s,
629
 and the critical scholars were of-
ten greatly inspired by it. Although continental thought has influenced American legal 
scholarship at least since the late nineteenth century,
630
 critical legal scholars of the 
1960s and 1970s were in the forefront in introducing new continental theories to Ameri-
can jurisprudence and hence following the recent intellectual trends. Joan Williams has 
argued that the epistemology of CLS followed the trends in continental philosophy, 
where the conception of reality through empirical observations was criticized and the 
focus was directed to the roles of the observer, culture, contingent conventions, and in-
terpretation.
631
 In addition, as noted by James Boyle, critical legal scholarship was also 
a response to the decline of reason to which postwar continental philosophy contributed. 
Critical legal scholars attempted to show that reason was contingent so that one needed 
to understand the structures of consciousness to understand the manifestation of social 
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rationality.
632
 The emergence of critical legal scholarship indeed followed the linguistic 
and epistemological turns which directed perception to the construction of reality. The 
possibilities of describing reality were constrained by the limits of language as well as 
by the context of culture, society, and politics. CLS philosophy sought to point out the 
deficiencies in the mainstream thinking so that the essence of being could be redefined.   
   Whatever the impact of philosophy and social theory was, the sources were always 
read freely and interpreted to suit the purpose. Schlag writes that “[t]o the extent that 
Marx, Weber, Sartre, Levi Strauss (and later Nietzsche, Derrida, and Foucault) played 
any role in shaping cls thought, it was either as deep background or as interstitial in-
sight.”633 Although greatly overstated, the argument is substantially correct. As already 
noted, critical scholars applied various influences, which were adapted to the interest of 
the scholar. At the beginning, critical legal scholarship was rather a search for authentic-
ity than a theoretical movement. It had neither a definite theoretical basis nor solid in-
fluences. It followed the social upheaval and the personal drives of the scholars more 
than any intellectual or jurisprudential agenda, but this does not mean that theoretical or 
intellectual sources did not matter. It seems that the fundamental point in the radical-
critical legal scholarship was primarily to surpass the collective consciousness of mod-
ern man and to examine the authentic self-consciousness of the individual, and various 
influences were used to a greater or lesser extent, sometimes very superficially, in the 
endeavor.    
   Furthermore, of course, the scholars were affected by each other’s writings. CLS 
was a “network of scholars” writing in the law reviews, reading each other’s texts to a 
varying extent and thus having reciprocal influence on the development of the various 
theories.
634
 A common factor between critical scholars was a particular attitude rather 
than theory. They developed ideas and others were influenced by them and developed 
them further. The diversity of the influence of critical legal scholarship reflected the 
diversity of the scholars; they had different emphases and therefore theories differed as 
well. And as the literature expanded and the critical thought became stronger, the criti-
cal scholars felt the need to gather for a conversation. The conference on critical legal 
studies gathered scholars with similar attitudes, theoretical backgrounds, political orien-
tation, and research interests together.   
   Critical race theory and critical feminist legal scholarship developed with a similar 
pattern but with some lag. They were intertwined with the movement but grew apart 
when they become disappointed with it.
635
 Racial and gender-based inequalities were 
pressing problems and subjects of social activism. Both women and African Americans 
had had difficulty in obtaining higher education and tenure in the universities. As these 
groups increasingly entered the academy, the scholarship also increased. The rising crit-
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ical legal studies provided theory and methods that could transcend the limits of tradi-
tional scholarship, analyze the connection between ideology, consciousness, and law, 
critically examine the legal situation in context, and find alternatives to contemporary 
policies. The critical scholarship on race and gender issues began, of course, outside and 
parallel to the rise of critical legal studies, but the movements were intertwined in the 
late 1970s. Race and gender problems were, however, mostly of interest to racial minor-
ities and women. So when it turned out that critical legal studies were not so concerned 
with these problems, they developed theories of their own.  
   Although it is extremely difficult to pinpoint the actual origins of CLS, it seems 
that it is best described as an academic counter-culture that pursued various ends. It 
originated in the counter-culture identity of the 1960s, the disappointments with legal 
education at the same time, the feelings that the law and society had failed the great 
expectations, and in the postwar changes in scholarship, science, and jurisprudence. The 
origins of the counterculture, social radicalism and civil rights movements, the New 
Left, and the changes in scholarship are of course in the 1950s, but in the 1960s and 
1970s legal scholars realized the indefensibility of the legal tradition. CLS was an aca-
demic response to the social, cultural, and intellectual changes, that grew out of the 
combination of the dissatisfaction with the law and the academic legal tradition and the 
personal drive to criticize and change the tradition. Its theories emanated from the crit i-
cal thought and alternative jurisprudence of the 1950s and early 1960s. When the schol-
ars who matured during the turbulence of the sixties reached the point at which they 
were ready to depart both from the traditional and the alternative branch of jurispru-
dence, they began to develop comprehensive critical theories. The 1970s then registered 
the evolution of radical-critical legal thought.       
   Radical legal thought developed in the 1970s because that was a time of transfor-
mation. The 1960s was a strange decade in which the criticism of the social system 
sought to point out that apparently benevolent institutions had pernicious effects. In the 
1970s, however, the critique turned to adapt these institutions to conform to the rights of 
the citizen. In a sense, then, CLS was a remnant of the thought of the sixties because at 
a fundamental level it still aimed to reveal the paradoxes of modern institutions and to 
show that the modern rights consciousness simply protected the status quo. However, it 
was not simply the sixties thought adapted to the seventies, but rather new thought 
changed according to the needs and ideas of the new decade. 
   In the late 1970s there was a movement called Critical Legal Studies. There was 
no single or unified theory of CLS, although the main points of the movement were ba-
sically the same. It is difficult to summarize the theoretical premises because of the di-
versified literature and, moreover, because Unger seems to be the only one who has 
tried to develop a systematic theory. Although there is no “theory of CLS,”636 its most 
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essential elements, as they were in the late 1970s, can be summed up as follows. First, 
there is no rational basis for legal reasoning. Law is indeterminate and differing deci-
sions deriving from the same facts are always possible. Second, law is related to the 
dominant social ideology. There are no natural, logical, or necessary solutions within a 
society, everything being conditioned by ideology. The third premise, following from 
the second, is that rights and values are socially constructed and thus open to debate, not 
natural or inevitable. Fourth, following from those above, legal activity is conditioned 
by the personality of the actor and the structures within which he or she acts, and neither 
the actor nor the context decides the outcome of a case alone. Fifthly and finally, law is 
a product of history, and the contemporary circumstances are created and restrained by 
historical development. These are of course not the only criteria of CLS scholarship but 
are essential to it. Critical scholars worked on these assumptions and developed various 
theories. And, furthermore, the more reformist branch of critical scholarship advocated 
these methods to bring about improvements in law.     
   The response to CLS reflects its image. Despite the radical agenda, early critical 
legal literature passed mostly unnoticed and it was not until the 1980s that a major reac-
tion began.
637
 Only Unger’s and Horwitz’s first books attracted serious attention in the 
1970s, but it was not until critical scholarship had a firm foothold in academia that it 
began to attract the attention of the profession. Traditional scholars then argued that 
CLS merely rewrote old ideas,
638
 its philosophy was too vague and ambiguous to build 
any comprehensive theory,
639
 its arguments were ambiguous and poor,
640
 and its target 
was a straw-man.
641
 It is obvious that critical scholarship caricatured and misinterpreted 
law and traditional scholarship but that was based on the experiences of the scholars 
since people with different world views may perceive things differently. Critical legal 
scholarship followed from the epistemological differences between the critical and tra-
ditional scholars. Criticism originated from bad experiences with the society and the law 
school, but the pursuit of radical criticism drove the scholars further and also contribut-
ed to the creation of their enemy. It is impossible to say which was the true state of the 
law, but the critical scholars perceived only its flaws, set them in ideological context, 
and criticized the totality. This was a project in which honest and sincere efforts to im-
prove society and update the paradigm were mixed with the pursuit of academic fame 
and taking revenge on the tradition.     
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   It has been argued that critics of CLS have often misunderstood the movement and 
simplified its theories.
642
 Early critical legal scholarship was not deterministic, simply 
destructive, nihilistic, or playing only the “law is politics” card. The scholarship was not 
reductionist, but sought to define law in a highly complex manner and thus to define 
theories of jurisprudence that could determine the true meaning of law. The purpose of 
the criticism was to go beyond legal rules and principles to reveal their real purposes 
and functions. Therefore, the scholarship was centered on the project of total criticism 
because it was thought that it was the only way to transcend the boundaries of con-
sciousness. CLS was a response to the social problems, but it was also an effort by the 
scholars to acquire academic capital, and, furthermore, it was a philosophical and polit i-
cal enterprise to create a theory of law and society that could guarantee authentic human 
essence and freedom beyond the capitalist and socialist state. It was an academic 
movement of total criticism of the tradition in search of authenticity and originality. 
5 Conclusions 
5.1 CLS in Context 
 
CLS was an outcome of various factors and the result of long process of development. 
Its conceptual basis developed in the 1960s and 1970s alongside social and intellectual 
criticism. Although mainstream jurisprudence took a more conservative and traditional 
direction after the war, there were forms of realist and alternative legal scholarship dur-
ing the decades of transformation. Critical legal scholars of the 1970s, however, identi-
fied with the antagonistic spirit and radicalized the critical scholarship of the 1960s. 
They drew influences from the postwar sciences, neo-Marxism, and critical social 
thought, combined these with the lessons of legal realism, and brought a dash of indi-
viduality. After the mid-1970s, there were enough critical scholars to organize a confer-
ence and create a semi-formal critical society within the law schools.  
   In the first place, critical legal scholarship was a response to the social changes 
and hence a product of its time. The 1960s was a decade of transformation, although the 
changes had begun earlier and the decade mostly marked a revision, resurgence, and 
radicalization of older ideas. In the 1960s, however, a considerable part of the genera-
tion adopted a critical attitude toward society, noted the social inequalities and the injus-
tices the modern order created and upheld, and began to struggle against the traditional 
authorities. The Vietnam War that represented capitalist oppression both home and 
abroad was the last straw that marked the beginning of the mass radicalism. Critical 
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legal scholars were students or scholars who were critical and leftist before the 1960s or 
adopted these ideas during the years of turbulence, and thus identified with the radical 
students and the leftist agenda. Their literature pointed out that law was part of the so-
cial hierarchies of power and therefore contributed to their preservation.   
   Lawyers and legal scholars had looked for alternative ways to practice their pro-
fession during the sixties, which was seen as the development of the law and society 
scholarship and in the creation of the various forms of alternative advocacy as well as in 
the willingness of lawyers to change the society. Critical legal scholars were the most 
upset segment of the legal profession who wanted to pursue an academic career. They 
were interested in philosophy and theory and wanted to elaborate jurisprudence that 
would suit their interests. Critical legal scholarship was thus a combination of the New 
Left ideology, the critical attitude of the critical lawyers, and postwar critical theories 
and continental philosophy. Critical scholars had identified themselves with the radical 
youth of the 1960s, and they continued the critical work within academia. The critical 
movement was in many ways like the New Left; it was an academic movement criticiz-
ing the dominant consciousness and seeking an alternative theory, and whereas the New 
Left aimed at participatory democracy, CLS tried to elaborate legal theory that would be 
true to the actual needs of the people.  
  Critical legal scholarship also followed the general intellectual and scientific 
trends. The postwar years witnessed the rise of the criticism of positivism and natural-
ism in science, the linguistic turn, and the transformation of epistemology. Neo-
Marxism and critical theories entered the studies of history, sociology, economics, cul-
ture, and literature. Furthermore, interdisciplinary legal scholarship became more popu-
lar in the 1960s and 1970s. Critical legal scholars applied the new sciences in legal stud-
ies and created a philosophy of law that could transcend the pursuit of rationality and 
the neutrality of traditional jurisprudence. It was a legal theory that denied the superiori-
ty of the values and policies of modern society and emphasized the fact that people cre-
ated the image of reality, the values and norms that were part of it, and constructed so-
cial institutions. Critical legal scholarship sought to emancipate law, jurisprudence, and 
people from the repression of consciousness and to understand the freedom of creation.  
   In the last resort, however, critical legal scholarship was an academic movement. 
Although many critical legal scholars participated in social practices, an academic ca-
reer was their primary goal. They were radicals who disliked all the other forms of con-
temporary jurisprudence and wanted to create a legal theory that could transcend the 
ideological chains of scholarship. Critical legal scholarship was a way to acquire aca-
demic fame, even if indirectly, because criticism itself was a way of self-realization. 
CLS was a methodology of criticism, combining philosophical thinking into traditional 
forms of criticism, and stretching the critical potential to the extreme. It was a philoso-
phy of law designed to explore the authenticity of the relation between the individual 
and law in modern society. Reasons for adopting a critical stance might vary from social 
benevolence and altruism to philosophical and theoretical interests or from the disap-
pointments of being a student to the willingness to distinguish oneself from the masses. 
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Whatever the reason, the critical scholars found the traditional scholarship unsatisfacto-
ry and wanted to create an alternative tradition. The impulses of the critical theory often 
came from the society and influences came from philosophy and scholarship. The varie-
ty of influences indicates that there was no common theory, even if the basic premises 
were very close to each other. Critical legal scholarship was also a struggle toward au-
thenticity and originality.  
   While stressing one factor in the rise of the CLS movement, scholars are missing 
some elementary aspects of its development. It is important to understand the rise of the 
movement as an academic response to the changes in society, culture, and legal scholar-
ship. It is also important to perceive CLS scholars as scholars who were frustrated with 
the tradition in several ways, and hence expressed their personal world views through 
their scholarship. Their activities were meant to change the legal scholarship, law, and 
society, but they were also meant to attack the tradition and create something new. Crit-
ical legal scholarship was an expression of a different world view and lifestyle. 
5.2 A final remark: CLS in the 1980s 
 
As we have seen, the critical legal scholarship of the 1970s, culminating in the estab-
lishment of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies in 1977, was a complex phenome-
non combining various aspects of the 1960s and 1970s. There was critical scholarship in 
the 1960s, but the more radical from of criticism came into existence in a series of 
fragmentary articles during the early 1970s and, with a more weighty amount of litera-
ture published in the latter half of the decade, critical legal scholarship became one of 
the most influential forms of legal scholarship of the decade.  
   Critical Legal Studies was anything but over as the 1970s came to its close. In fact, 
it was only entering the most productive and fertile era, and as Duxbury writes, 
“[a]lthough critical legal studies grew out of the New Left-inspired academic disaffec-
tion of the 1970s, it will probably be remembered as the jurisprudence of the 1980s.”643 
CLS scholars continued to write on several topics, and in the 1980s it became interna-
tionally well-known and a very influential form of jurisprudence. Critical scholars wrote 
on various topics such as contract,
644
 labor,
645
 constitutional
646
 and criminal law.
647
 In 
addition, legal reasoning,
648
 education,
649
 rights,
650
 and law and economics
651
 were all 
                                               
643 Duxbury 1995, supra n, 42 at 468.  
644 Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Refer-
ence to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Maryland Law Review 563–658 (1982).  
645 Karl E. Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New History of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 Indus-
trial Relations Law Journal 450–482 (1981).  
646 Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Princi-
ples, 96 Harvard Law Review 781–827 (1983). 
647 Mark Kelman, Interpretative Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stanford Law Review 
591–673 (1981).  
648 Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 Research in Law and Sociology 25–52 (1980).  
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placed under the radical microscope. CLS also sought to cooperate more with the Guild 
than it had in the previous years
 652
, and it expanded in size tremendously.
653
 In the 
1980s, CLS reached the point at which it became known.   
   Whereas the CLS movement faded in the early 1990s,
654
 critical race theory and 
feminist jurisprudence prospered, probably because they were more constructive and 
had a clear agenda. Since the decline of CLS is not, however, the primary concern of 
this study, we cannot delve any deeper into that problem. The 1980s was, nonetheless, a 
golden age for CLS. It seems that the philosophical basis, the opportunities the scholar-
ship provided, and the conservative atmosphere of the decade provided a fertile ground 
for CLS scholarship to flourish in. Moreover, CLS never died. Although it lost lots of 
its appeal and was eventually absorbed into the dominant paradigm, it has given and 
continues to give much inspiration, and influences modern legal scholarship.      
   The development of CLS provides an interesting perspective not only on the criti-
cal legal scholarship in the United Sates but also a more universal phenomenon of the 
Western world. The United States was a significant locus of scholarship in the postwar 
world, which was influenced by European currents but which also had a considerable 
influence on the development of European scholarship. In the following chapter, we 
turn to the development of alternative legal scholarship in Scandinavia, because it pro-
vides a more particular perspective on the issue. 
                                                                                                                                         
649 Kennedy 2004, supra n. 539.    
650 Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 
Texas Law Review 1563–1599 (1984).  
651 Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics? 8 Hofstra Law Review 905–912 (1981).  
652 See Kairys (ed.) 1982, supra n. 598, which was a product of the cooperation of the National Lawyers 
Guild and CLS.  
653 See Kennedy 1985, supra n. 637.  
654 John Henry Schlegel, CLS Wasn’t Killed by a Question, 58 Alabama Law Review 967, 967–969 
(2007). 
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IV Alternative and critical legal scholarship in 
Scandinavia, 1965–1980 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scandinavia as a legal area 
 
In the previous chapter we noted how alternative legal scholarship arose in the United 
States during the 1960s and evolved into critical legal studies in the 1970s. We noted 
how various aspects of society, culture, and scholarship affected its development. In this 
chapter I will examine the alternative and critical legal scholarship of the 1960s and 
1970s in the Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden,
1
 which are stud-
ied collectively and in less detail than the United States was in the previous chapter, and 
then Finland in the following one. The intention is a general overview, and the compari-
son will mainly be done between the Scandinavian countries and Finland on the one 
hand and the United States and the Nordic Countries on the other.  
   The Scandinavian countries share a relatively similar, albeit not identical, political 
culture,
2
 and law and legal scholarship also have many similarities. A general analysis is 
thus both possible and practical.
3
 As the Norwegian legal scholar Johannes Andenæs 
wrote in 1968, “[w]hen it comes to details, there are many differences from one country 
to another in Scandinavia, but I imagine that the similarities are so great that a foreign 
observer would easily recognize their legal systems as belonging to the same family.”4 
As noted in chapter II, although the Continental legal tradition has had a considerable 
influence on Scandinavian law and legal scholarship, the historical development has 
both distanced the Scandinavian countries from the Continental tradition and unified the 
Nordic legal tradition.
5
 Because of the historical inheritance and the similar languages, 
                                               
1 The word “Scandinavia” usually refers to these countries. The phrase “Nordic Countries” is used when 
Finland and Iceland are included, but Scandinavia can also be used to refer to all five Nordic Countries. 
Here “Scandinavia” means only Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and “Nordic Countries” includes Fin-
land, but the adjective “Scandinavian” can also refer to the Nordic Countries. Iceland will not be a part of 
my analysis.      
2 Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth, Introduction: The Cultural Construction of Norden, 7, in Øystein 
Sørensen and Bo Stråth (eds.), The Cultural Construction of Norden (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press 
1997), 1–24.  
3 See Ulf Bernitz, What is Scandinavian Law? Concept, Characteristics, Future, 50 Scandinavian Studies 
in Law 13–29 (2007).  
4 Johs. Andenæs, The Legal Framework, 9, in Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, Volume 2 (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget 1968), 9–17.    
5 Ditlev Tamm, The Nordic Legal Tradition in European Context ─ Roman Law and the Nordic Coun-
tries, 17, in Pia Letto-Vanamo (ed.), Nordisk Identitet: Nordisk rätt i europeisk gemenskap (Helsingfors: 
KATTI 1998), 15–31. See also Jaakko Husa, Kimmo Nuotio, Heikki Pihlajamäki, Nordic Law: Between 
Tradition and Dynamism, 10–38, in Jaakko Husa, Kimmo Nuotio, Heikki Pihlajamäki (eds.), Nordic Law 
– Between Tradition and Dynamism (Antwerp ─ Oxford: Intersentia 2007), 1–39.   
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legal scholars of the Scandinavian countries have always been aware of the currents of 
their neighboring countries and there has always been close communication between 
them.  
   The Scandinavian countries have also long been cooperating in law and politics,
6
 
cooperation which has involved legislation as well as legal scholarship. Many of the 
laws of the Nordic countries have been prepared together and therefore legislation is 
quite similar, in certain cases even identical.
7
 The countries have followed each other’s 
legislative reforms and followed the example if considered reasonable. Furthermore, the 
lawyers’ associations of these countries have held conferences in which they have been 
able to contemplate contemporary legal problems. Cooperation itself, of course, creates 
uniformity, but the basis of the Scandinavian cooperation is also the historical connec-
tions between the countries and their closely related legal cultures. The cooperation has 
therefore been based on their cultural closeness, and has created and reproduced more 
closeness.   
   During the turbulent times of the 1960s, similar associations for similar causes 
were established in the Nordic countries. For example, the associations for criminal po-
litical research and reform were founded in the late 1960s.
8
 There were also law jour-
nals that were read in all of the countries and in which contemporary problems could be 
reviewed, such as Tidsskrift for rettsvitenskap (Journal for Legal Scholarship), Nordisk 
tidsskrift for kriminalvitenskap (Nordic Journal for Criminal Legal Scholarship), and 
Scandinavian Studies in Law. The last was founded in 1951 to publish Scandinavian 
legal studies in English. The 1960s increased the common cause. For example, Scandi-
navian Studies in Criminology was founded in 1965 to gather and publish Scandinavian 
criminological research in English. Scandinavian legal scholars did not work within 
strict national boundaries but cooperated with each other, and the rise of critical juris-
prudence boosted the common scholarship.  
   In this chapter, I shall explore the rise of the Scandinavian alternative and critical 
legal scholarship in the 1960s and its development in the 1970s. I will here use the word 
critical legal scholarship in referring to Marxist jurisprudence and to fundamental crit i-
cism of law and legal scholarship, whereas alternative legal scholarship refers to the 
various schools of sociological and non-traditional jurisprudence, even if clear distinc-
tions between the extremes cannot be drawn. After I have briefly described the social 
                                               
6 An influential factor in the common legislation in the postwar era has been the Scandinavian Council, 
which was founded in 1952 as a formal organization for cooperation between the Nordic Countries. (T.K. 
Derry, A History of Scandinavia: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland & Iceland (Minneapolis: Universi-
ty of Minnesota Press 1979), 374–376.)     
7 On the legislative cooperation, see Leif Sevón, Några reflexioner kring det nordiska lagstiftningssamar-
betet, TfR 1988, 509–523.  
8 The Swedes were the first to establish “The National Swedish Association for Penal Reform”, KRUM in 
1966. Denmark and Finland followed the next year, and the Norwegian Association for Criminal Reform 
(KROM) was founded in 1968. These organizations then cooperated in conferences and research. (Hans 
Nestius, Förord, 7, in Hans Nestius (ed.), Behandling som Straff: 23 debattinlägg om nordisk kriminalpo-
litik (Stockholm: Bokförlaget Prisma 1969), 7–13; Thomas Mathiesen, Politics of Abolition: Essays in 
Political Action Theory (Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, Volume 4, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 
1974), 40–44.)      
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circumstances of the period, I will, first, briefly analyze the rise of the sociology of law 
and alternative legal scholarship in the 1960s. As will be seen, there was a realist tradi-
tion within Scandinavian legal scholarship, but in the 1950s and 1960s the interest in 
sociological jurisprudence increased and legal scholars began to take a more critical 
view of their profession. Second, I will explore the development of Marxist legal schol-
arship in the 1970s. Marxist legal scholarship, which reflected the trends in social and 
intellectual criticism, was the most critical form of legal scholarship. There were differ-
ences and similarities in the Marxist legal scholarship of the Scandinavian countries, but 
the general trend was the same. Third, I will examine the alternative and critical legal 
scholarship in the late 1970s and consider a few particular topics. Because there are 
three countries under consideration, this chapter is not as detailed as chapters three and 
five. Nonetheless, the general account illuminates interesting and important aspects of 
the critical legal scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s and is thus useful for the compara-
tive analysis. 
1.2 Scandinavia and the 1960s 
 
Scandinavian countries were in a different position after the Second World War, but 
when the war was over and the reconstruction began, they took a relatively similar path 
toward modernization. Denmark and Norway had been occupied by Germany, and 
therefore had to settle their accounts with the war-time administrations. As a result of 
their war-time experiences and the political situation, they both joined NATO as found-
ing members. Sweden, on the other hand, had not participated in the war and was there-
fore untouched by its ravages. She also decided to remain neutral in Cold War power 
politics and declined to align militarily.  
   The decades before the Second World War were a time of slow but steady trans-
formation of the Scandinavian countries, which remained mostly agrarian despite indus-
trialization. The great depression of the 1930s did not hit the Scandinavian countries, 
which also avoided the rise of fascism, particularly hard. The Second World War inter-
rupted the steady development, but the postwar reconstruction re-started it again. Dur-
ing the two decades after the War, Scandinavian countries witnessed a tremendous eco-
nomic growth, and urbanization and industrialization of the society, all boosted by the 
population growth.
9
   
   The construction of the welfare state was one of the most significant social chang-
es in Scandinavia. Although this began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, welfare legislation blossomed from the 1950s onwards.
10
 Sweden was the best-
known with its “Swedish model” economy and “People’s Home” welfare politics. Their 
                                               
9 Mary Hilson, The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945 (London: Reaktion Books 2008), 59–75.  
10 Derry 1979, supra n. 6 at 365–370; Hilson 2008, supra n. 9 at 91–106.  
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internationally admired combination of capitalism and socialism was created, and the 
social security system took care of every citizen.
11
 Norway too had a considerable wel-
fare system by the 1960s,
12
 whereas the Danish system was not as extensive.
13
 A post-
war goal of Scandinavian countries was to create an equal society in which differences 
of class and income would not be significant and where every citizen would be taken 
care of by the society. The governments sought to create stability and happiness in soci-
ety through significant redistributive measures.  
   Significant characteristics of Scandinavian politics in the twentieth century as well 
as powerful factors in the construction of the welfare state were political consensus, 
cooperation between opposing political parties, and the dominant social democratic ide-
ology. Labor unions and the working class have been relatively strong throughout the 
century and have had a significant influence on the postwar politics.
14
 Especially in 
Norway and Sweden, labor market relations were peaceful until the late 1960s.
15
 De-
spite the class divisions, the interaction between political consensus, the welfare state, 
and peaceful labor market relations brought stability to the society and decreased na-
tional tensions.     
   The political and social trends were both influenced by and contributed to the fact 
that the moderate left dominated the Scandinavian political field from the inter-war era 
to the beginning of the 1970s.
16
 There was of course no absolute consensus or unanimi-
ty about politics, but the first quarter of a century after the war was nevertheless marked 
by a relatively high level of political and social stability, and Scandinavia thus avoided 
serious political tensions.  
   Despite the political consensus, prosperity, and growth, the age of anxiety was 
coming. Criticism of society and liberation from the conservative values had begun in 
the 1950s, but the 1960s was the beginning of turbulent times in Scandinavia.
17
 The 
revolutionary left was revitalized in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and following the 
                                               
11 Sven Olson, Sweden, 7–12, in Peter Flora (ed.), Growth to Limits: The Western European Welfare 
States Since World War II, Volume 1: Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 
1986), 1–116; Göran Hägg, Välfärdsåren: Svensk historia 1945─1986 (Stockholm: Wahlström & 
Widstrand 2005), 47–55, 153–156. “People’s Home” (folkhemmet) was originally a conservative concept 
but the leftists adopted it in the late 1930s. (Sørensen and Stråth 1997, supra n. 2 at 16.)   
12 Stein Kuhnle, Norway, 122–125, in Flora (ed.) 1986, supra n.11 at 117–196. 
13 Lars Nørby Johansen, Denmark, 300–304, in Flora (ed.) 1986, supra n. 11 at 293–381.  
14 Henrik Stenius, The Good Life Is a Life of Conformity: The Impact of the Lutheran Tradition on Nor-
dic Political Culture, 170, in Sørensen & Stråth (eds.) 1997, supra n. 2 at 161–171; Derry 1979, supra n. 6 
at 367.  
15 Hilson 2008, supra n. 9 at 71.  
16 Derry 1979, supra n. 6 at 361–362; Hilson 2008, supra n. 9 at 40–46. Social Democratic dominance has 
been mostly a Swedish story. In Norway and Denmark Social Democrats have had to cooperate more 
with other political parties. As will be seen in the next chapter, Finland has differed from Scandinavia 
with respect to both politics and labor market relations.   
17 Recent Scandinavian historiography has presented the radicalism of the late 1960s and the year 1968 as 
the zenith of the “long sixties” that covered the period of approximately 1958–1974. (Kjell Östberg, Swe-
den and the Long ‘1968’: Break or Continuity? 33 Scandinavian Journal of History 339, 339–340 (2008); 
Anette Warring, Around 1968 ─ Danish Historiography, 33 Scandinavian Journal of History 353, 354 
(2008); Laura Kolbe, From Memory to History: Year 1968 in Finland, 33 Scandinavian Journal of Histo-
ry 366, 366 (2008).)   
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international trend, the old communist parties distanced themselves from Soviet social-
ism and created a new left agenda for socialism in a western democracy.
18
 The revolu-
tionary communist left had never disappeared from the political map although it could 
not compete with the moderate left. As both international and domestic politics 
changed, the socialists had to renew in order to form a powerful alternative to the polit i-
cal establishment, and communism became thus a powerful political ideology in the 
1960s and 1970s.   
   Alongside the radicalization of the society and politics, critical and radical coun-
ter-cultures were formed, which questioned the traditional lifestyle and social mores.
19
 
Furthermore, students became radicalized and more involved in politics. The 1960s in 
general was a time when everything was politicized, and students too perceived the 
problems at the university in terms of politics. They also struggled against the university 
hierarchies, administration, and curriculum, and formed critical study groups and 
movements for social action.
20
 Students were the major impetus in youth radicalism and 
in the development of the youth counter culture. Universities were places were young 
people could interact and acquire theoretical knowledge about social and scholarly crit i-
cism. It was therefore the students who were the most receptive to global controversies 
and who were also the most active participants in constructing the image of them.    
   The Vietnam War was a major factor in the process of radicalization, and mass 
protests against the war occurred everywhere.
21
 Radicals were not simply concerned 
with the issues at home, but protested against the global capitalist system and oppres-
sion that the war represented in its most outrageous form. It was not like the other wars 
in history because it was seen to be a direct consequence of capitalism.
22
 Protests 
against the war were also targeted against the Scandinavian countries because of their 
support for the system, even if the official foreign policy often disapproved of the war. 
Sweden in particular was extremely critical of the war. Because of NATO membership, 
                                               
18 Thomas Ekman Jørgensen, Transformations and Crises: The Left and the Nation in Denmark and Swe-
den, 1956–1980 (New York: Berghahn Books 2008), 32–51. Orthodox communism survived the crisis of 
the late 1950s but it was not very popular and therefore remained quite insignificant in national politics.  
19 In general on the counter-cultures of the 1960s and 1970s in Scandinavia, see, e.g., Morten Bendix 
Andersen & Niklas Olsen (eds.), 1968: Dengang og nu (København: Museum Tusculanums Forlag 2004); 
Tor Egil Førland & Trine Rogg Korsvik (eds.), 1968: Opprør og motkultur på norsk (Oslo: Pax forlag 
2006); Kjell Östberg, 1968 när allting var i rörelse: Sextiotalsradikaliseringen och de sociala rörelserna 
(Stockholm: Prisma 2002).  
20 Sven-Olof Josefsson, Året var 1968: Universitetskris och studentrevolt i Stockholm och Lund (Göte-
borg: Avhandlingar från Historiska institutionen i Göteborg 1996), 124–130, 135–137, 142–144, 186–
189, 213–216; Steven L.B. Jensen & Thomas Ekman Jørgensen, Studenteroprøret i Danmark, 101:2 His-
torisk tidsskrift 435–469 (2001).   
21 Vietnam protests in Scandinavia are dealt with in Kim Salomon, Rebeller i takt med tiden: FNL-
rörelsen och 60-talets politiska ritualer (Stockholm: Rabén Prisma 1996); Johs. Nordentoft & Søren H. 
Rasmussen, Kampagnen mod Atomvåben og Vietnambevægelsen 1960–1972 (Odense: Odense Universi-
tetsforlag 1991); James Godbolt, Den norske vietnambevegelsen (Oslo: Unipub forlag 2010).   
22 Jørgensen 2008, supra n. 18 at 89, 92.  
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the situation in Norway and Denmark was different. Nonetheless, they too were ambas-
sadors of peace and adopted a critical attitude on the war.
23
   
   The radicalism of the 1960s was in any event a rebellion against the traditional 
values, norms, and the authorities. Radical counter culture was born out of the frustra-
tion with the bourgeois society, and the cold war nuclear threat and balance of terror, 
combined with student dissatisfaction within the universities, which was exacerbated by 
the explosion of the student population.
24
 The youth rebellion that culminated in 1968 
was a global phenomenon adapted to national circumstances.
25
 The student revolts of 
1968 were thus not as dramatic in Scandinavia as they were, for example, in France, 
West Germany, and the United States. In addition, the national governments were more 
supportive and understanding toward the restless students.
26
 Although the rebellion was 
the same at a basic level, theoretical stresses and underpinnings varied. Communism 
became popular among the radicals even if Soviet communism was not supported. In 
Denmark, radicalism was based more on Marxist thought than in Sweden and Norway, 
where the radicals adopted more Maoist approaches toward socialism.
27
 Although social 
radicalism followed more contemporary politics and the development of the youth 
counter culture, it needed a theoretical boost. Since capitalism was the public enemy 
number one, counter culture needed socialist ideology, and since the Soviet Union had 
shown its oppressive side, the radicals turned towards Cuba and China.  
   The critical perception of the establishment was also seen in the rise of critical 
scholarship. Logical positivism was criticized and scholars became more interested in 
critical theories such as the Frankfurt School and Marxism. Scholarly traditions were 
criticized for being ideological and biased toward capitalism.
28
 Scholarship was also 
seeking theories to criticize the tradition and the hierarchies of academic scholarship, 
                                               
23 James Godbolt, Chris Holmsted Larsen, Søren Hein Rasmussen, The Vietnam War: The Danish and 
Norwegian Experience 1964–1975, 33 Scandinavian Journal of History 395–416 (2008).  
24 See, e.g., the analysis in Josefsson 1996, supra n. 20 at 25–33.     
25 Terry H. Anderson, 1968: The American and Scandinavian Experiences, 33 Scandinavian Journal of 
History 491, 492–493 (2008).  
26 Thomas Ekman Jørgensen, The Scandinavian 1968 in a European Perspective, 33 Scandinavian Journal 
of History 326, 327 (2008); Steven L.B. Jensen, “Youth Enacts Society and Somebody Makes a Coup”: 
The Danish Student Movement between Political and Lifestyle Radicalism, 237, in Axel Schildt and 
Detlef Siegfried  (eds.), Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 
1960─1980 (New York: Berghahn Books 2006), 224–238; Thomas Etzemüller, A Struggle for Radical 
Change? Swedish Students in the 1960s, 241–243, in Schildt and Siegfried (eds.) 2006, id. at 239–257.   
27 For Swedish Maoism, see Anne Hedén, Röd stjärna över Sverige: Folkrepubliken Kina som resurs i 
den svenska vänsterradikaliseringen under 1960- och 1970-talen (Lund: Sekel 2008); Lars Åke Au-
gustsson & Stig Hansen, Maoisterna: En historia berättad av några som var med (Stockholm: Ordfront 
förlag 1997). For Maoism in Norway, see Hans Petter Sjøli, Mao, min Mao: Historien om AKPs vekst og 
fall (Oslo: Cappelen 2005). For a comparative view of the new left in Sweden and Denmark, see Jørgen-
sen 2008, supra n. 18. As will be noted in the following chapter, Finland differed from the Scandinavian 
countries in that orthodox Marxism was more influential.   
28 Svante Nordin, Från Hägerström till Hedenius: Den moderna svenska filosofin (Lund: Doxa 1983), 
198–201, 205–206; Josefsson 1996, supra n. 20 at 263–267; August Aronsson, Mellan kritisk vetenskap 
och revolutionär teori: Den marxistiska samhällsvetenskapens utformning i Häften för Kritiska Studier 
1968–1971, C-uppsatts VT 2007, Institutionen för idé- och lärdomshistoria, Uppsala universitetet, 17–27 
(available at http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?searchId=1&pid=diva2:291946 (last visited 
31.1.2013)).       
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and the new trends in critical theory and Marxism proved very productive in criticizing 
the academic tradition. As society was criticized for its apparent neutrality, traditional 
scholarship also came under the attack of critical perceptions.  
   The turn of the 1970s was in many ways a continuance of the preceding decade, 
but it also meant transformation. The decade registered an economic downturn and a 
series of strikes which interrupted the otherwise peaceful labor market relations. Alt-
hough student radicalism faded in the early 1970s, leftist ideology was still strong in 
politics and its focus turned away from global politics toward the working class at 
home. Hence, for example, new labor legislation was enacted during the 1970s.
29
 The 
economic crisis also sharpened the criticism of the welfare state by the political left. It 
had been already noted in the 1960s that the welfare state had been incapable of promot-
ing equality and struggling against poverty, and the criticism intensified in the 1970s 
when several studies pointed out the persistent inequalities in Scandinavian societies.
30
 
As a countervailing force to the continuance of the strong left, the neo-conservatism that 
had been on the rise since radicalism came to prominence as a powerful alternative to 
the social democratic hegemony.
31
 However, many of the issues that had begun in the 
late 1960s were promoted in the 1970s, and thus movements such as feminism and envi-
ronmentalism became stronger.
32
 New problems emerged as the old conflict between 
labor and capital was slowly fading into the background, and problems such as econom-
ic efficiency and global integration on the one hand, and national authenticity on the 
other became more important. Membership of the EC was one of the most controversial 
topics of the early 1970s. Denmark joined the community, whereas Norway declined 
because of the powerful opposition that had struggled against EC membership since the 
1960s. Sweden also decided to continue its policy of neutrality and did not apply for 
membership.
33
  
   The decade after the turbulent 1960s thus registered a continuation of old issues as 
well as a change. At the end of the 1970s, the left lost its momentum. Just like its rise, 
the fall of the new left was a consequence of many things. First, socialism as an ideolo-
gy lost its appeal because of its global downfall. Second, the radical left could not find a 
new ideology and the new generation was not all that interested in the old radicalism; 
the young became more interested in career and property than in utopian ideology. 
Third, society changed and the traditional industrial working class that had been the 
core of socialist ideology both shrank and was not that interested in the socialist cause, 
and the new working class in the service sector did not identify with socialism.
34
 Be-
                                               
29 Jørgensen 2008, supra n. 18 at 132–136.  
30 Hilson 2008, supra n. 9 at 106–107.  
31 Claes Arvidsson, Ett annat land: Sverige och det långa 70-talet (Stockholm: Timbro 1999), 329–337, 
349–356; Hägg 2005, supra n. 11 at 328–355; Berge Furre, Norsk historie 1914─2000: Industrisamfunnet 
─ frå vokstervisse til framtidstvil (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget 1999), 364–367; Ebbe Kühle, Danmarks 
historie i et globalt perspektiv (København: Gyldendal 2008), 311–313.  
32 Östberg 2008, supra n. 17 at 345–346. 
33 Furre 1999, supra n. 31 at 300–313; Kühle 2008, supra n. 31 at 296–314.  
34 Jørgensen 2008, supra n. 18 at 165–178. 
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cause socialism lost its momentum both at global and national level, and because radi-
calism lost its momentum as the driving force of the young, the radical left vanished. 
Leftism, of course, continued but it was different in the 1980s. 
2 The roots of critical legal scholarship, 1965–1973 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Scandinavian critical legal scholarship emerged in the late 1960s and reached its most 
critical phase in the 1970s with the rise of Marxist legal scholarship. In order to under-
stand the history of the critical legal scholarship of the 1970s, it is important to situate it 
in the context of society and scholarship. Therefore, in this section I shall deal with the 
forms of alternative legal scholarship of the 1960s which gave a theoretical and meth-
odological grounding to the more critical scholarship of the 1970s.  
   Of particular importance is the rise of sociology of law in Scandinavia in the 
1960s. As compared to the United States, there was then no firm tradition of sociology 
of law in Scandinavia. The rise of the discipline nevertheless performed the same func-
tions as it did in the United States. Sociology of law of the 1960s thus provided a strong 
basis for the studies of the social functions and effects of law as well as the gap between 
law in books and law in action, and it also provided tools for criticism. The first steps 
toward sociological jurisprudence had been taken during the times of realism, in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and in particular during the inter-war years, but 
it was only during the 1960s that influential and expansive tradition was formed around 
the discipline. As will be noted, like their American colleagues, Scandinavian legal 
scholars began to emphasize the importance of investigating the roles law actually 
played in social relationships. What the 1960s brought was a functional understanding 
of law as well as the realization of the very ambivalent character of law.  
   The purpose of this section is to illuminate the changes in legal scholarship in the 
1960s. I will first briefly examine the rise of the sociology of law in Scandinavia in the 
1960s, paying particular attention to its critical aspects. Second, I will study the rise of 
the critical legal scholarship in the late 1960s. It is important to understand that the ju-
risprudential tradition of Scandinavia was quite realistic, and the critical scholars sought 
to stretch the tradition a few steps more in a realist and critical direction. 
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2.2 The rise of sociology of law in Scandinavia 
 
The rise of sociology of law was an international phenomenon after the Second World 
War. The dramatic changes in social and economic structures and the new currents in 
scholarship created new needs for legal research, and the scholars who were willing to 
take the challenge began to work on a scholarship that could explore the social functions 
of law.
35
 Scandinavian legal sociology rose in the wake of the international discipline.
36
 
A general trend in legal research was to find alternative methods to the traditional doc-
trinal analysis in order to transcend the level of law and provide data on the actual func-
tion of law in society. In addition to the social and theoretical interests, the rise of the 
new scholarship also reflected the increased interest in cross-disciplinary research, and 
the increased international cooperation of scholars intensified the global aspect of the 
new field of study.  
   The methodological transformation of Scandinavian legal scholarship in the 1960s 
followed international currents. An essential figure in the rise of the sociology of law 
was the Norwegian scholar Vilhelm Aubert, whose contribution to introducing the 
methods of sociology of law in Scandinavia was significant,
37
 and who has since been 
credited with laying the theoretical basis for the Scandinavian critical legal scholarship 
of the 1970s.
38
 Even if the credits for the theoretical basis may be a matter of debate, 
Aubert’s contribution to Scandinavian alternative legal scholarship was significant. He 
had begun his project on legal sociology in the late 1940s by calling for studies on the 
social origins of law, the causes of legal conflicts, and the social effects of law.
39
 In the 
1950s, he participated in the first study of modern legal sociology in Scandinavia by co-
authoring a study on the effects of the law on domestic help with Torstein Eckhoff and 
                                               
35 Renato Treves, Introduction, 1–10, in Renato Treves and J.F. Glastra van Loon (eds.), Norms and Ac-
tions: National Reports on Sociology of Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1968), 1–20.   
36 A good account of Scandinavian sociology of law between approximately 1947 and 1965 is Torstein 
Eckhoff, Sociology of Law in Scandinavia, in Treves and van Loon (eds.) 1968, supra n. 35 at 21–50. See 
also Britt-Mari Persson Blegvad, The Systematic Position of Sociology of Law in Current Scandinavian 
Research, in Britt-Mari Persson Blegvad (ed.), Contributions to the Sociology of Law (Copenhagen: 
Munksgaard 1966), 2–19. A brief but well-documented history of Norwegian sociology before the Sec-
ond World War is Gunn Elisabeth Birkelund, The Genesis of Norwegian Sociology: A Story of Failures 
and Success (University of Oxford: Sociology Working Papers 2006–05) (available at 
http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/documents/working-papers/2006/2006-05.pdf (last visited 17.9.2012)).     
37 Vilhelm Aubert (1922–1988) first studied law in Oslo and then sociology in New York, where he re-
ceived the theoretical background to his scholarship. After returning to Norway, he became a very influ-
ential figure in the rising sociology of law in Scandinavia. A biographical essay on Aubert appears in 
http://snl.no/.nbl_biografi/Vilhelm_Aubert/utdypning (last visited 17.9.2012). There were other important 
figures with respect to sociology of law in Scandinavia in the 1950s besides Aubert, but he was the most 
significant. For a more detailed description of the early phases of sociology of law in Scandinavia see 
Persson Blegvad 1966, supra n. 36 at 2–13; Eckhoff 1968, supra n. 36 at 21–50.   
38 Nils Kristian Sundby, Innledning, 12, in Anders Bratholm & Nils Kristian Sundby (eds.), Kritisk juss 
(Oslo: Pax forlag 1976), 9–17.  
39 Vilhelm Aubert, Noen problemområder i rettssosiologien, TfR 1948, 432–465.   
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Knut Sveri,
40
 and he later investigated the functions of criminal law in his PhD disserta-
tion.
41
 The development of the methods of legal sociology in the 1950s thus directed the 
interest of legal scholars in the legal reality behind the rules. This can be seen as the 
beginning of the postwar Scandinavian alternative legal scholarship in which the focus 
went beyond doctrinal analysis.  
   The roots of the criticism of law and legal scholarship lay in the sociological ap-
proach. In developing his methods, Aubert also began to criticize traditional legal 
scholarship for its alleged value-neutrality.
42
 According to Aubert, who by the mid-
1960s had already conducted a considerable number of sociological studies on law, law 
was a method of structuring the society and the problems between people within it, and, 
furthermore, law in action always differed from law in books. Therefore, he considered 
an analysis of the values and policies behind law essential for legal research because it 
helped in understanding legal reality and one’s perspective on it.43 The realistic ap-
proach to law made scholars aware of the fact that law in action did not directly corre-
spond with the law in books. Although this notion had already been acknowledged, it 
took some time before Scandinavian legal scholars really began to contemplate the 
problem. The critical aspect in sociological jurisprudence emphasized that, first, law 
was a system of values and was therefore always promoting certain social interests, and 
second, formal equality produced factual inequality, and the latter was related to the 
former. Thus, sociology of law paved the way for the critical analysis of law.   
   The interest in sociology of law grew considerably in the 1960s.
44
 The decade did 
not initiate such research but it meant that more and more scholars became interested in 
it and that its theories and methods were developed. The first Scandinavian conference 
on legal sociology arranged by the Scandinavian Association for Sociology of Law was 
held in December 1967 in Denmark. The purpose of the conference was to give a 
chance for sociology of law scholars to discuss its research and education.
45
 Sociologi-
cal studies in law were the first studies in the 1960s to have a critical grasp of the rela-
                                               
40 Vilhelm Aubert, Torstein Eckhoff, Knut Sveri, En lov i søkelyset: Socialpsykologisk undersøkelse av 
den norske hushjelplov (Oslo: Akademisk forlag 1952).   
41 Vilhelm Aubert, Om straffens sosiale funksjon (Oslo: Akademisk forlag 1954).    
42 Vilhelm Aubert, Likhet og rett (Oslo: Pax forlag 1964), 8, 99.   
43 Vilhelm Aubert, The Hidden Society (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press 1965), 22, 59–60, 
65–75, 83–115. Aubert had conducted studies on law and society from the fifties, and occasionally with 
some American scholars. Some of his essential studies are collected in The Hidden Society. The purpose 
of the book was to examine unfamiliar aspects of society, and in particular the effects and functions of 
law in society not explicitly observed by the people or scholars of traditional legal scholarship. Aubert’s 
studies covered a vast area of legal problems in society.  
44 Per Stjernquist, Rättssociologi som examensämne i Sverige, JFT 1964, 318–335. Stjernquist lamented 
that sociology of law was not integrated into legal education as was done in the United States. He then 
explained the possible uses of sociology of law according to American examples.  
45 Britt-Mari Persson Blegvad (ed.), Retssociologi i norden: Indlæg på den første nordiske konference i 
retssociologi 1967 (Handelshøjskolen i København: Institution for Organisation og Arbejdssociologi 
1968), 3 [foreword]. The studies presented at the first conference were gathered in Persson Blegvad (ed.) 
1968, id.  
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tionship between law and society.
46
 Thus, these studies were conducted in investigating 
such issues as the potential of legal interpretation and argumentation,
47
 the effects of 
legislation,
48
 legal behavior,
49
 and arbitration as a method of conflict-solving.
50
 The 
development in this regard was remarkably similar to that of the United States. Scandi-
navian sociology of law can be seen as law and society scholarship that focused on the 
actual social functions and effects of law. Its scholars were interested in critically exam-
ining the reality of law in order to reveal problems and consider reforms. It was a 
branch of scholarship which provided opportunities to apply alternative approaches, 
criticize law, participate in contemporary legal debates, and develop theories on law. 
Just like the American scholars of political jurisprudence, law and development, and 
law and society, the Scandinavian sociological legal scholars developed scholarship that 
tackled contemporary problems and provided explanations and propositions for reform.   
   A scholar who reflected many of the aspects of this trend was Sten Edlund, who 
combined the sociological approaches with a somewhat more traditional legal research. 
In his treatise on the negotiation procedures in labor disputes, he criticized traditional 
legal scholarship for its narrow and normative perspective. He argued that since con-
tractual relations were totalities in which individual and social factors were important, 
legal research should focus on the personalities of the judges and the behavior of the 
parties so that the significance of extra-legal factors could be taken into account.
51
 The 
critical mood was rising, as was seen in the dislike of the normative perspective of tradi-
tional legal scholarship, and the focus was moving to the law in action instead. The 
methodological basis of legal scholarship was expanding, and the sociological approach 
was becoming more popular.    
   Besides the increased interest in sociology of law,
52
 the late 1960s also witnessed 
the publication of the first systematic efforts to bring out and expound its methodolo-
gies. In a textbook on sociology of law, Aubert explained that research on the social 
functions and effects of law were important because it affected people differently, and 
people had differing perceptions of it.
53
 One of the earliest notions in sociological stud-
ies on law had been that courts sometimes applied the same rules in varying ways de-
                                               
46 Aubert wrote that because of the heterogeneity of the research it would be better to talk about Law and 
Society than legal sociology, as had been done in the United States. (Vilhelm Aubert, Symposium rettsso-
siologi: Oppsummering, 18, in Persson Blegvad (ed.) 1968, supra n. 45 at 7–18.)      
47 Per Olof Bolding, Samhällsvetenskapliga data, common sense och juridisk argumentation, in Persson 
Blegvad (ed.) 1968, supra n. 45 at 29–41. [Later referred to as Bolding 1968(a).]    
48 Bernhard Gomard & Jan Hellner, Retssociologi og erstatningsret, in Persson Blegvad (ed.) 1968, supra 
n. 45 at 42–52. 
49 Jaakko Uotila, Raimo Blom, Per Norseng, Allmänhetens inställningar till rättsväsendet, in Persson 
Blegvad (ed.) 1968, supra n. 45 at 53–66. 
50 Per Olof Bolding, Britt-Mari Persson Blegvad, Ole Lando, Skiljeförfarande som konfliktlösning, in 
Persson Blegvad (ed.) 1968, supra n. 45 at 67–79. 
51 Sten E:son Edlund, Tvisteförhandlingar på arbetsmarknaden: En rättslig studie av två riksavtal i till-
lämpning (Stockholm: P.A. Nordstedt & Söners förlag 1967), 13–26.    
52 Persson Blegvad (ed.) 1966, supra n. 36; Persson Blegvad (ed.) 1968, supra n. 45; Jette Møller Nielsen 
(ed.), Retssociologi i norden II: Indlæg på den tredie nordiske forskerkonference i retssociologi 1969 
(Handelshøjskolen i København: Institution for Organisation og Arbejdssociologi 1970).   
53 Vilhelm Aubert, Rettssosiologi (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1968), 11–15, 31–32, 57–67, 76–84.   
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pending on the case in hand.
54
 It was therefore an essential task of the legal sociologist 
to explore the factual inequalities which followed from the apparently equitable law. 
The notion concerning the gap between law in books and law in action was one of the 
tenets on which critical theory of law could be built once the theoretical basis was laid.  
   A critical turn in sociology of law occurred at the beginning of the 1970s. In a 
Swedish revised edition of Aubert’s textbook that appeared four years after the original 
one, the methodology had become far more critical, to a certain extent even Marxist. In 
1972, Aubert wrote about the Marxist theory on social class conflicts and their influ-
ences on law.
55
 This critical turn followed the social radicalism and the rise of the crit i-
cal theories in academia. Sociology of law had noted the ambivalent nature of law and 
the differences between theory and practice, and by the early 1970s, the functional ap-
proach of sociological jurisprudence was moving towards a critical approach.   
   Combined with the radicalization of society and theoretical reorientation of alter-
native legal scholarship, sociology of law turned from critical analysis to criticism of 
law. Aubert’s books on sociology of law were realistic insights into law, its place in 
society, and legal scholarship, including the distinction between law in books and law in 
action and focusing on the latter. There were critical perspectives on law but the law per 
se and the legal system as a whole were not criticized. Nevertheless, sociology of law 
directed the interest from legal rules toward legal reality and promoted a critical per-
spective that would not take law at face value. The road toward radical criticism of law 
was paved when this methodology was combined with a Marxist analysis of the origins 
and functions of law. As can be seen in the methodological turn, Marxism was becom-
ing popular in the early 1970s, opening up new critical opportunities for legal research.  
   The rise of sociology of law in Scandinavia reflected the same currents as it did in 
the United States. It was an outcome of the expansion of the methodological basis of 
legal scholarship and of the growing interest in social organization and planning 
through law. Furthermore, the increasing interest in the rights of the citizen was also 
considerable, since the postwar scholars wanted to analyze whether the law in fact did 
what it was supposed to do. In the pursuit of examining whether law can promote social 
good, the scholars had to focus on the law in action. Both in the United States and 
Scandinavia, scholars extended the methodologies and subjects of legal scholarship, and 
began to participate in the debates on contemporary concerns.   
   The rise and development of legal sociology was an elementary factor in the de-
velopment of critical legal scholarship, since it provided the methodological basis for 
critical approaches. Rune Slagstad has analyzed the continuity between realism, Scandi-
navian realism, sociology of law, and post-realism in postwar Norway. He points out 
that sociology of law followed realism in the 1950s and early 1960s, but empiricism 
                                               
54 Aubert 1964, supra n. 42 at 112–129.   
55 Vilhelm Aubert, Rättssociologi (Stockholm: Bokförlaget Aldus/Bonniers 1972), 81–91, 95–97. Aubert 
did note, however, that economic relations do not completely explain law, being merely one part of it. (Id. 
at 89–91, 98.)   
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turned toward realism on the judiciary and law in the late 1960s and 1970s.
56
 These 
were the times of the birth of modern critical legal scholarship. The roots of the critical 
legal scholarship of the 1960s and the 1970s are a combination of the rise of the sociol-
ogy of law in the 1950s, the inheritance of Scandinavian realism and the adoption of 
parts of American legal realism, the postwar tradition of critical scholarship that at-
tacked scientific positivism, and the nascent social and academic dissatisfaction. In this 
very brief account of the rise of the sociology of law, I have tried to demonstrate the 
development of the sociological method. In the following sections, I shall point out the 
rise of the critical legal scholarship and its relation to the sociology of law. 
2.3 Criticism of legal scholarship in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
 
Besides sociology of law, the 1960s witnessed a revival of critical legal scholarship. 
Realism had attacked the metaphysical foundations of legal scholarship in the first half 
of the century. The interest in social studies of law, the rise of critical scholarship, and 
the increasing social dissatisfaction, however, contributed to the rise of a new kind of 
critical legal scholarship that would critically analyze the origins and functions of law. 
Unlike the realism of the 1930s, the “new realism” did not try to purge legal discourse 
of values and policies, but acknowledged their existence and then analyzed them open-
ly. I will explore the rise of the critical legal scholarship that developed together with 
and, to a certain extent, emanated from the sociology of law of the 1960s.   
   There was no strict legal formalism in Scandinavia in the 1960s because realism 
had left a legacy of pragmatic jurisprudence. Traditional jurisprudence was contested 
again in the 1950s, and theories were elaborated that would consider the goals and poli-
cies of law,
57
 but the mainstream legal scholarship was mostly normative. Nonetheless, 
many legal scholars realized the discretion in legal reasoning by the mid-1960s and 
were calling for a more flexible approach to it.
58
 Contemporary legal problems also 
raised other responses, such as a call for closer cooperation between legal scholarship 
and social sciences,
59
 and a semantic analysis of legal rules.
60
 Especially in Norway, 
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legal scholars began to emphasize the importance of court practice as a legal source,
61
 
which reflected the realistic tendencies of legal scholarship of the 1960s. Various fac-
tors affected the pragmatic grip on jurisprudence, but no critical paradigm prevailed. 
The mainstream jurisprudence acknowledged that legal reasoning was not completely 
logical or formalist, but the majority of scholars endorsed a more realistic standpoint 
simply in order to maintain the rationality of legal reasoning. There was a trend away 
from strict rule adherence and logical deduction, but there was no major drive toward 
political or value-oriented argumentation. The emphasis on realist arguments meant 
simply an urge to make legal reasoning correspond with contemporary problems while 
still keeping it rational, neutral, and unbiased.  
   Despite the pragmatic trend in Scandinavian jurisprudence, more critical voices 
were also heard. In 1966, the Norwegian legal scholar Anders Bratholm argued that 
politics was everywhere in law, including legislation, adjudication, and scholarship. The 
relation between law and politics was thus to be critically analyzed, he continued, be-
cause social motives and their preferences had an impact on legal activity.
62
 Bratholm 
was inspired by the postwar sociology of law and the ongoing debates on the constitu-
tional law in Norway.
63
 His article reflected the emerging critical view that since law 
and politics were inevitably connected, the political motives behind law were to be ana-
lyzed if one was to have an accurate image of law. By the mid-1960s, the critical mood 
was not yet mature but it was evidently there waiting for more influences and propo-
nents to carry it further.  
   A significant impetus for Scandinavian critical legal scholarship emerged in the 
most turbulent year, 1968, when a Swedish and a Norwegian scholar both published 
books with alternative methods and theories on law. These were Juridik och sam-
hällsdebatt (Jurisprudence and Social Debate) by Per Olof Bolding
64
 and Grunnlovens 
grenser (The Limits of the Constitution) by Carl August Fleischer.
65
 Although these 
books were of quite different character, they both expounded an alternative theory of 
law that would be oriented toward contemporary social problems from a leftist perspec-
                                               
61 Tore Sandvik, Entreprennørrisikoen (Oslo 1966), 68; Arvid Frihagen, Villfarelse og ugyldighet i for-
valtningsretten (Oslo 1966), 190. See Slagstad 1991, supra n. 56 at 227.  
62 Anders Bratholm, Jus og politikk: Refleksjoner etter en diskusjon, Lov og rett 1966, 102–103, 106–
112, 114–117.   
63 There was an intense debate on the Norwegian constitutional law in the mid-1960s, which will be ana-
lyzed in section 5 of this chapter.  
64 Per Olof Bolding, Juridik och samhällsdebatt (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1968). Bolding partici-
pated in the early studies on sociology of law and wrote the first book in Scandinavia with a systematic 
theory of critical legal scholarship. Otherwise his contribution to the critical scholarship was inconsidera-
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realist legal reasoning and endorsed an alternative view of constitutional law. His literature will be dealt 
with in more detail in the section on constitutional law.  
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tive. They represented the first expressions of the new legal realism that was about to 
develop into critical legal scholarship.    
   Per Olof Bolding, who in the late 1960s was a professor of procedural law at the 
University of Lund, had studied the law of evidence and arbitration during his early 
career and was by no means unaware of the problems of judicial decision-making in the 
late 1960s. In fact, he had participated in sociology of law, and argued in 1965 that both 
judicial decision-making and legal scholarship should pay more attention to the social 
facts of the case.
66
 In 1968, he took his critical arguments further and developed a social 
theory of law. Law, he claimed, always responded to particular social problems and 
therefore it was necessary to have knowledge of the society in order to understand the 
law. Furthermore, he argued, legal rules were simply an end to reasoning that could 
always be manipulated to reach one of many contradictory possibilities. Thus, to make 
judicial decision-making correspond with social reality, it had to be made both social 
and open. One had to discuss social problems and all the possible solutions, and legal 
rules should merely circumscribe those solutions.
67
   
   Bolding’s book was applied sociological jurisprudence with a critical perspective, 
and the argument that law and society were inevitably connected was taken to the ex-
treme. Sociology of law had already paid attention to the association between society 
and judicial decision-making and legal reasoning, but now they were intertwined in a 
way that made it impossible to keep them separate. It is difficult to analyze Bolding’s 
influence because there was no detailed documentation in his book, but it obviously 
built on Scandinavian realism and the recent debates on social problems.
68
 Bolding was 
a post-realist, influenced by the rise of the sociology of law, and taking an active part in 
the contemporary discussions. His theory was sociological jurisprudence par excellence: 
since neither law nor legal scholarship was autonomous, sociological data should be 
integrated into them. His comprehensive criticism covered the whole area of law, en-
dorsing a fundamental revamp of the tradition.     
   Bolding’s theory attracted some attention that pointed out some controversial is-
sues in legal thought. Legal theorist Stig Strömholm criticized Bolding’s theory for go-
ing too far. He argued that since the rule of law required a degree of formalism, 
Bolding’s theory led to arbitrary judicial decision-making.69 In addition to judicial deci-
sion-making, the problem of the relationship between sociology and legal scholarship 
also surfaced. Strömholm argued that legal scholarship was to be mostly normative, 
although sociology was useful to a certain extent, although least of all for adjudica-
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tion.
70
 Staffan Rylander replied to Strömholm by arguing that sociology helped to un-
derstand the nature of law better than traditional legal scholarship.
71
 The conflict be-
tween the traditional view that social sciences simply assisted legal scholarship, and the 
critical view that social sciences were elementary to it, concerned the nature of legal 
scholarship in the first place. Traditionalists wanted to maintain the autonomy of legal 
scholarship whereas the critical scholars sought to displace it with the integration of 
social sciences. By the early 1970s, the conflict had become more evident.  
   The problem was also about the nature of adjudication. The critical mood that was 
appearing denied the possibility of formalism altogether. Although even the more con-
servative scholars such as Strömholm agreed that sociology could be of assistance to 
legal research in certain cases, they nonetheless wanted to maintain a minimum amount 
of formalism because that was needed lest law became arbitrary and biased. For the 
critical scholars, however, since law was already arbitrary and biased, the integration of 
sociology into legal scholarship would only make it more honest, critical, and realist. 
Here again the problem was differing perceptions about adjudication. Just as the Ameri-
can scholars debating the neutral principles disagreed on the nature of judicial decision-
making, the Swedish scholars disagreed on it while debating sociology of law. The 
problem was the same, but the Scandinavian scholars simply approached it from a dif-
ferent perspective.      
   Judicial decision-making was indeed an important problem for legal scholars. The 
Norwegian Carl August Fleischer also developed a comprehensive alternative theory of 
judicial decision-making. Whereas Bolding had tackled every possible problem from 
legal education to adjudication, Fleischer concentrated on adjudication in constitutional 
problems, although his theory touched several aspects of law indirectly. According to 
him, to put it simply, constitutional interpretation and adjudication changed in the 
course of time, but indoctrination and education had stabilized them. Thus, whenever a 
problem regarding the constitution arose, one had to take into account all the relevant 
social issues that the problem concerned in order to devise an appropriate solution. The 
constitution was therefore a developing institution.
72
   
   It is important to note that this theory was targeted toward practical problems relat-
ing to the interpretation of the Norwegian Constitution in the 1960s.
73
 The purpose of 
the flexible interpretation was to guarantee the protection of social values over private 
property rights. Fleischer constructed a realist theory that would take account of social 
values and facts instead of sticking to the letter of the constitution and maintaining loy-
alty to the legal principles it seemed to protect on the face of it. He did not rely on con-
                                               
70 Stig Strömholm, Något om sociologiens betydelse för juridiken, SvJT 1970, 101, 105, 117–121.   
71 Staffan Rylander, Strömholm och rättssociologin, SvJT 1970, 484–487. See Strömholm’s reply to 
Rylander, Stig Strömhom, Genmäle, SvJT 1970, 488–491.   
72 Fleischer 1968, supra n. 65 at 21–57, 86–91, 152–177.  
73 As will be seen later, there were intense debates concerning the interpretation of the constitution in 
Norway in the 1960s. One major problem concerned the natural areas surrounding Oslo, the capital city 
of Norway. The owners wanted to construct buildings but activists such as Fleischer thought that the area 
should be protected because of its environmental values.  
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temporary critical theories, however, constructing his theory on Norwegian constitu-
tional scholarship and legal theory and seeking to point out their inconsistencies and 
inadequacies in modern society. His ideas obviously reflected the social ideology and 
optimism over the social planning of the time. Fleischer sought to facilitate constitu-
tional interpretation that would have allowed the legislator to regulate society without 
being overly restricted by the constitutional standards which, he claimed, were mostly 
relics of an ancient society without perfect correspondence to contemporary times. It is 
good to keep in mind that the theory sought to modify the fundamental premises and 
principles of the legal system of Norway to respond to the values that the political left 
considered important in the 1960s. In spite of the political preferences, his theory indi-
cated a flexible and realistic legal interpretation and reasoning in which social data was 
more important than the letter of the law.      
   The problem of legal interpretation and its potential was becoming pressing by the 
early 1970s. Legal scholars generally realized that neither adjudication nor jurispru-
dence was formalist but both involved extra-legal material that was to be taken into ac-
count. Thus, scholars endorsed scientific analysis of values in law
74
 or supported legal 
scholarship with political goals.
75
 The fundamental point, however, was to maintain the 
rationality of law and legal scholarship, even though they were to be mixed with ele-
ments of values and politics. The Norwegian legal scholar Torstein Eckhoff, who 
strongly supported sociological analysis of law, argued that although extreme theories 
such as Bolding’s went too far in their claims, legal reasoning needed more flexibility.76 
Jørgen Dalberg-Larsen, a Danish scholar who was also to become an eager proponent of 
sociological jurisprudence, wrote in 1969 that although there was no point in abandon-
ing the traditional methods of legal scholarship, there was a need to consider the con-
nection between theory and practice further and to use social science more in legal 
scholarship.
77
   
   Many legal scholars in the early 1970s argued for openness in legal reasoning so 
that judicial decision-making could respond to legal problems better.
78
 Agneta Charpen-
tier, who participated in the Scandinavian cooperation in sociology of law, wrote that 
since various factors affected judicial decision-making, behavioral studies on the judges 
would be useful in analyzing the ways the judges responded to the social facts presented 
                                               
74 Stig Jørgensen, Argumentation and Decision, 269–270, 284, in Festskrift til professor, dr. jur. & phil 
Alf Ross (København: Juristforbundets forlag 1969), 261–284. 
75 Jan Hellner, Syften och uppgifter för rättsvetenskaplig forskning, 222–223, in Festskrift til Alf Ross 
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76 Torstein Eckhoff, Bokanmeldelse [Juridik och samhällsdebatt], TfR 1969, 639–640. 
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rer till grundlagberedningens förslag, SvJT 1973, 242; Carl Martin Roos, Tvetydigheter i avtal, SvJT 
1972, 626–627, 638. 
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in the cases.
79
 The changed social circumstances had given rise to new problems which 
required new methods in solving them, and the new theoretical interests provided new 
opportunities for legal research. Legal scholars had to contemplate how to make legal 
practice and theory more rational by modern standards. In this respect, realist and be-
havioral approaches were seen useful in explicating the nature of the law.   
   The problem was thus not whether there was a need for social legal reasoning and 
use of the social sciences in legal research but to what extent and how it was to be 
achieved. The more traditional scholars wanted to maintain the autonomy of legal 
scholarship and the logical nature of legal reasoning as far as possible, whereas the 
more critical scholars wanted to integrate legal scholarship with social sciences and turn 
legal reasoning into applied sociology. The critical thought that was becoming more 
widespread in the early 1970s was influenced by this controversy, whereas the majority 
of the legal scholars balanced between the two extremes.  
   For instance, Stig Jørgensen developed an analytical-hermeneutical theory of law 
throughout the early 1970s that would maintain the fundamental premises of traditional 
legal scholarship but modify them to include aspects of social science, values, and poli-
tics. According to him, law was not simply a system of rules but part of a wider con-
text.
80
 A judicial decision was thus the outcome of an interpretation of legal rules and 
principles, affected by values and ideologies to a certain extent.
81
 This also applied to 
legal scholarship.
82
 Therefore, he argued, it was important to analyze the effects of ex-
tra-legal materials on legal language.
83
 Jørgensen was following many of the theoretical 
and philosophical currents of the time. His theory was not radically critical, but it de-
nied the possibility of autonomous legal scholarship and reasoning. With the help of 
linguistic philosophy, sociology, and history, he sought to define a theory that could 
surpass the formalist language of legal rules and principles and analyze the reality be-
hind them. It was normal at the time to point out the inaccuracies of legal language and 
to construct theories to criticize it. A frequent strategy in the early 1970s was to point 
out the problems of strict definitions and to emphasize interpretation.  
   One important topic that was of interest to legal scholars was the concept of jus-
tice. This, like so many other scholarly problems of the time, emanated from the con-
cept of justice defined by the Danish legal philosopher Alf Ross, who was considered to 
                                               
79 Agneta Charpentier, Undersökningar av rättspersonal, 103–104, 109, in Møller Nielsen (ed.) 1970, 
supra n. 52 at 103–110.  
80 Stig Jørgensen, Ret og samfund (København: Berlingske forlag 1970), 7–9, 20–25.  
81 Stig Jørgensen, Norm og virkelighed, TfR 1970, 498–502; Jørgensen 1970, supra n. 80 at 90–102.  
82 Stig Jørgensen, Grundtræk af de danske retskilders historie, TfR 1971, 201.   
83 Stig Jørgensen, Hermeneutik og fortolkning, TfR 1973, 626, 632. Jørgensen himself labeled his theory 
analytical-hermeneutical. (Stig Jørgensen, Idealisme og realisme i retslæren, JFT 1976, 4.) Dalberg-
Larsen writes that it is difficult to define Jørgensen’s theory because it has such a wide basis, but it none-
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175 
 
be the most influential legal theorist at that time. He was a Scandinavian realist whose 
later theory sought to draw sharp distinctions between law and morals on the one hand 
and legal scholarship and politics on the other. His willingness to expunge out unrealis-
tic metaphysical considerations from law turned his theory into a form of positivism that 
did not please the critical scholars of the time.
84
 Ross’s theory was labeled the “ruling 
theory” in Scandinavian legal scholarship,85 so that those legal scholars who wanted to 
criticize the dominant paradigm of jurisprudence often chose Ross as their target.         
  According to Ross, justice was not a natural, metaphysical concept. Nor was it a 
general political goal. Justice was always the practical application of a legal rule in an 
actual case.
86
 Aubert had criticized this conventionalist-positivist definition of justice in 
the mid-1960s by arguing that the positivist construction of justice excluded the possi-
bility of analyzing justice scientifically. Therefore, wrote Aubert, justice had to be un-
derstood in terms of values and policies because it could then be placed under critical 
scientific scrutiny.
87
 The difference in perspective was already apparent in the 1960s. 
Traditional legal scholarship observed legal concepts in the context of legal rules and 
judicial decisions and sought to exclude the influence of values, ideologies, and policies 
from the analysis. The alternative, on the other hand, argued that the values, ideologies 
and policies were such fundamental parts of law that to ignore them distorted the image 
of law and excluded the possibility of scientific analysis. Writing in the 1960s and from 
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personal biases of the judge in the analysis; his theory thus failed to be useful for reforming legal scholar-
ship and to be of interest from a social scientific perspective. This was so because Ross wanted to main-
tain legal science as an autonomous science within the social sciences and because he was a devoted 
positivist. (Id. at 384–385, 388–390, 393.) The later criticism of Ross’s theory was also largely built on 
these premises.    
   It is indeed an interesting question why it was particularly Ross who was criticized. Dalberg-Larsen 
writes that it is odd why so much effort went into criticizing a theory that was already somewhat outdated 
when it was first published. (Dalberg-Larsen 2006, supra n. 83 at 202.) It seems that criticism often needs 
a face, and it was Ross who was chosen probably because he was an influential and considerable figure in 
Scandinavian legal scholarship. The purpose of the criticism of Ross was probably to criticize traditional 
legal scholarship. It has to be remembered that, even if Ross’ theory did not represent the paradigm of law 
in every detail, it nonetheless was probably the closest expression of it. Realism had made its way into 
Scandinavian legal thinking, as has been noted, and there was a paradigm mixed with elements of tradi-
tional conceptualism and empirical realism. 
86 Ross 1971, supra n. 84 at 365.  
87 Vilhelm Aubert, Rettferdighet i sosiologisk belysning, Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning 1966, 101, 
104–117.  
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the position of a sociologist, Aubert was promoting his concept of sociological jurispru-
dence. In any event, he had set the path for the criticism of the realist exclusion of val-
ues from legal analysis. Scholars of the 1970s continued this tradition and brought some 
new aspects to the problem.  
   The notions of the concept of justice reflected the transformation of legal scholar-
ship. Karen Dykjær Hansen analyzed the various concepts of justice, concluding that 
respect for humanity was the only constant principle. Otherwise the precise definition 
depended on argumentation, which, however, ought to be done on the basis of legal 
principles.
88
 Although her starting-point was the legal system and legal principles, she 
stressed the ambiguity of legal argumentation and the impossibility of incontrovertible 
definitions. Torstein Eckhoff examined the concept of justice from a very different point 
of view. According to him, the concept of justice was ambiguous because it depended 
on the perspective, and therefore he studied people’s conceptions of justice and their 
impact and effects on the strategic behavior and market transactions.
89
 Eckhoff’s post-
realist conception of law and justice was empirical and included values and their practi-
cal presentation in legal reality. Moreover, on the basis of his study, Eckhoff defined 
justice as a form of equal distribution found in between the free pursuance of selfish 
interests on the one hand and collective ownership and an absolutely equal distribution 
on the other.
90
 Eckhoff was thus trying to find a balance between competing social ideo-
logies. Despite the differing approaches, both theories emphasized the impossibility of 
defining justice in accurate and definite terms and encouraged diversified argumentation 
in defining it. Values and open argumentation were becoming essential for legal schol-
arship.     
   The rise of the new realism that emphasized an open discourse on values in law 
was making its way in other areas of jurisprudence too. An important topic was the doc-
trine of legal sources and the concept of valid law in this respect. Here again, Torstein 
Eckhoff was innovative. In his doctrine on legal sources, Eckhoff distanced himself 
from the traditional distinction between finding the sources and revealing their meaning. 
He also emphasized the possibility of interpretation and the influence of personal bias in 
judicial decision-making, arguing further that realistic considerations and values were a 
part of legal reasoning.
91
  
   It has been noted that this was the first time that considerations on circumstances 
were explicitly analyzed as a part of a legal doctrine, although Eckhoff was not con-
structing a radically deviant or new theory, but simply placing these considerations 
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among legal sources.
92
 Eckhoff’s theory on the sources of law represented the new real-
ism that was coming to the fore of Scandinavian legal scholarship, but it was not radi-
cal. His purpose was to point out the widely acknowledged fact that judicial decision-
making contained various elements and was not logical formalism. It is important, how-
ever, that scholars were at pains to develop a theory that would suit the modern needs 
and particularly the relationship between law, values, and politics.     
   A point of origin of critical legal scholarship was the dissonance between alterna-
tive and critical perspectives on law. Karen Hansen also distanced herself from Ross’s 
theory and constructed a theory of valid law that combined traditional legal scholarship 
with contemporary legal practice. According to her, law was those rules that were ap-
plied in legal practice, but it was also important to analyze legal arguments because they 
raised the ideological elements within law.
93
 She thought that her alternative method 
was useful in analyzing the relation between law and politics.
94
 Hansen’s was a post-
realist theory, aiming to bridge the gap between theory and practice, and replacing 
Ross’s theory with one that could be used with respect to values and politics. It thus 
reflects the broader change in legal scholarship, although it was not a critical theory.    
   The gulf between critical scholars and those who wanted to modify the tradition 
without changing its fundamental basis was apparent. Critical scholars were displeased 
with the loyalty to the tradition displayed by the alternative legal scholarship. Preben 
Stuer Lauridsen had already criticized Hansen’s theory for its ambiguity,95 but the prob-
lem also concerned a more fundamental point. Hansen had noted that there was an ele-
ment of indoctrination in legal scholarship which could, however, be overcome since 
contradictory arguments were logically possible.
96
 A young Marxist legal scholar, Peter 
Blume, was more critical of the indoctrination involved in legal education and argued 
that Hansen’s notion was self-contradictory.97 The problem between an alternative and a 
critical view was that the former sought to change certain premises of the tradition while 
maintaining it as far as possible. A critical view, on the other hand, held that the basis of 
traditional scholarship was fundamentally false. The unwillingness of the majority of 
the profession to recognize the fundamental flaw was a major factor for the critical legal 
scholars in the development of their arguments.   
   The late 1960s and early 1970s was a transformative period for Scandinavian ju-
risprudence. The realism of the early twentieth century had left a legacy of pragmatism, 
and by the early 1970s, new realism had emerged and established a strong position. The 
new realism held that since law had to be understood in practical circumstances, norma-
tive legal scholarship was not meaningful, and unlike its predecessor, the new realism, 
rather than being anti-metaphysical, accepted the position of values and politics in law 
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and sought to analyze them openly. The Scandinavian debates on legal reasoning 
strongly resembled the American debates on neutral principles, the question being about 
the nature and extent of the impact of extra-legal factors on judicial decision-making. 
Both in the United States, as mentioned in the previous chapter, and in Scandinavia, as 
will soon be seen, the disagreement on legal reasoning intensified the dynamics of 
change and eventually led to the emergence of a radical critique of law. In a theoretical 
sense, the critical thought developed from the combination of the methods of sociology 
of law and new realism on the one hand, and from the conflict between the traditional 
faith in the rationality of legal scholarship and the radical argument on the political na-
ture of law on the other. 
2.4 Alternative legal scholarship in the early 1970s 
 
Realistic insights and alternative theories of law had made their way into legal scholar-
ship by the beginning of the 1970s. The alternative branch that had continued the legacy 
of legal realism had grown during the postwar decades, and now it was coming to be a 
part of the mainstream. As Eckhoff and Jørgensen noted, by now at least it was general-
ly accepted that a legal decision was not based simply on rules but also on various con-
siderations on facts and values.
98
 A central concern of the legal scholars of the early 
1970s was to develop theories to make both adjudication and legal scholarship meet the 
needs of the new society. The rise of the new realism, social turbulence, and the emer-
gence of the critical academic tradition drove the development of critical legal scholar-
ship.   
   The rising interest in the critical analysis of the reality of law was evident in the 
increasing attraction of sociological jurisprudence. The interest in sociology of law con-
tinued to increase in the early 1970s. A collection of both classic and contemporary arti-
cles was translated into Swedish,
99
 and a Swedish anthology on the fundamental aspects 
of sociology of law was published as an introduction to the discipline.
100
 In addition, 
Dalberg-Larsen wrote a systematic and comprehensive textbook on the topic.
101
 Socio-
logical studies of law were important, as the Norwegian legal sociologist Thomas 
Mathiesen wrote, since they helped to examine law as an outcome of social power and 
as a tool of masking and legitimizing social power relations.
102
 Sociological studies 
concerned, for example, the possibility of changing social behavior through legal regu-
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lation, the effects of the administration, and the functions and effects of legal aid.
103
 
Because of the critical potential, legal sociology was often used as a means for critical, 
or even Marxist, insights into law. The nature of the alternative scholarship was thus 
acquiring a more critical tone.  
   The new movements were not uncritically accepted. One of the defenders of a 
more traditional legal scholarship was Jes Bjarup, who wrote that sociological legal 
scholars had exaggerated the role of the person of the judge and values in judicial deci-
sion-making because, he argued, judges mostly sincerely followed legal materials while 
deciding cases. He also criticized the recent attempts to change the methodology of le-
gal scholarship to include values because, according to him, the values that had been 
included in law were “legal values”.104 Bjarup criticized the new realism both for its 
premises on the theory on legal reasoning and its claims for integrating legal scholarship 
into social science. He thus represented the most normative branch of traditional legal 
scholarship by emphasizing the fact that legal scholarship should focus on the “ought” 
in law. The traditionalist view held that legal phenomena could be studied from a purely 
legal perspective without mixing any personal elements into the analysis but still keep-
ing it rational and objective.  
   Despite the theoretical details, it was the claims for rationality and objectivity of 
the traditional legal scholarship which the critical scholars attacked. In 1974, Henrik 
Zahle, a young post-graduate student on procedural law, published his lengthy criticism 
of Ross’s legal theory, attacking the strict separation between legal scholarship and poli-
tics in particular. According to him, the fact that values and policies were excluded from 
legal scholarship did not mean that they had no effect on it. On the contrary, they al-
ways had effect on research but the traditional scholarship simply denied this fact. Thus, 
Zahle argued, without considering the effects of the economy, politics, and ideology, 
one could not obtain a realistic picture of the law.
105
 The rising critical legal scholarship 
abhorred the sharp division between law and politics. Zahle’s analysis was already 
pointing in the critical direction where all kinds of social values would be included in 
legal studies in order to make both law and legal scholarship correspond with the social 
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reality. The greater social dissatisfaction and knowledge of contemporary critical theo-
ries induced the critical scholars to contemplate the fundamental premises of legal 
scholarship.   
   In the first half of the 1970s, many legal scholars were commenting on the tradi-
tion in order to change it. The concept of legal rules became an interesting subject of 
analysis since the definition of a rule was of importance to legal sociology.
106
 In 1974, 
the Norwegian Nils Kristian Sundby
107
 tackled the problem of legal rules in his study 
Om normer (On Norms). His purpose was to construct a new definition of legal rules so 
that cross-disciplinary research on them as well as an analysis of the values within the 
rules would be possible. He encouraged a structural examination of the rules because, 
he argued, the values within the rules were more significant than personal values regard-
ing them.
108
 Sundby’s purpose was to redefine the concept of norm to correspond with 
the contemporary society and law. He had earlier endorsed thorough analyses of the 
legal system and the combination of legal philosophy and sociology in order to study 
the critical potential of legal scholarship and the political connections of law.
109
 Thus, 
his study related to the larger project of redefining the system in order to construct theo-
retical tools for criticism.   
   The most significant aspect of Sundby’s theory will be dealt with later, but here it 
is important to note a few methodological details in his book. His theory was not radi-
cal, his obvious intention being to contribute to the new realistic legal thought and prac-
tice which would promote social equality and make more flexible and open argumenta-
tion and interpretation possible. At the beginning of the book, Sundby wrote that he was 
politically socialist and sympathized with the recent critical legal scholarship, but he 
noted that radical criticism and Marxism were often theoretically untenable.
110
 Here 
Sundby was representing the critical premise of openly stating the political biases of the 
scholar, yet he nonetheless distanced himself from the radical and Marxist tradition.   
  Another scholar who developed alternative theories from within the system but 
from a far more traditional and conservative point of view was the Danish Preben Stuer 
Lauridsen. He elaborated a theory in which political argumentation would be included 
in legal scholarship so that there would be no need either to maintain strict divisions 
between legal and political argumentation or to make law and legal scholarship into 
politics. He defined scientific standards for political arguments which then would be 
tested in a collegial forum of jurists.
111
 His theory was a counter-reaction to the critical 
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claims of integrating legal scholarship into social science, but he nevertheless sought to 
fit political arguments into legal argumentation. The idea was that social science could 
not provide any more realistic data than traditional legal scholarship could. His purpose 
was to make political arguments “scientific”, meaning that they could be included in 
legal scholarship without compromising the nature of the scholarship. According to the 
critics, however, his theory stabilized the argumentation.
112
   
   Obvious in the revisions of legal scholarship was the attempt to come to terms 
with the relationship between politics and scholarship. In general, the trend of the early 
1970s was to analyze the problematic relationship between academic research and poli-
tics.
113
 Thus, legal scholars of the 1970s were concerned with the problem of the rela-
tionship between law and politics and provided various theories to overcome it. This 
was also the purpose of both Sundby’s and Lauridsen’s treatises.114 There were various 
efforts to distance theories from the realist tradition and bring values and politics into 
the ambit of legal scholarship in one way or another. Some scholars were more favora-
bly disposed toward social science and the critical potential of scholarship, whereas 
others tried to maintain the autonomy of legal scholarship while still bringing it closer 
to politics and social realities.   
   Even conservative scholars noted the problems legal scholarship faced in the 
changed atmosphere. Changes in society and scholarship had caused various new prob-
lems regarding both theory and practice that legal scholars had to deal with. Stig 
Strömholm, a Swedish legal scholar with relatively conservative views, also noted the 
need for political research within legal scholarship but did not want to turn jurispru-
dence into political activity,
115
 and, furthermore, he criticized the recent arguments for 
more flexible judicial decision-making for being too ambiguous.
116
 Thus, in 1975, ask-
ing whether jurisprudence had a future, he acknowledged that legal scholarship was 
about to change but argued that traditional scholarship had to be preserved as far as pos-
sible because it was beneficial for the legal profession.
117
 The changed circumstances 
forced many legal scholars to reconsider the boundaries between law and politics and 
between jurisprudence and social science, but the traditional element of the profession 
did not want to change its basis. By the mid-1970s, the tradition of Scandinavian legal 
scholarship had been opened up to various alternatives.  
   In a quite similar way to the United States, alternative legal scholarship developed 
from sociological and cross-disciplinary jurisprudence into alternative theories of law. 
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Scandinavian legal scholars also became frustrated with the pursuit of rationality and 
the neutrality of the traditional legal thought, as well as its insistence on the autonomy 
of legal scholarship. Furthermore, both in the United States and Scandinavia, there were 
scholars who sought to update the tradition without however abandoning it, and there 
were scholars who were readier for more fundamental changes. The dynamic between 
the alternative and the critical perspective was crucial for the development of critical 
legal scholarship.  
   According to Dalberg-Larsen, Danish legal philosophy from the 1960s onwards 
was characterized by criticism of logical positivism, increasing interest in legal sociolo-
gy, and the rise of Marxist legal scholarship. Moreover, after 1969 there was not only a 
conflict between proponents and opponents of Ross but also between the various types 
of opponents of Ross.
118
 The same applies to Scandinavia at large, because the same 
trends were dominant, albeit with differences in methods and emphasis. The time from 
the sixties onwards was indeed a time of methodological pluralism in legal scholarship 
and many of the new methodologies criticized the traditional positivism in one way or 
another. Alternative legal scholarship was not a uniform or coherent movement, but the 
traditional legal scholarship, or its image, was attacked with varying intensity from dif-
ferent angles. The new theories took a stand on the same problems from various per-
spectives and provided various answers depending on the interests and perspectives of 
the scholars. A common theme, however, was to provide a theory that would account 
for the relationship between law and society. As the alternative scholarship turned to-
wards critical scholarship, criticism of the tradition became the unifying theme.    
   The criticism of traditional legal thinking became most obvious in Marxist legal 
scholarship. There were clear connections between realistic, sociological legal scholar-
ship and flexible legal argumentation on the one hand and Marxist legal scholarship on 
the other. Marxist legal scholarship applied many of the ideas and methods of sociolog-
ical jurisprudence but set them in the context of Marxist theory and was thus much more 
critical of the prevailing legal system. It shared the same basis as the various forms of 
alternative legal scholarship but it took criticism to a more radical level. The rise of 
Marxist legal scholarship thus represents the culmination of the critical legal scholarship 
in Scandinavia. 
3 The origins of Scandinavian Marxist legal scholarship, 1972–1976 
 
The 1960s was a crucial period for the development of Marxist legal scholarship in 
Scandinavia. As we saw, the interest in the sociology of law increased the studies on the 
relationship between law and society, and legal scholarship in general began to pay 
more attention to the relationship between law and politics. Alternative legal scholar-
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ship rebutted both the traditional distinction between legal scholarship and social sci-
ence and the realist distinction between law and metaphysics. The new realism that de-
veloped in the late 1960s sought to place values and ideologies under open scrutiny and 
also to bring law and politics into common consideration.  
   The changes in social, academic, and scholarly life were also important for the de-
velopment of critical legal thought. The sixties in general was a time of the rise of the 
new left and social criticism, which meant that traditional social values were attacked 
and questioned and social institutions were placed under critical examination. In the late 
1960s, cultural radicals criticized social and cultural authorities and students rebelled 
against the university hierarchies. In addition, the critical thought according to which 
both society and scholarship were ideologically structured began to rise.  
   As the interest in Marxism spread, together with the interest in cross-disciplinary 
research, critical scholars put the problem of the class society and class oppression on 
the table from various perspectives.
119
 The problem of values and objectivity was be-
coming more and more pressing, for instance, in social and economic scholarship,
120
 
and Marxism and critical notions began to have their influence on sociology.
121
 Critical 
theory on the prerequisites of scholarship began to interest scholars who opined that 
traditional scholarship was bound up with the social ideologies. During the 1960s, a 
critical bloc arose within the universities, attacking the authority of the traditional 
scholarship. The critical scholars often adopted Marxism as their theoretical basis, 
which then became a critical method.  
   As critical scholarship grew, scholars became more interested in the critical theory 
of the Frankfurt School and its potential for scholarship.
122
 The rise in critical scholar-
ship initiated a conflict over the place of values in and freedom of academic scholar-
ship.
123
 The juxtaposition only encouraged the critical scholars who continued to chal-
lenge the tradition, and critical theory was both analyzed
124
 and introduced to the aca-
demic public.
125
 Scholars became more interested in the recent currents of critical 
thought and theory and began to work on theories in various disciplines which could 
help to transcend the dominant paradigm. Critical theories sought to demonstrate that 
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since traditional scholarship was ideology-bound, its observations were more or less 
flawed. Thus the critics sought to establish a basis of scholarship that could comprehend 
the nature of reality better.    
   Academic life changed too, and critical study circles and journals for critical 
scholarship were established. One of the outcomes was Häften för kritiska studier 
(Journal for Critical Studies) which was founded in Sweden in 1968 as a forum for crit-
ical scholarship. It was argued that there was a need for such a journal because the tradi-
tion was dominated by conservative bourgeois ideology.
126
 The left in general became 
more radical in the late 1960s,
127
 which was also a time of the elaboration of the critical 
theory in Scandinavian scholarship.
128
 Analytical philosophy was considered as domi-
nant in the academy, but the critical theories in the 1960s began to drive a wedge into 
the tradition. Critical scholars struggled for academic emancipation even to the extent 
that it was argued that one could make a career of being “critical”.129  
   By the early 1970s, there was general academic strife between positive and critical 
scholarship, between traditional and Marxist scholarship.
130
 There was a group of young 
scholars who had grown up in the radical atmosphere of the 1960s and adopted critical 
thought from the emerging schools of critical and Marxist scholarship. These young 
scholars were interested in an analysis of the relationship between ideology and scholar-
ship. Thus, as the alternative legal scholarship had gained a strong foothold in the legal 
academia, and when critical and Marxist scholarship had risen to a prominent place, 
legal scholarship was also about to take a new turn. As we saw, there was a Marxist turn 
in sociology of law during the change of the decade. The same turn, which began to be 
seen during the 1970s, occurred within jurisprudence. Critical legal scholarship was an 
extreme manifestation of the scholarly change in the 1960s and 1970s, representing a 
new cultural image of the legal academia.    
   The interest in Marxist legal theory had expanded enormously since the beginning 
of the 1960s. A new wave of Marxist legal theory began in Germany, France and Italy, 
and spread from there to the Nordic Countries.
131
 Marxism entered legal scholarship 
first through radical social thought, sociological jurisprudence, and critical theory, and 
later it took on a unique tone as scholars became more familiar with Marxist literature. 
As noted in the previous chapter, Marxist scholarship in general arose in the United 
States in the 1960s and achieved an established position in the 1970s, but it did not 
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flourish in legal thought as such. American critical legal thought was close to Marxism, 
but it built on various theories and philosophies. In the Nordic Countries, the situation 
was somewhat different. In Finland especially, Marxist-inspired critical legal literature 
began to emerge in the late 1960s and acquired a wide basis by the early 1970s, as will 
be seen in the following chapter. In Scandinavia, Marxist legal scholarship began in the 
early 1970s as a response to the general scholarly trends.   
   In general, critical legal scholarship was a radicalization of the alternative legal 
scholarship. Legal sociology had had a Marxist tone at least since the 1960s. Vilhelm 
Aubert had noted in the early 1960s that the idea of formal equality often masked the 
actual class inequalities in society,
132
 and after the Marxist turn he argued that despite 
the apparent neutrality, legislation sometimes functioned as a tool of class domina-
tion.
133
 Aubert, however, had always distanced himself from orthodox Marxism. Thus, 
Marxist sociologists criticized him for his superficial analysis of the legitimizing func-
tion of law in the class conflict and for neglecting an analysis of the relationship be-
tween economic, political, ideological, and legal structures.
134
 The Marxist turn also 
meant a need for a more radical and critical theory to analyze the social power struc-
tures. With respect to law, the turn meant a move from empirical studies on the gap be-
tween law in books and law in action towards a structural and ideological analysis, and 
from reconsiderations of particular topics to a fundamental analysis.    
   In 1973, the young Swedish legal scholars Göran Elwin and Dag Victor sketched a 
systematic theory for Marxist legal scholarship. Their theory was mostly based on the 
literature on Marx and Marx-related matters, but they also cited the recent alternative 
legal literature and critical scholarship, as well as Finnish Marxist legal scholarship.
135
 
According to Elwin and Victor, since law was mostly an ideological superstructure, it 
was important to examine both its origins and functions. Law emanated from society 
and was a tool in the social power structure, always serving particular material social 
interests. The study of these interests was the material side of the law. However, law 
had also an autonomous inner structure which had an impact on society, particularly in 
reproducing ideology. The dialectical aspect of legal scholarship should therefore inves-
tigate the ideological functions of law.
136
 Finnish scholars criticized the article for its 
generality and for the lack of a historical aspect,
137
 to which the Swedish replied that 
their theory was mostly a sketch for the future.
138
 The debate shows that Marxism was 
in its early phase but its basis was being elaborated. Its two most important aspects were 
the examination of the material origins and purposes of law and its ideological functions 
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in society. Scholars of course disagreed on details but the common theoretical basis was 
laid.  
   Marxist legal scholarship criticized the very basis of law and traditional legal 
scholarship. Law schools were the places where, according to critical scholars, the in-
doctrination into the tradition began, and thus the critique began from there. Bolding 
had already criticized legal education in the late 1960s for the fact that it reproduced the 
tradition, and had called for a practical and sociological education.
139
 The Marxists, 
however, stressed the ideological aspects of indoctrination. Young Danish law student 
and future Marxist legal scholar, Peter Blume, argued that contemporary legal education 
was uncritical toward the ideological aspects of law, and he called for alternative views 
on the legal system in education so that the students would realize the possibility of al-
ternatives.
140
 The concern of the critical scholars was that the dominant paradigm
141
 
excluded any real alternatives and preserved the status quo, and that the possibility of 
alternative views should therefore be included in the education. As was the case in the 
American critical legal scholarship, as noted in the previous chapter, the talk of para-
digms and legal consciousness entered the Scandinavian legal discourse through this 
critique. In their ideas on indoctrination, critical scholars began to pay attention to the 
fundamental consciousness behind law.     
   The fundamental criticism and the ideas on ideology caused conflicts between crit-
ical and alternative legal scholars. Stig Jørgensen criticized Marxist scholarship for its 
simplistic behaviorism and misunderstanding of the role of law in society. According to 
him, one did not have to be Marxist to analyze the relationship between law and socie-
ty.
142
 In addition, he argued, Marxism often turned legal scholarship into ideology.
143
 
Blume replied that the traditional legal scholarship simply denied the ideological con-
tent of legal practice and scholarship, whereas Marxism tried to examine it. Ideology 
was everywhere and it was pointless to neglect it.
144
 The split between the critical and 
the more traditional view concerned the nature of law and legal scholarship. According 
to the former, ideology was inherent in law, whereas it played only a part according to 
the latter.  
   The critical legal scholars worked on these fundamental problems in the early 
1970s when the Marxist legal theory was being developed. This was also the period in 
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which Denmark was becoming the center of Scandinavian Marxism. Young critical le-
gal scholars at the University of Aarhus, the Critical Front, worked on a publication in 
which the basic themes and theories of Marxist legal theory were laid down. The schol-
ars thought that education was the beginning of the indoctrination into the tradition that 
protected the prevailing social structures. Even the alternative forms of traditional 
scholarship missed the ideological functions of law, and thus were unable to criticize 
the tradition. Therefore, critical scholarship had to work toward a radical alteration in 
the education, and reveal the origins of the tradition in order to analyze the relation be-
tween its specific concepts, methods, and functions and the contemporary society.
145
 A 
Marxist establishment was formed within the universities at the late 1960s, and in the 
early 1970s it was ready to attack the tradition and criticize the dominant legal thinking.  
   For the critical scholars, it was the basis of the traditional legal thought that was to 
be analyzed and criticized, and this fundamental division marked the split between the 
radical and the traditional blocs. Marxist legal scholars argued that since every aspect of 
law was affected by values, one had to be either critical or traditionalist, and the critical 
function was to inquire the impact of ideology in law.
146
 The critics of Marxist scholars 
argued that their arguments were tautological and lacked a viable basis,
147
 but the Marx-
ists often shrugged this argument off by defining it as political.
148
 The problem was in 
the different points of view the various scholars had. Indeed, where the Marxists saw 
ideology the traditionalists saw law, where the Marxists saw politics the traditionalists 
saw scholarship, and where the Marxists saw indoctrination the traditionalists saw edu-
cation. These differences in perspective meant that the dialogue between the opposing 
schools was often difficult if not impossible. Marxism was often self-assured in its criti-
cism of the tradition, but that followed its theoretical premises; it was critical by defini-
tion.  
   In any event, the Marxist endeavor continued, and the criticism specified the con-
troversial points. Blume argued that scholarship had to be rid of all the “word-
fetishism” and concentrate on the historical and social origins of legal rules, institutions, 
and arguments. In order to make a difference, nothing was to be taken at face value.
149
 
Ole Krarup argued that since legal concepts were often ambiguous and protected hidden 
values, they had to be analyzed in their historical and social context as related to class 
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conflict.
150
 Alf Ross criticized Krarup for doing simply abstract sociology,
151
 and 
Krarup saw Ross’s criticism as an effort to maintain the division between legal scholar-
ship and sociology.
152
 Ross was naturally upset at the materialist conception since he 
had done much to purify legal concepts of metaphysics and now the critical scholars 
were maneuvering the metaphysics back into them. The critical scholars, however, ar-
gued that since there were no legal concepts without material interests, legal analysis 
had to consider social interests and values.    
   The major difference between the traditional, realist-based legal scholarship and 
critical legal scholarship was the mode of analysis of legal rules. Anders Fogelklou, for 
example, criticized the semantic-logical analysis of law, endorsing a dialectical-
materialist analysis instead.
153
 Critical scholars opined that logical analysis of legal 
rules without an analysis of their social aspects was not adequate in sorting out the true 
meaning of law. Here they also faced the problem of Soviet legal theory and legal prac-
tice. Fogleklou represented a middle way by arguing that Soviet legal theory provided 
useful lessons for Scandinavian legal scholarship, but was not suitable because of its 
apologetic nature.
154
 Finnish scholars were more optimistic about the potential of Soviet 
legal theory,
155
 while scholars who were skeptical about socialist law noted that it was 
often seriously reactionary.
156
 In criticizing the institutions of western society and deriv-
ing inspiration from a theory that was strongly related to socialist societies, the critical 
scholars also had to take a stand on the socialist practice while focusing on the theoreti-
cal aspects of Marxism. Critical scholars were often theoretical and did not specify any 
practical implications of their work. Scandinavian Marxist legal scholars, however, 
were not uncritically inclined toward socialism. Their main objective was to explore the 
basis of western legal institutions theoretically in order to construct opportunities for 
criticism and change.    
   At the heart of the criticism was the notion that in its persistent efforts to maintain 
a division between law and values, traditional jurisprudence missed the point that law 
always promoted the values that were built into it. Whereas the more traditional schol-
ars criticized Marxist scholars for tackling problems relating rather to sociology or his-
tory than law,
157
 the critical scholars argued that it was precisely these problems that 
were at the roots of the legal problems. Erling Albrechtsen argued that the traditional 
“pure jurisprudence” missed the point that material wealth meant more freedom and 
power in legal terms. Thus, he declared, since lawyers were often close to the rich, the 
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legal profession contributed to the unequal distribution of rights and legal power.
158
 
Critical thought was moving toward the notion that law protected some values while 
neglecting other values, which could have just as well been protected. Hence, the inter-
est was focused not simply on legal matters but also on the context of the origins of law.    
   In the endeavor to reveal the true nature of law, the theoretical basis and practical 
usability of the Marxist theory had to be specified. Torben Wanscher analyzed the vari-
ous forms of Marxism and neo-Marxism to explicate them in detail.
159
 Lisbet Roep-
storff, on the other hand, examined the relations between various levels of society and 
the capitalist mode of production. According to her, the economy created the precondi-
tions for all the other levels, which were only relatively autonomous and which had a 
feedback effect on the economy. Nevertheless, since economic values dominated mod-
ern society, justice and humanity were reflections of the economy.
160
 The Marxist ar-
gument that the contemporary conception of justice and the system of values emanated 
from the economic basis of society and thus protected the interests of the rich reflected 
the radical leftist thought of the 1960s. The left opposed capitalism and struggled for a 
society that was not controlled by business interests. The Marxist legal scholars brought 
these ideas to legal theory and attacked the legal establishment. The notion that values 
were not simply metaphysics but had a material basis in society followed from the epis-
temological turn and Marxist thinking. This was also one of the most essential aspects 
of critical legal scholarship. The critical scholars constructed a link between the social 
order and the legal profession, and worked to unravel it.   
   Specific aspects of the relationship between law and class struggle were brought 
out especially in studies concerning labor law. Marxist history had been done in Scan-
dinavia before the 1970s,
161
 but the critical legal scholars brought new elements to it 
and enhanced the research. In 1971, Gösta Hultén argued that labor law had long been 
used to curb worker activity and protect the interests of the economy. Furthermore, he 
claimed, despite recent developments, labor law was still a tool to protect the employ-
ers.
162
 The study was Marxist scholarship par excellence without however explicitly 
emphasizing this. The central elements were, nonetheless, present in it; the contempo-
rary situation was explained in the light of historical dialectical materialism with an 
emphasis on the class struggle. The central message of the book was that law was de-
termined in the last resort by the interests of big money, and details of superficial regu-
lation did not alter its basis.      
   Per Eklund also conducted a thorough analysis of labor law from the Marxist 
standpoint. On methodology, he noted that it was futile to argue that law promoted ma-
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terialist interests, because understanding the particular interests behind the law was 
more useful. Laws did not necessarily promote particular interests directly, but some-
times were compromises between conflicting interests. Nevertheless, he concluded, la-
bor law had mostly been used to support conservative values and the interests of the 
employers, and the legal system often legitimized an otherwise unequal situation.
163
 
Eklund was a typical neo-Marxist who stressed the relative autonomy of law and did not 
want to succumb to economic determinism. He represented the structuralist branch of 
Marxism, explaining law in terms of historical-dialectical materialism while acknowl-
edging the structures of society. The structural approach was typical for Scandinavian 
Marxism in the 1970s, because it helped to avoid being labeled either as orthodox or 
determinist.    
   Eklund’s study also exposed the difficulties in Marxist history. The Swedish legal 
historian Stig Jägerskiöld argued that Eklund had drawn abstract generalizations with-
out adequate historical evidence, and had exaggerated the role of the class conflict in the 
history of the law.
164
 Eklund replied that Jägerskiöld’s criticism was largely political 
and defended his methods by arguing that an analysis of the economic position of the 
law-makers was useful because it helped to overcome the otherwise assumed social 
consensus.
165
 Wanscher, another Marxist legal scholar, also criticized Jägerskiöld for 
his bourgeois ideology in the interpretation of historical data, but he also criticized 
Eklund for his narrow perspective. According to Wanscher, Eklund had reduced class 
conflict to parliamentary struggles over legislation and thus neglected several other im-
portant aspects, such as the judiciary.
166
 As there was disagreement on the contemporary 
law, there was also disagreement about the history of law. Marxist scholars interpreted 
historical material in the light of the class conflict, arriving at conclusions that did not 
convince more traditional legal historians. In addition, as Marxist scholarship increased, 
the scholars themselves had to define the meaning of Marxism more precisely, which 
was by no means a simple task. Nevertheless, Marxist legal scholarship was about to 
mature.      
   By the mid-1970s, there was a large group of legal scholars who distanced them-
selves from the tradition, criticized contemporary legal institutions, and sought to de-
velop a radical alternative theory to the traditional jurisprudence. The time was now ripe 
for a symposium on Marxist legal scholarship in the pages of the Journal for Legal 
Scholarship (Tidsskrift for rettsvitenskap). The purpose of the symposium was to intro-
duce Marxist legal scholarship and the problems with which it dealt to a wider audience.  
   The potential of Marxist theory in jurisprudence had increased in the few years 
that had elapsed since the beginning of the decade, and it was applied in various con-
texts. The Finnish scholar Lars D. Eriksson criticized the concept of legitimacy which, 
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according to him, was reactionary. He argued that instead of an abstract and general 
concept, legitimacy should be considered in the context of particular society so that it 
could be analyzed and criticized accordingly.
167
 Eriksson’s theory was an application of 
Marxist theory to a particular topic, encouraging a more particular analysis of the con-
cept of legitimacy. That was a concept the critical scholars thought was also uncritically 
accepted in the tradition, so that they wanted to reconsider its meaning in contemporary 
society.    
   The reconsideration of traditional concepts was a major feature of critical legal 
scholarship, as was noted in the symposium. In the general analyses, critical theory was 
contrasted with traditional theory to point out the weaknesses of the latter. Krarup con-
tinued his criticism on the impersonal and neutral way traditional legal scholarship ex-
amined legal phenomena,
168
 and Wanscher was concerned about the way traditional 
legal history reproduced the dominant ideology, arguing that Marxist theory could bring 
a more authentic perspective to studies of legal history.
169
 The common argument of the 
critical scholars was that the traditional scholarship could not grasp the true nature of 
legal phenomena without setting them against their background and surroundings. 
Marxist scholarship made the materialist aspects of law into the primary concern of re-
search.    
   Specific analyses brought the general theory to a more concrete level, while still 
stressing the materialist aspect. The general argument, nonetheless, was that the seem-
ingly neutral law hid some less noble intentions than the apparent ones and Marxist the-
ory helped to purge the law of its ideological excrescences and to reveal its actual pur-
poses. Thus, Henrik Bang argued that social law was mostly meant to secure peace and 
order and to shape people in a market-fashion,
170
 Ulla Paabøl wrote that the formal 
equality of labor law in fact supported the interests of those who owned the means of 
production,
171
 and Henrik Zahle linked the evolution of the law of evidence to the de-
velopment of capitalism.
172
 The purpose of the analysis was always to go beyond the 
level of legal rules and concepts and to link them to something more practical.  
   For the Marxist scholars, materialism was the most essential element of legal 
scholarship. It also distinguished their theory from all the other forms of critical theory 
because it helped them to analyze the relation between the base and the superstructure 
on the one hand, and the authentic nature of the legal phenomena on the other. Accord-
ing to Wanscher, for example, this kind of critical inquiry was necessary to emancipate 
law from its contemporary chains.
173
 The critical scholars argued that the contemporary 
law originated in the material interests of the ruling social class, namely, the economi-
cally powerful class. By relating law, as well as conceptions of right and justice, to eco-
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nomic interests, they aimed to reconsider the old concepts and to contribute to a real 
change.   
   The materialist emphasis of Marxist legal scholarship was, of course, contrary to 
the view of traditional legal scholars, and Marxism also had its critics. Jes Bjarup ar-
gued that Marxist legal scholarship was mostly abstract, ambiguous generalization, and 
that while it may have been correct on some issues, it was false regarding the big pic-
ture. Thus, Marxism was mostly ideology and its theoretical premises should be in-
quired into critically.
174
 Frede Castberg, a proponent of natural law theory, criticized the 
Marxists for reducing law to an ideological superstructure and over-emphasizing the 
class conflict because thus they missed several other important aspects. He nonetheless 
gave credit to critical legal scholarship for bringing up many important topics.
175
 Stig 
Jørgensen, a legal philosopher, noted that a major problem of Marxism was that it was 
often political or ideological and, moreover, it was very difficult to verify.
176
 Non-
Marxist legal scholars were not convinced of the materialist and ideological emphasizes, 
because they had a different conception of law. Problems were often matters of interpre-
tation, and the Marxists could not prove their point beyond doubt.  
   Marxism was in any event moving rapidly to the center of legal scholarship. Alt-
hough Vilhelm Aubert was never an orthodox Marxist, he had always been theoretically 
close to it,
177
 and in his work in the 1970s he drew even closer. In his noteworthy gen-
eral analysis of the social functions of law, he wrote that law was always in a close rela-
tion to the social class conflict and could never abolish it completely. Thus, he argued, 
class conflict had an important role in legal analysis even if it alone could not explain 
every legal phenomenon.
178
 Although Marxism was criticized for offering a one-sided 
image of law in society,
179
 it had become a major player in legal scholarship. Beginning 
as an interest of study groups of critical young scholars in the universities in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, it had become a legal theory among others.   
   By the mid-1970s, Marxist scholarship had evolved from a critical concept into a 
school of jurisprudence, and the legal scholars within the movement wanted to have 
more cooperation. Thus, the first Scandinavian journal for Marxist legal scholarship,  
Retfærd, was founded in 1976. Critical legal scholars thought that Marxist analyses of 
society had become more frequent given the need for a struggle against capitalism and 
for socialism, and thus Marxist legal scholarship was also essential. The purpose of Ret-
færd was to be a forum for Marxist legal scholarship, which meant a combination of 
theory and political practice. There was a need for such a law review since no such 
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journal yet existed in Scandinavia.
180
 Retfærd was initially a Danish invention because 
of the lack of a Danish organization of progressive jurists, but the core of the journal 
was to be constructed around Nordic cooperation.
181
  
   The purpose of the journal was stated on the opening page of the first issue as fol-
lows: 
 
RETFÆRD shall work as a forum for the promotion of theoretical and stra-
tegic analysis of legal matters on a broad Marxist foundation of social stud-
ies. This entails a strategic union of theoretical work and political practice. 
We aim at a legal science which can contribute to the working class’ fight 
against capitalism and in favour of socialism.
182
 
 
The foundation of Retfærd demonstrates both the relationship between politics and 
theory in Scandinavian Marxist legal scholarship and its expansion in the 1970s, as well 
as relating the Scandinavian Marxist legal scholarship to the international context. As 
Perry Anderson argues, Western Marxism was detached from political agitation during 
the interwar years, and “it was to speak its own enciphered language, at an increasingly 
remote distance from the class whose fortunes it formally sought to serve or articulate.” 
After the war, Marxism moved more towards philosophy and became interested in vari-
ous new fields, but the 1960s and 1970s reopened the possibility of the combination of 
Marxist theory and political practice.
183
  During its foundation there were controversies 
as to whether the journal should be more scholarly or be politically oriented.
184
 In the 
end, however, the open political tone of the journal was clear, though not surprising, 
since critical legal scholarship was openly political. Furthermore, by the mid-1970s crit-
ical legal scholarship had become more widespread and had more proponents, and, fi-
nally, there was a forum for critical legal scholars to disseminate their ideas to readers 
who shared the same interests.    
   The first issue of Retfærd was dedicated to labor law, which suited the purpose 
well. First there was a Danish translation of the German legal scholar Thomas Blanke’s 
general Marxist theory on labor law,
185
 and then the Scandinavian scholars considered 
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more specific issues, noting, for instance, that labor law was at the heart of the class 
conflict that was a central element in Marxist theory and thus was unique.
186
 There were 
many strikes in the 1970s and legal scholars were particularly interested in them be-
cause there was much talk about a general crisis of labor in modern society.
187
 Marxist 
legal scholars thus investigated the use of non-union workers to break strikes,
188
 and the 
use of police force in taming them.
189
 Scandinavian critical legal scholarship thus 
jumped on the European bandwagon in examining legal problems from a Marxist per-
spective and having a law journal for the purpose.
190
 Labor law was a natural starting-
point because of the importance of labor to Marxist theory and the leftist cause. The 
purpose was to deal with contemporary social and legal problems from a perspective 
that could be helpful in clarifying the problems from the critical point of view and per-
haps even provide alternative solutions.   
   Despite the foundation of Retfærd and the expansion of Marxist studies of law, 
Marxism in general was beginning to fade after the mid-1970s. As an academic phe-
nomenon, it interested the critical scholars in the late 1970s.
191
 They noted that once 
Marxism had risen to prominence in the late 1960s, the disunited scholarship of the 
1970s had led to its withering and the distance between academic research and political 
activity had increased. The political deactivation and theoretical impoverishment had 
reduced Marxism to an alternative theory among many others.
192
 They argued further 
that it was politics and academic repression that had suffocated Marxism theoretically 
and with respect to practice.
193
 By the late 1970s, there was a Marxist bloc at the uni-
versities in Scandinavia, but the movement had not succeeded in establishing a firm 
position in the university curricula, a uniform theory, or a steady connection with poli-
tics. There was still both a practical and theoretical need for critical leftist scholarship, 
but its charm and utility had weakened since the beginning of the decade.  
   Scandinavian critical legal thought matured and developed during the 1970s. 
Marxist legal scholarship was the most radical scholarly endeavor in Scandinavia in the 
1970s. The critical thought in the universities had spread during the 1960s, and when it 
came together with the theories and methods of sociology of law, and the critical theory 
and Marxism at the turn of the decade, it developed into Marxist legal scholarship. It 
was a theoretical form of the critical thought, pursuing a critical view of the law as an 
outcome of the class conflict. Whereas sociological jurisprudence discussed the rela-
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tionship between law and society, Marxist legal scholarship paid attention to the relation 
between law and class conflict, the ideological functions of law, and its materialist in-
terests. By the mid-1970s, the Marxist bloc had grown to the extent that they founded a 
law journal and to tried to find a solid basis for cooperation. Although Marxism in gen-
eral was losing its momentum, it still had extensive support in academia.  
   Marxist legal scholarship was a kind of radicalization of the alternative legal 
scholarship and a theoretical representation of the radical and antagonist thought similar 
to CLS in the United States. The origins of the movements were in the social turbulence 
of the 1960s, the theoretical transformation of jurisprudence and academic scholarship, 
the leftist thought, the efforts to improve the rights of the citizen, and the pursuit of au-
thenticity among the critical scholars. In the 1970s, the critique was set in the frame-
work of theory and philosophy. In a sense, Scandinavian Marxist jurisprudence was also 
a reaction against the sociological jurisprudence, as was the critical legal scholarship in 
the United States. However, the difference was rather about the way the legal sociolo-
gists analyzed and interpreted the empirical material than about the approach as such. 
The radicals argued that sociological jurisprudence neglected the ideological aspect of 
law, and thus missed the way law created people’s conceptions of society and reality. 
The basic premises of Scandinavian Marxist legal scholarship and American CLS were 
also much the same. They both analyzed the relationship between law and society crit i-
cally, and emphasized the position of values in law and the ideological functions of law. 
The rhetoric used and the theoretical basis marked the differences. Scandinavian critical 
scholarship was based on Marxism, whereas the American scholars applied several the-
ories and often avoided socialist rhetoric. Thus the Scandinavians also had a common 
basis for critical scholarship, although with differing interpretations, whereas the Amer-
icans operated with various approaches. After the mid-1970s, both movements orga-
nized; Scandinavian scholars founded Retfærd, American scholars founded CLS. The 
evolution of the organized forms of the criticism reflects their position within the aca-
demic controversies; critical legal scholarship was also a tool of criticism and an at-
tempt to change the tradition. In the following sections I will discuss the dimensions of 
the criticism in order to illuminate its characteristics. 
4 Changes in criminal law scholarship, 1965─1979 
4.1 Criminal law and alternative legal scholarship  
 
Criminal law scholarship and criminology in particular were important parts of the al-
ternative legal scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s, being one of its first and most influ-
ential forms. Alternative criminological research related to the rise of the sociology of 
law and also affected its development. Alternative criminology in the 1960s regarded 
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crime as a social phenomenon, relating rather to social structures than to the deviant 
personality of the offender. Furthermore, the concept of crime was considered as a so-
cial construct, a manifestation of social power rather than the expression of a natural 
state. Alternative criminal legal scholarship thus began to investigate crime as a phe-
nomenon of social reality and focused on the reasons why crime occurred and why it 
was understood the way it was.  
   In this section, I will examine the rise of the alternative criminology and criminal 
legal scholarship in the 1960s. Besides sociology of law, criminal law was the first 
branch of law in which a noteworthy school of alternative scholarship emerged, and was 
therefore an essential element in the development of critical legal scholarship. Since a 
comprehensive analysis of the subject would require a book of its own, I will concen-
trate on its main features. I shall explore the alternative views of the concept of crime, 
methods of investigating it, and the efforts of the scholars to influence criminal law. 
Criminal law scholars were those who most actively participated in legal and political 
debates and tried to influence the legal-political practice. The lasting influence of the 
alternative criminal law scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s was the heavy emphasis on 
criminology that the Scandinavian criminal law scholarship exhibits even today.   
   The origins of the alternative criminal law scholarship of the 1960s are in the 
postwar sociology, criminology, and social science. Survey studies of American and 
British scholars in the late 1940s and early 1950s revealed that crime was much more 
widespread in society than was traditionally believed. Social-psychological, sociologi-
cal, and structural criminology were established when these notions were combined 
with the new currents in social studies concentrating on social structures. Scandinavian 
scholars often studied in the United States in the 1950s and brought the new methodol-
ogies of criminology with them, and alternative criminology began to flourish in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. The social upheaval of the 1960s intensified the need and the 
desire to study crime as a reflection of social power structures, and the Scandinavian 
ministries of justice were often interested in criminological research as a basis for their 
policies. Criminology and sociology of law in Scandinavia thus took the same path in 
the 1960s, and cooperation between the scholars in the Nordic Countries began. The 
“Scandinavian Studies in Criminology” study series was established in 1965 in order to 
expose Scandinavian criminological research to an international audience.
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   Critical criminology had established itself as a school of criminal jurisprudence by 
the mid-1960s, investigating the social factors of crime. It shared the trends in alterna-
tive legal scholarship in discrediting doctrinal analysis. Aubert, for instance, argued that 
the traditional studies did not give a realistic account of crime because they ignored the 
social context.
195
 Preben Wolf and Erik Høgh, on the other hand, conducted a thorough 
statistical analysis of crime, concluding that since crime originated mostly from social 
circumstances, criminal policy should include aspects of social, welfare, and cultural 
politics.
196
 Like sociological jurisprudence, the alternative approach to crime empha-
sized contextual studies, cross-disciplinary research, and a focus on law in action.     
   The new approach encouraged various studies on particular aspects of the control 
system from a realistic and empirical perspective. These studies concerned such things 
as the social role of the public prosecutor,
197
 the psychological aspects of the influence 
of social experiences on the statements of witnesses,
198
 and problems regarding the pro-
bation system.
199
 There was a serious interest in the functions and effects of the system, 
and the structural and the functional approach were seen as helpful in understanding its 
reasons and motives. As the general atmosphere was critical of public authorities and 
the government had optimistic faith in social planning, scholars paid more attention to 
the realities of the state institutions.   
   A significant study on the control system was Thomas Mathiesen’s The Defences 
of the Weak, published in 1965. Mathiesen was a sociologist who studied in the United 
States in the 1950s and contributed to the Scandinavian sociology of law and criminolo-
gy in the 1960s. In his doctoral dissertation he explored the informal structures of power 
within a Norwegian correctional institution and the experiences of the inmates regarding 
the treatment and the punishment within the facilities. He developed a theory of censo-
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riousness which referred to the reactions weak people felt in relation to their superiors. 
According to him, there was a consensus on the established norms but the ruled often 
felt that the rulers deviated from them. Power in this context referred to the ability to 
control the distribution of burdens and benefits within the established structure of rela-
tions. Although the theory was constructed in relation to the correctional institution, 
Mathiesen argued that censoriousness worked in society as well.
200
 The study reflected 
the sociological and empirical orientation of alternative scholarship, in which the offi-
cial rules were in the background and the unofficial control and the power structures 
were more important. Although the study concerned a correctional institution, the theo-
ry was also applied to social structures. The leap seems to have meant that the society 
was also a kind of a prison in which the ordinary citizen was subjected to the higher 
stratum and control was mostly exercised through unofficial methods.  
   Criminology was thus linked to the larger discourse on the nature of society and 
control. Alvar Nelson reflected the radical attitude when he criticized the Swedish crim-
inal code for being conservative and biased against the traditional crimes. He argued 
that criminal law was a remnant of the class society and thus the system had to be seri-
ously revised.
201
 The radical view of crime caused the tension between conservative and 
radical criminology, as the Finnish sociological legal scholar Inkeri Anttila called them, 
the latter of which saw crime as an expression of social conflict and criminal policy as a 
mean of balancing these conflicts.
202
 This notion was criticized for neglecting the good 
aspects of the conservative criminology.
203
 Just as there was a conflict between tradi-
tional and alternative scholarship, there was a conflict between traditional and alterna-
tive criminal policy, the latter arguing more for reform. The problem here was also a 
matter of debate, because the scholars had different perspectives on the problems and 
therefore interpreted them differently.   
   Alternative legal scholarship was closely related to politics. Some scholars, for in-
stance, exhibited political biases in their studies,
204
 thus reflecting the argument that the 
relationship between politics and scholarship had to be openly reviewed. Besides the 
politicization of scholarship, cross-disciplinary research was another issue in the strife 
over political scholarship. The Norwegian legal scholar, Johannes Andenæs, who also 
participated actively in sociological and criminological studies, noted that cross-
disciplinary research was necessary in providing social data for political reform
205
 and 
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modifying legal scholarship to correspond to contemporary problems.
206
 In many ways, 
alternative scholarship made it possible to participate in academic, social, and political 
debates. It was reformist scholarship which also took social and political problems seri-
ously and provided data for reform. Critical criminologists regarded themselves as ex-
perts on contemporary problems and thus pointed out the utility of their scholarship.   
   An important topic on which the political orientation of the alternative methodolo-
gy was obvious was recidivism. Studies on recidivism claimed to provide useful infor-
mation about criminal offenders and the factors that either increased or decreased the 
probability of recidivism.
207
 It was thought that this data enabled analysis of the effi-
ciency of the criminal justice system and its punitive aspects. In addition, studies sup-
plied information on the sociological structure of crime. Thus, there was both a socio-
logical and a political aspect to the studies since they afforded data on crime as a social 
phenomenon and on the measures meant to combat it.  
   Although criminology was the emerging methodology of crime studies, the schol-
ars were not completely unanimous on the methods and purposes of criminology. The 
1960s and 1970s witnessed various efforts to explicate the methods of criminology in a 
modern way. Nils Christie provided his view on criminology in 1965 in a book which 
was based on the analysis of the relation between norm-abiding and deviance. Accord-
ing to Christie, the legislator defined crime, which was thus a manifestation of social 
power, and criminology studied the social reflections of this power structure.
208
 Christie 
was laying down an outline of the methods of alternative criminology. Later he crit i-
cized the standard account of criminology, Stephan Hurwitz and Karl Christiansen’s 
voluminous book,
209
 for its lack of sociological perspective. Christie argued that crimi-
nology was meaningless without a solid connection with society.
210
 Because of the 
stress on the sociological elements in studying crime, alternative criminology sought to 
point out that criminology was not an autonomous discipline but cross-disciplinary 
scholarship. Besides reflecting the politicization of scholarship and the transformation 
of the methodologies, the attack on traditional scholarship and the emphasis on cross-
disciplinary work was also an effort to dethrone the tradition and to replace it with the 
new approach.     
   The schism between the traditional and alternative approaches was evident in 
criminology, as it was in jurisprudence. One of the authors of the standard criminology 
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and a mentor of many Scandinavian criminologists, Karl Christiansen, criticized a Finn-
ish text book on criminology, titled Criminology from the Perspective of Criminal Poli-
tics,
211
 for its policy-oriented view, arguing that the book could just as well have been 
named “criminal politics from the criminological perspective”.212 The more traditional 
scholars did not like the politicization of scholarship that was an important part of the 
alternative criminology. By bridging the gap between research and politics, alternative 
scholars sought to bring academia closer to society. Criminology was thus a clear ex-
ample of the academic controversies and the urge to transform the tradition. The en-
deavor to bring the new elements into criminological research was in part an effort to 
deprecate the tradition in order to support the alternative cause.             
   Alternative criminology did bring various new elements into criminal law scholar-
ship, but it was not radical criticism of the system. Whether functionalist, sociological, 
realist, or political, the minor branch of radical criminologists criticized the alternative 
criminology for being bourgeois. A Finnish radical criminologist, Klaus Mäkelä, for 
example, argued that the recent Scandinavian critical criminology was too abstract and 
lacked a context. According to him, critical criminologists had universalized the concept 
of crime and missed the significance of class conflict in this regard. He argued that 
criminological studies should be related to the legal system as a whole.
213
 Marxist or 
radical criminology differed from critical or alternative criminology in that the former 
sought to change the whole social and legal structure, whereas the latter focused rather 
on the structure of criminal law. In addition, whereas critical criminology saw crime as 
a reflection of social power relations, radical criminology related crime directly to the 
economic basis of society. In Scandinavia, Marxist criminology was, however, a mar-
ginal phenomenon and did not have the significance that critical criminology did.   
   Critical criminology developed in the 1950s and began to establish itself as a 
school of criminal jurisprudence in the 1960s. The rise of the sociology of law and the 
recent trends in scholarship influenced its development, but it was also driven further by 
the social turmoil and the academic conflict between the traditional and the alternative 
professions. Critical criminology contributed greatly to the development of alternative 
legal scholarship, providing data and arguments for criticism of law and society. It was 
cross-disciplinary scholarship responding to the contemporary social needs and to the 
planning optimism of the 1960s. Its prime objective was the analysis of crime as a so-
cial phenomenon, reflecting the social power structure, as will be clarified in the follow-
ing sub-section.   
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4.2 Criminal law scholarship and criminal policy 
 
Critical criminal law scholars adopted a realistic perspective on the functions of the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in order to reveal the ways it actually functioned in soci-
ety. Their critical notions and the results of their studies encouraged them to reconsider 
some of the fundamental premises of the criminal system. Important in the respect were 
the studies on self-reported crime. Becoming more common during the 1960s and 
1970s, they sought to point out that crime was much more widespread in society than 
was normally assumed but the system functioned selectively against the lower social 
classes.
214
 The moral standard of the critical thought of the time stressed that people 
were not that different, but it was the system that caused the differences. In order to 
transform the criminal system to meet the critical standard, Nils Christie, for instance, 
argued that one should not polarize people into saints and sinners, but approach crime as 
a social problem.
215
 The studies on self-reported crime adhered to the fact that people of 
all classes committed crimes, but the official statistics revealed only the tip of the ice-
berg that the official control system was able to solve, and that the system discriminated 
against the lower classes. Critical criminology thus directed its research to the reform of 
criminal policy, and the struggle to a humane criminal policy became the slogan of the 
1960s and the 1970s.  
   The arguments against the treatment ideology and special deterrence and for gen-
eral deterrence related to the studies on self-reported crime. The critical criminology 
attacked the treatment ideology that functioned as a basis of the contemporary system of 
punishment.
216
 While the defenders of the treatment ideology argued that its critics did 
not have an accurate image of it,
217
 critical scholars kept piling up evidence on the bad 
effects of treatment and the idea of special deterrence it was based on. They argued that 
sentences based on individual treatment ideology caused much uncertainty and feelings 
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of injustice among the convicts,
218
 and that it could not contribute to the preservation of 
general morals in society, which ought to be the primary function of the criminal sys-
tem.
219
 They argued further that special deterrence had caused marked diversity in the 
criminal system which was bad for equality and justice.
220
 Therefore the criminal sys-
tem should be based on general deterrence because then punishments would be meas-
ured according to the gravity of the crime.
221
 The pursuit of a humane system of crimi-
nal law was a clear reflection of the social activism of these decades. The arguments 
against the individual and for unified standards of punishment were reactions to the lib-
eralization of society, as well as against the tradition of criminal law scholarship. In the 
attempt to change the tradition, the alternative scholars adopted the role of a utopian 
politician, and criticized the basis of the system.      
   In arguing against harsh punishments and special deterrence, scholars began to 
criticize the prison system. Studies had already shown in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
that treatment was not especially effective in curbing recidivism,
222
 but the ground-
breaking study in Scandinavia was Bengt Börjeson’s detailed treatise, which concluded 
that recidivism was often higher after incarceration than surveillance and control in 
freedom.
223
 Since the time was now ripe for a thorough criticism of the treatment ideol-
ogy and reform of the system of punishment, the studies of the 1960s on the subject 
were seeds sown on fertile land. Thus, scholars argued that punishment should aim at 
re-socializing the convicts,
224
 and that the methods of rehabilitation after punishment 
should also be reformed accordingly.
225
 In addition, Christie noted that incarceration 
was such a harsh intrusion into the personal liberty of the citizen that it should be used 
only for serious offences.
226
 Since crime was to be understood as a social phenomenon, 
social policy measures would be the most appropriate in upholding general morals 
against crime and improving the social deficits which caused crime.
227
 The criminal 
justice system of the 1960s was based on incarceration, treatment ideology, and special 
deterrence and the critical legal scholars were at pains to point out their inefficiency and 
inappropriateness. Since the alternative thought of the 1960s saw crime as a social phe-
nomenon, it also reviewed the administration of criminal justice against its social func-
tions.   
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   Crime was such an important topic that the link between political practice and al-
ternative scholarship on crime was easy to form. The Scandinavian associations for 
criminal reform were established in Sweden in 1966, Denmark and Finland in 1967, and 
Norway in 1968. These associations combated the penal system and fought for reform. 
The research of the time was closely connected to the operation of these movements, 
and many of the critical legal scholars on criminal law were actively involved in the 
associations. The associations were obvious signals of the seriousness of the scholar’s 
intention to alter the paradigm, but also of the benevolent aspects of the scholarship. 
Alternative scholarship on crime was not simply academic scholarship or a method of 
criticism, but also a tool of political activism and reform.   
   In 1968, a conference on the reform of criminal policy was held in Sweden. The 
scholars of alternative scholarship on criminal law could discuss the recent scholarship 
on the problems of crime and contemplate the potential for reform. The conference, 
which was filled with familiar names of alternative legal scholarship and critical crimi-
nology, dealt with relevant topics regarding both politics and scholarship.
228
 Nestius, 
Nelson, and Hecksher argued for closer cooperation between social care and criminal 
after care,
229
 and Mathiesen and Gustavsen criticized the prison institution for its stig-
matizing and incapacitating influences.
230
 Many scholars argued that criminal law was 
biased against the so-called traditional crimes and thus against the lower social classes, 
even though studies had pointed out that crime was much more common in society.
231
 
The gathering was a perfect place for the scholars to point out that the criminal system 
was outdated and biased. Alternative and critical legal scholarship had become so com-
mon by the end of the 1960s, in particular with respect to criminal law, that it was pos-
sible to organize a conference to discuss problems and reform. The purpose of the con-
ference seems to have also been to create a connection between scholarship and practice 
that would encompass all the aspects of the system. Thus, the pursuit of the humane 
criminal policy was a common aspect of both politics and scholarship.     
   The humane perspective on criminal law changed the critics’ perception of crime, 
which was not to be tolerated, but was to be understood.
232
 As noted by the organizers 
of a Swedish symposium on social change and criminality, crime was a part of a com-
plex totality of social problems, and thus could be comprehended as a symptom among 
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many of the consequences of the social changes.
233
 It was typical, as done in the sympo-
sium, to gather scholars of various disciplines to discuss crime and its control in all its 
possible social aspects,
234
 since the emphasis on cross-disciplinary analysis reflected the 
pursuit of the comprehensive perspective of alternative legal scholarship.  
   Arguments for the class-biased nature of the criminal control system were more 
shrill in the mid-1960s. A significant figure was Aubert, who conducted sociological 
studies and developed critical theory on the concept of crime.
235
 On the basis of Aubert, 
Gunnar Olofsson conducted a master’s thesis study on the impact of the social status on 
punishment in traffic crimes, concluding that there was a certain amount of status-based 
discrimination in the judicial process.
236
 The study might have passed unnoticed had it 
not been used as evidence of discriminatory criminal adjudication in a TV program. It is 
indeed odd how significant this little study became to the Scandinavian scholarship on 
the issue, but because of the wide publicity of the study, Malmer, a more traditional 
legal scholar, criticized it for result-oriented interpretation of the empirical material and 
for an inaccurate description of the criminal justice system.
237
 Interpretation of empiri-
cal statistics was obviously a matter of debate and often reflected the world-view of the 
interpreter, but the attention the study attracted also shows the different perceptions of 
the competing views.   
   Critical scholars, nonetheless, argued for a realistic analysis of criminal law. For 
instance, Andenæs and Hauge researched the sentencing practice of the Norwegian Su-
preme Court, finding that it did not follow its own principles, which caused a serious 
breach in legal reality.
238
 Mogens Moe also noted that there were clear and serious dif-
ferences between sentencing of the various judges,
239
 and Göran Elwin argued that the 
traditional legal scholarship masked many relevant aspects of judicial decision-making 
in criminal cases.
240
 The critical arguments followed the notion concerning the gap be-
tween law in books and law in action. Although criminal adjudication was often thought 
to be different than civil law adjudication, the critical scholars noted the discretion in 
adjudication which in their opinion caused inequitable legal practice.    
   The difference between theory and practice led the scholars to contemplate the 
ideological function of law. The critics argued that the gap between law in books and 
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law in action was maintained by myths and ideologies which laid the basis for the crim-
inal system.
241
 The official “myths”, for instance, gave an unrealistically humane and 
efficient image of the prisons although the reality was very different.
242
 Dag Victor thus 
argued that criminal politics should be studied as a part of society in order to avoid the 
myths and conservative ideology.
243
 The general atmosphere among the radical left and 
progressive social circles was against the traditional social institutions. With the help of 
the critical scholarship, critical legal scholars sought to point out that there was a dispar-
ity between the official and the actual position.     
   What was then needed, according to the critical scholars, was a total reform of the 
criminal system. As noted, there was widespread skepticism about the prison system,
244
 
which, in accordance with Foucauldian history, was considered to protect the prevailing 
capitalist ideology.
245
 The critical scholars investigated its various aspects in order to 
demonstrate the flaws in the system. Prison sentences of indeterminate duration were 
widely criticized because they were not good for general deterrence, against the rehabil-
itative ideal, and caused uncertainty.
246
 In addition, the reformers often argued that short 
prison sentences could be replaced by fines because they had been proved better in re-
socializing the criminals.
247
 In general, the inefficiency of the criminal justice system 
was widely acknowledged, and scholars contemplated ways to improve it. Common 
themes were decriminalization of traditional crimes and criminalization of modern 
crimes and finding a balance between the penalties imposed on the various crimes.
248
 
The critical opinion was that the modern system of criminal justice did not conform to 
social standards, but was conservative and inequitable. The contemporary social stand-
ards were, of course, defined by the critical scholars who nevertheless argued that they 
had revealed the ideology behind the system.      
   Stig Edling and Göran Elwin, who contributed significantly to the development of 
sociology of law and critical criminal law scholarship, also stressed the conservative 
and outmoded nature of the criminal system in their comprehensive analysis of the offi-
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cial report on the prison reform.
249
 They analyzed the political composition of the com-
mittee and its memorandum in detail, concluding that the proposed reform would not 
change the system of punishment as expected, would maintain the conservative nature 
of the prison institution and the uncertainty and inequality of law, and contribute to the 
myths of the efficiency and appropriateness of the modern system. The analysis reflect-
ed both the realistic, sociological and political analysis of criminal law and the thor-
oughgoing reforms the critical scholars often stressed.  
   The critical scholars also tackled the problem of juvenile delinquency. Mathiesen 
criticized the juvenile detention centers for anti-socializing and stigmatizing impacts,
250
 
and Bratholm argued that the juvenile delinquency system should be reformed in ac-
cordance with the general trends by emphasizing humanity, rehabilitation, and general 
deterrence.
251
 Ulla Bondeson conducted an empirical and multi-disciplinary research 
study on the community of the inmates within correctional centers, particularly dealing 
with juvenile delinquents. She concluded that the treatment within the centers and the 
ideology of individual prevention had failed.
252
 By emphasizing universal arguments in 
studies on particular subjects, the critical scholars sought to point out the fundamental 
flaws of the criminal law system.    
   Since the ultimate target was the system of criminal law, an important topic was 
the purpose and function of criminal punishment. And since the alternative scholars 
were against the traditional system and for the reformist agenda, the argument was that 
criminal law ought to be based on general deterrence. According to the general opinion, 
it would treat criminals equally, be certain, diminish harsh penalties, provide better op-
portunities for re-socialization and rehabilitation, and educate people to avoid criminal 
behavior.
253
 Not everybody was, of course, straightforwardly optimistic about general 
deterrence. It was, for instance, argued that the criminal system should be based on eco-
nomic theory.
254
 For the critical scholars, the concern was the fact that general deter-
rence often raised the level of punishment. Nils Christie noted this, calling for more 
research on the impact of general deterrence.
255
 Andenæs, the most prominent spokes-
man for general deterrence, argued on the other hand that it was the most appropriate 
basis for criminal law.
256
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   The difference of opinion followed from the difference in perspective. Although 
they were fundamentally on the same side, Christie had more social perspective on the 
issue at least partly because of his sociological education. Thus, he argued that law 
alone could not decrease crime, but it could contribute to social structures that would.
257
 
Elwin, on the other hand, encouraged more nuanced discussion on general deterrence. 
He thought that sometimes it might function merely as an ideology, hiding the real 
causes of criminalization, such as was the case with property crime, and as an ideology 
it also legitimized harsh punishments.
258
 Since the common catchphrase of the time was 
that social policy was the best criminal policy, the more critical the scholar was, the 
more emphasis he or she placed on the social structures. Although the general trend was 
towards general deterrence, the scholars had differing conceptions about it and empha-
sized different aspects of it.     
   In any event, Andenæs’s faith did not fade as the 1970s went on. In 1974, he pub-
lished two collections of his articles advocating general deterrence.
259
 He argued that it 
deterred, built morality, created general law-abiding behavior, and could thus form the 
basis for both legislation and sentencing practice.
260
 One of his most powerful argu-
ments, covering a wide area of criminal law, was that “[p]unishment on the basis of 
general prevention is ethically defensible, both in legislation and sentencing, if the pen-
alty is in reasonable proportion to the gravity of the offence and does not violate the 
principle of equality before the law.”261 And even in 1977 as the general enthusiasm 
faded, Andenæs supported general deterrence by noting that there was now more re-
search on the topic which had increased knowledge of it and discouraged any radical 
arguments in one direction or another.
262
  
   General deterrence was one of the most important aspects of the alternative crimi-
nal law scholarship, and the policies in this regard often changed to a certain extent in 
favor of it. It was a fundamental principle which, according to many alternative schol-
ars, could function as a guide-line directing the criminal system in a more just direction. 
The effects of the treatment ideology and the inequalities in the system were felt as de-
ficiencies in need of correction, and the critical scholars were in the front line in pro-
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moting the reform. General deterrence was also a general trend in criminal policy, not 
simply a matter for the alternative scholars. However, as the enthusiasm of the 1960s 
and early 1970s waned and the scholarship expanded, people became more moderate 
and less eager for radical reform.  
   Whether the interest of a legal scholar regarding criminal policy was criminal law 
or other social measures, the purpose of the alternative scholarship was also to observe 
crime as a consequence of social relations and structures. Scandinavian critical crimi-
nologists were not particularly enthusiastic about the criminal system of the socialist 
countries because they normally held that an authoritarian society was too great a price 
to pay for the diminished criminality.
263
 This did not mean, however, that the literature 
lacked Marxist rhetoric. Many critical legal scholars in the field approached crime from 
the perspective of class conflict. As we saw, Alvar Nelson criticized criminal law for its 
class bias,
264
 and Aubert argued that criminal law often preserved the dominant social 
ideology.
265
 Furthermore, as we saw, it was argued that sentencing was in fact some-
times biased against the lower social classes. Although there was no glorification of 
socialism, the general rhetoric of the criticism stressed the class character of modern 
society and the social inequalities that followed.   
   The general rhetoric of critical legal scholarship was thus present in criminal law. 
In Uppsala, for instance, a discussion group on matters of criminal law and policy was 
established in the late 1960s. Professor Alvar Nelson led the group, which consisted of 
the young scholars Nils Jareborg, Göran Elwin, Sten Heckscher, and Dag Victor, who 
discussed the need for openness and change in legal concepts. The point was to see that 
legal policy and legal theory could not be understood separately, since the theory need-
ed policy considerations and policy needed theories.
266
 Students and would-be-scholars 
debated the nature and origins of legal concepts and the need for political research in 
criminal law. Alternative and critical legal scholarship also grew within the universities 
among eager students and in study circles in which the students could read theoretical 
literature and discuss the state of law and scholarship.  
   One of the young legal scholars who was active both in Marxist legal scholarship 
and criminal law scholarship was Göran Elwin who, with Sten Hecksher and Alvar Nel-
son, wrote a textbook on criminal law that was meant to provide a comprehensive ac-
count of criminal policy. The perspective was naturally critical, and the authors con-
demned Swedish criminal policy overall. For example, they argued that criminality was 
more common than the official “myth” claimed, incarceration was an ineffective mode 
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265 Vilhelm Aubert, Om klasselovgivning, 62–72, in Bratholm & Sundby (ed.) 1976, supra n. 38 at 61–88. 
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of punishment, and that treatment ideology did not work.
267
 The book reflected the 
scholarly orientation of the authors. It was politically oriented to the extent that a re-
viewer noted that it should have been called “A critique of Swedish criminal policy”, 
and that it was mostly one-sided.
268
 The adverse criticism did not seem to bother the 
authors, since the book was revised four years later with a more pronounced Marxist 
tone. Now the authors stressed the connection between criminal policy, and not only 
social structures, but also capitalism, which was seen as the origin of the modern crimi-
nal policy. In addition, the attitude toward general deterrence was more critical than it 
had been four years earlier.
269
 The Marxist turn of the early 1970s was also obvious in 
the criminal law scholarship. Furthermore, the purpose of the book was to show that 
crime and criminal policy emanated from society and their particular forms reflected the 
power structures in society. The sophistication in critical theories made the theoretical 
basis of the book clearer and highlighted the points of the book.   
   The construction of a comprehensive social theory of crime and the methods of 
controlling it was an important theme in the alternative criminal law literature of the 
1970s. Thomas Mathiesen, who was an active scholar and a participant in the reform 
associations, worked on a theory of a society without prisons. In his The Politics of Abo-
lition, published in 1974, he laid out its general outline, arguing that criminal policy was 
largely unreasonable and unjust and was thus to be mostly abolished. This was to be 
achieved through continuous struggle and partial reform, so-called negative reforms, 
which unmasked the unjust institutions and abolished them piece by piece.
270
 For 
Mathiesen, the continuous scholarship on revealing the legitimizing façade of the crimi-
nal justice institutions and the persistent dismantling of the system made the revolution. 
Abolitionism was indeed a radical argument, but Mathiesen managed to construct it in a 
way that made it seem like a realistic possibility. Whether its purpose was to produce 
reform or merely raise discussion, abolitionism was the most radical expression of the 
reformism of alternative legal scholarship. It was also a demonstration of a comprehen-
sive strategy and a social theory of crime.    
   Nils Christie also worked on a social theory of crime. His starting-point was that 
crime was fundamentally linked to society, arguing that the contemporary society had 
                                               
267 Göran Elwin, Sten Heckscher, Alvar Nelson, Den första stenen: Studiebok i kriminalpolitik (Stock-
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increased wealth and distanced people from each other, which created the basis of 
common criminality, and hence official crime control had become significant. Crime 
was a social phenomenon defined by the powerful classes of society through legislation. 
He then defined conditions for a closely integrated society in which the administration 
of criminal justice and the system of criminal law would be brought closer to the people 
actually involved in the issue. The standards of a good criminal system were that it be 
approved by the people, simple, open, and clear. It was also supposed to cause as little 
suffering as possible, and people should be able to contribute to it as much as possi-
ble.
271
 The connection between the general criticism of capitalism and mass-
consumption was reflected in Christie’s critique of the faceless, impersonal society, 
which had also created the atomistic law. He therefore sought to reform the system of 
crime control through changing the nature of the society and thus constructing a new 
legal system that would be accessible to and understandable by lay people.  
   Besides commenting on the common themes, Christie was also adding some new 
elements to his work. He argued that culture, including legal culture, had professional-
ized along the development of faceless society. This had turned people into roles, which 
had distorted the legal process. Hence there was a need for a victim-oriented process 
that would pay attention to the needs of the victim of the crime.
272
 Much of the criminal 
legal literature had revolved around the criminal, but the perspective of the victim was 
not forgotten. The purpose of the victim approach was also to create a closer relation-
ship between people and let the parties take more charge in the process. The transition 
from a systemic functional approach to a humane approach was also evident.   
   The common theme in the theories was to create a system of criminal law that was 
equitable and just. Critical scholars argued that most registered criminals were young, 
male, and from the lowest social classes, but there also was a major problem of modern 
economic crime that was not dealt with appropriately.
273
 The people of lower class were 
simply more prone to be caught in the machinery of criminal control.
274
 Therefore, edu-
cation was often considered more efficient than harsh punishment.
275
 All the main 
themes relating to the general concern were gathered in Christie’s book, which was a 
collection of articles from two and a half decades of his career. The main message of the 
book was, as its title, Like Most of the People (Som folk flest), suggested, to understand 
crime in its social context. Criminals were usually not some kind of monster, Christie 
argued, but people created by their interactivity with society.
276
 Since the purpose was 
to see crime as a reaction to social circumstances, an approach to social psychology and 
sociology was important in understanding crime and creating a system that would fight 
against crime best and be just in responding to it.   
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   Christies’s book was described as a cross-section of Norwegian postwar criminol-
ogy.
277
 Indeed, it was. Criminology had come a long way during the previous two dec-
ades and the scholars had participated in various kinds of discussions. The main points 
of the critical scholars were that crime was common in society, it mostly originated in 
social structures, the administration of criminal justice was selective in terms of social 
classes, and that treatment and harsh penalties were ineffective in preventing it. The 
alternative scholars on criminal law participated in the contemporary debates, modified 
the basis of scholarship, and struggled against the traditional scholarship. The emphasis 
on the connection between scholarship and politics and on the cross-disciplinary ap-
proach was common methods that furthered the alternative cause. 
4.3 Criticism of criminal law in perspective 
 
So far, alternative criminal law scholarship has mostly been about the social nature of 
crime, and about criminological research and its political significance. The focus of crit-
ical scholarship was indeed the endeavor to understand the social causes of crime and 
the activity of changing the system. However, the scholars also contemplated matters 
less directly relating to the political consequences of their scholarship. I will now briefly 
discuss a couple of examples of criticism of the concepts of criminal law and criminal 
law scholarship in order to clarify the connection between critical legal scholarship and 
criminal law. 
   As was often the case in general jurisprudence, criticism was targeted at Alf 
Ross’s concepts. According to Ross, the concepts of general and special deterrence were 
useless in defining the basis of criminal law because of their ambiguity and because 
they were based on social interests. Whether punishments served a social function, he 
argued, was an empirical question. Therefore, prevention was the goal and retribution 
the reason for punishment.
278
 Ross’s realism, in which concepts had to have a specific 
point of reference in empirical reality, did not please the scholars whose jurisprudential 
views were more sociologically oriented. Andenæs criticized Ross for ignoring the fact 
that criminal law might have various reasons and goals,
279
 and Christie argued that 
Ross’s theory would lead to unreasonable consequences and disproportionately harsh 
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punishments because it did not pay attention to the social influence of criminal law.
280
 
Ross, nonetheless, maintained his views that the question of the motives and goals of 
criminal law were categorically of different character
281
 and that the critical scholars 
had over-emphasized the role of politics and the ill consequences of special deter-
rence.
282
       
   The problem between the new and the traditional criminal law scholarship related 
to the more general problem between realism and the “new realism”, which placed val-
ues and policies at the center of legal analysis. Ross was interested in the logical con-
nections between problems and concepts, whereas the alternative and critical scholars 
were more interested in the social and political values and consequences of the legal 
concepts. Since they regarded law as inherently pertaining to politics, they opined that 
legal concepts should not be understood without considering their political motives and 
consequences. Furthermore, Ross’s theory excluded the possibility of general deterrence 
being the basis of criminal law, which was a central argument of the alternative legal 
scholarship. The general problem was also seen in Nils Jareborg’s philosophical analy-
sis of values in law, in which he argued that values always reflected the general theoret-
ical background of the analysis.
283
 According to the new realism, values were neither 
true nor false but conformed or did not conform to a theory or an ideology.     
   A more comprehensive criticism of traditional criminal law scholarship was Nils 
Kristian Sunby’s critical review of Johannes Andenæs’s textbook on criminal law. The 
book, published in 1974, was intended to update the criminal law education.
284
 Accord-
ing to Sundby, however, Andenæs did not pay due attention to all of the relevant chang-
es of the past couple of decades although it was an improvement over the older books. 
Especially problematic were the sections regarding criminal psychiatry and criminolo-
gy. In addition, a few significant topics such as the prison institution were neglected, 
and the effects of punishment were dealt with in a highly abstract manner with a one-
sided over-emphasis on general deterrence. Moreover, Andenæs had not considered the 
class character of criminal law and had also neglected all consideration of values and 
scholarship.
285
   
   Andenæs’s alternative view with Sundby’s more critical view collided in this con-
troversy. Two points are obvious in Sundby’s critique. First, even if Andenæs was a 
reformist scholar who endorsed the sociological view on criminal law, his text-book 
was a compromise between alternative and traditional views, and therefore did not take 
the social aspect far enough. Second, Andenæs did not consider values. This was one of 
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the main points on which the critical legal scholarship differed from the tradition, and 
from alternative scholarship as well. The critical legal scholars claimed that all law and 
legal scholarship, either explicitly or implicitly, was influenced by values, and therefore 
they had to be taken into account in legal studies. Sundby also emphasized the class 
character of law, whereas Andenæs’ perspective on society was less conflicted. 
Sundby’s critique thus brought up the difference between alternative and critical legal 
scholarship. Whereas alternative scholarship balanced between tradition and new in-
sights, critical scholarship endorsed a completely new view of law and legal scholar-
ship. 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The basis of alternative legal scholarship on criminal law was formed in the early 1960s 
from sociology of law. Studies on the social reality of crime suggested that crime could 
be a more complex social phenomenon than had previously been assumed. Research 
approaching crime as a social phenomenon became more common during the sixties, 
and from the middle of the decade onwards, Scandinavian scholars cooperated on re-
search and participated in associations to change the criminal law. Alternative criminal 
legal scholarship considered crime as a reflection of social circumstances and power 
structures. There was also a more radical, Marxist movement in criminology but it was 
quite a marginal phenomenon. In general, alternative criminologists were not critical 
scholars, rather representing the opening up of legal scholarship towards social science. 
In any event, some alternative legal scholars did stress the fact that criminal law was a 
product of class society and was thus related to the class conflict.  
   The criticism of treatment ideology and the emphasis on certainty and equality in 
criminal law as well as on the reform of the law and the system of punishment were 
general social and political trends of the time and not just the business of the legal 
scholars. Nordic Countries did change their criminal policies following the alternative 
agenda in the late 1970s,
286
 but the causes of the change are completely another matter. 
The scholarship obviously had some influence in this regard, but it is as obvious that it 
too was influenced by the general critical atmosphere and the political demands of the 
left. Moreover, in the late 1970s, the alternative scholars began to criticize the neo-
classical trend in criminal politics because it had been used to increase the punishments 
and because its effects on reality had not been taken into consideration.
287
 Reforms are 
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usually compromises between conflicting opinions, and that was also the problem in the 
1970s. Critical scholars were after a more humane criminal policy, and the effort suc-
ceeded to some extent.  
   In many respects, alternative criminology and scholarship on criminal law reflect-
ed the general approach of critical legal scholarship. Even though views varied between 
scholars, the main points were often the same. Alternative legal scholarship endorsed 
the understanding that crime was a social phenomenon caused by social circumstances 
and defined and conceptualized by law that reflected social power structures. Therefore, 
crime was to be seen in its social context, and scholars had to be aware of their political 
biases and values. Critical criminal law scholarship was thus also political scholarship 
which encouraged arguments about values. The emphasis on policies and value argu-
ments, as well as the endorsement of cross-disciplinary research were both reflections of 
the changes in society and scholarship and methods in the academic struggle. Critical 
scholars sought to change the society, but they also pursued academic positions and 
power over scholarship.  
   Criminal law scholarship also had close contacts with political practice, and the 
scholars participated actively in the associations for criminal reform. Their studies pro-
vided information for reform, but studies were also inspired by the efforts of the associ-
ations. In criminal law, thus, the contact between theory and practice was most appar-
ent. This was obviously so because crime was a major part of society and criminal re-
form was an important social topic in the critical atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Many people, both politicians and social activists, were interested in crime. It thus pro-
vided a field of research with a tremendous number of opportunities, a chance to devel-
op new theories and methodologies, and a significant opportunity to participate in con-
temporary political debates.  
   Both in the United States and Scandinavia, a critical criminology emerged in the 
1960s, observing crime as a social phenomenon and trying to change the contemporary 
system of the administration of criminal justice. The basic ideas were the same; the crit-
ical criminology tried to show that the system discriminated against the lower social 
classes, severe punishments were not effective in preventing crime, and the system con-
stituted and protected social ideologies and the prevailing circumstances. The differ-
ences in detail followed the differences in the social circumstances. A major and inter-
esting difference is, however, that Marxist criminology was stronger in the United 
States than in Scandinavia, even though Marxism had a stronger position in the critical 
legal scholarship in Scandinavia than in the United States in general. It would be inter-
esting to delve deeper into this question, but it seems that the strong position of Marx-
ism in American criminology was a consequence of British influence and of the fact that 
the American criminologists were more theoretical than their Scandinavian colleagues, 
who also worked for the ministries of justice and for the reform organizations. Marxism 
was the backbone of Scandinavian criminology, but the scholars maintained a close 
connection between political practices and thus avoided extreme arguments, despite the 
emphasis on abolition. 
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5 Alternative views on constitutional law, 1965─1979   
 
Legal scholars were naturally interested in many practical topics, and on some occa-
sions there were heated debates about some legal problem. In Finland especially, debate 
raged about the reform of the Constitution in the 1970s. In Scandinavia, however, the 
debates on constitutional law were not as intense. In Denmark, the constitution was re-
formed in the 1950s and in Sweden in the 1970s. These reforms did not provoke espe-
cially vehement debates among the legal scholars, although politically they were con-
troversial.
288
 In Norway, the old Constitution of 1814 was still valid in the 1970s; in 
fact, it is still valid today, but serious debates about the Constitution and its interpreta-
tion emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.
289
 Therefore, in this section I will explore the 
Norwegian discussion on constitutional law in the 1960s and 1970s. I will concentrate 
on the discussion of judicial review and the constitutional protection of private property 
because these were the most controversial topics and they illuminate the dimensions of 
critical legal scholarship.  
   It seems that two things made constitutional law more controversial problem in 
Norway than in Sweden and Denmark. First and foremost, the Norwegian Supreme 
Court had in fact applied its powers of judicial review. In the 1960s and 1970s, no 
Scandinavian constitution had any explicit mentions of judicial review, but it had been 
approved in theory or in practice in each of the countries. Norway, however, was the 
only country where the Supreme Court had invalidated laws.
290
 Thus, legal scholars 
contemplated the problem in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, Norwegian constitutional 
law revolved greatly around Carl August Fleischer, a professor of law and a controver-
sialist who had quarrels with many of the prominent figures in the Norwegian academy, 
whom he accused of bad jurisprudence.
291
 Fleischer developed a flexible constitutional 
theory which incorporated the social circumstances and made progressive and reformist 
interpretations possible. Thus, because of the different constitutional situation and be-
cause of the personality of Fleischer, the debates on constitutional law were more heated 
and critical in Norway than in Sweden and Denmark.   
   The common opinion in Norway in the early 1960s approved judicial review and 
endorsed the independence of the judiciary. According to Eckhoff, judicial independ-
ence was a cornerstone of the legal system. Problems arose, however, as to the exact 
substance of this independence and the acceptable extent of judicial review because the 
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impartiality of the courts was to be protected and guaranteed.
292
 Although a major con-
cern was to find a balance between judicial review and impartiality, the fact that judicial 
practice reflected political currents was also acknowledged.
293
 Disagreement arose as to 
whether the Supreme Court was essentially a political or legal organ. On the basis of his 
historical researches, Jens Seip argued that the Supreme Court was a political institution 
and that the idea of neutral judicial decision-making was a mere myth.
294
 Andenæs crit-
icized Seip for not understanding the context of judicial decision-making which, An-
denæs argued, was not political even if extra-legal factors had a certain influence on 
it.
295
 Seip responded that Andenæs represented the illusion of neutral legal reasoning 
and the arrogant attitude of legal scholars whenever a scholar of some other discipline 
tried to analyze law.
296
 Andenæs replied once again that Seip had misunderstood his 
points on judicial interpretation.
297
     
   Contrasted were a legal perspective of balanced realism and a historian’s perspec-
tive of extreme realism. According to the former, shared by the majority of the legal 
profession in the 1960s, judicial decision-making was not formalistic logic but a multi-
faceted process in which many perspectives had to be taken into account. It was never-
theless rational and rather legal than political. Seip, on the other hand, stressed the polit-
ical context of the decisions and propounded a theory of radical realism in which judi-
cial decision-making was rather political than legal, and in which the decisions were 
outcomes of political pressures rather than simply being influenced by them. Although 
supporting the sociological perspective in criminology, Andenæs was closer to the tradi-
tional legal scholarship than alternative legal scholarship in constitutional law. Despite 
his realistic notions, he supported the general notion that judicial decision-making was 
rational and not simply politics.  
   The question over the political role of the Court brought up the problems regarding 
the nature of balanced realism in judicial decision-making. Although Seip’s arguments 
were understood to an extent,
298
 they were also criticized for being over-statements be-
cause judicial discretion fitted within the margins of the rule of law.
299
 Anders Bratholm 
noted that the political biases of the judges occasionally decided legal cases but these 
were relatively rare,
300
 and in a study on judicial behavior Andenæs and Kvamme con-
cluded that it was difficult to analyze the impact of extra-legal factors on judicial deci-
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sions but they obviously had some influence.
301
 Moreover, according to Eckhoff the 
majority of the legal profession felt positively about the fact that judges made law.
302
 
Legal scholars were irritated by the extreme realism of Seip and the fact that a historian 
intruded into their businesses. The question was also about the use of social science in 
legal studies over which there was no unanimous agreement.    
   The problem was how far extra-legal factors could influence constitutional inter-
pretation without making it irrational and biased or into politics and without violating 
the fundamental principles of the Constitution and the rule of law. Hardly anyone sup-
ported extreme formalism on the issue, but the majority opined that legal reasoning and 
interpretation could occur within reasonable boundaries set by the law. The problem 
was pressing regarding not only legal theory but also practice because it had very thor-
oughgoing implications for actual cases. One of these problems was the constitutional 
protection of private property and its social and political consequences. 
   Constitutional protection of private property rights was a serious point of contro-
versy in Norwegian constitutional law in the 1960s. The most prominent spokesman for 
a flexible interpretation of the Constitution was Fleischer, who elaborated a theory of 
constitutional interpretation that would make the Constitution into a progressive social 
force. He claimed that property rights were merely standards, and the legislator could 
regulate the use of property within reasonable limits without violating the constitu-
tion.
303
 His views were criticized for turning questions of constitutional law into ques-
tions of values and for violating legal certainty.
304
 The more traditional scholars argued 
that constitutional law required clear, strict, and certain boundaries so that the rule of 
law could be guaranteed.
305
 Fleischer, however, also argued that, rightly understood, his 
theory was important to social development,
306
 but he was again criticized for bringing 
economic arguments into legal reasoning.
307
 To Fleischer, however, the problem of 
compensation in cases in which regulation caused damages was not as unequivocal as 
his critics argued.
308
    
   There was a clear conflict between conception of property, interpretation of the 
constitution, and legal argumentation. Constitutional law was changing between the 
dialectic of the traditional view and the new critical view. The critical view that 
Fleischer represented saw property as a social thing, not absolutely protected against the 
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measures of society for the sake of the public good. The critical conception of property 
did not completely overthrow the traditional conception, but rather adopted a social per-
spective on it. With respect to constitutional law, the critical conception endorsed dy-
namic interpretation in accordance with economic and social changes, changes which 
were also regarded as valid arguments in legal reasoning. The traditional conception, on 
the other hand, endorsed the view that legal and political issues were to be kept sepa-
rate, and the protection of private property was strict and administered by clear rules. 
For the traditional conception, dynamic interpretation was ambiguous and a threat to 
legal certainty.    
   Fleischer’s comprehensive theory of constitutional interpretation led him to con-
clude that the Constitution had to be interpreted in accordance with social changes and 
the specific circumstances of actual cases, because there was no point in holding on to 
the principles of natural law which characterized the 1814 Constitution. The Constitu-
tion encompassed such a large area of social life that it could not fulfill its functions 
without a certain degree of elasticity.
309
 The book, which was originally a brief for the 
Norwegian apartment construction association, received a relatively positive response, 
although Fleischer was criticized for expressing subjective opinions in an otherwise 
theoretically sophisticated book.
310
 Fleischer’s book was not a radical critique of the 
legal system but a theory of realistic and dynamic constitutional interpretation, favoring 
strongly progressive and reformist social planning.  
   Another example of the problems of private property was that of expropriation. 
The Norwegian law on expropriation was reformed at the late 1960s, the new regulation 
providing better opportunities for land regulation without full compensation. Audvar Os 
criticized the new law and supported a theory of full compensation.
311
 Fleischer, how-
ever, supported the will of the legislator.
312
 Fleischer’s theory was clear at least in cases 
where legislation supported his views, since the courts were then not to step outside the 
purposes of the law.  For him, it was an important part of the more realistic conception 
of property that the right to compensation could be withdrawn if the value of the proper-
ty had risen because of factors not dependent on the owner.
313
 Fleischer strongly sup-
ported the idea of social planning and the reformist social ideology. Since the reformist 
side considered expropriation and full compensation as hindrances to reform, it was 
clear that his theories supported easier expropriation and proportional compensation. In 
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this regard, it is also clear how the critical scholars comprehended the connection be-
tween law and politics. For them, law was often politics expressed in legal terms, and 
the new conception was set to unravel the relationship.  
   In any event, expropriation brought up interesting legal problems. For instance, 
Andenæs emphasized the role of the judiciary in applying the law of expropriation,
314
 
whereas Eckhoff and Wilberg favored the letter of the law.
315
 Andenæs was also criti-
cized for conservative legal theory,
316
 which, according to Andenæs, was based rather 
on a political than legal view.
317
 Andenæs’s theories indeed supported his political 
views, since he was a reformist in criminal law scholarship but more conservative re-
garding constitutional law. The theories obviously largely corresponded to the political 
views of the scholar in question. Only rarely did someone note that his theoretical views 
contradicted his political views. Traditional scholars, of course, saw the connection be-
tween scholarship and politics meager, whereas it was the most important thing for crit-
ical scholars.    
   Sometimes the political connection was the obvious purpose. Fleischer applied his 
theory in a case on the use of the Oslomarka, i.e., the natural areas surrounding the capi-
tal city of Norway. The problem was whether the owner had the right to build in the 
area or whether it should be protected as a natural environment. According to Fleischer, 
there was no point in legal formalism that would allow the owner to do whatever was 
not forbidden by the law because the problems concerned such an important area. The 
situation was about protection of a unique natural area, not simply about property rights. 
Public rights had to be weighed against private economic rights, and when the unique 
circumstances were taken into account the environment was to be protected.
318
  
   Social interpretation of the Constitution did not please the traditional profession, 
Fleischer once again being criticized for stretching his arguments too far and not having 
enough respect for legal certainty.
319
 This time he was also criticized because of his 
historical interpretation. Fleischer argued that there was no historically established pri-
vate ownership of the area,
320
 but historians argued the contrary.
321
 Indeed, Brækhus 
commented that Fleischer’s article was so ambiguous and poorly documented and that 
its conclusions were so flawed that it ought not to have been published.
322
 The new con-
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ceptions of property and constitutional interpretation were easier to sell to the legal pro-
fession, but the historical analysis of the situation caused troubles because Fleischer’s 
interpretation was obviously motivated by his goals. Environmentalism was on the rise 
in the early 1970s and the new conception of property provided better opportunities for 
the protection of the environment. Fleischer’s interpretation of history supported his 
interpretation of constitutional law, both of which conflicted with the traditional view.   
   Despite the criticism, Fleischer continued to build his theories of a more dynamic 
concept of property by arguing for more dynamic land regulation
323
 and for a theory 
according to which the legislator could withdraw from public contracts more easily.
324
 
In each case, however, his arguments were rebutted on the basis that he had placed his 
own opinions in the place of law.
325
 Even though his arguments were not radical at face 
value, they deviated from the tradition to the extent that they were unacceptable to the 
majority of the profession. Critical scholarship met the needs of reform, but it collided 
with the tradition.    
   Another problem of private property in which Fleischer actively developed re-
formist theory was the question of industrial democracy, which was a widely debated 
topic in the sixties.
326
 According to Fleischer, it was not rational to assume that the Con-
stitution protected a particular kind of economic system. This meant that rights relating 
to the modern economy were not absolutely inviolable.
327
 Therefore, he argued, the 
concept of property should be brought up to date. The rights of the owner would not be 
completely abandoned, but a system of industrial democracy would enforce the modern 
concepts of welfare and freedom better.
328
 Fleischer’s ideas were widely criticized be-
cause they were regarded as mixing law with politics and violating the basis of property 
rights,
329
 even if Asbjørn Eide understood Fleischer’s ideas from the perspective of so-
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cial rights.
330
 Fleischer, on the other hand, criticized his critics for formalist legal theory 
and noted that he merely reconsidered the concept of property without abandoning it.
331
       
   Fleischer’s arguments suggested that the concept of freedom and welfare should 
be reconsidered in modern society. Here it is easy to see the connection with the critical 
argument that values were social constructs, and thus subjective and open to debate. For 
many of the traditional profession, these ideas were too radical, which explains the gen-
eral and hostile response to Fleischer’s theories. According to the critical notion, the 
problem was about conceptualization and interpretation, whereas the traditional view 
held that the question involved such fundamental premises of the legal system that they 
could not be left to personal discretion. From the perspective of critical legal scholar-
ship, political arguments were valid whereas they were unacceptable from a traditional 
perspective. Furthermore, industrial democracy had a heavy socialist connection, which 
people without socialist sympathies could not tolerate.    
   The difference between traditional and critical scholarship was clear in the debates 
on industrial democracy. Although traditional constitutional scholarship was aware of 
the fact that constitutional interpretation changed with time,
332
 Fleischer criticized it for 
being restrictive and formalist with respect to property rights
333
 and endorsed greater 
freedom from the constitutional boundaries for the legislator.
334
 Andenæs did not fully 
comply with Fleischer’s radical arguments, noting that a certain amount of industrial 
democracy might be possible.
335
 Fleischer was beyond the margins of the tradition and 
therefore his opinions were too radical. He resembled American realism in his persistent 
endorsement of the powers of the legislator over fundamental principles of constitution-
al law which he considered as natural law. For the critical scholars, since law was a so-
cial construct, it had to be treated accordingly. In this persistent defense of social inter-
pretation of the Constitution, Fleischer’s arguments were also similar to those of the 
critics of the neutral principles. Fleischer was simply more openly and obviously polit i-
cal in his critique than his American colleagues.   
   As we see, at the most basic level the Norwegian debates on constitutional law did 
not consider the Constitution per se but the nature of the interpretation of the constitu-
tion. In the first place, the question was whether judicial review was political or legal. 
Critical insight held that it was political, and, according to traditional scholarship, it 
occurred within judicial discretion. The same theme was present in the discussion of the 
interpretation of the constitution on actual cases, such as expropriation and industrial 
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democracy. The problem in these respects concerned the constitutional protection of 
property rights. Fleischer’s realistic theory preferred the public interest and social wel-
fare to private property rights, whereas the traditional theory emphasized legal certainty 
and fundamental principles of law. There was no formalism, but the traditional scholar-
ship stressed the protection of private rights, and hence a more formalist interpretation 
of the constitution than the critical scholarship. Fleischer, for instance, placed the high-
est priority on the changes in society and the political will of the legislator. His alterna-
tive theory promoted social planning, public interest, reconsideration of property rights, 
and material welfare and equality.  
   Many of the fundamental points of Marxist theory were obvious in Fleischer’s 
scholarship although he did not explicitly support any particular theory. Meanwhile, 
Scandinavian critical legal scholars were not developing a comprehensive Marxist con-
stitutional theory,
336
 although they did deal with some contemporary problems, such as 
conscientious objection
337
 and the state governance of people’s private lives through 
anti-terrorist laws,
338
 and a symposium on Marxism and public law was organized.
339
 
Scandinavian Marxist legal scholars brought up the problems of constitutional law in 
their analyses of other legal problems and were not concerned over a fundamental re-
form of the Constitution. The practical application of the constitution was important, not 
the constitution as such.    
   The Norwegian debates on constitutional law recalled the American debates on 
neutral principles. Both occasions concerned the question of whether legal reasoning 
was supposed to be rational and neutral, or whether it ought to conform to social reali-
ties. Otherwise, constitutional law was not particularly important for critical scholars 
either in the United States or in Scandinavia, the scholars being more concerned about 
its interpretation and practical application. However, through the conception of rights, 
constitutional law was indirectly significant for critical scholarship. 
6 Alternative and critical legal scholarship in the late 1970s 
6.1 Development of the critical mood 
 
Alternative and critical legal scholarship developed in the 1960s and started to attract 
more attention in the early 1970s, when more students and scholars became interested in 
the critical activities. Old trends continued and new ideas were advanced. Critical legal 
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scholars worked towards changing the society and the nature of scholarship and found-
ed various associations and journals.
340
 The new trends of the 1970s included the efforts 
to bring legal aid to people previously unable to obtain it, such as the Norwegian “Juss-
buss” project,341 as well as the efforts to gather the theories and studies on legal aid,342 
sociology of law,
343
 critical legal scholarship,
344
 critical criminal law scholarship,
345
 and 
Marxist legal scholarship
346
 into comprehensive editions available to a wider audience. 
In addition, scholarship on practical legal behavior became more common,
347
 and legal 
scholarship entered fields of citizen activism, such as women’s rights.348 Alternative and 
critical legal scholarship activities became more common, spreading to cover a vast 
number of social problems. In addition, people participating in the activities wanted to 
organize their actions more and to make their studies more generally available. Alterna-
tive legal scholarship became common practice and it pursued more practical utility.  
   Moreover, although the 1970s was a time of increased interest in Marxist theory, it 
was also a time when Marxism was widely criticized. Some legal scholars who in gen-
eral favored critical and Marxist theory thus sought to distance themselves from ortho-
dox Marxism and develop the theory to make it more productive from a less radical 
perspective.
349
 The late 1970s thus meant change for Marxist legal scholarship, because 
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some scholars tried to impose qualifications on it in order to take it out of its original 
form and others were modifying it to respond to contemporary society better. In any 
event, the decade was still a prosperous one for alternative and critical legal theory and 
scholarship.  
   In this section, I will deal with the currents of Scandinavian alternative and critical 
legal scholarship in the late 1970s. The scholarship expanded at the end of the decade to 
a considerable extent, and I will provide a general outline of this development up to the 
1980s. First, I will take a look at the practical connections of the scholarship, such as 
legal aid, the rights of the citizen, and feminism. I will then briefly examine some prob-
lems of general jurisprudence, the emergence of the distinction between rules and prin-
ciples, and the development of Marxist legal scholarship. The movement of alternative 
legal scholarship that culminated in the latter half of the 1970s was a relatively exten-
sive phenomenon, emanating from the changes in society and scholarship and deriving 
from the same influences, but the differences in theory and detail derived from the in-
terests of the particular scholars. Critical legal scholarship was a radical manifestation 
of the wider movement.  
6.2 The legal profession and the critical mood 
 
Organizing was an important element of the critical legal activities. According to 
Thomas Mathiesen, a Norwegian scholar of sociological jurisprudence, it was difficult 
though not impossible to use the law as a tool of social change, but this required, among 
other things, organized activity in close contact with those in need of the change.
350
 Al-
ternative legal activity was needed because, as Ole Bae noted, there were people whose 
social situation was not as good as it was supposed to be in a society that was based on 
human rights and an equal distribution of social benefits and rights. The activities of the 
alternative jurists, or progressive jurists as Bae called them, aimed at improving their 
status.
351
 Alternative legal scholarship focused on the reasons for the gap between law 
in books and law in action, and their practical work aimed at bridging this gap. Their 
work increased in the 1960s and early 1970s and intensified in the late 1970s.   
   The practical orientation was needed because the critical scholars saw that law and 
society shared a fundamental connection. Mathiesen argued that law had effects on so-
ciety beyond the intentions of the legislator because law consolidated and legitimized 
the existing social structures and made them seem natural and rational. Alternative theo-
ries and scholarship were needed to reveal the legitimizing function of law and to work 
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towards change.
352
 Although some other legal sociologists criticized Mathiesen’s theory 
for its materialism, undervaluing of law, and drawing empirical conclusions from its 
theoretical premises,
353
 it did describe the nature of the alternative legal scholarship. 
Critical legal scholars were after a theory that could help to explore the indirect and 
unseen functions of law and provide tools for criticism. In the latter part of the 1970s, 
critical legal scholarship stressed the ideological and constitutive elements of law more. 
However, the theories and studies had to be taken to the practical level, critical scholar-
ship being not enough alone. This meant either grass-roots activity or research on prac-
tical matters.   
   Organizing and practical orientation were major trends in the 1970s. Critical and 
alternative legal scholarship had started mostly as academic movements, but as they 
acquired more proponents, their research expanded and the project was oriented more 
toward everyday practice. As noted, the alternative movement in criminal law had al-
ready been organized into political associations in the late 1960s. Alternative scholar-
ship on crime had prospered throughout the 1960s and the associations founded at the 
end of the decade aimed to bring the critical notions into practice. On these occasions, 
scholars were not satisfied with mere research, wanting to have practical utility for their 
scholarship and participation in political activities.   
   Organizing thus concerned critical legal scholars and scholarship in general. There 
were legal movements with practical orientation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
which contributed to critical scholarship and literature and gained a stronger foothold in 
social matters as the 1970s progressed. Among the organizations were Swedish FiB 
lawyers who were interested in fundamental rights. There was also the critical law 
movement in Norway with its general interest in critical scholarship and legal work. It 
was influenced by the critical sociology of law and transformed from a general endeav-
or in legal aid into the Norwegian Legal-Political Association (Rettspolitisk forening). 
In Denmark, there were the critical front and the law and society movement, which were 
interested in Marxist theory and sociological jurisprudence.
354
  
   In the latter part of the 1970s, these movements founded law journals for critical 
articles dealing with contemporary social and legal problems. Finland was the forerun-
ner, when the Association of Democratic Lawyers founded the journal Oikeus (Law) for 
critical legal literature in 1972.
355
 Their Scandinavian colleagues soon followed, and the 
Norwegian Hefte for kritisk juss (Journal for Critical Jurisprudence) was founded in 
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1975, and the Swedish Tidskrift för folkets rättigheter (Journal for the Rights of the 
People)
356
 was founded in 1977. The Danish Retfærd, established in 1976, was to be-
come a Nordic journal for Marxist legal scholarship. Thus, there were Scandinavian 
journals for critical legal scholarship in which critical scholars could participate in con-
temporary social debates and offer their theories on law and society. Retfærd was a 
scholarly journal including mostly theoretical articles relating to practical problems. The 
Swedish and Norwegian journals were more directed to the ordinary reader and aimed 
at dealing with practical matters in an easily accessible style.   
   For example, the journal of critical jurisprudence, a publication of the Norwegian 
Legal-Political Association, was a small, pamphlet-like journal that contained articles 
regarding contemporary legal problems, such as legal aid, housing, criminal law, labor 
law, and minorities' rights. The journal was aimed at reformist politics and was clearly 
leftist and anti-imperialistic. The plain and unscholarly nature of the essays encapsulat-
ed the idea of making them accessible to everyone, not just jurists. The close coopera-
tion of the people working at the Juss-Buss and in the Legal-Political Association made 
the journal close to the legal problems of ordinary people. It was, after all, these organi-
zations that narrowed the distance between critical legal scholarship and lay people. 
Critical legal scholarship was not simply a theoretical academic movement, many of its 
activities actually working for the benefit of the underdog.         
   A part of the reformist project was the studies on legal aid. The sociological and 
critical legal movement accelerated the interest in studying the real need for access to 
justice and the consequences of the lack of it.
357
 In a study on legal aid in 1973, Ståle 
Eskeland and Just Finne argued that the people most in need of legal assistance had the 
least opportunity to obtain it.
358
 The study was an empirical and participatory study 
based on actual legal problems that showed that people were not aware of their rights or 
had serious difficulty in obtaining them. The authors applied the methods of critical 
legal scholarship, namely, Marxist theory and empirical observation, and they criticized 
the whole legal aid system.   
   Legal aid was mostly a benevolent effort to improve society, but it was also a field 
of study, providing theoretical opportunities. A purpose of a compilation of studies on 
legal aid was to examine its function in society and whether it could be used as a tool of 
social reform.
359
 Scholars argued that the serious inequalities in legal aid corresponded 
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with the social class divisions.
360
 Thus, they revised the concept of legal aid from pas-
sive assistance into an active and comprehensive political struggle for social reform.
361
 
Other problems were also observed. Scholars noted that the reform of legal aid did not 
pay due attention to the actual circumstances of the poor and could not therefore effi-
ciently guarantee their right of access to justice.
362
 Since inequalities in access to justice 
were seen to derive from the inequalities in society, wide-ranging reforms were need-
ed.
363
 The critical notion was that not only did the law protect the interests of the rich, 
but also provided better opportunities for the rich to protect their rights. This notion 
made the critical scholars assume that the law was systematically biased in favor of the 
rich, and thus it directed the interest to the structures of law.     
   The critical scholars sought to demonstrate that legal aid was to be understood as a 
legal mechanism with considerable functions and effects in society, and as a legal tool 
in organizing and reforming society, not in a traditional, normative sense. Studies in 
legal aid were sociological studies aiming at revealing the actual situation so that the 
problems could be realized and corrected. Critical legal scholars were also interested in 
legal aid because of the new legal ethos. They thought that the legal profession was in 
general a conservative social force on the side of the upper social classes, but it could 
become an active reformist force siding with the lower social classes and promoting 
social welfare and equality.     
   Critical legal scholars wanted to distance themselves from the tradition in various 
respects. They did not want to identify with the image of the legal profession they had, 
and they created a new identity according to which the legal profession worked for the 
poor and the under-privileged, as well as working for a more equal society. In the 
1970s, various legal journals were founded to support the critical cause and studies on 
the law in action increased. Alternative scholarship was regarded as a progressive force 
that contributed to the social change. In the efforts to criticize the traditional legal 
thought and struggle toward change, the rights of the people became more interesting to 
the legal scholars. 
6.3 Perspectives on the rights of the citizen  
 
As people in general began to demand more equality and rights, and as scholarship had 
persistently argued that the law treated people inequitably because of the differences in 
social status, the rights of the people became more and more significant in the scholar-
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ship. The critical legal scholarship of the 1970s placed ever heavier emphasis on the 
rights of the citizen although they had already been important to legal scholarship in the 
1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, however, rights became special arguments with which to 
analyze and criticize the social order.   
   The problem of rights had been crucial to legal scholarship at least since the time 
of legal realism. The realists had argued that rights were mere metaphysics without a 
point of reference in empirical reality. In the 1960s, natural law theorists such as Frede 
Castberg had criticized realism for its lack of interest in rights.
364
 Marxist theory, on the 
other hand, was skeptical of the traditional conception of rights because it saw that their 
purpose was to protect bourgeois society, and it thus focused typically on the materialist 
and ideological aspects of rights.
365
 Rights analysis had been of interest to critical legal 
scholars in the late 1960s
366
 and, by the mid-1970s, Sundby argued that natural law was 
still used to legitimize legal phenomena.
367
 Rights were important to critical legal schol-
arship, not only because of their social significance but also their theoretical interest. 
Realism had sought to extract values from legal scholarship, and natural law theory took 
certain values at face value. Critical scholarship, on the other hand, wanted to expose 
values and policies into an open discussion in jurisprudence.  
   Scandinavian Marxist legal scholars did not develop a comprehensive theory of 
rights although there was a need for it
368
 and there were efforts at doing this else-
where.
369
 The problem of rights, however, was that the traditional concept derived from 
the bourgeois values of the nineteenth century, and it was still presented as natural and 
rational.
370
 For instance, with respect to legitimacy, Marxist legal scholars denied the 
existence of universal categories of legitimacy and emphasized its function in a particu-
lar society.
371
 Critical scholarship concerned the various concepts of rights and their 
practical expressions, seeking to place their considerations in a context in which the 
rights could be examined against their functions and origins. The critical understanding 
was that rights were not universal or metaphysical, but served particular material inter-
ests and purposes.    
   Critical theory on human rights was mostly seen in studies concerning freedom of 
speech and political activity. Critical legal scholars in general became more interested in 
the political suppression of revolutionary activity and the public efforts to tame the radi-
cal political left.
372
 Political rights were naturally of importance to the critical legal 
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scholars because free political activity was a precondition of social and political change 
as well as of their scholarship. Marxist theory stressed the fact that freedom and rights 
mostly supported the contemporary society, and the state therefore often reacted violent-
ly to activities which threatened the existing source of protection. Although the problem 
was a matter of debate, the critical scholars had their theoretical point of view from 
which they observed the state actions.   
   General political rights were also interesting in the 1970s, when the problems of 
human rights especially were brought into the spotlight of legal scholarship. FiB law-
yers were established in Sweden in 1972 to promote freedom of expression and publish-
ing, legal aid for the rights of the people, and anti-imperialism. Göran Bodin and Staffan 
Rylander, who participated in the organization, investigated the limits of the freedom of 
expression, coming to the conclusion that this right was often ambiguous, which led to 
uncertainty and arbitrariness.
373
 Bodin and Rylander studied the gap between law in 
books and law in action in a historical, sociological, and empirical perspective with a 
critical theoretical background. Besides the critical pursuit, they also participated in 
contemporary discussion by focusing much of their criticism to the formulation of the 
new Constitution.
374
 The study was thus both critical and political. It advanced various 
methods in analyzing legal reality and used its findings to point out the need for reform, 
from the critical point of view of course. Critical legal scholarship was moving from the 
analysis of the gap between law in books and law in action to the analysis of the reasons 
for the gap, as well as to analysis of ideology. Critical scholarship thus represented a 
critique of the value-neutrality of the traditional scholarship, and sought to reintroduce 
the question of values to legal scholarship.     
   Scholarship was also directed toward other socially important problems. Critical 
scholars were interested in such things as law concerning labor and housing,
375
 minority 
rights,
376
 and women’s rights.377 Studies on legal aid related to access to justice and 
equal protection of the poor. Studies on political rights concerned mostly reformist po-
litical activity, public opinion-building, radicalism, and freedom of expression, and thus 
related to the political opposition and critical scholarship. Studies on labor law, housing, 
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and minorities concerned people otherwise in a less-privileged social position. Although 
it is impossible to estimate the practical impact of these studies, they contributed more 
or less to the idea of equality and to the construction of welfare legislation. However, it 
was especially the studies on women’s rights which were important because they con-
tributed to the rise of a new branch of legal scholarship. 
6.4 Critical gender studies in law 
 
Feminist criticism of law also began to attract more attraction in the 1970s. The feminist 
movement had arisen in the 1960s, and with the emergence of the sociology of law and 
critical legal scholarship, feminist jurisprudence appeared, focusing on the legal status 
of the women. Critical gender studies in law established itself as an academic discipline 
in Norway in the early 1970s and spread rapidly to the other Nordic Countries.
378
 Its 
theoretical basis was materialism, with the difference that it placed the heaviest empha-
sis on the male dominance of society.
379
 This laid the foundations for scholars interested 
in the status of women to elaborate a theory to analyze the situation in its legal and so-
cial context. The critical feminist movement in law was a part of the critical legal 
movements and Marxist scholarship, and its theories were relatively similar with the 
exception of the main focus. Feminist jurisprudence was thus an expression of the rise 
of the female profession within the alternative establishment.    
   Critical feminist scholars dealt with various legal topics, both theoretical and prac-
tical. For instance, they criticized the Norwegian law on equality because it was built on 
the ideal of equality before law without sufficient account of the actual social situation 
of women. Therefore, they argued, there ought to have been a law against discrimina-
tion against women rather than one on equality between the sexes because the presump-
tion of equality was the biggest hindrance to improvement.
380
 Jes Bjarup, who also criti-
cized Marxist legal scholarship, argued that the feminist scholars had drawn conclusions 
from their theoretical premises and exaggerated the need for radical change.
381
 Since 
feminist legal scholars used the same theoretical basis as the critical legal scholarship, it 
faced the same problems. According to critical gender theory, society was structurally 
biased against women, and thus minimal changes and reforms could not overcome the 
problem, whereas traditional thought emphasized the legislation that protected women. 
The difference was in the mode of perception.   
   The connection between Marxism and feminist jurisprudence was obvious on 
some occasions. For example, Karin Widerberg applied a theory of structuralist Marx-
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ism in exploring the development of the legal and social status of women in Sweden. 
However, she had to revise the theory because, she claimed, structuralism was gender-
neutral and had a male perspective on society. Despite the switch of perspective, her 
arguments reflected critical thought. She argued that in order to maintain the develop-
ment of capitalism, the state had to reproduce hierarchies between the sexes, so that 
women were subordinated both to men and to capitalism. Her conclusions were also 
typical of critical scholarship, focusing on fundamental social change. She noted that 
the formal equality of capitalist society could not produce actual equality. There was 
thus a need to struggle for a society in which politics, not the economy, would deter-
mine the measures of equality, which meant a struggle toward socialism.
382
 The femi-
nist theory of structuralism was also a theory of fundamental criticism of law because, 
according to the theory, the traditional legal system was not able to fulfill its own re-
quirements. Feminist theory also sought fundamental social reform. The theory was 
basically the same as Marxist theory, but instead of capitalist oppression, the emphasis 
was on gender-based oppression, which nonetheless related to the economic structures.  
   Together with the rising interest in the social problems of women and critical gen-
der studies, particular problems, such as rape, for example, were also brought to the 
attention of legal research. Bertil Falconer conducted empirical research on rape and its 
impact on the social status of women.
383
 Carstensen and Larsen, on the other hand, fo-
cused on the ideological and constitutive aspects, arguing that the traditional concept of 
rape as an expression of individual mental problems and sexual frustration could not 
explain rape as a social phenomenon. The problem was rather of a structural kind, relat-
ing to the economic structure of the society and in particular to the power structure of 
the genders.
384
 Structural explanations were popular at the time because they focused on 
factors outside the individual. According to critical thought, social problems originated 
in the social and economic structures, and the fault was in the system.    
   The interest in gender studies in law increased as the 1970s approached its 
close.
385
 Gender studies had a multifaceted program for its methods and purposes. It 
sought to reveal the oppressed status of women in society and to tear down the hierar-
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chies within the legal system. It favored cross-disciplinary research to obtain various 
kinds of social data. It stressed the political nature of scholarship and sought to make it 
openly political, the fundamental purpose being to change the legal system and to 
emancipate women from their legal oppression.
386
 Feminist jurisprudence assumed sys-
tematic oppression, wanted to expose the myth of apolitical research, and sought to 
make scholarship openly political. Just like Marxism, it aimed at emancipating the op-
pressed group from its systemic oppression by changing the system. Ideological and 
structural factors were important for research that emphasized the critical and reformist 
aspect of the movements.   
   Critical gender studies in law were an outcome of the liberalization of women, so-
cial radicalism, and critical scholarship. The interest in the rights of women and the 
gender-related social problems arose everywhere hand in hand with the general interest 
in social oppression and the rights of the underprivileged. Criticism of the social order 
was targeted at the structures of society because, the critics argued, inequality was in-
herent in the structures of modern society and the economy. Critical gender studies, 
along with other projects for specified social problems, were also an expression of the 
social dissatisfaction. The society, and hence the scholarly activity, endeavored to 
achieve better consolidation of rights.  
6.5 General problems of jurisprudence 
 
The 1960s and the 1970s were a time of marked social change, and this was also seen in 
the changes in the nature of legal problems and the new regulation that followed. Alt-
hough a vast amount of new legislation was enacted, the legislator could not grasp every 
new legal problem that came up. Problems in the markets and consumer activity raised 
the need for new methods to deal with them, and legal scholars contemplated various 
questions. Alternative legal scholarship thus flourished in many branches of law, and 
became quite popular by the end of the 1970s. Although much of the alternative schol-
arship was not particularly radical or critical, the following analysis helps us to under-
stand critical legal scholarship in context; the 1970s marked a general change in legal 
scholarship, and the critical scholarship was an extreme cultural expression of the trans-
formation.       
   Alternative analysis of law evolved for nearly two decades, reaching maturity in 
the late 1970s. Stig Jørgensen had already noted by the mid-1960s that the expansion of 
commerce had created new legal problems to deal with, especially concerning equali-
ty.
387
 Many problems of contract law thus interested the legal scholars of the 1970s. 
Carl Martin Roos, for instance, endorsed a semantic interpretation of legal rules in ac-
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cordance with the empirically verifiable facts of the case to make legal decision-making 
more realistic.
388
 Although he was criticized for not being specific enough with his new 
methods of interpretation,
389
 he worked for a theory of interpretation that would suit the 
needs of contemporary society better.
390
 Because of the changed social circumstances, 
legal scholars often considered an interpretation that would go beyond the letter of the 
law and find a point of reference from the actual circumstances.    
   Indeed, the new currents of contract law emphasized the importance of the specific 
circumstances of the case in legal interpretation and legal decision-making. Legal schol-
ars argued that standard contracts should be interpreted against the facts of the case to 
guarantee consumer protection,
391
 and that aberration from a contract ought to be more 
flexible on a case basis.
392
 Besides developing practical methods for realistic interpreta-
tion, scholars also encouraged empirical and politically-oriented research.
393
 In particu-
lar, new legal fields, such as environmental law, provided fruitful topics for alternative 
use of legal sources.
394
 The urge for legal studies taking a stand on controversial topics 
and for realistic argumentation was a general, though not dominating, trend. Radical 
theories, such as Bolding’s described above, were simply extreme presentations of the 
general trend.  
   Marxist legal scholars were not generally bothered by specific problems of con-
tract law because they mostly dealt with general issues of jurisprudence or some other 
more general aspects of law. The Finnish legal scholar Thomas Wilhelmsson, however, 
argued that the general trend to regulate through general clauses transferred power from 
the legislator to the judiciary, which was often very conservative. He therefore endorsed 
studies on the meaning and interpretation of general clauses so that their purposes 
would not be lost in practical cases.
395
 The apparent motive behind the realist and Marx-
ist scholarship was that law was often meant to protect the weaker party in contractual 
relations, but practical solutions diverged from this. Scholarship began to pay more at-
tention to the actual cases and solutions in order to analyze the law in action and to re-
veal the possible deficiencies and inequalities.  
   Scandinavian scholars also criticized the courts, even if they were not their prima-
ry concern. Although Scandinavian legal scholars did not attack on the judiciary in such 
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a radical way as Finnish legal scholars did,
396
 the criticism of inequitable judicial deci-
sion-making and the call for a realistic interpretation referred to the notion that courts 
were not a progressive or reformist force. Bolding, for instance, argued that legal educa-
tion and the fact that judges mostly came from conservative upper class families con-
tributed to this “upper class ideology”. Thus, judicial decision-making was mostly con-
servative and had to be changed to make it more equitable.
397
 Traditional scholars, on 
the other hand, argued that the critics gave a distorted and one-sided image of the courts 
and could not support their claims with evidence. They argued that, contrary to the crit i-
cal arguments, judicial decision-making often favored the poor.
398
 In addition, Carl 
Hamilton wrote that judges often were in contact with the lower social classes.
399
 The 
controversial opinions about the judges reflected the controversies with respect to legal 
scholarship. Critical scholars thought that the judges favored the upper classes and 
could not understand the problems of the lower classes, whereas traditional scholars 
emphasized laws that balanced the problems and the process.   
   Even if the problems regarding the legal process were noted, critical scholars did 
not often study them. An exception was the Danish Henrik Zahle. During the 1970s, he 
had criticized the law of evidence by arguing that legal language masked the true mean-
ing of the concepts and thus prevented ordinary people from understanding law,
400
 and 
that the social ideology and consciousness affected the interpretation of evidence.
401
 In 
1976, he published his voluminous doctoral dissertation on legal evidence, which was 
nearly rejected and in which he sought to neutralize the impact of ideologies on the in-
terpretation of evidence.
402
 In short, Zahle argued that the traditional theory of the law 
of evidence left considerable room for subjective interpretation and evaluation because 
it was based on a calculus of probabilities. To correct the situation, he argued, there 
should be no formal rules concerning either the procedural or material side of the evi-
dence. Rather, the parties to a case should present all the evidence possible without re-
striction, and the case should be decided on the basis of comprehensive evaluation of 
the evidence presented and the behavior of the parties during the whole process.
403
 Alt-
hough Zahle started from the premises of traditional legal scholarship, his theory was a 
                                               
396 In Finland there was indeed a radical attack on the judiciary, as will be seen in the next chapter. Finn-
ish traditional legal scholar Erkki Havansi lamented in a Swedish law review to his Scandinavian col-
leagues about the radical criticism of the courts and the undemocratic manner the reform was progressing. 
(Erkki Havansi, Finlands domstolar inför omvälvning? SvJT 1973, 63–78.)    
397 Per Olof Bolding, Domarens sociala tillhörighet, SvJT 1974, 459–473.  
398 Bertil Adèll, Ej mindre den fattige än den rike, SvJT 1973, 331–340.  
399 Carl Hamilton, Domarkårens isolering ─ en enkät, SvJT 1973, 525–528.  
400 Henrik Zahle, Om processuel forkyndelse, Juristen 1973, 307–308.  
401 Zahle 1975, supra n. 172 at 250.  
402 Zahle 2010, supra n. 105 at 77–78. Zahle was an openly leftist legal scholar and held a course on pro-
cedural law, the methods of which have been described as an alternative. (Id. at 62, 73–74.)     
403 Henrik Zahle, Om det juridiske bevis (København: Juristforbundets Forlag 1976), esp. at 1–4, 126, 
138–139, 152–153, 160–161, 230, 244–247, 299–304, 396–401, 409–445, 485–491, 573–586, 641–648, 
691–693. It is very difficult to explain the theory briefly because it is very complicated and covers nearly 
eight hundred pages, and, furthermore, because in order to fully understand it one would have to know a 
lot about the Scandinavian law of evidence in the 1970s. In any event, his purpose was to elaborate a 
theory on the evaluation of evidence which would minimize the room for subjective interpretations.   
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kind of fundamental criticism since he criticized the whole basis of the law of evidence 
and sought to replace it with an alternative system. He noted that ideologies and subjec-
tive values had a significant effect on law, but differed from the general trend of critical 
scholarship by trying to take ideology out from the legal process instead of making it 
open. 
   In a certain sense, Zahle was a moderate fact skeptic
404
 because he criticized the 
traditional notion of the neutral observation of facts. He thought that the traditional 
methods of evaluating facts were incapable of making objective observations and 
sought to elaborate a theory that could overcome the problems of these methods. How-
ever, Bolding criticized his theory for being presumptive and ambiguous and also lead-
ing exactly to the same problems it tried to avoid.
405
 Criticism was always easy, but 
constructing alternative theories was not. Nevertheless, Zahle’s fact skepticism reflected 
the general notion that facts were always related to values, and his critical theory sought 
to avoid this problem.    
   The problem of facts and values became apparent on several occasions concerning 
practical legal problems. A problem arose upon a proposition for a foundation for em-
ployees to secure better wages. Stig Strömholm argued that the proposition violated the 
fundamental principles of Swedish law to the extent that if the law was to be enacted, it 
was to be done in accordance with the constitutional order.
406
 Other legal scholars did 
not like Strömholm’s formalist interpretation. Joachim Nelhans opined that 
Strömholm’s interpretation reflected a conservative world view, and argued that the 
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with contemporary society and thus the 
employee foundation was legal.
407
 Marxist legal scholar Per Eklund also criticized 
Strömholm for his conservative natural law theory, arguing that the problem revealed 
how the economic system determined the substance of the law.
408
 Fritz Kaijser, on the 
other hand, supported Strömholm’s view and noted that there were serious legal prob-
lems in this regard, even if politically he agreed with Eklund.
409
   
                                               
404 “Fact skepticism” was another strand of critique of judicial decision-making by the American legal 
realism. The other was “rule skepticism”. According to the first, the facts of a case were uncertain to the 
extent that they could be construed in various ways in order to reach a desirable decision. Despite how 
certain the legal rules were, the result was thus always uncertain. (See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Law and the 
Modern Mind (London: Stevens & Sons 1949), viii–ix.) Zahle did not approve extreme fact skepticism 
because he thought that there were certain rules that had to be followed in deciding the facts. (Zahle 1976, 
supra n. 403 at 64–65.)  
405 Per Olof Bolding, Bevisprövning utan sannonlikhetuppskattning? TfR 1978, 535–538. In addition, 
Zahle labelled Eckhoff, Ekelöf, and Bolding as the representatives of the Swedish-Norwegian theory of 
law of evidence that was, in his view, the dominant theory, and to which his theory was an alternative. 
(Zahle 1976, supra n. 403 at 230, 485, 648.) Bolding, on the other hand, did not think that this was true 
because there were differences in the theories of the three scholars. (Bolding 1978, id. at 530.)  
406 Stig Strömholm, Förslaget om s.k. löntagarfonder i rättslig belysning, SvJT 1976, 468. According to 
Strömholm, general rules of expropriation and taxation did not apply to this situation. Therefore the ques-
tion was of fundamental principles of law implicitly protected by the Constitution.  
407 Joachim Nelhans, De Meidnerska löntagarfonderna i Strömholms rättsliga belysning, SvJT 1976, 649.  
408 Per Eklund, Juridiken som samhälleligt styrmedel, SvJT 1976, 586–588, 594.  
409 Fritz Kaijser, Om de s.k. löntagarfondernas grundlagsenlighet ─ ett genmäle, SvJT 1976, 650–651, 
654–656.  
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   Various problems arose in this brief debate. Strömholm did not take a stand on the 
relation between law and power. He regarded the protection of private property as of 
such importance for the legal system that it was to be constitutionally protected. Nel-
hans, on the other hand, emphasized different aspects. For him, the rights of the workers 
in a joint stock company were equal to those of the stock holders and had to be protect-
ed too. From the Marxist perspective of Eklund, the problem represented the struggle 
between social, political, and economic power. He saw that law was an outcome of the 
struggle and so was legal scholarship. Critical legal scholars stressed the connection 
between law and politics and the fact that scholars often reproduced the status quo if 
they were not aware of the political element in law and legal scholarship. The funda-
mental differences in interpretation between the critical and traditional followed the 
fundamental differences in perceiving the problems.   
   For alternative scholarship, the relationship between law and personal biases was 
of fundamental importance. Torstein Eckhoff, who could be defined as a sociological 
scholar and a neo-realist, noted that it was obvious that personal biases affected judicial 
decision-making and legal scholarship but it was difficult to specify the degree and na-
ture of the impact.
410
 Ole Krarup presented a somewhat more radical tone in his criti-
cism of judicial decision-making, arguing that the courts could often reach their deci-
sion arbitrarily and then present it in rational terms. The extra-legal reasons behind the 
decision were camouflaged by legal rhetoric and the decision was simply written in 
formalist terms to appear neutral and legally sound.
411
 Since Krarup’s critique was 
based on an actual case where he was one of the representatives of the losing side,
412
 it 
is quite easy to understand his frustration. Nevertheless, the critical opinion was that 
judicial decision-making was mostly personal and the traditional methods permitted the 
courts to hide the real motives of a decision behind the legal language. Although many 
legal scholars held realist notions on the issue, radical criticism was rare.   
   The problem of the nature of law and legal scholarship remained significant, and 
in the late 1970s, several efforts to elaborate comprehensive conceptions of it were 
made. In general, scholars were interested in alternatives to traditional scholarship so 
that legal studies could contribute to the general policy-making.
413
 More theoretical 
analyses were also popular. Lauridsen sought to construct a general doctrine of juris-
prudence by reforming the tradition,
414
 and Sundby and Eckhoff constructed a systemic 
                                               
410 Eckhoff 1976, supra n. 349 at 18, 26–27, 47–49, 56–57.  
411 Ole Krarup, Om retlige og begreber retsgrundsætninger, Juristen og økonomi 1979, 461–465, 475.  
412 The article considered the Christiania Case of 1978, which concerned the status of the free town of 
Christiania in Copenhagen, which had been founded in the early 1970s as a free town area. Krarup was 
one of the representatives of Christiania in the case, in which the Danish Supreme Court eventually enti-
tled the state to alter the conditions it had provided for the city in 1971. However, the state did not intrude 
in the city administration, probably because of the public support for the town, and has let the city flour-
ish since.   
413 Staffan Westerlund, Rättsvetenskap inom tvärvetenskaplig forskning, TfR 1976, 117–124.  
414 Preben Stuer Lauridsen, Retslæren (København: Akademisk forlag 1977). In a critical review of the 
book, Jareborg argued that Lauridsen did not give an accurate account of previous legal theory, was am-
biguous with his words and concepts, concentrated on Danish discussion, neglected many theories of law, 
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theory, according to which law was a part of the social system.
415
 In 1977, Danish soci-
ological legal scholar Jørgen Dalberg-Larsen published his massive study Retsviden-
skaben som samfundsvidenskab (Legal Scholarship as a Social Science), in which he 
analyzed the efforts to bring jurisprudence closer to social science during the previous 
two hundred years and concluded with the recent debates on the problem. According to 
him, changes in society, the economy, politics, and scholarship caused new kinds of 
legal problems and thus new needs for legal scholarship, which therefore had to partici-
pate in political discourse, and yet retain its neutral, even scientific nature. Thus, in or-
der to respond to contemporary problems but remain neutral and rational at the same 
time, legal scholarship had to adopt the methods of social science without however 
completely abandoning traditional doctrinal analysis.
416
   
   Dalberg-Larsen’s analysis was a synthesis and combination of the recent, and old-
er, efforts to integrate social science into legal scholarship and make it more realistic. 
He conducted a thorough examination on the issue but did not bring much new insight 
to it. Strömholm thus criticized him for not being constructive and argued that social 
sciences were only rarely useful to legal scholarship.
417
 The situation had not changed 
much during the decade of debates. There were still those who argued that elements of 
social science had to be included in legal scholarship in order to make it correspond 
with reality and to make it more “scientific”. Then there were those who thought that 
legal analysis was mostly doctrinal and should not be mixed with politics or social sci-
ence because otherwise the scholarship would lose its rationality. According to the tra-
ditional view, the social sciences were only of very limited use to legal scholarship. 
Traditional and alternative legal scholars perceived legal problems differently and thus 
provided different answers to them. 
6.6 The rules-principles distinction 
 
During the debates on the nature and methods of legal scholarship, theoretical problems 
with practical relevance were also discussed. One of these was the construction of a 
legal rule and its specific meaning in actual situations. This is important from a modern 
perspective because the origins of the distinction between legal rules and principles in 
Scandinavian legal scholarship can be seen in it. Scandinavian legal scholars naturally 
followed international trends, but they adapted the literature to their context and shaped 
                                                                                                                                         
and ignored several interesting problems. (Nils Jareborg, Litteratur [Retslæren], TfR 1979, 333–340.) 
Lauridsen replied that Jareborg had misunderstood his points. (Preben Stuer Lauridsen, Kommentar til en 
anmeldelse af “Retslæren”, TfR 1979, 598–603.)   
415 Torstein Eckhoff & Nils Kristian Sundby, Rettssystemer: Systemteoretisk innføring i rettsfilosofien 
(Oslo: Tanum-Norli 1976).   
416 Jørgen Dalberg-Larsen, Retsvidenskaben som samfundsvidenskab: Et retsteoretisk tema i historisk og 
aktuel belysning (København: Juristforbundets forlag 1977), esp. at 21–27, 476–477, 491–503, 534–549.  
417 Stig Strömholm, Hur många rättsvetenskaper finns det? TfR 1978, 625, 644, 646, 653.  
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the theories to fit their needs. The problem thus illuminates several important aspects of 
the alternative legal scholarship of the 1970s.  
   As noted, the Danish legal philosopher Alf Ross was considered the most influen-
tial legal theorist in the 1970s. Regarding the conception of legal rules, too, it was 
Ross’s semantic-logical analysis of the structure of legal norms418 that the young legal 
scholars attacked. The young Norwegian legal scholars Nils Kristian Sundby and Ole 
Rømer Sandberg were not pleased with Ross’s deontic analysis of norms, arguing that 
he had been unable to construct a concept of legal rules which was realistic and defini-
tive in various situations.
419
 Alternative legal scholars abhorred logic that disregarded 
actual circumstances and focused on the normative aspects of legal rules. Even though 
Sandberg’s and Sundby’s analysis was philosophical, it nonetheless obviously sought to 
place legal rules in a more social context.   
   The interest in legal sociology contributed to the need to create a concept of the 
legal rule that would fit into multi-disciplinary research and the social reality. Thus, 
there were problems regarding rules, their application in adjudication, and their explana-
tion in legal research. Sundby had developed his conception of norm in 1974. He also 
elaborated a distinction between legal rules and principles which he then called “guiding 
standards” (retningslinjer).420 The construction of the concept of legal rule and its par-
ticular meaning in actual cases thus meant the beginning of the discourse on legal rules 
and principles and their significance in judicial decision-making.
421
 The problem related 
to the debates on legal reasoning and the use of arguments on facts and values.   
                                               
418 Alf Ross, Directives and Norms (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1968).   
419 Ole Rømer Sandberg & Nils Kristian Sundby, Språk og direktiver, TfR 1970, 384–439; Ole Rømer 
Sandberg & Nils Kristian Sundby, Direktiver og logikk, TfR 1971, 17–68. Lauridsen criticized the criti-
cism of Sandberg and Sundby. (Preben Stuer Lauridsen, Kommentarer til et normbergeb, TfR 1972, 99–
111.) 
420 The word principle was not originally applied because it was used in so many different connections. 
Therefore, Sundby used the Norwegian word retningslinje to describe principles in legal decision-making. 
In an English article, Eckhoff used the term guiding standard which was, according to him, the most ap-
propriate English translation for retningslinje or German Richtlinie. (Torstein Eckhoff, Guiding Standards 
in Legal Reasoning, 29 Current Legal Problems 205, 206–207 (1976).) In Finland, the term “guiding 
standard” was first translated as oikeusohje (Timo Konstari, Harkintavallan väärinkäytöstä: Tutkimus 
tarkoitussidonnaisuudesta hallintoviranomaisten harkintavallan rajoitusperiaatteena (Helsinki: Suomalai-
nen lakimiesyhdistys 1979), 68), and later as suuntaviiva (Aulis Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria (Juva: 
WSOY 1989), 79). Eriksson used the Swedish terms riktlinje and princip. (Lars D. Eriksson, Om olika 
argumentationsmodeller, JFT 1979, 35–37.) Since then, however, the word principle (periaate) has be-
come the normal term.   
421 The discussion on legal principles is commonly linked to the names of Ronald Dworkin and Robert 
Alexy. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was particularly Dworkin whose literature stimulated the 
discussion in the Nordic Countries, and the scholars commented upon his work while elaborating their 
ideas on legal principles. Robert Alexy, a German, entered the stage later, but in Germany there seem to 
be deeper roots for the discussion on principles in judicial decision-making. The pioneer was Josef Esser, 
whose first contribution to the subject was probably his book of 1956 (Josef Esser, Grundsatz und Norm 
in der richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts (Tübingen 1956).) This, however, is not within our am-
bit. Oddly enough, there seems to be no reference to Esser in Scandinavian legal literature on principles in 
the 1970s, although there were references to him in other connections.  
   This raises the interesting question of where the most significant influences to Scandinavian legal 
scholarship came from. It seems that during the first two postwar decades, influences came mostly, in 
addition to Scandinavian literature, from the United States and England, and since the mid-sixties Germa-
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   The problem of rules and standards related to the nature of judicial decision-
making. Sundby argued that there were rules that gave the solution for a legal problem 
directly, and there were also guiding standards which merely indicated the factors which 
were essential in deciding the case and provided arguments for the decision. A conflict 
between rules was decided by prioritizing them, whereas a conflict between guiding 
standards was decided by weighing the arguments the standards invoked.
422
 Eckhoff 
also emphasized the role of the guiding standards, writing that a judicial decision could 
always be made to appear as a logical deduction, even if it in fact was arbitrarily made. 
Therefore, the concept of guiding standards could help in understanding the particular 
factors in legal reasoning.
423
 Sundby and Eckhoff used the concept of guiding standards 
in pointing out the inability of rules to provide a definite solution in a particular case 
and the inevitability of interpretation and evaluation. To them, guiding standards were 
legal standards which laid out the relevant factors of a case and the arguments pertain-
ing thereto. The standards were thus theoretical gates through which one could bring 
social data into legal arguments while keeping their nature legal. 
   The need for the concept of guiding standards divided legal scholars. Lauridsen 
argued that the distinction was inconsistent and did not bring much new to the already-
existing distinction between clear rules and rules that were open to interpretation.
424
 
Sundby replied that guiding standards pointed out the facts which were relevant in 
reaching a decision, and vague rules merely completed them.
425
 Nils Jareborg, on the 
other hand, argued that guiding standards were unclear and useless in practical reason-
ing,
426
 to which Eckhoff replied that they were useful because they pointed out relevant 
facts and values which otherwise would have been missed.
427
 It is obvious that more 
                                                                                                                                         
ny made some kind of “come-back” in Scandinavian legal literature, although it never acquired the signif-
icant position it had had before the War. This has also been Strömholm's view. He writes that there was 
nothing particularly new in German legal scholarship during the first twenty years after the War, and the 
interest seems to have arisen when German scholarship reoriented itself theoretically. (Stig Strömholm, 
Anmälan [Rechtsystem und Rechtsdogmatik], SvJT 1975, 295–296.) One should not, of course, exagger-
ate or downplay the significance of any particular country, because different scholars were influenced by 
different sources. There clearly was a shift in influence, but it was not complete.  
   In any event, it seems that the modern theory of principles in legal decision-making has two 
branched roots. The origins of the Dworkinian theory are in the American jurisprudence of the 1950s and 
1960s. On the other hand, there is the German theory which also has its origins in the 1950s. These two 
branches then collided in the 1970s and 1980s. The purpose here is not to trace the origins of the theories 
of legal principles, however, but to analyze the meaning and purpose of the principles issue for the legal 
debates of the 1970s. In addition, the theme was brought up in Norway by Ragnar Knoph in 1939 (Ragnar 
Knoph, Rettslige standarder: Særlig grunnlovens § 97 (Oslo: Grøndahl & Søn 1939)), which was widely 
read in Scandinavia.     
422 Sundby 1974, supra n. 108 at 190–306, esp. at 197–204, 254–262, 273–274, 285–287. Eckhoff had 
brought up problems regarding guiding standards in judicial decision-making in 1971 without, however, 
any detailed analysis. (Eckhoff 1971, supra n. 91 at 16, 24–25.)   
423 Eckhoff 1976, supra n. 420 at 205–208, 214–218. Sundby and Eckhoff stressed guiding standards in 
their systemic theory of law. (Eckhoff & Sundby 1976, supra n. 415 at 128–156.)  
424 Preben Stuer Lauridsen, Om jus og normer, TfR 1978, 125–128.  
425 Nils Kristian Sundby, Sondringen mellom regler og retningslinjer ─ en replikk, TfR 1978, 140–145, n. 
7.  
426 Nils Jareborg, Regler och riktlinjer, TfR 1979, 387–388, 394–395.  
427 Torstein Eckhoff, Retningslinjer og “tumregler”, TfR 1980, 152–163.  
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traditional scholars were interested in definite concepts and clear theories, whereas al-
ternative scholars were interested in the relationship between argumentation, interpreta-
tion, and social circumstances. Since guiding standards emphasized the circumstances 
of a particular case, they interested legal scholars who stressed the role of values and 
policies in judicial decision-making.   
   Guiding standards were both a way of pointing out how personal biases did in fact 
influence legal reasoning and a method of getting policy considerations into legal argu-
mentation in a controlled and orderly fashion. Aubert, for instance, brought a Marxist 
perspective to the issue, arguing that the influence of values entered law through legal 
standards. In criminal law adjudication, values played a role when, for example, a judge 
had to decide whether the accused posed a threat of forthcoming criminal behavior, and 
thus criminal adjudication was not simply deductive logic. In addition, he wrote, there 
were many open standards in law, such as “the benefit of a child”, which all left room 
for interpretation and values.
428
 Furthermore, Sundby had endorsed thorough analyses 
of the legal system in order to change it
429
 and an analysis of the still relevant natural 
law in contemporary law,
430
 and was also actively involved in critical legal scholar-
ship.
431
 Guiding standards thus suited his efforts to make legal scholarship more realis-
tic and social well without however transforming it into social science or politics.   
   The distinction between rules and principles emerged at a time when strict legal 
positivism was criticized and the need for a social theory of law was serious. The dis-
tinction thus corresponded with the idea of constructing the concept of a norm in a way 
that would be accordant with the functions of law in society. Principles were a way to 
avoid strict legal positivism and natural law, and brought rationality into legal reason-
ing. As the awareness of discretion in judicial decision-making had increased, it became 
necessary to develop a theory that would bring order into legal reasoning. Furthermore, 
principles made it possible to bring social data and policy considerations into law 
through legal discourse while keeping the discourse “legal.” With principles, one could 
criticize judicial decision-making, strict legal positivism, and natural law without how-
ever trashing law and legal scholarship from a purely subjective perspective.  
6.7 Marxist legal scholarship in the late 1970s 
 
During the 1970s, Marxist legal scholarship had developed into a lively literature, and a 
law journal was founded to publish Marxist legal literature. The scholarship, however, 
was not very innovative, mainly simply analyzing legal phenomena from a materialistic 
perspective and pointing out the connection between the economic system and the law. 
                                               
428 Aubert 1976, supra n. 178 at 20–22.  
429 Sundby 1973, supra n. 109 at 714–715. 
430 Sundby 1975, supra n. 85 at 343–344, 353–354. 
431 Sundby 1976, supra n. 38 at 9–17.  
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Not surprisingly, then, Lauridsen criticized Marxist legal scholarship for being merely a 
theory of law and not providing tools for analyzing fundamental legal concepts, nor 
being capable of providing the means of knowing what was valid law or how legal 
problems ought to be solved.
432
 Furthermore, as we saw, the 1970s was in general a turn 
towards more conservative social politics. The combination of scholarship and politics 
had always been problematic, and the change in the times only made the situation hard-
er.
433
 Marxist legal scholars had to reorient their scholarship to find more relevance in 
the academic and practical world. Many of the young critical legal scholars who wrote 
articles in the early 1970s completed doctorates later in the decade, and their theoretical 
orientation often provided a background for the more comprehensive studies. Moreover, 
Marxism had become a jurisprudential school, which meant that its proponents talked 
more about its theories and concepts. The late 1970s thus meant a significant develop-
ment for Marxist legal scholarship.   
   Dag Victor was one of the first to contemplate the potential of Marxism in legal 
scholarship. His doctoral dissertation from 1977 dealt with the old problem of whether 
legal scholarship could be regarded as science. According to him, law was a system 
within the social system. The legal system was also, first, a structure consisting of vari-
ous sub-structures, such as social ideology, language, and speech, and second, both an 
ideological and social system. Law was indeterminate, but because of the structural 
connections legal rationality was always system-bound. Thus, social ideology was more 
important than individual ideology, and legal scholars had to be aware of the social ide-
ology in order to make legal scholarship more “scientific”.434 Victor was distancing 
himself from orthodox, materialist Marxism and was moving toward a structural, sys-
temic theory. The criticism of the possibility of scientific objectivity and the emphasis 
on the connection between ideology and law was evident. Victor’s structuralist theory 
was an effort to combine Marxist theory of law with the recent legal debates and to 
adapt it to a theory of law and legal scholarship.  
   The theory brought up interesting questions on the nature of legal scholarship and 
Marxist legal scholarship. Traditional scholars did not pay much attention to the 
book.
435
 Marxist scholars, however, were more interested in it, and their responses illu-
minate the controversies within the school. Peter Blume criticized Victor for bourgeois 
legal scholarship, noting that Victor had not considered dialectical analysis of the de-
velopment of legal scholarship, had an idealistic conception of scholarship, and had 
detached his theory from social reality.
436
 Victor replied that Marxism was not simply 
materialism, and because there was no uniform basis for it, there was no point in trying 
to create one interpretation but rather to construct various interpretations. Furthermore, 
Victor argued, the theory explained false consciousness, covered the historical context 
                                               
432 Lauridsen 1977, supra n. 414 at 110–112. 
433 See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text.     
434 Dag Victor, Rättssystem och vetenskap: Studier kring en analysmodell för ideologiska system (Stock-
holm: P.A. Norstedt & Söners förlag 1977), esp. at 13–17, 102–126, 194–195, 203–232, 261–267.  
435 Tore Strömberg, Litteratur [Rättssystem och vetenskap], SvJT 1978, 135–138.   
436 Peter Blume, Retsvidenskabens problematik, Retfærd 8/1978, 100–104.   
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of legal phenomena, analyzed the reciprocity between the economy and law, was neutral 
with respect to the models of interpretation, and was aware of the difference between 
perception and analysis.
437
 Victor had diverged from economic determinism and sought 
to place the theory into a more complicated framework, but the more orthodox Marxists 
thought that he was giving in to the traditional legal scholarship. The time had come to 
specify the premises of Marxist theory, since it had been criticized for its economic de-
terminism and for turning legal scholarship into ideology. Critical legal scholars were 
aware of the deficiencies of their theories, and began to develop them further. Marxism 
as such was not yet out of fashion; it was just to be modernized.  
   Sociology of law was also a context in which Marxist theory had significance. The 
Swedish Håkan Hydén conducted a thorough analysis of the social functions of law 
from a Marxist perspective in his doctoral dissertation, Rättens samhälleliga funktioner 
(The Social Functions of Law). He also began from the premise that law was in an ele-
mentary relation to society. The purpose of law was to mediate the fundamental func-
tions of society, namely, production, distribution, and consumption, as well as the prac-
tices which executed the fundamental functions, meaning the economy, politics, ideolo-
gy, and scholarship. Thus, law reproduced the fundamental social functions and made 
them seem natural. It also had an independent function, but this was preconditioned by 
the fundamental functions.
438
 Hydén relied heavily on Althusserian theory, representing 
thus a structuralist interpretation of Marxism. Although economic factors were empha-
sized, they and law existed within a complicated system of social structures. The theory 
was somewhere between legal sociology and theory, and involved many contemporary 
legal topics.   
   In the pursuit of a vital critical theory of law, critical scholars became more inter-
ested in the relevance of Marxist theory to modern law and legal scholarship. The Swe-
dish scholar Anders Fogelklou noted that Marxism could be merely used in partial criti-
cism of specific branches of law.
439
 The Finnish scholar Markku Kivinen criticized Fo-
gelklou’s analysis because the relations between the rule of law and the form of law on 
the one hand, and between historical materialism and criticism of political economy on 
the other, were lost. Hence the meaning of criticism was also lost.
440
 In the late 1970s, 
Marxist legal scholars began to debate the potentiality and methods of critical theory. 
Since Marx himself never wrote a specific theory of law, the construction of such a the-
ory from his voluminous literature was difficult and required interpretation.  
   In a comprehensive treatise on various forms of Marxist theory, Fogelklou ana-
lyzed the critical potentiality of Marxism and its possible consequences. After examin-
ing the theories of Pashukanis, Hegel, and Marx, he noted that the theory was relatively 
ambiguous as to the ways the revolutionary utopia was to be achieved. Marxism was 
                                               
437 Dag Victor, Kommentarer i anslutning til en anmälan, Retfærd 8/1978, 109–116, 122.   
438 Håkan Hydén, Rättens samhälleliga funktioner (Lund: Studentlitteratur 1978), esp. at 16–32, 83–88, 
120–122, 127–134, 195–202, 214–217, 235, 364–379.  
439 Anders Fogelklou, Marx och rättsteorin, Retfærd 7/1978, 6–28.  
440 Markku Kivinen, Vad handlar Wajdas film om? Randanmärkningar till Fogelklous artikel i Retfærd 
nr. 7, Retfærd 8/1978, 94–98.  
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skeptical of changes through law, and thus its revolutionary potential was meager.
441
 
Fogelklou’s interpretation was appreciated in general, although it was noted that he did 
not pay attention to the difference between political and theoretical aspects of the theo-
ries.
442
 The purpose was to contribute to the contemporary efforts at sorting out the rel-
evance of Marxist theory to modern jurisprudence by analyzing it and its interpretations 
in detail. The intention was obviously to understand the various forms of Marxist juris-
prudence and to contribute to the understanding of the basis of critical theory.     
   Despite the rigorous examination, Fogelklou’s contribution to critical scholarship 
was rather in the fact that it exposed the differences between varying interpretations. 
Three young Finnish critical legal scholars, Eero Backman, Markku Kivinen, and Juha 
Pöyhönen, argued that, despite the respectful work, the book was full of misinterpreta-
tions and flaws. They argued that Fogelklou was ambiguous with his concepts, neglect-
ed several relevant problems, and did not paid due attention to the actual meaning of 
Marx’s writings.443 As the theorizing about Marx went further, differences between the 
scholars became more evident. Scholars disagreed on the interpretations, depending on 
their reading and their scholarly ambitions. Finnish scholars were more optimistic on 
the potentiality of Marxist and Soviet theory than their Scandinavian colleagues. Never-
theless, scholars did not want to reduce Marxism to economic determinism or total crit i-
cism, but wanted to sort out its particular meanings and usability in constructing a criti-
cal legal theory.    
   The dialogue between traditional and Marxist legal scholarship also became more 
serious when the critical scholars began to explicate their theoretical foundations. Tor-
ben Wanscher elaborated a theory of Marxism, which focused on the various aspects of 
society. According to him, it was important to understand the social totality that came 
into being through the dialectics of the history of social conflicts. Since a scholar was 
both a product of and an actor within the society, and law was partially subjected to and 
relatively autonomous of the social totality, it was important to study the aspects of the 
functions of law within the various social sectors and to criticize the difference between 
the ideal and the real.
444
 Here, too, the purpose was to point out the nuances of critical 
theory and the fact that one should not focus simply on economic repression. Reflecting 
the retreat from orthodox Marxism and determinism, many scholars began to view law 
as an outcome of the dialectical history of class conflict, not just a tool of oppression.  
   Class conflict was in any case a major part of Marxist legal theory. It was also cen-
tral to Wanscher’s historical study on the freedom of assembly of organized workers in 
Denmark in the 1870s. Wanscher sought to indicate that the freedom of assembly was 
restricted beyond the constitutional boundaries because of political motives, and that the 
courts had legitimized this practice. Class conflict was thus an essential aspect in defin-
                                               
441 Anders Fogelklou, Den orättfärdiga rätten: En studie över Hegels rättfärdigande och marxismens kritik 
av den moderna rättsordningen (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söners förlag 1978).   
442 Daniel Tarschys, Litteratur [Den orättfärdiga rätten] SvJT 1978, 694–696.  
443 Eero Backman, Markku Kivinen, Juha Pöyhönen, Objektiv Marx-tolkning? Retfærd 11/1979, 94–108. 
444 Torben Wanscher, Marxistisk videnskab som aspektvidenskab, Retfærd 7/1978, 29–38. 
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ing the limits of fundamental rights.
445
 The point was the historical dimension of the 
dialectics of the class conflict in relation to law. The critical scholars thought that the 
gap between law in books and law in action followed from the class conflict and was 
manifested in the actions of the public authorities. Through its various applications, 
Marxist legal scholarship sought to point out the problems and biases of law and its ide-
ological and social functions.  
   Although Marxism was mostly of interest to the Marxists themselves, scholars 
outside the school also criticized it. In his alternative interpretation of Scandinavian 
legal theory,
446
 Jacob Sundberg criticized the critical enterprise for being a scholarship 
of power and lacking a concept of law. He argued that Marxism was ideological schol-
arship, falling into the same failure it criticized traditional legal scholarship for.
447
 Alt-
hough Dalberg-Larsen argued that there were many differences between Soviet and 
Western Marxist legal theory,
448
 Sundberg’s criticism indicated that the emphasis on 
class struggle and the absolutist conception of “just” society often led Marxist scholars 
to ignore the fact that in the criticism of the ideological function of traditional law they 
missed the other side of the coin. Critical legal scholarship was critical by definition, 
and it was much more difficult to construct an alternative theory of law that could over-
come the problem of values.    
   Criticism was at the heart of Marxist legal scholarship, but at the end of the 1970s 
it had been interpreted and developed in various directions. Marxist legal literature was 
expanding, the pages of Retfærd were filled with articles, and scholars were using it as a 
basis of their theories in more comprehensive studies. Nevertheless, there was no 
unique or even a systematic theory of Marxist jurisprudence. At the end of the decade, 
however, the Finnish legal scholar Lars D. Eriksson was finishing his theory, which also 
held that the relationship between law and productive relations was many-sided and 
complex, but that ideology always imposed boundaries on law.
449
 In 1980, he published 
his doctoral dissertation Marxistisk teori och rättsvetenskap (Marxist Theory and Legal 
Scholarship) which consisted of his thirteen articles published in 1966–1979 and a con-
clusion summarizing his arguments. In short, his theory emphasized the historical and 
sociological aspect of a particular legal system and the difference between the real and 
                                               
445 Torben Wanscher, Forsamlingsfriheden og “fælledslaget”: Studier til belysning af statens fastlæggelse 
af grænserne for arbejderbevægelsens forsamlingsfrihed 1872─1874 (Århus: Modtryk 1979), esp. at 5–9, 
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446 According to Dalberg-Larsen, contemporary Scandinavian legal theory revolved around the concepts 
of legal realism and analytical philosophy, but Sundberg distanced himself from these notions in many 
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447 Jacob W.F. Sunberg, fr. Eddan t. Ekelöf: Repetitorium om rättskällor i norden (Malmö: Studentlittera-
tur/Akademisk förlag 1978), 191–285, esp.at 194–198, 224–227, 258, 268–271.   
448 Dalberg-Larsen 1979, supra n. 446 at 488.  
449 Lars D. Eriksson, Utkast till en marxistisk jurisprudens, Retfærd 11/1979, 40–54. Eriksson’s theory 
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the possible. This criticism revealed the ideological aspects of law and breaches be-
tween the ideal and the real, and thus provided an opportunity for reform.
450
 According 
to critical legal scholarship, nothing was to be taken at face value, but everything was to 
be reflected against its context and the origins and functions were always essential. 
Thus, although the theories had become more numerous and nuanced, the basic argu-
ments of critical legal scholarship had not changed much during the decade.   
   Our story of Scandinavian critical legal scholarship conveniently ends here. Marx-
ist legal scholarship had begun at the early 1970s with a few articles and enthusiastic 
criticism without a definite theoretical basis, and at the beginning of the 1980s it had a 
systematic explanation for an alternative legal theory. Not everybody was, of course, 
straightforwardly pleased with Eriksson’s insights,451 and Marxist scholarship contin-
ued.
452
 Marxist legal scholarship developed from a marginal group into an academic 
bloc, but because of the lack of organization and political practicability, and because the 
critical and leftist thinking lost their momentum, it eventually began to fade as the 
1980s progressed.  
   Just as in the United States, Scandinavian legal scholars of the 1970s worked to 
find alternative ways to deal with the problems the new times had brought. This encour-
aged more cross-disciplinary research and alternative theories, the aim being to acquire 
a realistic and comprehensive image of law in society. Responses to the changed cir-
cumstances varied, but critical legal scholarship, CLS in the United States and Marxist 
jurisprudence in Scandinavia, were the most radical responses. Not only did they reflect 
the changes in society and scholarship, but also radical leftist thought and the academic 
power struggle. Various forms of cross-disciplinary research, an emphasis on flexible 
argumentation, and the elaboration of principles were reflections of the larger transfor-
mation of legal scholarship, and the critical legal scholarship was the most extreme, and 
most culturally bound and politically oriented new current in jurisprudence. Critical 
legal scholarship was an extreme manifestation of alternative legal scholarship, repre-
senting the most radical aspect of academic legal scholarship.   
7 Conclusions 
7.1 A historical perspective on critical legal scholarship 
 
Now that the most essential aspects of the Scandinavian critical legal scholarship have 
been examined, it is time to summarize them and place them in a historical perspective. 
                                               
450 Lars D. Eriksson, Marxistisk teori och rättsvetenskap (Helsinki: Juridiska föreningen i Finland 1980).   
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As noted in the previous chapter, scholars on the history of CLS have stressed one as-
pect over another without providing a thorough account of the history. CLS was a reac-
tion to the fact that the postwar jurisprudence, whether traditional or alternative, formal-
ist or realist, did not focus on the analysis of the fundamental basis of law and legal 
scholarship or on the relationship between values and policies and law. It was also a 
response to the dramatic changes in scholarship, society, and culture. Thus, it was a cul-
tural movement. In the following analysis, I will apply the same approach to the Scan-
dinavian critical legal scholarship as was used regarding CLS, pointing out that at the 
fundamental level these two movements were similar kinds of cultural reactions to law 
and scholarship.   
   Alternative legal scholarship arose slowly in the 1950s and 1960s. At first, it was 
mostly sociology of law, intended to analyze the social functions of law. Alternative 
criminology also emerged, investigating crime as a social phenomenon and focusing on 
the functions of the criminal system. By the mid-1960s, alternative legal scholarship 
had an established position within the academic legal profession. Furthermore, im-
portant social problems such as industrial democracy and expropriation and their legal 
regulations were widely debated. Those who endorsed a change often advanced socio-
logical and value-based argumentation. Alternative legal scholarship in the first place 
was thus socially oriented jurisprudence which sought to understand the functions and 
effects of law and to provide information for reform.  
   The changes in legal scholarship and the rise of the alternative schools were con-
sequences of the changes in scholarship and society. Postwar scholarship was marked 
by the interest in sociology and cross-disciplinary research. Many of the leading figures 
of Scandinavian alternative legal scholarship, such as Vilhem Aubert and Thomas 
Mathiesen, studied in the United States and acquired their theoretical basis there. The 
new methodologies suited the needs of society to acquire more accurate data to deal 
with the new social problems. At the heart of alternative legal scholarship were the 
methods of the empirical social sciences with which it analyzed the social functions and 
effects of law, having mainly two purposes. First, it criticized law for its formal charac-
ter and the emphasis on formal equality, the gap between law in books and law in ac-
tion, and its political and ideological connections. Second, through the criticism it 
sought to change the law. Its perspective was mostly leftist.     
   It was especially the leftist aspect of alternative legal scholarship that contributed 
to its radicalization and to the rise of critical legal scholarship. Critical and Marxist legal 
scholarship were the continuation of the alternative legal scholarship of the 1960s, but 
they also transformed its theories and methods. Marxist theory was used to disclose the 
social class-struggle which, according to the Marxist scholars, was a major source of the 
legal system. The purpose was still to examine the actual functions and effects of law, 
but the perspective was changed. Critical legal scholarship was critical by definition, 
because its assumption was that law emanated from the class conflict and was mostly a 
tool of the ruling elite, thus supporting its interests and oppressing the lower social clas-
ses. Marxist legal scholarship quickly advanced to the heart of jurisprudence during the 
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1970s. First, Marxist legal scholarship was pieces of writing and academic work groups, 
but by the end of the decade, it had grown into a jurisprudential school, had a Nordic 
law journal, and there were several comprehensive treatises on its theoretical founda-
tions. Despite the expansion and unification, however, there was no unified theory of 
Marxist legal scholarship.    
   Critical legal scholarship reflected the radicalization of scholarship in the 1970s. 
Early influences on the sociology of law and critical criminology came mostly from 
American scholarship, but at the end of the 1960s, critical theory and continental Marx-
ism began to have more impact. Marxist legal scholarship of the 1970s was based most-
ly on Continental neo-Marxism. Alternative and critical scholars often also drew influ-
ence from the contemporary topics, and used Marxist rhetoric to grasp them. Various 
aspects of contemporary philosophy and social theory were also applied.  
   Despite the disagreements in theories, alternative and critical legal scholars also 
worked partially for a common goal and shared similarities in substance. Critical legal 
scholarship was also in line with the socially and politically oriented studies. It tackled 
problems relating to capitalist society, its purpose being to disclose the weaknesses of 
bourgeois welfare state and to point out that the problems could not be solved by tradi-
tional measures. Both the sociological jurisprudence and critical criminology on the one 
hand and the more radical Marxist legal scholarship on the other provided data for so-
cial planning. They also sprang from the rising rights consciousness, their aim being to 
improve the conditions of the less-privileged. Although there were differences as to the 
appropriate reform measures, alternative and critical legal scholars shared a background 
in leftist politics.  
   Leftism was the critical thought at the time. Critical legal scholarship developed 
when law students became interested in the counter-culture, sociology of law, and in 
critical scholarship. They fought the authorities of law and legal scholarship and elabo-
rated a jurisprudence that could transcend doctrinal analysis and expose law in action. 
Many of the alternative and critical legal scholars sympathized with leftism before they 
entered the critical path, but for some the leftist ideology followed the critical scholar-
ship. Leftism was an ideology of antagonism, criticism, and radicalism. It was a coun-
ter-force against the establishment. Just as the new left and the cultural radicals of the 
1960s wanted to show that there was an alternative to the modern liberal society, the 
critical legal scholars wanted to point out that there were alternatives to modern law, 
and that the alternatives would better guarantee welfare and democracy.   
   Besides the social and political aspect, critical scholarship was also a scholarly en-
terprise. Alternative and critical legal scholarship were forms of criticism of the scholar-
ly tradition. They criticized logical positivism in science and formalist, normative orien-
tation in legal scholarship. The critical thought denied the presumption that one could 
obtain reality through empirical observation because perception was always structured 
by ideology. Therefore one should be aware of one’s biases to understand the meaning 
of the perception. Thus, critical legal scholarship was also criticism of Scandinavian 
realism, or the critical scholars’ definition of it. In the 1960s, realism was a major 
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school of jurisprudence, and the majority of the legal profession accepted the fact that 
legal scholarship should not contemplate values or policies. The critical scholars, how-
ever, wanted to bring values, ideologies, and policies back into the legal discourse. Crit-
ical legal scholarship was legal positivism, because it considered law as a man-made 
system, but it criticized the sharp distinction between law, values, and politics. In a 
sense, then, critical thought sought to bring metaphysics back into legal scholarship. 
Moreover, critical legal scholarship was also realistic, since it emphasized law in action. 
Critical scholars disagreed in many respects, but they all endorsed legal argumentation 
that was open with values and policies.    
   The question was also about the criticism of the autonomy of legal scholarship. 
Traditional legal scholars opined that their profession could use social science to an 
extent, but doctrinal analysis was nevertheless the core of the scholarship. The alterna-
tive and critical legal scholars, on the other hand, argued that legal scholarship should 
be transformed into a mixture of jurisprudence and social and political science. Whereas 
the attack on positivism was an attack on a more general tradition of scholarship, the 
attack on the autonomy of legal scholarship was an attack on the academic legal profes-
sion in particular.  
   Critical legal scholarship thus had a social-political and a scholarly aspect. How-
ever, there was yet another aspect, the academic aspect. Critical legal scholars were af-
ter an academic reputation, notwithstanding whether it was their material advantage. By 
attacking the tradition, the critical scholars disrespected authorities, lifted themselves 
above the crowd, and pursued an authentic self. Critical and radical thought was a life-
style of academic scholarship. To an extent, the campus radicalism of the 1960s was an 
expression of the authentic self just as it was an expression of the frustration with the 
system. Some of the critical legal scholars were radical students while some merely 
sympathized with them, but most were either pursuing their authenticity in scholarship 
or were frustrated with the tradition of scholarship, university administration, faculty, or 
all of them. In part, critical legal scholarship was an enterprise to provide help for the 
underdog by improving their legal and social status, and in part it was an exercise in 
updating the theories and methodologies of legal scholarship. Nevertheless, in part it 
was also an academic movement toward originality and authenticity in scholarship.              
   In short, American and Scandinavian critical legal scholarship were similar in 
many respects. They both arose as a radicalization of the sociological jurisprudence of 
the 1960s as reflections of the rise of Marxist scholarship. They were both new left aca-
demic movements of those students who did not want to conform to the tradition and 
sought to replace it with a comprehensive alternative. They contemplated significant 
social problems and sought to trace them in the structures of law, society, the economy, 
and the consciousness of the people. Scandinavian critical scholarship adopted a Marx-
ist basis, while the American critical scholars kept their distance from Marxism and 
applied various approaches. The Scandinavians, however, disagreed as to the exact in-
terpretation of Marxism and developed various differing theories. 
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7.2 Critical legal scholarship and the 1980s 
 
Critical legal scholarship grew out of the postwar scholarship and society. Legal schol-
arship was marked by the criticism of positivism, the emergence of sociology of law, 
and policy-oriented legal argumentation. Critical legal scholars wanted to expose social 
and legal reality, criticize the reasons that caused the problems, and propose reforms for 
a better society, better as defined by the scholars themselves. Alternative legal scholar-
ship grew steadily during the 1960s; it was radicalized and turned into critical scholar-
ship at the turn of the decade, reaching its height in the 1970s. Marxism became the 
common theoretical background on which to construct more specific legal analyses and 
theories. Alternative legal scholarship was, however, much more than simple criticism. 
It was also empirical studies on the legal status of the poor and women, for example, 
and practical suggestions to improve their situation.   
   Although there was a vast amount of theoretical and empirical literature, critical 
legal scholarship faded slowly in the 1980s. As Kristian Andenæs wrote on the tenth 
anniversary of the Juss-Buss movement in 1981, critical legal scholarship and practice 
were not doing as well as they had ten years ago, since older scholars had become office 
clerks and students were not that interested in legal sociology or other alternative legal 
activities.
453
 Marxist legal scholarship of course continued in the pages of Retfærd, but 
it too was slowly waning and, moreover, turning into a critical analysis of the welfare 
legislation. As the 1980s progressed, there was ever less Marxist literature, but studies 
on the problems of the law of the welfare state and on the problems of the rights of the 
citizen prospered.
454
 The 1980s was in general a turn toward more conservative politics. 
It thus seems that Andenæs was right in saying that most of the older scholars were fa-
tigued by their professional responsibilities, whether in the academy or in their practic-
es, and the students were no longer that interested in critical scholarship. Criticism drift-
ed out of fashion. Critical and Marxist legal scholarship did not vanish completely, but 
the major radical bloc faded. Because of these changes in the nature of critical legal 
scholarship, our analysis will stop at the beginning of the 1980s. 
   We have now seen how alternative legal scholarship arose in Scandinavia in the 
1960s, how a more critical stance emerged at the same time, and how Marxist legal 
scholarship was elaborated in the 1970s. An interesting aspect in the context is the de-
velopment of alternative and critical legal scholarship in Finland, because in many ways 
it recalled its Scandinavian neighbors but at the same time was also different from them 
and formed a unique and interesting, more radical critical legal thought. Since we now 
have examined the rise of critical legal scholarship in the United States and in Scandi-
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navia, our next focus is in the small country at the borderline between the West and the 
East.
251 
 
V Alternative and critical legal scholarship in Finland, 
1965─1980 
1 Finland and the 1960s: The great structural change in society 
 
In the previous chapters we have seen how critical legal scholarship arose in the United 
States and Scandinavia in the 1960s as a result of the changes in society, politics, and 
culture. In this chapter, I shall deal with the Finnish critical and alternative legal schol-
arship in the 1960s and 1970s, which in many ways followed the international context. 
During the quarter of a century approximately from the late 1950s to the early 1980s, 
Finland underwent a relatively late but rapid and marked social change, known as the 
great structural change, and it is important to begin the examination with an introduc-
tion to the social circumstances.    
   Finland was transformed from a relatively backward and agricultural society into a 
modern industrial welfare state in the 1960s. Efforts at improving social welfare had 
begun in the 1930s but were halted by the Second World War. After the War, Finnish 
politics took a new course in order to pay the war reparations and to modernize society.
1
 
The most dramatic change occurred in the 1960s. The postwar baby-boom increased the 
population of Finland considerably, and there was massive migration both from the 
countryside to the urban areas and to Sweden, when vast numbers of people moved to 
the cities in search of a better future.
2
 Thus, the 1950s and 1960s were marked by indus-
trialization, economic expansion, and urbanization. This altered the social and class 
structure of Finland. A society that had previously been predominantly agricultural be-
came an industrial one, and the size of the industrial working class grew rapidly.
3
  
   The social change and the growth of the urban working class altered the political 
arena as well. The working class became a major player in politics as a consequence of 
the structural change and the active organization of workers. Support for the moderate 
left increased significantly, and politics moved towards the left. This was unprecedented 
in the history of independent Finland, since the left had been on the margin of politics 
                                               
1 Pekka Haatanen, Suomalaisen hyvinvointivaltion kehitys, 43–50, in Olavi Riihinen (ed.), Sosiaalipoli-
tiikka 2017: Näkökulmia suomalaisen yhteiskunnan kehitykseen ja tulevaisuuteen (Juva: Werner Söder-
ström osakeyhtiö 1993), 31–67.  
2 Tapani Valkonen, Väkiluvun ja ikärakenteen kehitys, 20, 28–29, in Tapani Valkonen, Risto Alapuro, 
Matti Alestalo, Riitta Jallinoja, Tom Sandlund, Suomalaiset: Yhteiskunnan rakenne teollistumisen aikana 
(Juva: Werner Söderström osakeyhtiö 1985), 10–35. 
3 Pertti Alasuutari, Toinen tasavalta: Suomi 1946–1994 (Tampere: Vastapaino 1996), 62–65; Hannu 
Soikkanen, Miten 1960-luvun raju elinkeinorakenteen murros syntyi ja miten sitä hallittiin? 581–582, in 
Tie tulkintaan (Juva: WSOY 1997), 578–602; Matti Alestalo, Yhteiskuntaluokat ja sosiaaliset kerrostu-
mat toisen maailmansodan jälkeen, 103–107, 184–185, in Valkonen et al. 1985, supra n. 2 at 101–200.   
252 
 
after the civil war. Leftism was suppressed by extreme-right activism during the Inter-
War era and communism was banned in Finland. In the 1960s, however, the left had a 
significant position in Finnish politics,
4
 but it also had a difficult position because of its 
controversial relations with the Soviet Union.
5
 The relationship between Finland and the 
Soviet Union was difficult after the Second World War, and the Finnish left was in an 
awkward position. Nevertheless, leftism became an ideology of reform and a powerful 
component of social and political rhetoric in the 1960s.  
   Changes in social and welfare policy followed the social transformation, while ur-
banization and industrialization revealed existing social problems and created new ones. 
The 1960s and the 1970s were times of intense debates on social and legal politics, and 
people became more aware of their rights than before. The increased wealth of the na-
tion and the changed social circumstances both encouraged the people to demand more 
from the state and the state to regulate society and take care of the nation. The social 
policy of the 1960s trusted social planning, and a considerable amount of welfare legis-
lation was enacted. The social security system and labor law, as well as regulation on 
housing and public subsidies were reformed.
6
   
  Governmental regulation created the basis for the welfare state, but the society was 
transforming in other ways as well. Social problems and people’s awareness of them 
gave rise to social criticism. The so-called single cause movements criticized the status 
of the poor and the unemployed, women, and minorities, as well as prisoners and inst i-
tutionalized people. Social activism, as well as ideas such as pacifism and feminism 
began to emerge. The social movements hoped to improve the status of the less-
privileged and create increasing social equality.
7
 Thus, control and criminal policy were 
reformed to become more humane and modern and the legal security of the citizen was 
improved. Many old offences were decriminalized and penalties were moderated.
8
    
   In addition to the criticism of politics, the social atmosphere of the 1960s was an-
tagonistic in general. Mass protests against the Vietnam War and the poor conditions in 
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the developing countries occurred, which marked the socialist and anti-imperialist tone 
of radicalism. Demonstrations became frequent after the mid-1960s.
9
 A counter-culture 
arose together with social radicalism, in which the traditional values, mores, and hierar-
chies were criticized and people began to seek alternative lifestyles. Everything was 
questionable. Mass protests were targeted against the power structures and conservative 
nature of the society, and people demanded more democracy, power, and liberty.
10
 
   Just as the society was in turmoil, so was the academy and scholarship, and aca-
demia changed significantly in many ways in the 1960s. Many social and political sci-
entists studied in the United States in the 1950s, which in general was a period of Amer-
icanization of scholarship.
11
 In the 1960s, however, critical theory made its way into 
Finnish scholarship and Marxism began to emerge. At the beginning of the 1970s, 
Marxism became a powerful, though often scorned, paradigm in social science. Marxist 
scholarship distanced itself from the positivist paradigm that prevailed and sought to 
analyze the social reality critically.
12
 Students also became a powerful source of radical-
ism. The 1960s was a time of massive student expansion at the universities, which made 
the poor conditions of students more obvious. As the problems increased, the number of 
students grew and their social backgrounds became more various, they became political-
ly active group.
13
 The student protests culminated in 1968 in the occupation of the Old 
Student House, where the students demanded democratization of the university admin-
istration, critical studies in the curriculum, and closer cooperation with the trade un-
ions.
14
 As elsewhere in the world, Finnish students adopted the counter-culture of the 
1960s and aligned with the political left, thus creating the new left, and became a motor 
of social radicalism.  
   An economic downturn and growing unemployment marked the 1970s.
15
 Trade 
unions and leftism were still powerful, and student radicalism adopted a more Marxist 
tone and moved even more towards the left,
16
 but society in general was becoming more 
conservative. Although the trends of the 1960s continued and new trends such as envi-
                                               
9 Tuominen 1991, supra n. 7 at 158–178, 218–222; Suominen 1997, supra n. 7 at 172–174.  
10 Johan von Bonsdorff, Kun vanha vallattiin (Helsinki: Tammi 1986), 68–86, 104–142; Tuominen 1991, 
supra n. 7 at 344–382.   
11 Erik Allardt, Suunnistuksia ja kulttuurishokkeja (Helsinki: Otava 1995), 74–82; Marja Alaketola-
Tuominen, Jokapojan amerikanperintö: Yhdysvaltalaisia kulttuurivaikutteita Suomessa toisen maailman-
sodan jälkeen (Helsinki: Gaudeamus 1989), 61, 64.   
12 Matti Alestalo & Teuvo Räty, Sosiologian 1960- ja 1970-lukujen kriisi väitöskirjojen valossa, 223, in 
Pekka Ahtiainen, Teuvo Räty, John Strömberg, Jukka Tervonen, (eds.), Historia, sosiologia ja Suomi: 
Yhteiskuntatutkimus itseymmärryksen jäljillä (Helsinki: Hanki ja jää 1994), 217–243; Antti Eskola, Sep-
po Toiviainen, Matti Alestalo, Risto Alapuro, Marxilainen tutkimus, 222–223, in Suomalaisen sosiologi-
an juuret (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö 1973), 194–225.     
13 Laura Kolbe, Eliitti, traditio, murros: Helsingin yliopiston ylioppilaskunta 1960–1990 (Helsinki: Otava 
1996), 177–202, 387–389.  
14 Kolbe 1996, supra n. 13 at 327–364; Tuominen 1991, supra n. 7 at 322–339; Bonsdorff 1986, supra n. 
10 at 9–31; Virtanen 2001, supra n. 7 at 309–318; Suominen 1997, supra n. 7 at 176–198. An interesting 
point is that the Finnish students occupied a building that belonged to the students’ union, not one belong-
ing to the University. Thus, although student radicalism in Finland followed the international trends, it 
was somewhat more moderate than elsewhere in the Western world.  
15 Alestalo & Uusitalo 1986, supra n. 6 at 205, 213, 234, 250. 
16 Kolbe 1996, supra n. 13 at 409–501. 
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ronmentalism emerged, more conservative voices were also heard,
17
  and the structures 
of the welfare state were criticized for being too costly.
18
 By the end of the 1970s, radi-
calism had faded and politics sought consensus rather than conflict, and students had 
lost most of their interest in politics.
19
 Despite the change, the 1960s and 1970s had left 
a permanent mark on Finnish society. The remainder of this chapter examines its impact 
on legal scholarship.  
2 Criticism of legal scholarship 
2.1 A prelude to the problems of legal scholarship in the 1960s 
 
Finnish legal scholars began to modify legal scholarship to meet the needs of the chang-
ing society during the postwar years.
20
 Despite the changes, Finnish jurisprudence of the 
1960s was still based on nineteenth-century conceptualism. No extreme formalism, 
however, prevailed, since legal scholars recognized the fact that law was open to inter-
pretation, as well as the personal input of the judges in judicial decision-making. Never-
theless, legal thought sought to maintain legal reasoning within rational limits and to 
keep it as neutral and logical as possible.
21
 In general, jurisprudence was dominated by 
doctrinal analysis, the purpose of which was to interpret and systematize legal rules. 
Other forms of legal scholarship, such as legal history and sociology, were considered 
as auxiliary disciplines.
22
 Doctrinal analysis, on the other hand, was divided into con-
ceptual and analytical approaches. The former emphasized the importance of legal con-
cepts, whereas the latter, the analytical school that developed in the 1950s, sought to 
                                               
17 Virtanen 2001, supra n. 7 at 318–339.  
18 Jukka Pekkarinen, Keynesiläinen hyvinvointivaltio kritiikin ristitulessa, 104–107, in Riihinen (ed.) 
1993, supra n. 1 at 97–108; Hellsten 1993, supra n. 6 at 148–150.  
19 Kolbe 1996, supra n. 13 at 529–539.  
20 Urpo Kangas (ed.), Oikeustiede Suomessa 1900–2000 (Juva: Werner Söderström Lakitieto 1998), 172–
173.  
21 See, e.g., Aatos Alanen, Yleinen oikeustiede ja kansainvälinen yksityisoikeus (Porvoo: Werner Söder-
ström Osakeyhtiö 1965), 101–177. Alanen wrote that although the personal input of a judge in adjudica-
tion had long been acknowledged (id. at 167), legal education guided judges toward objectivity and im-
partiality (id. at 172). Alanen stressed these points as early as the late 1940s. (Aatos Alanen, Yleinen 
oikeustiede (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö 1948), 112, 115.) It is, of course, a matter of debate 
as to whether Alanen’s points of views can be regarded as representative of the majority of the legal pro-
fession. It nevertheless seems apposite to use them as guides to the legal thought of postwar Finland be-
cause his books were used as text books on general jurisprudence. In any event, he emphasized the pursuit 
and the possibility of neutrality and objectivity in legal reasoning while acknowledging the exercise of 
discretion. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that Finnish legal scholarship of the 1960s emphasized the 
logical and formal aspects of legal reasoning.     
22 Simo Zitting, Valtioelämän oikeustieteellinen, historiallinen ja sosiologinen tutkimustapa, Politiikka 
1961, 36–39.  
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distinguish concepts into more definite and detailed parts.
23
 Legal scholars were aware 
of the fact that legal scholarship had a partial law-making aspect, but the focus was on 
normative aspects.
24
 Text-books often stressed the fact that a legal decision was a logi-
cal deduction,
25
 and conceptualist jurisprudence was also supported, especially in public 
law.
26
 The characteristics of legal scholarship thus were its normative nature and its 
emphasis on legal rules as well as its pursuit of neutrality and objectivity, the taught 
tradition being more formalist than legal scholarship in general.   
   The transformation of Finnish legal scholarship had thus begun after the Second 
World War, but the 1960s marked a more intense period of change. Despite the formal-
ist tradition, the openness of legal reasoning was acknowledged,
27
 and legal scholars 
were calling for more empirical legal research,
28
 and studies concentrating on the prob-
lems of legal interpretation.
29
 One especially significant occasion in Finnish legal theory 
was the doctoral dissertation of Kaarle Makkonen, published in 1965, which concerned 
the problems of judicial decision-making. Makkonen criticized the traditional notion 
that a judicial decision was a logical deduction from general principles and argued that 
in cases with discretion, the judge always put his opinion in the place of law and made 
an evaluative argument about what the law ought to be.
30
 Although the book did not 
raise general attention at the time of its publication, it became significant for later schol-
arship since it pointed out the problems the legal scholars were facing and encouraged 
seeing adjudication from a new perspective. Moreover, traditional legal scholars did not 
approve the central arguments of the book, suggesting that Makkonen went too far with 
his arguments. They thought that it was useful to present judicial decision-making as a 
logical deduction at least for study purposes.
31
   
   Even if the traditional profession was not willing to change the basis of their 
scholarship, legal scholars developed new methods of making legal scholarship meet 
the needs of society and respond to the contemporary legal problems. An important 
school of the 1960s was the new analytical jurisprudence, which the young legal scholar 
Aulis Aarnio (b. 1937) developed on the basis of the older Finnish analytical jurispru-
dence. The analytical-realistic school, which was mostly interested in dividing legal 
concepts into smaller units, was transformed into an analytical-hermeneutical school, 
                                               
23 Simo Zitting, Omistajan oikeuksista ja velvollisuuksista I─II, LM 1952, 387–401, 501–531.  
24 Zitting 1961, supra n. 22 at 36–37.  
25 Tauno Tirkkonen, Suomen siviiliprosessioikeus II (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö 1966), 
292–295.   
26 Olavi Rytköla, Hallinto- ja finanssioikeudessa sovellettavista oikeusnormeista, LM 1965, 172–185.  
27 Jan-Magnus Jansson, Grundlagsutskottet som grundlagstolkare, JFT 1955, 277–297; Simo Zitting, 
Teoreettisen tutkimuksen merkityksestä juridiikassa, LM 1960, 861–868.   
28 Martti Federley, Laintulkinnasta deskriptiivisenä tulkintaoppina, LM 1965, 296–302; Jaakko Uotila, 
Normitieto ja reaalitieto, LM 1967, 839–847.   
29 Kaarle Makkonen, Luova ajattelu oikeustieteessä, LM 1965, 844.  
30 Kaarle Makkonen, Zur Problematik der juridischen Entscheidung: Eine strukturanalytische Studie 
(Turku: Turun yliopisto 1965), esp. at 175–195.     
31 Tauno Tirkkonen, Mietteitä erään väitöskirjan johdosta, LM 1966, 128.  
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focusing on the linguistic uses of the concepts as well.
32
 Aarnio argued that it was not 
meaningful to operate simply with the concepts, but one ought to examine their practi-
cal meaning.
33
 His doctoral dissertation thus brought the elements of linguistic philoso-
phy and deontic logic into the analytical theory, and sought to explain the meaning of 
the concepts, their sub-concepts, legal rules, and legal pronouncements in reality. The 
purpose was to sort out the meaning of legal rules in practical legal situations.
34
   
   Aarnio’s analytical jurisprudence sought to make legal scholarship and reasoning 
more realistic but it was not an attempt to abandon the traditional characteristics of legal 
scholarship. Rather, with the help of linguistic philosophy he endeavored to respond to 
the contemporary problems of legal reasoning and scholarship. Another young legal 
scholar, Hannu Tapani Klami, for instance, criticized Aarnio for not being able to define 
the new method of legal scholarship and argued for more nuanced and realistic legal 
argumentation.
35
 By the mid-1960s, many legal scholars opined that the old conceptual-
ist jurisprudence was outdated, and began to elaborate more realistic methods of reason-
ing. The theoretical premises of new methods, however, were open to debate and criti-
cism.    
   As we saw in the previous chapters, postwar jurisprudence struggled with the pur-
suit of rationality. By the second half of the 1960s, Finnish legal scholarship was also 
facing new challenges. The legal profession had traditionally been quite conservative, 
and so was academic jurisprudence. Although there never was any realist tradition in 
Finland, its elements had made their way into Finnish jurisprudence since the late 1940s 
when legal scholars began to pay more attention to the social realities of legal prob-
lems,
36
 and the analytical jurisprudence of the 1950s shared certain elements of it.
37
 In 
the 1960s, legal scholars were becoming more interested in the methodological prob-
lems of their scholarship. As Zitting noted, Aarnio’s treatise combined doctrinal analy-
sis with legal philosophy and thus complemented, not invalidated traditional scholar-
ship.
38
 During the 1960s, legal scholars became more interested in other methods con-
sidering legal phenomena than doctrinal analysis, and the problems of analyzing judicial 
decision-making were becoming more pressing. New currents in philosophy and social 
                                               
32 Kaarlo Tuori, Oikeuden ratio ja voluntas (Helsinki: WSOYpro 2007), 190–196. According to Tuori, 
Makkonen was a mediator between the two schools. Finnish analytical jurisprudence was originally de-
veloped in the 1950s by Simo Zitting.  
33 Aulis Aarnio, Avio-oikeuden käsitteestä, LM 1965, 592, 594–595.  
34 Aulis Aarnio, Perillisen oikeusasemasta (Helsinki: Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys 1967), esp. at 23–59, 
104–133. See also Aulis Aarnio, Några tankar om oskiftat dödsbo som juridisk person, JFT 1968, 342–
368.  
35 Hannu Tapani Klami, Kan lagfart beviljas oskiftat dödsbo? En studie i frågeställningar, JFT 1969, 219–
227. See also Aarnio’s reply Aulis Aarnio, Några tankar om oskiftat dödsbo som juridisk person II: Svar 
till Hannu Tapani Klami, JFT 1969, 228–243. 
36 Markku Helin, Lainoppi ja metafysiikka: Tutkimus skandinaavisen oikeusrealismin tieteenkuvasta ja 
sen vaikutuksesta Suomen siviilioikeuden tutkimuksessa vuosina 1920–1960 (Helsinki: Suomalainen 
lakimiesyhdistys 1988), 261–422.    
37 Heikki Pihlajamäki & Anu Pylkkänen, Suomalainen oikeustiede eurooppalaisessa traditiossa: Luentoja 
oikeustieteen historiasta (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto 1996), 136–138. As noted, Otto Brusiin had de-
veloped Finnish legal realism in the 1930s but his theories were widely discredited. (Id. at 113–124.)   
38 Simo Zitting, Perillisen oikeusasemasta [book review], LM 1968, 611.  
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science interested legal scholars. Finnish legal thought was about to change, but it was 
also about to face a challenge of previously unseen magnitude. 
2.2 The rise of critical legal scholarship in the late 1960s 
 
As legal scholarship was facing general problems regarding the phrasing of questions, 
reasoning, and argument, a more critical trend was also developing. The 1960s in gen-
eral was time of radicalization of youth and culture. Students at the universities were 
getting more involved in politics, and scholarship was drawing influences from the crit-
ical theories of Western Europe. At the same time, young legal scholars were also de-
veloping alternative methods with which to approach legal problems. The interest in 
philosophy and the rising social unrest then contributed to the development of critical 
legal thought.  
   Legal philosophy was not in the mainstream of Finnish legal education or scholar-
ship in the 1960s. It was practiced but not on a major scale, although the interest in 
philosophical questions had increased during the 1960s. Thus, a young, Swedish-
speaking legal scholar in his late twenties, Lars D. Eriksson became seriously interested 
in legal philosophy during his study year in the United States in 1966. This was a time 
when American campuses were already places for radicalism. Besides the rising interest 
in legal philosophy, Eriksson was fascinated neither by the capitalist nature of the Unit-
ed States nor by the lack of program of the American radicals.
39
 Finnish scholarship was 
in a need of new ideas, and international currents provided considerable influence that 
had to be adapted to the Finnish circumstances. The weak progressive legal profession 
and the conservative scholarship provided a fertile ground for counter-cultural elements 
in the legal academia.      
   Critical and philosophical trends in Finnish jurisprudence became apparent by the 
mid-1960s. The first critical analysis of legal reasoning was Eriksson’s article on legal 
argumentation and dialectical logic in which he argued that legal reasoning was not log-
ic but dialectical argumentation, or simply rhetoric. According to him, solutions fol-
lowed from the values and premises of the decision-maker, and the process of the deci-
sion was structured within the inner logic of law. The arbitrary and evaluative character 
of legal reasoning was simply obscured by the legal language. Therefore, he concluded, 
legal argumentation ought to be open, and legal scholars ought to analyze the inner 
structure of legal reasoning.
40
 Mostly on the basis of the recent philosophy of Perelman 
and Viehweg and American legal realism, Eriksson applied philosophical methods to 
legal reasoning in order to point out its openness and impermanence. Besides the philo-
sophical innovation, the radical tone of the analysis was striking. Legal discretion was 
                                               
39 On Eriksson’s thoughts on his visit to America, see Lars D. Eriksson, Dyre Broder…, FBT 1–2/1966, 
71–73. 
40 Lars D. Eriksson, Rättslig argumentering och den dialektiska logiken, JFT 1966, 459–482.  
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recognized and scholars had called for more nuanced argumentation, but Eriksson ar-
gued that law was merely rhetoric, based on values and premises which were partly 
built into the legal structures. Thus the indeterminacy thesis, meaning that with the right 
arguments legal decisions could turn either way, entered Finnish jurisprudence.     
   Another alternative trend, emphasizing methodological plurality and the value-
bound nature of legal scholarship grew alongside the theory of legal indeterminacy. An 
important figure in this regard was Antero Jyränki, a legal scholar in his early thirties. 
During the 1960s, he stressed the importance of legal history for legal scholarship,
41
 and 
research on law in action instead of law in books.
42
 In his doctoral dissertation, which 
otherwise was a traditional analysis on the powers of the President of Finland over the 
military forces, he stressed the fact that legal interpretation was inevitably value-
bound.
43
 Later he elaborated this notion further, pointing out that eclectic analysis of the 
Constitution could open up countless dimensions in sorting out the legal reality.
44
 Obvi-
ous in the literature were the emphasis on the inherent position of values in law and in 
legal scholarship, as well as his support for eclectic and open research. Jyränki was also 
critical of the tradition of constitutional scholarship in Finland because of its formalist 
nature and the neglect of values and social aspects. In these respects, Jyränki was fol-
lowing American realism and the recent Scandinavian alternative legal scholarship.   
   Critical legal scholarship was thus heading in two directions in the latter half of 
the 1960s. On the one hand, there was the critical analysis of legal reasoning, arguing 
that legal decision-making was not logic but indeterminate and rather a question of ar-
gumentation and rhetoric. On the other hand, there was the criticism of doctrinal analy-
sis, arguing that instead of law in books, scholarship should focus on law in action from 
various perspectives using various methods. The criticism of traditional legal scholar-
ship was thus evident. Although there was no single definition of traditional legal schol-
arship, it was mainly characterized by doctrinal analysis and the pursuit of rationality 
and neutrality. In the last resort, then, it was the common faith of the legal profession on 
legal certainty and the autonomy of legal scholarship that was being questioned. Critical 
legal scholars thus adopted a completely different perspective on law and legal scholar-
ship than the traditional profession in Finland, as they did in the United States and 
Scandinavia, as we saw in the previous chapters.    
   The late 1960s was a time of debate on the rights of the citizen and on rationality 
of the administration of justice in general. In 1967, Eriksson edited a political pamphlet 
criticizing the arbitrary and discriminatory character of the system of treatment in which 
people were institutionalized “for their own good,”45 and in 1968 the publishing compa-
ny Tammi founded the Huutomerkki (exclamation mark) series that was to become a 
                                               
41 Antero Jyränki, Ministerimyötävaikutuksen historiallisesta taustasta ja kehityksestä Suomessa ja Ruot-
sissa, JFT 1963, 30–53. 
42 Antero Jyränki, Yhdysvaltain ja Suomen presidentin aseman vertailua, Politiikka 1962, 208–244.  
43 Antero Jyränki, Sotavoiman ylin päällikkyys: Tutkimus tasavallan presidentille HM 30 §:n nojalla 
kuuluvasta toimivallasta ja sen käyttämisestä (Helsinki: Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys 1967), 302–303.   
44 Antero Jyränki, Näkökohtia Suomen perusoikeusjärjestelmästä, LM 1968, 982–999.  
45 Lars D. Eriksson (ed.), Pakkoauttajat (Helsinki: Tammi 1967).   
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publishing channel for pamphlets of social, political, and legal criticism.
46
 On the other 
hand, 1968 also marked the Finnish translation of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law.47 
There was also a need for positivist, normative analysis, since traditional scholarship 
maintained the ideals of legal autonomy and rationality. The critical thought, however, 
questioned the old authorities, and since the general atmosphere provided encouraging 
circumstances, the criticism was becoming harsher.  
   The idea of autonomous jurisprudence irritated the critical legal scholars, who 
thought that jurisprudence had to open itself up toward society in order to fulfill its 
functions. In the pursuit of socially oriented legal scholarship, Eriksson followed the 
recent Scandinavian theories on sociological jurisprudence but was not pleased with 
them. He nonetheless did recognize the need for flexible argumentation in judicial deci-
sion-making which, he claimed, was already replete with value arguments, which were 
simply not explicitly articulated.
48
 Therefore, he declared, legal scholarship and argu-
mentation had to contemplate the social circumstances together with social scientific 
data in order to become realistic and respond to contemporary needs.
49
 Distinctive of the 
alternative perception of legal scholarship was the willingness to take the social func-
tions of law seriously and pay attention to its realities. In Scandinavia, legal scholars 
hoped to systematize the alternative approach in the late 1960s, and there was interest in 
this in Finland as well. What was lacking, however, was a systematic analysis of the 
theoretical premises of critical legal theory.  
   Critical legal scholarship thus needed a program because, according to the criti-
cism, traditional scholarship was unable to respond to contemporary needs. Eriksson 
laid the basis for critical legal scholarship in the 1960s, arguing that the social sciences, 
including legal scholarship, were based on assumptions which were concealed or pre-
sented as facts. According to Eriksson, traditional legal scholarship was based on three 
premises, which were the autonomy of jurisprudence, its neutrality, and the harmony of 
the legal system. Therefore, traditional scholarship was static and conservative, and crit-
ical scholarship was needed to disclose the values and ideologies in law.
50
 Although his 
short article was rather a proclamation than a systematic examination of the theoretical 
basis, Eriksson described all the fundamental elements for a critical legal scholarship 
project. The article was also typical of the critical thought of the late 1960s, since it de-
scribed the traditional scholarship as uncritical, formalist, and unrealistic, thus ridiculing 
the tradition.     
                                               
46 The books in the series took critical positions on contemporary domestic and international problems. 
Legal critiques included Jyrki Tala (ed.), Kantajana kansalainen: Raportti oikeusturvasta (Helsinki: Tam-
mi 1969); Heikki Karapuu (ed.), Harvojen tasavalta: Perustuslain epädemokraattisuus (Helsinki: Tammi 
1970).   
47 Hans Kelsen, Puhdas oikeusoppi (Helsinki: WSOY 1968).    
48 Lars D. Eriksson, Samhällstillvänd juridik, JFT 1968, 565–583. Eriksson reviewed the books of the 
Swede Per Olof Bolding and the Norwegian Carl August Fleischer. These books are dealt with in chapter 
four. Despite the critical response of Eriksson, Finnish legal scholars followed the Scandinavian legal 
scholarship and drew influence from that.   
49 Eriksson 1968, supra n. 48 at 578, 582–583.  
50 Lars D. Eriksson, För en kritisk rättsvetenskap, Contra 1/1969, 12–14.  
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   Critical legal thought was thus emerging in the late 1960s. Finnish legal scholar-
ship was opening up towards international and philosophical influences in general, 
some of which were used to develop more critical theories about jurisprudence. A cru-
cial event in the development of this critical thought was the publication of the doctoral 
dissertation by Antti Kivivuori (b. 1940) in 1969. The treatise was about the Finnish law 
of torts in the nineteenth century. For our purposes, however, its most interesting part 
was the introduction in which the methods were explained. Kivivuori argued that the 
traditional question of Finnish legal scholarship, namely what was the correct solution 
to a given legal problem according to the law in force, was not a meaningful scholarly 
question, because the purpose of law was to control and direct human behavior. Mean-
ingful scholarly problems, therefore, related to the explanation of legal behavior, and 
the purposes, functions, and effects of law.
51
 Besides giving a powerful impetus to the 
debates on legal scholarship, the publication of the Kivivuori dissertation was the be-
ginning of behaviorist and political jurisprudence in Finland. The influences of the theo-
ry came mostly from philosophy, the most important influence being the Finnish phi-
losopher Georg Henrik von Wright, and its idea was to explain the behavior of the legis-
lator. It was also noteworthy that alternative methodology and criticism of traditional 
legal scholarship were explicitly highlighted in a doctoral thesis. It was possible to point 
out the usefulness of the new methods by dismissing traditional scholarship as scientifi-
cally meaningless. The controversy over the methods of legal scholarship was also clear 
in the emphasis on the use of social science in legal research. These critical notions an-
ticipated an academic quarrel that had been simmering for the previous couple of years.     
   The smoldering controversy over the nature of legal scholarship flared up after the 
publication of Kivivuori’s dissertation. Eriksson and Kivivuori criticized the jurispru-
dential tradition, calling for alternative scholarship to purge jurisprudence of its incon-
sistencies and absurdities. The tradition, however, was not ready to accept such critical 
arguments. The spokesman for a more traditional legal scholarship was Aarnio. For 
him, the question as to whether legal scholarship was a science was not appropriate be-
cause of the conventionality of the criteria of science. He admitted that jurisprudence 
involved much argumentation and interpretation, but denied that legal scholarship, es-
pecially analytical jurisprudence, was unrealistic or conservative.
52
 Aarnio’s reply at-
tempted to maintain the autonomy of legal scholarship and the rationality of law to a 
certain extent. Although he admitted that there was a place for alternative scholarship, 
and that jurisprudence was argumentation to a considerable extent, he did not consider 
them to be in the mainstream of jurisprudence. This defense was an attempt to distin-
guish law from politics at a general level, pointing out the major controversy between 
the critical and traditional views, since the critical scholars were not willing to accept 
the distinction.    
                                               
51 Antti Kivivuori, Suomen vahingonkorvauslainsäädännön kehitys I: Rikoslainsäädäntö 1809–1875 (Hel-
sinki: Helsingin yliopiston yksityisoikeuden laitoksen julkaisuja 1969), 25–26.  
52 Aulis Aarnio, Juridisen tutkimuksen näköaloja, JFT 1969, 374, 376–382, 384–404.   
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   Aarnio’s reply thus fuelled the debates. According to Kivivuori, the problem never 
was about the scientific nature of legal scholarship, but about its meaningfulness and 
rationality. He argued that Aarnio had simply shown the weaknesses of analytical juris-
prudence while stating that legal behavior was a subject of jurisprudence and assimilat-
ing the process of political and legal decision-making, but then denying the role of ex-
plaining the behavior and making a strict distinction between law and politics.
53
 Eriks-
son argued that analytical jurisprudence focused on trivial questions while examining 
legal concepts and did not concentrate on the questions beyond the concepts. The nar-
row perspective of traditional scholars neglected structural aspects relating to values and 
interpretation.
54
 The defense of a more traditional legal scholarship pushed the critical 
debates further by offering counter-arguments to which the critical scholars could re-
spond and thus criticize the tradition even further.    
   The quarrel clarified the controversy that was about the nature and purposes of le-
gal scholarship. The critical scholars were not that far removed from Aarnio’s views, 
because in his reply, Aarnio demonstrated that analytical jurisprudence did not exclude 
any problems from research and that Eriksson had simply over-emphasized the role of 
values in judicial decision-making.
55
 In addition, he argued that Kivivuori’s critique was 
based on misreading and misunderstanding and was therefore off the mark.
56
 Regarding 
the major parts, however, the controversy was clear. Critical legal scholars were after a 
political and “critical” legal scholarship, whereas the more traditional view was that 
these were simply parts of legal scholarship at best. The critical scholars also disagreed 
on some points. Eriksson criticized Kivivuori for his descriptive approach,
57
 Kivivuori 
replying that descriptivism also had political goals and criticizing Eriksson for ambigui-
ty.
58
 The debate was expanding into an exchange about the nature and purpose of law 
and legal scholarship. Many of the scholars shared a theoretical basis to some extent, 
but disagreed on its purposes. Critical legal scholarship attacked the traditional concept 
of law and legal scholarship because they thought that these could not be used in a 
meaningful way in modern society. 
   The rebellion on the methods of legal scholarship was open and apparent by the 
end of the 1960s. Following European, Scandinavian, and Finnish debates on alternative 
legal scholarship, Jyränki proposed a few critical theses about jurisprudence. According 
to him, legal scholarship had to be integrated with social science and had to consider all 
the socially relevant legal institutions. Legal scholarship needed various methods and 
perspectives because of the complexity of legal phenomena and because of their ele-
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mentary ties with society, which the traditional analysis could not grasp.
59
 The interna-
tional aspect and the central elements of the critical legal scholarship were apparent in 
this article. The critical thought regarded traditional legal scholarship as serving the 
interests of the old, conservative element of the legal profession, as well as capitalist 
interests. Critical scholars sought to expose the connection between society and the law 
and the fact that the law and traditional legal scholarship were biased towards powerful 
social interests and unable to go beyond the surface. Depicting traditional jurisprudence 
as conservative and thus stressing the reforming aspects of the alternatives was evident 
in the critical pursuit.  
   Critical scholars pursued change. To picture the legal profession as a guardian of 
social hierarchies was thus a major aspect of critical scholarship. This was also the pur-
pose of Raimo Blom’s study on national confidence in the judiciary. This was an empir-
ical survey on what people thought about the impartiality of the judiciary, which 
showed that there was a general lack of confidence in the courts.
60
 In his speech given 
before the public examination of the dissertation, Blom straightforwardly announced 
that social status had an impact on the decisions of the courts and that the judiciary’s 
treatment of the people was inequitable.
61
 The study provoked serious discussion,
62
 and 
even though the traditional scholars argued that it revealed more about people’s atti-
tudes than about the reality of the judiciary,
63
 it was often regarded as an expression of 
class-based law. Critical scholarship sought to disclose the biased nature of law and the 
legal system. By turning the facts of research into facts about the administration of jus-
tice, the arguments could be used as a criticism of the legal system. Methods of research 
were one thing, and their use was another. Since critical scholarship often reflected a 
perspective on law that deviated from the tradition, its results were used to criticize the 
prevailing circumstances. An empirical survey as such was not particularly radical, but 
it provided ammunition for criticism.   
   The treatise by Blom pointed out the rising trends in Finnish alternative and crit i-
cal legal scholarship. As a study, it was an empirical survey, demonstrating that people 
did not have great confidence in the judiciary. It reflected the rise of the empirical legal 
research and the combination of jurisprudence and social science. As a criticism, it re-
flected the leftist antagonism against social hierarchies and the structures of power. It 
was also an expression of the international trends in Finnish legal scholarship, because 
studies on the impacts of social status on judicial decisions were popular in Scandinavia 
and the United States, as we saw earlier, and Blom referred to these in his book. It can 
thus be considered as an empirical, sociological-political jurisprudence. Critical and 
alternative legal scholarship, as well as the rebellion on the methods of jurisprudence, 
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were general international trends, and Finnish legal scholarship followed them, adapting 
them to its own circumstances.     
   As the 1960s turned into the 1970s, debates on legal scholarship became more 
general, as well as more intense and nuanced, and more and more scholars participated. 
Jyränki argued that law, and hence legal scholarship as well, was not some special field 
but part of social totality. Thus, legal scholarship should use all kinds of social science 
methods and should focus on law as part of social totality.
64
 Hannu Tapani Klami 
(1945–2002), an exceptionally talented young legal scholar who had specialized in legal 
history and philosophy, criticized traditional positivism and analytical jurisprudence for 
their one-sided perspective, and the recent critical legal scholarship for its political ori-
entation. He argued that legal scholarship should use historical methods in pursuit of the 
purposes of law, thus obtaining a teleological analysis determining the consequences of 
law.
65
 Juha Tolonen (b. 1941) argued that both traditional positivism and recent empiri-
cism had good qualities but were insufficient alone. He stressed the fact that since law 
was always human activity in pursuit of certain goals, legal scholarship should continu-
ously criticize, not only legal rules but also the understanding of the rules, in order to 
improve the system.
66
 Aarnio replied that the critics of analytical jurisprudence had 
misunderstood it. He continued to emphasize the significance of semantic analysis in 
legal scholarship because many problems followed from linguistic inaccuracies.
67
 The 
criticism always reflected the image of traditional jurisprudence of the alternative schol-
ars, who were dissatisfied with contemporary legal scholarship and encouraged broader 
perspective for it. Whether the tradition was as formalist as the critics depicted it is a 
matter of debate, but there was a genuine frustration with it. The extent of the debates 
indicates the general willingness to change the tradition. Alternative views on legal 
scholarship were thus quite common, and the critical aspect was an extreme articulation 
of the more general trend.    
   Legal scholars became more interested in judicial decision-making as political ac-
tivity in the early 1970s,
68
 and the criticism of legal scholarship was also becoming 
more strident. Kivivuori argued that analytical jurisprudence was the follower of con-
ceptualism, and that it had been unable to produce clear questions for legal scholarship. 
It ignored the preliminary works of law drafting, thus neglecting important sources, and 
it also analyzed legislation and argumentation impersonally, thus masking the political 
biases of law and legal scholarship.
69
 Aarnio was upset that the criticism was directed 
against analytical jurisprudence, arguing that Kivivuori’s methods were often meaning-
less in sorting out solutions to practical legal problems. He also argued that legal inter-
pretation was not absolutely free, as Kivivuori had argued, and that issues of private law 
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were not political.
70
 Kivivuori replied that Aarnio had missed the politically relevant 
substance in legal problems and thus masked the political nature of law in the way tradi-
tional legal scholars tended to do.
71
 Although interpretation and discretion were widely 
acknowledged, critical scholars were more convinced about their pervasive and political 
nature than the more traditional scholars. Furthermore, the critical scholars were not 
particularly pleased with the attempt to explain the legal language because they opined 
that it simply masked the real problems. According to the critical argument, since the 
problems of law and legal scholarship were embedded in the legal structures and the 
ideology on which the law was based, there was a need for a more thorough and critical 
analysis.   
   Just as the debates on legal scholarship were heating up at the beginning of the 
1970s, a considerable boost was provided. The President of Finland, who had been in 
office since 1956, had his 70
th
 birthday in September 1970, and there was an interview 
in the most prestigious Finnish law review, Lakimies, later continued on radio. President 
Kekkonen, an authoritative figure in Finland in the 1970s, was known for his tight con-
trol of both domestic and foreign affairs and his continuous meddling in them. The in-
terview was, however, an extraordinary criticism of the Finnish legal system. Kekkonen 
took a stand on the national lack of confidence in the judiciary, commenting that the law 
and the courts produced inequality. He also tackled the problems of legislation, the con-
servative nature of legal scholarship and education, the political nature of the judiciary, 
discrimination in the administration of justice, and noted the need to reconsider the divi-
sion of state powers in modern society.
72
 The interview had a wide-ranged agenda on 
various important contemporary topics, and since the President was a significant figure, 
his opinions on the issues interested many people. 
   More important than the questions were the answers, which indeed were intri-
guing. By referring to Blom’s study, for example, President Kekkonen argued that Finn-
ish law was in many ways outdated and treated people unequally on the basis of their 
social status.
73
 He also said that legal scholarship was mostly conservative, lacked an 
empirical approach, and was often political, although mostly unconsciously.
74
 The Pres-
ident thus said what the critical scholars had argued for the past couple of years, namely 
that legal scholarship was ideological and political, but because of its formalist nature 
and the denial of the scholars, the political character was masked, and hence legal 
scholarship was conservative. The President’s harsh words confused the legal profes-
sion, and a crisis in law seemed to be in the offing.       
   However, there was a catch. The questions of the interview were carefully framed 
by three legal scholars, Aulis Aarnio, Matti Savolainen and Ilmari Ojanen, all members 
of the Social Democratic Party. In addition, before replying, the President talked with a 
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group of legal scholars, who were Antero Jyränki, Lars D. Eriksson, Antti Kivivuori, 
Raimo Blom and Olavi Heinonen, also all members of the political left.
75
 Furthermore, 
as should be obvious by now, the scholars behind the interview were active participants 
on the critical side of the debates on legal scholarship. The framers of the questions 
were all young legal scholars favoring alternative perspectives on legal scholarship, 
even if Aarnio’s position was problematic, since he rejected the most critical arguments. 
Those who advised the President, on the other hand, were active proponents of critical 
or alternative legal scholarship and strongly on the left in politics. Needless to say, the 
questions conformed precisely to the agenda of the critical legal scholars, and the Presi-
dent’s answers mirrored their arguments.   
   Whatever the truth behind the interview was, it pointed out the turbulent situation 
in legal scholarship and stirred the already restive atmosphere. The majority of the legal 
profession disagreed with the President’s insights.76 Although closely managed by the 
critical legal scholars, the President reflected the general critical atmosphere of the time 
and probably wanted to ginger up debates on social reforms.
77
 The interview was none-
theless a sharp criticism of the legal system, expressed in tough and uncompromising 
terms. Its purpose was obviously to provoke discussion and to contribute to the possible 
changes in the legal system and in academic legal scholarship. Because of the authority 
of the President and the severe tone, the interview was very difficult to ignore. Legal 
scholarship was facing new problems which had to be dealt with.  
   Indeed, the interview intensified the discussion. For some, it pointed out the need 
to observe the values and social functions of law in legal scholarship and education.
78
 
Traditional scholars, however, responded that the critique was exaggerated and missed 
the point in many ways. Paavo Kastari argued that the President’s critique was so harsh 
that it rather closed than invited discussion.
79
 Juha Vikatmaa noted that there was a need 
to reform legal scholarship, but it nevertheless was an exaggeration to talk about ideo-
logical one-sidedness or lack of empirical research.
80
 Simo Zitting also greeted discus-
sion about scholarship but criticized the critical scholars for turning scholarship into 
ideology.
81
 The need to change legal scholarship was generally acknowledged but the 
critical scholars took the reform to an extreme. Whereas the critical view saw that legal 
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scholarship was ideological and should be openly so, the more traditional scholars ar-
gued that it was not and was not supposed to be. At the beginning of the 1970s, scholars 
were willing to discuss reform, but the difference between critical and traditional schol-
ars was in their perception of the world and thus fundamental. Critical legal scholarship 
represented a completely different cultural attitude towards law.       
   Legal scholars were, in any event, interested in the presidential interview, and 
some of them brought more reformist views to the issue. Some scholars paid attention to 
judicial decision-making. Eero Backman continued the argument that a judicial decision 
was not a logical syllogism but was dependent on the choice of the premises of the deci-
sion and the interpretation of the facts of the case, as well as the legal rules. The inter-
pretation was further structured by personal experience and social ideology.
82
 Makko-
nen wrote that evaluations had an impact on judicial decision-making although it was 
difficult to specify this in particular cases.
83
 Some scholars were interested in general 
issues. Ojanen argued that there was a clear division between normative arguments and 
descriptions of facts, and the former could not be derived from the latter. Therefore, 
legal scholars had to realize that their profession was also a part of politics.
84
 Tolonen 
argued that legal scholarship should not focus simply on valid law but rather on the de-
velopment of legal institutions in a broad socio-political context in order to improve the 
system.
85
 Alternative legal scholars were fascinated by this asperity and wanted to point 
out the reasons for the criticism. Although the majority of the academic profession re-
mained traditional, the spirit of reform was widespread. Various arguments for alterna-
tive scholarship were offered, the critical notions being the most radical.   
   Finnish legal scholarship was moving in a realistic direction in the 1960s, which 
obviously reflected the trends in the United States and Scandinavia. Since the American 
and Scandinavian jurisprudential traditions were much more realist than the Finnish 
tradition at the beginning of the decade, Finnish critical scholarship was more radical 
from the beginning. Finland lacked a powerful alternative to the tradition, and thus the 
critical bloc was small but aggressive. During the 1960s, various sociological approach-
es as well as criticism of legal reasoning and scholarship emerged, and by the end of the 
decade, a rebellion against the tradition had begun. The major scholarly motors of the 
rebellion were the various philosophical schools, including American realism and polit-
ical jurisprudence, and Scandinavian alternative legal scholarship, but the critique obvi-
ously also followed the radicalization of society. Young legal scholars thought that the 
jurisprudential tradition was out of touch with the social reality and wanted to reform 
the tradition.   
   By and large, however, the rise of critical legal scholarship at the end of the 1960s 
in Finland was similar to the United States and Scandinavia. The central elements of 
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critical scholarship and its ideological background in the critique of formalist jurispru-
dence, the emphasis on the historicity and the ideological nature of law, and the empha-
sis on the rights of the citizen, were established in the 1960s. As we saw, the basic 
premises of critical legal scholarship were similar in the United States, Scandinavia, and 
Finland. Although Finnish legal scholarship was more conceptual and formalist than the 
legal thought in the United States and Scandinavia, Finnish legal scholars were adopting 
more realist tendencies in the 1960s. With both the application of various philosophical 
theories and social sciences and the rise of the social radicalism, jurisprudence was ac-
quiring a more critical voice in the late 1960s. The critical legal scholars, then, attacked 
the traditional conception of legal reasoning and scholarship, depicted them in a very 
formalist sense, and argued for a total alteration of the basis of the tradition. In Finland, 
the 1960s was the first time that such a wide-scale attack on the tradition occurred. 
Thus, the critical scholars of the 1960s made all the critical arguments at once, and the 
critique was very radical. By the late 1960s, the major schools of alternative and critical 
legal scholarship, political-behaviorist jurisprudence, empirical and social scientific 
legal research, and the critique of values had all emerged in Finnish legal scholarship.   
   Within a few years, the more critical notions about legal scholarship had entered 
the stage of legal discourse. By the mid-1960s, Finnish legal scholars became more in-
terested in the problems of legal scholarship and reasoning. Their theoretical literature 
was increasingly directed at the indeterminate and political nature of legal scholarship 
and practice. In the late 1960s, critical legal scholars attacked this notion by arguing that 
law was completely indeterminate and that traditional jurisprudence was doomed to fail. 
Thus, both legal scholarship and practice had to change. There were vehement articles 
spreading the critical arguments which were, then, gathered up in the interview with 
Kekkonen, which exacerbated both the defense of the traditional law and jurisprudence 
and their criticism. The atmosphere was congenial for legal polemic, and the following 
decade proved fertile for alternative and critical scholarship. 
2.3 The elaboration of critical legal thought, 1970─1976 
 
The 1960s had created the basis for the time of change in the early 1970s. In the 1960s, 
law students had become radicalized and active in university politics,
86
 and although 
lawyers were not the prime mover of social radicalism and reform, they did participate 
in the activities of the single cause movements.
87
 A major event describing the new, 
alternative thought of the jurists in the 1970s was the revival of the Association of 
Democratic Lawyers. It was originally founded in 1954 to associate with international 
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leftist lawyers and human rights associations and to promote democracy in Finland.
88
 
By the beginning of the 1970s, the association had withered. However, there was a lot 
of discussion about extending its ideological basis because many of the leftist lawyers 
of the 1970s felt that the Association of Finnish Lawyers was ideologically one-sided 
and conservative.
89
 Thus, the Association of Democratic Lawyers was reformed and 
revitalized, and began to acquire lots of new members.
90
 The revival of the association 
contributed to the organization of reformist lawyers and legal scholars and therefore 
also to the discussions about law and politics.
91
 As more and more lawyers and legal 
scholars had become interested in politics, reform, leftism, and alternative legal scholar-
ship, a need was felt to have an organization for the common cause. That organization 
already existed, but it simply needed some adjustments. Critical thought was about to 
expand.   
   Another major trend in the 1970s, though it had begun earlier, was the reorienta-
tion of philosophy and the rise of the theory of science. Finnish philosophy and social 
sciences were dominated by the analytical tradition and logical positivism, but in the 
1960s and 1970s, competing schools of thought emerged to explain social phenomena, 
and scholars became increasingly critical of explaining the social reality through simple 
observations.
92
 Among the new trends was Marxism, which became influential, espe-
cially in sociology, but in other disciplines as well.
93
 Following Kuhn and the concept 
of the paradigm, scholars began to examine the basis of their scholarship.
94
 Finnish phi-
losophy, sociology, and social and political sciences expanded in the wake of interna-
tional philosophical trends. New schools of thought appeared and the traditional schools 
were being criticized. These also had their impact on legal scholarship.   
   The changes in scholarship and especially the debate on the nature of legal schol-
arship that began at the end of the 1960s produced thoroughgoing changes in legal 
scholarship. An obvious expression of the transformation was the establishment of legal 
research and education at the University of Tampere. Legal education was not located in 
the law faculty, and cross-disciplinary methods came to mark the research, which set 
out to explain the human behavior underlying the law, not simply the law itself.
95
 The 
scholarship at Tampere was a clear attempt to challenge both the traditional legal schol-
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arship and the dominant position of the capital city, Helsinki, thus becoming a fertile 
place for the currents of radical policy of research and alternative methodologies. It was 
also a continuation and an expansion of the behaviorist approach that emerged in the 
late 1960s, best represented by Kivivuori. This new perspective on law and legal schol-
arship had acquired a strong position during the late 1960s, and the early 1970s, as the 
critical and alternative scholars of the 1960s were gaining positions at the universities, 
the new approach was becoming more widespread.   
   The change in the basis of jurisprudence at the early 1970s was a general phenom-
enon. As we saw, Finnish legal scholarship had been interested in the relationship be-
tween reality and language in the 1960s. The early 1970s, however, was a time in which 
Finnish jurisprudence took many steps towards methodological eclecticism and more 
inclusive argumentation. Although it remained largely true to the fundamental aspects 
of the tradition, changes did occur. Legal sociology was developing and becoming more 
general in Scandinavia in the 1960s. Although Finland lagged this trend, legal sociology 
made a slow but steady appearance in the early 1970s. Raimo Lahti, whose major con-
tribution concerned scholarship on criminal law, noted the usefulness of legal sociology 
in studying the legal reality and thus helping traditional scholarship and legislation as 
well.
96
 The Association of Law and Social Sciences was founded in 1970 to promote 
sociology of law and socially oriented legal research.
97
  
   The interest in sociology of law fitted comfortably with the pursuit of sociological 
and empirical jurisprudence and the general interest in examining society. Traditional 
scholarship was often considered old-fashioned, and alternative legal scholars of the 
1970s wanted to expand the basis of their scholarship. According to critical legal schol-
ars, however, sociology of law did not examine the roots of the social functions of law. 
Eriksson criticized the recent trend in Scandinavian sociology of law, noting that legal 
sociology alone did not suffice to criticize law. Criticism also had to concentrate on the 
power structures pertaining between society, the Constitution, and legislation.
98
 The 
difference between simply analyzing the gap between law in books and law in action 
and its causes distinguished critical legal scholarship from the various forms sociologi-
cal and alternative jurisprudence. The theoretical reorientation and the critical episte-
mology and analysis of the theory of science provided almost limitless possibilities for 
analyzing the deep structures of the relationship between law and society.   
   Besides the theoretical reorientation, legal scholars in general became more inter-
ested in law in action and the relationship between law and politics. They also became 
more interested in the nature of their scholarship and its position in society and politics. 
For instance, Eero Routamo empirically analyzed the relationship between theory and 
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practice,
99
 and in 1971, Blom continued his empirical analysis of law in a study con-
cerning the position of the legal profession in society. He concluded that the profession 
in general was conservative and identified with the higher social classes.
100
 Although 
Blom was more a sociologist than a lawyer, the legal profession, or at least a part of it, 
was reflecting itself against the society and reconsidering the basis of its scholarship. 
The trend in the 1970s was to review the theoretical basis of the tradition and contem-
plate potential for reform.  
   The pursuit of the critical self-reflection and reconsideration of legal scholarship 
was also apparent in Aarnio’s study on the basis of legal thought from 1971. By now he 
was much more willing to accept the place of values in legal reasoning and the role of 
social science in legal scholarship.
101
 His new book represented the openness towards 
political elements in law and the comprehensive argumentation of the beginning of the 
1970s. Aarnio was not a radical critic of the profession and thus never accepted the crit-
ical claim of the utter irrationality of legal reasoning or the integration of legal scholar-
ship into social sciences. However, he too had become more aware of the argumentative 
and interpretative nature of law and thus stressed them in his new book. Methodological 
eclecticism and the openness towards new ideas were obvious trends in the early 1970s 
in Finnish legal scholarship.  
   However, Aarnio never distanced himself completely from traditional scholarship 
although he tried to reform it. As a legal philosopher, he was interested particularly in 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and its applicability to legal theory. Thus, he 
sought to bring legal theory closer to legal practice by acknowledging the uncertainty in 
legal reasoning. By analyzing the meanings of legal concepts and their practical use 
from an intentional perspective, he sought to develop a legal theory that could compre-
hend legal practice in action.
102
 Aarnio’s practical model of judicial decision-making103 
was criticized, however, for presenting judicial decisions as certain, once the intentions 
of the judge were recognized.
104
 Since Aarnio combined various aspects, it is difficult to 
summarize his thinking. In any event, his comprehensive legal theory understood the 
legal system as a systemic whole within social structures. As he did in the 1960s with 
his analytical jurisprudence, he still tried to explicate the meaning of legal language in 
practice, but now his perspective was more open to society. The change in his theory 
reflected the political debates of the late 1960s and the influence of linguistic philoso-
phy. 
   The more critical influences were seen in the simple, yet elegant and radical theory 
of legal scholarship of Antti Kivivuori. In 1971, he published his “little red book”, a 
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pamphlet titled Politische Rechtswissenschaft (Political Jurisprudence), in which he 
summarized and developed the theory that he had begun a couple of years earlier in his 
doctoral dissertation. He argued that since law was human activity intended to influence 
people’s behavior, the purpose of legal scholarship was to study the origins and influ-
ences of law. Investigating the relationship between law and politics was especially im-
portant, because it had to be assumed that people pursued material interests. People 
were not to be regarded as atomistic individuals but as components of social classes. In 
addition, in exploring law in its political context, no distinctions between legal and so-
cial science were to be made.
105
 
   Political jurisprudence was a combination of the political-behaviorist approach, 
social science, and critical thought. In a sense, too, it was Marxist legal scholarship, 
although there were no explicit references to it. The emphasis on social class and law as 
a means of mediating between them were obvious reflections of the Marxist rhetoric of 
the early 1970s. Although this short piece did not attract much attention, it reflected 
several aspects of the 1970s. And although Kivivuori’s political jurisprudence was not 
Marxist per se, it represented the leftist political rhetoric of the critical legal scholarship 
of the early 1970s. It also encouraged legal scholarship as part of society and politics, 
endorsed the material concept of equality, and a teleological approach towards legisla-
tion, expressed in brusque terms. This theory made Kivivuori one of the most active and 
innovative participants in the legal debates of the time.   
   In the early 1970s, then, critical thought was being elaborated, and Marxism was 
also beginning to have more influence on Finnish legal scholarship. Eriksson was the 
scholar who most persistently developed the Marxist theory of law. In 1972, his purpose 
was to distance himself from the analysis of language and develop a structural-
materialistic analysis of law, in which law, society, and the state were in a reciprocal 
structural relationship. He argued that phenomena within the structures developed both 
as a consequence of external factors and as a consequence of their internal logic, and a 
dialectical analysis was needed to examine them. Law within the structures followed the 
trends of the economy and society and the interests of those who benefitted, and legal 
research had to focus on law as part of this complex process.
106
 Even though Eriksson 
combined various aspects, his article was criticized for its determinism.
107
 Economic 
factors were indeed significant, and many saw that relations between people were far 
more complex. In any event, the article was the first explicit and detailed analysis of 
Marxist theory in legal scholarship. Eriksson was also a pioneer in the Scandinavian 
context, for, as we saw in the previous chapter, Scandinavian Marxist legal scholarship 
was also taking its first steps at the time and Eriksson’s article was a source of inspira-
tion, and criticism, for Scandinavian legal scholars.  
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   Marxist elements became relatively apparent in the efforts to develop alternative 
legal theories in the 1970s. Materialism, values, and ideologies became important con-
cerns for the critical scholars who examined their position in law and legal scholarship 
in various ways. Tolonen emphasized the study of the historical development of legal 
phenomena, maintaining that materialism was an important aspect,
108
 but he was criti-
cized for failing to distinguish between social theory and law.
109
 Eero Backman, on the 
other hand, conducted a detailed and theoretical criticism of analytical jurisprudence, 
arguing that analytical jurisprudence missed the most essential aspect of law; namely, 
that language was socially constructed and was thus manifested in social structures. He 
thought that deciphering the linguistic quasi-problems was simply an aspect of scholar-
ship, but it was most important to explore the social structures of law because law and 
legal scholarship were political to a certain extent and the intentions of the legal actors 
often emanated from those structures.
110
 As Marxist thought began to have more influ-
ence in jurisprudence, legal scholars began to scrutinize the historical and structural 
aspects of law. This was a way to affirm the importance of the system and the structures 
within which the scholars operated and which had unconscious effects on their work. 
There was an urge to expand the basis of legal scholarship into society and politics. 
   The need to have more alternatives for traditional legal scholarship was manifested 
in the establishment of the new law journal Oikeus (the Law), published by the Associa-
tion of Democratic Lawyers and the Association of Law and Social Sciences in 1972. In 
the first issue, Aarnio explained the new journal had been founded because there was a 
general need for critical and open-minded legal research that was free from prejudic-
es.
111
 There were many young, and even older, legal scholars in the early 1970s who 
were frustrated with the Finnish legal culture, which they found conservative and op-
pressive. As Aarnio wrote, since the traditional scholarship was too theoretical and 
fragmented, there was a need for more organized, practical and realistic legal scholar-
ship.
112
 In the first issues of the journal, scholars dealt with contemporary legal and po-
litical problems, such as those of legal scholarship,
113
 legal education reform,
114
 crimi-
nal law reform,
115
 and recent court practice.
116
 The journal thus participated in contem-
porary debates on scholarship and politics. It also had a difficult beginning, because the 
Association of Finnish Lawyers refused to give its address file to the editorial board of 
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Oikeus for marketing purposes.
117
 The traditional profession wanted to maintain the 
neutrality of the profession and disliked the political tone of the alternative currents, 
which marked the difference between the tradition and the alternative thought. In any 
event, the alternative legal scholarship was expanding at the beginning of the 1970s. 
Now there was an association for lawyers and legal scholars who wanted to promote 
leftist ideology and politics, and there was a law journal for scholars who endorsed al-
ternative and critical scholarship.  
   Alternative legal scholarship entered a vigorous phase when legal scholars began 
to question the basis of traditional scholarship to an increasing extent and more and 
more new theories and methodologies emerged. In addition to Oikeus, the publication 
series Forum ─ Oikeustiede (Forum ─ Jurisprudence) was initiated in 1971, which be-
came a channel for alternative legal scholarship.
118
 As the 1970s progressed, the debates 
on the purposes and methods of legal scholarship expanded and new scholars participat-
ed in them. The aggressive edge of the late 1960s was toned down, but the criticism 
became more theoretical and, moreover, the critical scholars began to debate more with 
each other.  
   Alternative theories were also elaborated further and applied in research. One of 
the major new trends of the 1970s was Esko Riepula’s sociological jurisprudence. He 
argued that legal scholarship should apply more empirical data and methods of social 
sciences in its analysis.
119
 Traditional legal scholarship, he thought, was scientifically 
questionable and socially insignificant. The way to rescue legal scholarship from the 
crisis was to expand its field of research to encompass social relations.
120
 Riepula was 
taking the debate on legal scholarship into the question of whether legal scholarship 
could be considered as science. He pointed out that the debate of the late 1960s and ear-
ly 1970s had caused a crisis in jurisprudence, which was to be solved by extending its 
methodological basis to include the social and behavioral sciences. The early debates 
had not explicitly dealt with the problem of whether jurisprudence was “science”,121 but 
now it was coming to the fore.
122
 The problem concerned the subject of research and the 
methods of acquiring data and analyzing what had been observed.    
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   The idea behind the alternative methodologies was that they would provide more 
accurate information about law. In his doctoral dissertation, Riepula applied his meth-
ods while examining the practice of the constitutional committee of the parliament in 
interpreting the Constitution. He related the practice to the political context and to the 
political composition of the committee, concluding that its interpretation did follow the 
political biases and interests of its members to a certain extent.
123
 The treatise was an 
obvious expression of combining social science with legal scholarship. It was an empir-
ical, realistic study on constitutional interpretation, which was not seen simply as a legal 
activity, but first and foremost as a political activity. It was a continuation of the politi-
cal-behaviorist jurisprudence of Kivivuori and an application of American political ju-
risprudence in the Finnish context as well. The treatise was thus also an expression of 
the influence of American political jurisprudence and judicial realism on Finnish legal 
scholarship. Since there was no judicial review in Finland, the interpretation of the Con-
stitution was the business of the constitutional committee of the parliament, and thus a 
realist study on the practice of the committee was a version of Finnish realism and polit-
ical jurisprudence.      
   Although no realist legal theory was adopted in Finland, the legal scholars general-
ly took steps in that direction during the 1960s and 1970s. Until the 1960s, the dominant 
opinion was that there was only one correct solution to a legal case, and the purpose of 
the courts was to reach that decision.
124
 The doctrine of single correct solution was criti-
cized in the 1960s,
125
 and by the 1970s, more legal scholars acknowledged that there 
was room for discretion and interpretation in legal decision-making to the extent that the 
idea of one right decision seemed untenable.
126
 Thus, by the mid-1970s, the single cor-
rect solution doctrine was widely discredited.
127
 Finnish legal scholars abandoned the 
idea of legal reasoning as simple logic, but their general opinion should be depicted 
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rather as balanced realism than realism proper, because only a very few spoke for com-
plete indeterminacy or structurally biased judicial decision-making. The majority em-
phasized that there were reasonable limits for legal discretion, and that legal education 
helped the legal decision-maker to stay within a legally sound interpretation. The situa-
tion was somewhat similar in Finland to that in the United States and Scandinavia in 
that scholars admitted the margin of error in legal reasoning, but disagreed as to its na-
ture and extent. The critical scholars, of course, went further and sought to reveal the 
irrationality of legal reasoning. In this regard, then, the fundamental characteristic of the 
critical thought was clear.    
   Criticism of the pursuit of rationality became obvious in the critique of legal con-
cepts. Tolonen argued that even analytical jurisprudence took legal concepts as given 
and did not analyze their historical origins or their functions in modern society, even 
though these aspects were essential for legal analysis.
128
 Besides history, he also 
stressed the significance of theory in sorting out the meaning of the legal concepts.
129
 
Marxist legal scholars also stressed the importance of history for understanding the ac-
tual purpose of the legal concepts and their contemporary relevance.
130
 Eriksson thus 
criticized the artificial distinction between public and private law, arguing that purely 
legal perception of concepts such as freedom of contract and property rights blurred the 
fact that these concepts incorporated aspects of social power and enabled the creation of 
new law through interpretation.
131
 Even if analytical jurisprudence explained the mean-
ing of concepts in actual cases, it was not realistic according to the critical scholars be-
cause they wanted to study the reality behind the concepts as well. Historical and social 
analysis was regarded as important, and the more the scholar endorsed Marxist theory, 
the more he emphasized the significance of the social power structures underlying law.  
   Marxism was becoming a common framework for critical legal scholarship in the 
1970s, but the Marxist scholars were not unanimous about every aspect. For instance, 
both Eriksson and Helge Rontu, a slightly older lawyer who had been active in legal 
politics, studied corporate liability from a Marxist perspective but drew differing con-
clusions. Rontu supported corporate liability from a social point of view,
132
 but Eriksson 
disagreed, arguing that it hid personal liability behind the corporate veil and enabled the 
corporations to reallocate the damage to the consumer following the punishment. There-
fore it was just another way to protect capital.
133
 The former argument was a direct re-
sponse to the problems of capitalism whereas the latter sought to analyze the effects of 
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law further. Critical legal scholarship was interested in the social functions of legal con-
cepts and directed analysis to them, but the argument among the scholars differed in 
detail.    
   The reconsideration of the relationship between consciousness and social and legal 
awareness was a consequence of the rise of Marxism, as well as of critical epistemolo-
gy, the theory of science, and the new ways of comprehending social reality. All these 
were clear in the theory that Juha Tolonen elaborated in his doctoral thesis, in which he 
analyzed the relationship between empirical observations and theories and concepts, 
because, he argued, the former needed the latter in order to be comprehensible, whereas 
the latter needed the former in order to have relevance. He argued that since society 
created criteria against which the appropriateness of legal institutions was measured, 
scholarship needed a historical conception of legal phenomena in order to understand 
their true essence and functions in society.
134
 The most important aspect was the elabo-
ration of a new legal theory according to critical epistemology. The implications of the 
book were the pursuit of a critical understanding of reality and legal institutions. There 
were obvious Marxist traits without however any specific emphasis.    
   The rising interest in Marxism and the theoretical sophistication of critical scholar-
ship opened up new potential for criticism. As in the United States and Scandinavia, the 
critical scholars began to debate their theories among themselves. As we saw in the pre-
vious chapter, Scandinavian Marxist legal scholars debated the basis of Marxism in the 
1970s when the scholarship began to expand. This happened in Finland as well. Eriks-
son criticized Tolonen’s theory for its structuralism and idealism and the lack of critical 
potential, pointing out that the analysis was simply technical if the development of law 
was not seen in the context of the social and economic power structures.
135
 As com-
pared to Scandinavia and Western Europe, Finnish legal scholars were more concerned 
with Soviet legal theory and Marxism-Leninism. Thus, Marxist and Socialist legal theo-
ry were often presented in a good light, emphasizing their scientific aspects.
136
 The 
Finnish political left in general was relatively accommodating towards socialism. Nei-
ther did the critical scholars hesitate in viewing Soviet scholarship and socialist society 
positively. Socialism was part of the critical rhetoric and a powerful counter-argument 
in Finnish society, and thus it was applied in scholarly discourse as well.      
   The use of Marxism opened up many opportunities but also caused controversies 
between scholars. Olli Mäenpää related Marxist scholarship to the question of what was 
considered as legal science. He argued that since the relationship between law, society, 
and the economic basis of society determined the content of law in the last resort, legal 
scholarship had to concentrate on these in order to be science. Consideration was also to 
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be given to the division between the form and substance of law, as well as to the notion 
of law as an ideology and superstructure.
137
 Mäenpää was criticized for not being able 
to produce any valid theory of scientific legal scholarship or verification of interpreta-
tion.
138
 Furthermore, Antero Ignatius pointed out that Mäenpää’s analysis was seriously 
flawed. He argued that Mäenpää had neglected dialectical materialism in his theory and 
was ambiguous in his notions on the relationship between theory and practice.
139
 Elabo-
rating a solid critical theory of law that would be both practical and scientific was well 
intent but difficult in practice. Young Marxists were eager to develop new theories that 
would respond both to the contemporary need to reform legal scholarship and to the 
critical thought of the time, but the task was hard. Nevertheless, Marxism interested 
critical legal scholars because of its critical potentiality especially in a Western, liberal-
bourgeois state that was based on a capitalist economy.  
   Besides the critical scholarship, Finnish legal scholarship was in a dynamic state in 
the 1970s. Thus, to illuminate the context of the critical scholarship, it is important to 
take a look at the change that surrounded it. Legal scholars developed many theories 
that could overcome the problems of traditional positivism but which would not suc-
cumb to critical thought. The emphasis on values and policies became more frequent 
although traditional scholars warned about the dangers of the politicization of scholar-
ship.
140
 The creation of the new approaches was nonetheless widespread. One of the 
new currents was a system theory of law which, as Kauko Sipponen had already argued 
in 1970, could help to understand law in its social context and its relations with social 
phenomena.
141
 Alternative legal scholars saw the system theory as a valuable alternative 
to traditional scholarship because it could open law up to society in various practical 
matters, such as judicial decision-making and legislation.
142
 Non-legal scholars also 
participated in developing the theory by arguing that system theory could help to ana-
lyze judicial decision-making.
143
 System theory was a method of locating law in context 
and placing values in legal analysis without however making any radical arguments 
about the irrationality of law. It was also an expression of applying non-traditional 
methods in legal scholarship and thus widening its theoretical basis.   
   The social orientation of alternative legal scholarship was also of practical use. 
Both legal scholarship and law-making were opening up more toward society. The idea 
of directing social and economic development through active regulation originated in 
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the early 1960s.
144
 The social policy of the 1970s followed the optimism over social 
planning,
145
 and social data and values had ever more influence in legislation.
146
 A re-
flection of the social planning of the 1970s, as well as of the rising interest in sociology 
of law and social sciences in legal research, was the foundation of the National Re-
search Institute of Legal Policy, OPTULA (Oikeuspoliittinen tutkimuslaitos) in 1974, 
which replaced the Institute of Criminology which had been established in 1963.
147
 Its 
foundation encouraged socially-oriented legal scholarship by providing work for legal 
scholars and markets for research. The readiness to reform both law and legal scholar-
ship was widespread, the critical and the leftist thinking being simply its most obvious 
articulations.       
   In addition to the increased interest in empirical legal research, legal scholars were 
also concerned about the theoretical aspects of jurisprudence. Theoretical jurisprudence 
was modified to fit the new needs of society and the profession. Aarnio participated 
actively in the critical debates and elaborated new ideas on legal theory and scholarship. 
He thought that it was important to reconsider the premises of legal scholarship because 
to a certain extent they depended on the social circumstances.
148
 He argued that values 
did have a role, but not a decisive one in legal scholarship,
149
 which thus always had an 
element of politics but was never entirely political.
150
 In a study published in 1975, he 
summarized the concepts he had developed during the 1970s, pursuing a thorough un-
derstanding of law in its social and scientific context, an understanding legal theory.
151
 
His point of departure was the analytical tradition of Finnish jurisprudence, which he 
modified with Scandinavian realism, linguistic philosophy and deontic logic, and her-
meneutics, and which he sought to adopt into the contemporaneous critical debates. He 
also relied heavily on the literature of Otto Brusiin, a realist Finnish legal philosopher 
whose ideas were widely discredited in the 1930s when they were first published. Aar-
nio sought to demonstrate how legal decision-making and scholarship were simultane-
ously dependent on both social structures and the inner structures of the legal system. 
Not being a critical scholar, he debunked the thoroughgoing formalism as well as the 
notion of the complete irrationality of law, thus balancing between traditional and crit i-
cal scholarship.    
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   Recent trends in jurisprudence and philosophy were apparent in Aarnio’s combi-
nation of contradictory perspectives. Although he acknowledged that judicial decision-
making could be arbitrary, he suggested that the theory on judicial decision-making had 
to be based on rationality.
152
 He argued that Finnish legal scholarship was based on a 
positivist paradigm and doctrinal analysis of law, but he also recognized the usefulness 
of other methods and wanted to scrutinize the premises of positivism critically without 
however abandoning the tradition.
153
 He also argued that teleological theory, sociologi-
cal jurisprudence, and Marxist legal scholarship served important interests but could not 
form the basis of legal scholarship alone.
154
        
   Aarnio was distancing himself from the subjectivity of legal reasoning he had 
stressed before. Now he was elaborating a systematic theory of law in which the goal-
oriented reasoning and the obscurities of law would be understood in the context of the 
legal system. The pursuit of synthesis and objectivity did not, however, please critical 
scholars. Tolonen criticized Aarnio for missing the structural connections of law. In 
addition, he argued that there could have been no objective systematization because 
concepts were always one-sided, and hence ideological, descriptions of reality.
155
 Marx-
ist scholars criticized Aarnio for his idealistic subjectivism and neglecting the social 
construction of law and reality. Backman and Mäenpää argued that Aarnio had missed 
the way society constituted the knowledge of the individual. This idealist conception of 
reality ignored the fact that human consciousness was subordinated to objective reality. 
Marxist legal scholarship was practical precisely because it considered law as a social 
construction.
156
 The fundamental difference between Marxist scholarship and what was 
labeled as traditional was that Marxist legal scholarship stressed the importance of dia-
lectical analysis of the relationship between society and law, whereas traditional legal 
thought, or bourgeois as the Marxists often called it, sought to mask that relationship.
157
   
   Apart from the sociological aspect that marked the critical enterprise, the criticism 
of values and ideologies was another fundamental element of critical scholarship. Crit i-
cal scholars argued that society created boundaries for individual consciousness and 
imposed some values on them while excluding others. Thus, they thought that legal the-
ory that stressed the importance of subjective values but neglected their social origins 
missed an essential aspect of legal analysis. The question was not simply whether val-
ues influenced law, but rather what values, how they were constructed, and why it was 
just these particular values that mattered. Critical scholars understood law as a positive 
system, but they were dissatisfied with the understanding of law at face value, without 
considering the motives behind its goals and values. They thought that the traditional 
pursuit of rationalizing of what they thought was ambiguity was a denial of the ideology 
underpinning law, and therefore contributed to the mystification and reification of law.    
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   In the mid-1970s, critical legal scholarship was acquiring new dimensions, and its 
basis was being explained. As in other disciplines, Marxism was becoming a worthy 
method of legal research, not just a tool of criticism. The origins and functions of values 
within law were precisely relevant for critical legal scholarship. Critical scholars clari-
fied the meaning of Marxism in jurisprudence
158
 to show that it was not simply an ide-
ology. Eriksson was also elaborating his thinking further by building his premises on a 
more nuanced philosophical basis. For him the relevant question was not what was or 
what ought to have been, but rather what the essence of the legal phenomena was. The 
essential point was thus to construct the dynamic of the inner logic of law in its histori-
cal and social context.
159
 According to Eriksson, law turned material relations into legal 
concepts and hence into an ideology, and the purpose of the critical legal scholarship 
was to unmask this ideology,
160
 because only by realizing the social connections of law 
and its inner logic could people be emancipated and create real alternatives to the exist-
ing law.
161
 The focus was moving from values to their origins and purposes. Critical 
scholars considered even legal realism as “unrealistic” because it did not pay due atten-
tion to the factors underlying the values in law. Critical scholarship thus adopted a per-
spective on law that diverged from the traditional one completely.   
   The philosophical addition to Marxism turned the analysis towards the essence of 
society. Critical legal scholarship went beyond the efforts of empirical and sociological 
jurisprudence, since they were simply concerned with the law in action, not about its 
ultimate motives. Law was a human activity, but it was it for a purpose. According to 
Eriksson, the purpose of law was to promote the interests of the ruling social class, 
namely the economically powerful class. Critical legal scholarship therefore explicated 
the structural dependencies and contradictions within law, unmasked and demystified its 
ideological elements, and provided alternatives.
162
 The basis of critical legal scholarship 
was still the same but, as Eriksson became more familiar with Marxist literature, he was 
able to enhance and hone his arguments. Finnish Marxist legal scholarship of the mid-
1970s was no longer simply an ideology, but was becoming more of a theory, or rather 
a set of theories.   
   The discussion of the methods and purposes of legal scholarship continued, and 
legal scholars became interested in the foundation of their scholarship.
163
 Marxism, on 
the other hand, became a method of critical or realist legal scholarship. Tolonen contin-
ued elaborating his theory by stating that Marxism did not replace traditional scholar-
ship but complemented it by correcting its flaws and inadequacies. Dialectical material-
ism was a method of analyzing the gap between law in books and law in action as an 
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ongoing process. Thus critical scholarship avoided a basic flaw of traditional scholar-
ship, in which conceptions of the scholar masked the subject and excluded the possibil-
ity of alternative perspectives.
164
 Blom also combined the aspects of theoretical and 
empirical research by arguing that scholarship aimed to renew reality as it was under-
stood and conceptualized. He thought that research had to take the historical and social 
development of concepts into account and analyze their relationship with empirical real-
ity.
165
 By the mid-1970s, critical legal scholarship had established its position as a 
method of analyzing theoretical and empirical material. It was not a major paradigm, 
but it was a paradigm for those who were not content with the traditional scholarship. 
Although no major transformation of the paradigm had occurred, the methodological 
basis of legal scholarship had expanded.   
   The paradigmatic nature of the critical thought reveals a lot about the critical de-
bates. There was no predominant paradigm of legal scholarship in the late 1970s, or if 
there was, it was very difficult to adumbrate it. Nevertheless, the critics chose analytical 
jurisprudence as their target,
166
 despite Aarnio arguing that it was not the dominant par-
adigm.
167
 The critics needed a target and they chose analytical jurisprudence because it 
was a modern and a widely-used method of legal scholarship. Although their criticism 
often concerned the methods of conceptualism, there was no point in criticizing it be-
cause that had already been done, not least by the proponents of analytical jurispru-
dence. Criticism needed a target that could be labeled as conservative in order to make 
the alternative appear progressive. The critical scholars of course felt that traditional 
legal scholarship was conservative and out of touch with reality because of their differ-
ent perspective on the problems. Critical legal scholarship was about new conceptions 
of law, society, and scholarship, its basis being the way the critical scholars understood 
society and the role of their profession within it.    
   Indeed, the critical scholars wanted to change their profession, and the elaboration 
of alternative legal scholarship continued. In 1976, Backman noted the insufficiency of 
the critical debates and sought to develop alternative legal scholarship by specifying its 
theoretical basis and the use of the social sciences as well by focusing on those elements 
of social science which were meaningful for legal scholarship. He suggested that the 
purpose of legal scholarship was to investigate law and the state because law was de-
pendent on the type and the form of the state. The state, however, was a subject of legal 
research only to the extent that it created and supported law, because, just as it was a 
mistake to detach law from its political connections, it was a mistake to draw a parallel 
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between them.
168
 Those who wanted to integrate legal scholarship into social science 
were not particularly concerned about the various schools of social sciences or their 
practical applicability to legal scholarship. As the time went on, however, they had to be 
more specific about their arguments lest they repeat the same ones over and over again.   
   Alternative legal scholarship had developed greatly since the mid-1960s when the 
arguments against traditional legal scholarship began to be heard. The rebellion on 
methods was fully apparent by the end of the decade, and the critical scholars called for 
a jurisprudence that would be open with values and policies in law and apply the social 
science methods in legal research. They argued that the tradition was dominated by 
formalism which detached law from social reality and presented rules and concepts as 
natural. The interview with the President Kekkonen in 1970 brought the critical argu-
ments clearly before the legal profession, and the debates on the methods and purposes 
of legal scholarship continued. The 1970s also brought Marxist theory into critical legal 
scholarship, although elements of it had been apparent in the 1960s. By the mid-1970s, 
critical and alternative legal scholarship had a sophisticated and well-defined theoretical 
basis.  
   The development of the critical legal scholarship was similar in Finland to that in 
the United States and Scandinavia. The fundamental arguments and the ideological 
background were established in the 1960s, and the theoretical basis was elaborated and 
the scholarship became more widespread during the 1970s. Like their Scandinavian 
colleagues, the Finnish scholars found a common basis in Marxism, and with varying 
interpretations. Finnish scholars also became interested in political and behaviorist ju-
risprudence. Critical legal scholarship thus acquired two main currents; empirical and 
sociological jurisprudence on the one hand and the criticism of values and ideologies on 
the other. Critical legal scholarship reflected the broader transformation of legal schol-
arship, being its most extreme and radical demonstration. In addition, the Finnish criti-
cal scholars organized themselves, but this occurred earlier than in the United States or 
Scandinavia, and in closer cooperation with the profession itself. Of course, the Nation-
al Lawyers Guild in the United States had functioned as an alternative professional or-
ganization for decades before the 1970s. Nevertheless, Finnish critical legal scholarship 
was radical and socially active. The development of the critical legal scholarship, how-
ever, involves several aspects besides jurisprudence, and these will be dealt with in the 
following sections.   
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3 Criticism of constitutional law, 1967─1978 
3.1 Constitutional law and scholarship 
 
The intense discussions of constitutional law in the 1960s and 1970s in Finland provide 
insights into social radicalism and alternative and critical legal scholarship. The Consti-
tution of Finland was enacted in 1919, in the aftermath of the civil war once the revolu-
tionary left had been defeated. Thus, the Constitution established a liberal-bourgeois 
society in which the strong powers of the President were meant to maintain a stable 
buffer against radical reforms.
169
 Nevertheless, full democracy and the freedom of ex-
pression and assembly were guaranteed.
170
 Finland was by no means a fascist country. 
Rather, its society was based on contemporary Western liberal-bourgeois ideals of the 
rule of law and equality before law.  
   However, it was precisely the bourgeois-liberal society that the radicals of the 
1960s criticized, arguing that it protected the freedom and values of the economy while 
suppressing the values of the less-privileged classes. The critical argument was that 
formal equality masked the actual inequality, and it was precisely in the criticism of 
constitutional law in which this argument was most pronounced. In this section, I will 
therefore discuss the critical analysis of constitutional law and the judiciary, because 
these were the most radical parts of the critical legal scholarship, and those in which the 
connection between theory and practice was the most obvious.  
   The basis of the criticism of constitutional law was established in the late 1960s. 
The Constitution was placed under critical scrutiny after the mid-decade,
171
 and in 1967, 
Lars D. Eriksson explained all the critical objections the political left had to it in legal 
terms. According to Eriksson, the Constitution was a political document that established 
a capitalist society, since no real democracy could exist without democracy in the econ-
omy. The formalist-legalist bourgeois hegemony had masked the fact that the judiciary 
was biased towards the capitalist interests and that the system of legislation protected 
the status quo. Thus, only fundamental changes could bring reform.
172
 Evident in the 
criticism was the socialist rhetoric that demonstrated the evils of capitalism. It also illus-
trates the political connections of critical thought. Critical scholars argued that law was 
inherently related to the economic basis of society, which created social inequalities, 
and the traditional scholarship masked and legitimized the prevailing circumstances. 
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The purpose of critical scholarship, on the other hand, was to disclose reality, the openly 
political tone being a fundamental feature of critical scholarship.     
   Besides the fundamental aspects of the Constitution, the rights of the citizen were 
another concern of the critical scholars. Jyränki noted that the traditional conception of 
rights as protection against the state was very static. Since they concerned questions of 
values, however, rights played an important social role, and a social conception of them 
would improve equality as well as social conditions.
173
 Important for Jyränki was to 
reconsider the conception of rights and their functions in society, since the simple fact 
that they were stipulated in the Constitution could not guarantee their actual signifi-
cance. Later he took these arguments further, arguing that legal practice had increased 
the importance of property rights as related to other rights,
174
 and that the law on na-
tional broadcasting led to factual limitations on the freedom of expression.
175
 Essential 
in the critical thought was the argument that constitutional ideology delimited the exe-
cution of rights, which then became the object of research, for which the radical social 
thought provided further impetus. Critical legal scholarship essentially meant a critical 
comprehension of law, an alternative way to determine the legal and social reality.        
   The criticism of the Constitution intensified at the end of the 1960s. The cause of 
the critical legal scholars was popularized in collections of addresses and pamphlets in 
which the arguments for the inherent inequality of constitutional law were put for-
ward.
176
 The problem with the constitution was that it reflected the social power struc-
tures and the relations of production, but this was obscured by traditional legal con-
sciousness.
177
 A general argument was that the Constitution was deliberately conserva-
tive to obviate any real social reform.
178
 Critical scholarship was radical in the sense 
that it went to the roots of the problem, which in this case were in the constitutional sys-
tem and social structures. Criticism was therefore to be directed at the system.    
   To the critical scholars, the Constitution was not simply a legal document but a 
tool of social organization.
179
 Since the criticism reflected leftist thought, the criticism 
of the constitutional system was related to the concept of private property and its consti-
tutional protection. Hence, Riepula argued, the ideology of the bourgeoisie had been 
insinuated into the Constitution,
180
 and Jyränki explained that this was so because the 
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Constitution was drafted in accordance with the interests of the bourgeoisie as a conse-
quence of the civil war.
181
 This led to the reconsideration of the concept of rights and 
their constitutional protection. The critical opinion was that private property had a dom-
inating position in Finnish society, and that democracy in the economy was needed in 
order to produce genuine democracy.
182
 The Constitution was obviously drafted during 
controversial times, but whether it incorporated a particular kind of society and econom-
ic system is a matter of debate. The arguments of the critical scholars reveal more about 
their interpretation than about the Constitution as such. Their perception conformed to 
the radical leftist thinking of the 1960s and differed from the traditional view that con-
sidered the Constitution rather as a legal document.    
   In attacking the fundamentals of constitutional law the question of industrial de-
mocracy was also debated. The critical scholars opined that industrial democracy would 
contribute to the real sovereignty of the people. Eriksson wrote that since the sanctifica-
tion of private property caused problems of democracy and equality,
183
 decision-making 
should be brought closer to the citizen instead of being concentrated in the hands of the 
ruling elite,
184
 and the conceptions of share-holding and joint-stock companies should 
be reconsidered.
185
 Jyränki explained that the constitution stabilized the situation so that 
the minority which held the economic power could avert any fundamental changes. The 
contemporary society was a society of inequalities, which the law protected. Constitu-
tional scholarship had also contributed to the maintenance of the bourgeois conscious-
ness, which masked the true nature of social relations.
186
 For the critical scholars, the 
constitution was a fortress of indoctrination of false consciousness, and thus minor 
changes would not produce any real reform. What was needed, rather, was a fundamen-
tal change in the Constitution and in the traditional legal consciousness.     
   The split between the critical and the traditional scholars was obvious in their con-
ception of property. A traditional response was that the critical scholars had exaggerated 
the meaning of property. Although a more flexible concept was needed, property rights 
were still to be strictly protected.
187
 Traditional scholars argued further that the critics 
had misinterpreted the purpose of the protection of rights while relating property rights 
to personal liberties.
188
 To view property as a social concept was a radical break from 
the tradition, which obviously seemed irrational to traditional legal scholars. It was a 
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notion of the 1960s and 1970s to argue for personal liberty and against property rights, 
and thus the perceptions on the matter differed fundamentally.      
   The complex and not unambiguous view of the critical scholars on the problem of 
rights was seen in their endorsement of social rights. The critics argued that it was easi-
er to intervene in the personal liberty of a person than on private property rights.
189
 
However, they also encouraged more state activity in the protection and enforcement of 
social rights. The view of the early 1970s was still relatively strongly on the side of the 
welfare state and was optimist about the public potential to provide free services for the 
people, such as housing, education, and culture.
190
 This is why the critical legal scholars 
also argued that the rights of the poor were not effective, and that the general increase in 
wealth sometimes produced more misery. The state should thus be stronger in imple-
menting the actual effectiveness of rights.
191
 In general, the radical thought was critical 
of the welfare state because it was seen as a guardian of the status quo and a re-producer 
of false consciousness. With respect to redistribution and social rights, however, the 
critical scholars often favored a strong state. They demanded more power for the par-
liament over the government and the president, and they also demanded more power for 
the public authorities to redistribute economic welfare, but not in intervening in the pri-
vate life of the citizen.  
   The state emphasis on economic matters and rights was part of the criticism of 
formalism. For instance, in an analysis of rights-consciousness in modern society, Blom 
argued that since formal rights were detached from their economic basis, they caused 
actual inequality. Law and rights reflected and protected economic relations and masked 
and legitimized the resultant inequality.
192
 People were becoming more interested in 
their rights as the welfare state improved and the debates on the Constitution continued. 
The Marxist perspective on rights encouraged study of their structural relations and the 
consequences. Once the rights consciousness had made its way to the center of legal 
thought, critical scholars began to place even heavier emphasis on them. Blom, for ex-
ample, argued that to be effective, social rights and their enforcement should be strictly 
stipulated in the Constitution.
193
 Social rights often conflicted with private property 
rights,
194
 so the critical scholars argued that property rights should not be interpreted as 
a hindrance to the enforcement of social rights.
195
 The emergence of social rights as 
well as critical thought required a more flexible understanding of the concept of proper-
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ty which the critical scholars argued was an absolute concept. They wanted to see rights 
in a more social context.    
   Changes occurred in constitutional scholarship at a more general level as well. In a 
text-book on constitutional law, published in 1972, Jyränki and his co-authors stressed 
the Marxist aspects of the Constitution and the alternative aspects of legal scholarship in 
the recent years.
196
 These changes followed the methodological turn in general, follow-
ing the revision of Finnish history and its impact on the law in particular. As we saw, 
Jyränki endorsed methodological eclecticism and the focus on law in action. In a study 
concerning the Constitution and social change, he examined the history of particular 
constitutional occurrences, analyzing their impact on contemporary constitutional law. 
In brief, he argued that constitutional interpretation mostly reflected the needs of the 
economy, and that the protection of property was crucial in constitutional law. Follow-
ing the American classic, Charles Beard, he concluded that the Finnish Constitution 
created a system in which no social class could ever control all of the state powers, and 
the system overall was thus stabilized.
197
 Historical examination of practical cases thus 
proved, according to Jyränki, the inevitable connection between law and economic 
power. This study was one of the first critical legal histories in Finland in the 1970s 
with its emphasis on the social and ideological aspects of constitutional interpretation. It 
reflected the elements of critical and alternative legal scholarship in various ways, and 
was therefore a considerable deviation from the traditional scholarship.    
   The critical interpretation of history also highlighted the controversies in legal 
thought. The older and more traditional constitutional scholar, though not extremely so, 
Paavo Kastari
198
 criticized Jyränki for over emphasizing the class conflict and therefore 
making subjective interpretations which the sources did not support.
199
 From the critical 
perspective, the history of law involved the struggle between the social classes. Thus it 
was important for the critical scholar to understand law in its historical and social con-
text, which brought new dimensions to the analysis but also caused problems of inter-
pretation and argumentation. As was the case in Scandinavian Marxist legal scholarship, 
the more traditional scholars criticized the Marxist analysis for distorting the sources. 
The critical perspective on history was nonetheless a fundamental characteristic of crit i-
cal scholarship, marking the difference between the critical and traditional scholars.     
   Besides being an important aspect in the critical legal scholarship on constitutional 
law, the revision of history was an essential aspect of the more general transformation 
of scholarship in the 1970s. From a critical perspective, the revision of history was 
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needed because those historical events which were considered as a menace to the con-
temporary society were often regarded negatively.
200
 For the critical scholars, the histor-
ical dimension helped to understand law instead of taking it at face-value.
201
 This also 
raised the problems of the civil war. Nieminen, for instance, noted that the revolutionary 
constitution of 1918 was not as socialist as was commonly assumed, but rather a truly 
democratic one.
202
 The point was to show that the Finnish communists were not the 
same as the Soviet communists. In addition, Jyränki demonstrated that the drafting of 
the Constitution in 1917–1919 was a break with legality and tradition, and that the in-
terpretation of the Constitution had changed in the course of time.
203
 Jyränki obviously 
argued that the common faith in legalism and continuity in Finnish constitutional law 
was rather a myth with only a faint correspondence to reality. This notion enabled a 
contribution to the reform of the Constitution that was going on at the time and gave 
impetus to a more thorough reform. Because of the emphasis on the connection between 
scholarship and politics, alternative and critical legal scholarship bore a close connec-
tion to relevant contemporary topics.       
   The emphasis on history and class conflict reflected the general politicization of 
scholarship in the 1970s.
204
 Research often took a stand on controversial political ques-
tions. Jyränki thus argued that the Finnish Constitution was a semi-presidential system 
in which the powers of the parliament were restricted,
205
 and that the powers of the 
President had increased in practice.
206
 The purpose was obviously to articulate the 
strong position of the president in relation to the parliament. Since the political left con-
sidered the strong presidential powers as a hindrance to reform, scholarship focused on 
analyzing the evolution and the meaning of these powers. Non-traditional scholarship 
was politically oriented, as evident in the choice of methods and subjects as well as in 
the use of the findings.       
   History and reality also related to Marxist theory which stressed the relationship 
between law and the state. Eriksson noted that the Constitution was not simply a tool of 
the power of the ruling class, but a mediator between conflicting social interests. Scien-
tific determination of its exact meaning was impossible since interpretations varied ac-
cording to the perspective.
207
 Therefore, constitutional concepts had to be analyzed in 
particular contexts.
208
 A central tenet of the critical thought was that there were no ob-
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jective interpretations, and the social context and the values of the interpreter affected 
them. Since the Constitution was a significant legal institution, performing a fundamen-
tal role in society, the critical scholars emphasized the importance of seeing it in a social 
context instead of simply as a normative institution. Criticism of constitutional law and 
critical legal scholarship progressed hand in hand in this regard, influencing and being 
influenced by each other.      
   It is no surprise that the Marxist theory of the state also emerged in Finnish schol-
arship in the late 1970s. According to the critical scholars, the law and the state were in 
an organic relationship, and there could be no law without the state and no state without 
the law.
209
 The emergence of the state followed the emergence of the economy, and the 
economically powerful class controlled the state as a way to protect and reproduce the 
relations of power. Law was a product of the state and it made social relations appear 
abstract and formal in order to mask the reality.
210
 In modern society, however, the po-
litical reality had to delimit democracy in order to maintain the capitalist mode of pro-
duction.
211
 Therefore, the state mystified the democratic process by presenting the par-
liament as the most significant power and by reducing democracy to voting in order to 
make the people accept the situation.
212
 Critical scholarship sought to reveal that the 
apparently democratic institutions of the state were empty in practice, thus minimizing 
the power of the people and maximizing the power of capital. Marxist rhetoric and 
analysis were used to disclose what was called the ideological function of law, and 
hence to provide data for legal change. The fundamental nature of the analysis reflects 
the radicalism of the critical scholarship, and the use of the Marxist theory reflects the 
evolution of the critical scholarship as well as the importance of leftist rhetoric to it.     
   Even before the Marxist turn of the 1970s, critical scholars were interested in how 
the law contributed to social failings. A central theme in this regard was the criticism of 
the process of legislation. The critics argued that the power to legislate had moved from 
the parliament to various committees to a large extent, which was harmful for social 
development because the committees paid attention rather to technicalities than social 
issues,
213
 were often closed and thus excluded open discussion,
214
 and relied on the ex-
pertise of traditional legal scholars whose conservatism thus influenced the law great-
ly.
215
 The President of Finland confirmed these arguments in the notorious interview in 
1970, in which he also endorsed a socially and politically more diversified composition 
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of the committees as well as more sociological expertise in them.
216
 Backman also ar-
gued that whenever a problem was to be regulated, it had to be thoroughly analyzed in 
open discussion on the potential goals and the means to achieve them.
217
    
   The question of legislation was also one of social and academic power. For the 
critical legal scholars, the major problems regarding legislation were that its drafting 
was undemocratic and mostly controlled by conservative legal scholars who did not 
understand society. Their response was that legislation and its drafting were to be open, 
and legal scholars should have more understanding of society. Since their scholarship 
was based on social, political, and behavioral sciences, alternative and critical legal 
scholars considered themselves as lawyers for the society, having a better understanding 
of the social functions of law than the traditional profession.      
   Relating to the process of legislation was the problem of its constitutionality. Crit-
ical scholars were skeptical about judicial review and the constitutional court because 
they thought that the courts were a very conservative social institution.
218
 Some tradi-
tional scholars, on the other hand, favored an establishment of a constitutional court 
because of its potential to protect rights.
219
 This was also the opinion of the political 
right, which considered such a court necessary because of the rise of Marxism and the 
repressive use of the law by the radical left.
220
 An important factor in the conflict was 
that for the traditional view, the control of the constitutionality of legislation was a le-
gal, not a political issue, whereas for the critical view it was precisely a political issue. 
For instance, Riepula argued that control of the constitutionality of law could not be 
made apolitical by delegating it to the courts, and it should be opened up to a more di-
versified discussion.
221
 Since the process of legislation was a question of social power, 
it should not be masked behind the mist of legal rhetoric.
222
 When the law was consid-
ered as politics, as the critical scholars did, there was nothing apolitical about law. Part 
of the criticism might have been sheer trashing of the traditional symbols and values, 
but some of it related to genuine concern for the possibility of reform and enforcement 
of equal rights. Critical scholarship thus involved several aspects of society, politics, 
and scholarship.  
   The criticism of the inability of the legal system to enforce the rights of the citizen 
was also apparent in the criticism of the Chancellor of Justice. An entire issue of Oikeus 
was dedicated to this problem. The critics argued that the Chancellor was guided by his 
political biases and that he had neglected his duties towards the citizen while focusing 
on matters of legislation.
223
 Eriksson related the problem to the blind faith in legalism in 
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Finnish legal thought, arguing that legal problems were traditionally understood in for-
malist way, which blurred the realities behind them and caused inequalities and prob-
lems.
224
 The trashing of authority and the radical critique of traditional institutions were 
evident in every aspect of critical legal scholarship. By the mid-1970s, critical and al-
ternative scholars had formed a strong front which attacked every aspect of the law.  
   Criticism of constitutional law reflected various aspects of social radicalism and 
critical legal scholarship. The polarization of the Finnish society of the early 1970s be-
tween the working class and the bourgeoisie was clear in the critical rhetoric. The crit i-
cal scholars perceived the Constitution as part of a historical and social totality, origi-
nating and functioning in a context with specific purposes. Because their point of view 
was typically a Marxist and a leftist one, they argued that the Constitution was part of 
the legal myth which created a capitalist society and protected and reproduced its insti-
tutions. Their scholarship advocated the methods of history and social science in order 
to produce data for reform. In this regard, theory and practice were close to each other. 
In order to illuminate this relationship, we shall now take a brief look at the reform of 
the Constitution of Finland in the 1970s.  
   The Constitution was debated in the 1960s, and there was a general agreement on 
the need for reform, which was initiated in 1970. The reform committee published its 
first interim report in 1974. It was unanimous about increasing democracy and improv-
ing the rights of the citizen, but disagreement arose as to the extent of increasing the 
powers of the parliament and the scope of these rights. The radical side, represented by 
Jyränki, who was the vice-chairman of the committee, was willing to concentrate more 
power in the parliament, whereas the more moderate side wanted to maintain a balance 
between the state branches and proceed with the reform cautiously.
225
 I shall not discuss 
the reform in detail but provide some examples related to the critical constitutional 
scholarship.    
   We have seen that the critical legal scholars argued that the Constitution was based 
on the interests of capitalist society and was conservative. They therefore endorsed a 
total reform of the system. The radicals had their own proposal for the Finnish Constitu-
tion, which would have turned Finland into a soviet republic in which all the power 
would belong to the people, and where the courts would be subjected to democratic con-
trol.
226
 This radical proposal was meant to provide a framework for a more democratic 
society and would have altered the whole basis of constitutional law. It was obviously 
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meant to provoke discussion, but its substance was illustrative of the critical thinking. In 
any event, the radical agenda was real and it did have lots of significance in practice.    
   The radical notions were also the basis of the radical wing of the committee, which 
adopted the view that the since Constitution was drafted on the basis of class conflict, it 
protected the interests of the bourgeoisie and stabilized the prevailing social order.
227
 
The greatest controversy over the reform followed from this notion. The radicals pro-
posed a flexible, social concept of private property, endorsing an amendment that would 
have made expropriation for public purposes easier. They sought to enable the realloca-
tion of large portions of the economic structure and big corporations to social control if 
it was considered appropriate in improving social inequalities that the economic rela-
tions caused, the ultimate goal being in the establishment of the prerequisites for a 
planned economy.
228
 These proposals were extreme, but they have to be understood in 
the context of the 1970s. As political matters they were radical indeed, but they suited 
the political rhetoric and conflict of the time and were not exceptional by the standards 
of the time. The critical legal scholars endorsed a new, more social and less formal con-
cept of property, a concept which correlated with the goals of the radical left. Critical 
legal scholarship reflected the radical social thought, but it also contributed to it by 
making it clearer and providing it with more practical utility.     
   In connection with the reform, the critical scholars could demonstrate the ideologi-
cal restrictions of legal practice. After the report was published, critical legal scholars 
argued that the information on it was inadequate and that the political right had tried to 
undermine the proposals of the left.
229
 Eriksson noted that the practice of the moderate 
reformers was contrary to the fundamental principle of the reform, which was to im-
prove the sovereignty of the people.
230
 The politics and rhetoric were closely linked, the 
central point being that there were noble concepts which were not acted upon in reality. 
This was an effort to demonstrate the influence of ideology on the discourse over the 
Constitution, and it also reflected the critical perspective on law, which emphasized its 
actual functioning in the social reality.   
   The way the critical scholars mixed political and scholarly rhetoric and how this 
was incomprehensible to the traditional scholarship was also obvious. The defenders of 
the moderate reform argued that the problem concerned such fundamental issues that 
there was no reason to hurry.
231
 The radicals were also criticized for their proposals. A 
professor of constitutional law, Veli Merikoski argued that centralization of power to 
the parliament was harmful for democracy,
232
 and Mikael Hidén, a young but traditional 
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legal scholar argued that the concept of property of the radicals was ideological and 
legally unsound.
233
 The critical scholars often criticized the traditional scholars for ig-
noring the ideological biases in law and not understanding its social context, and now 
they faced the same criticism. The traditional point was that property was to be ap-
proached from a purely legal perspective without paying attention to any ideological 
factors. Because of the differences in perspective, the traditional and critical legal schol-
ars were in a continuous merry-go-round on the issue. The critical insight of the state 
institutions differed fundamentally from that of the traditional one, and since they per-
ceived problems differently, they had difficulty in finding a common language. Thus the 
debates on the Constitution clearly reflect the radicalism of the critical thought and the 
huge gulf between the traditional and critical epistemology.   
   Since the critical thought was all-encompassing, the critical scholars attacked a va-
riety of the state institutions. The state administration was also one of the authorities to 
which Marxist analysis could be appropriately applied. In this respect, too, the critical 
scholars wanted to go beyond the apparent reality. Legal scholarship on administrative 
law followed the general trends of jurisprudence with a lag of a few years. In the 1970s, 
scholars of administrative law became interested in analytical jurisprudence and began 
to criticize the conceptual tradition.
234
 In this regard, however, the critical scholars at-
tacked the thoroughgoing effects of the structure of the state, not analytical jurispru-
dence. A general argument was that the powers of the parliament were reduced in favor 
of the executive,
235
 which was harmful to democracy,
236
 and an effort of the capitalist 
state to maintain its legitimacy.
237
 The aim was once again to go beyond the meaning of 
concepts and to examine the reasons and purposes of the law in action. In the pursuit of 
the real essence of the executive branch, a theory was needed, and for the critical schol-
ars it was Marxist theory that was the most appropriate.  
   Marxist theory on administrative law followed the familiar patterns of critical legal 
scholarship. A significant person in this regard was Kaarlo Tuori, a young, promising 
scholar of administrative law in the mid-1970s. He was also interested in Marxism and 
critical legal scholarship, on the basis of which he developed a critical theory of the ad-
ministration of the state. According to him, administration mediated the politics of the 
state which emanated from the class conflict and society. It was therefore important to 
understand the dialectical development of both the form and substance of law in the 
regard in its historical, social, and political context. One could then understand the char-
acter of the authority of the state as a class power and the law as a legitimizing and mys-
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tifying institution.
238
 Critical self-reflection on theory was also required, since scholar-
ship on administrative law also legitimized and reproduced the system.
239
   
      The debates on the constitution faded in the latter half of the 1970s.
240
 By 1977, 
the total reform of the constitution was at a temporary standstill, and the focus moved 
towards reform of the protection of the rights of the citizen.
241
 While the criticism of the 
Constitution was fading in the mid-1970s, and while critical legal scholarship in general 
was becoming theoretically more sophisticated, critical legal scholars began to analyze 
more particular aspects of law. Nevertheless, as long as the critical debates on both the 
Constitution and constitutional scholarship were intense, critical scholars propounded 
the same arguments in these respects. For example, Jyränki, one of the most prominent 
proponents of critical legal scholarship and who also sat on the reform committee, pro-
moted the same arguments in both his scholarship and his political activity. Scholarship 
was indeed politicized in the 1970s. For the critical scholars, there were not simply legal 
rules, principles, and doctrine to analyze, but they all related to the complex totality of 
the society which had to be taken into account. Another example that illuminates this 
aspect was the criticism of the judiciary which is the topic of the next section.  
3.2 Criticism of the judiciary 
 
Courts are the organs that apply law and transform law in books into law in action. It is 
therefore no surprise that the critical legal scholarship also concerned itself with the 
judiciary and its position in the legal system. Legal protection and the administration of 
justice were also under serious scrutiny in the 1960s and 1970s, and the judiciary was 
also subjected to reform. The criticism of the judiciary was another aspect which points 
out the connection between critical legal scholarship in theory and in practice, as well as 
the difference in the perception of law between the critical and traditional scholars.    
   The radical criticism of the courts began in the 1960s. Ensio Hiitonen had already 
pointed out in his study in the 1950s that the courts had adjudicated political cases and 
followed the hegemony of the political right in their decisions.
242
 In 1965, Kaarle Mak-
konen had argued that adjudication was often irrational.
243
 The criticism of the courts 
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was intensified by the controversial suits in the 1960s, the most famous being the case 
against the author Hannu Salama for blasphemy,
244
 and the case against Erik Schüller in 
the late 1960s for inciting conscientious objection.
245
 Although the cases had their 
greatest influence on criminal law, they also contributed to the critical argument that the 
courts preserved the conservative social order. Thus, when the critique of legal reason-
ing and scholarship was already intense in the late 1960s, Eriksson argued that the inde-
pendence of the judiciary was simply a myth. On the contrary, he wrote, courts were 
political organs using political power, and in a class society they protected the interests 
of the ruling class. The political nature of the courts had to be recognized and be placed 
under democratic control.
246
 Since the critical thought identified legal institutions with 
the social power structures in this respect as well, it was radical regarding both percep-
tion and its political implications.     
   The beginning of the 1970s marked a dramatic turn. As we saw earlier, the studies 
by Blom revealed a serious lack of confidence in the courts,
247
 and, as on so many other 
occasions, the President gave a further impetus to the clamor over the judiciary. In his 
birthday interview, he pronounced that since the courts often made political decisions, 
there was a need to reconsider the concept of the separation of state powers.
248
 Although 
the need to reform the judiciary was recognized,
249
 President Kekkonen’s comment was 
the one the legal profession was most hostile about. The President was criticized for 
endorsing ideological elements and exaggerating the political power of the courts.
250
 
The critical scholars, on the other hand, chided the criticism as political, saying that the 
question was about increasing democracy.
251
 The politicization of the courts, neverthe-
less, became a major legal problem of the 1970s.
252
     
   The critical scholars promoted radical arguments with respect to the courts too, ar-
guing that the judges should be elected either by a popular vote or by the parliament for 
fixed periods, all social classes should be fairly represented in the judiciary, and the 
parliament should regularly monitor judicial practice.
253
 The argument for subjecting 
the courts to democratic control was in a stark contradiction to the Finnish legal system, 
which was based on the independence of the judiciary. The idea behind the radical al-
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teration in the basis of the judiciary was to create a kind of people’s court, however in-
famous the concept, and hence to bring the administration of justice closer to the peo-
ple. The concept was obviously very radical, but it raised discussion about the judiciary, 
the legal system and democracy, and reflected the polemical atmosphere of the 1970s as 
well as the socialist rhetoric of the criticism.      
   The administration of justice was also an aspect in which the critical scholars 
could invoke their arguments in practice. The reform of the judiciary was initiated in the 
early 1970s and its first report was published in 1971. The report was quite radical, pro-
posing major changes which followed the radical arguments. The committee consisted 
of three members, Olavi Heinonen, Aulis Aarnio, and Henrik Grönqvist, all members of 
the Socialist Democratic Party. Heinonen (b. 1938) and Aarnio (b. 1937) were young 
legal scholars with leftist tendencies. Although Aarnio defended more traditional views 
in the debates on legal scholarship in the late 1960s, he was one of the interviewers of 
the President and endorsed progressive views on legal scholarship, despite not wanting 
to turn it into politics. Heinonen also sympathized with the alternative views and was 
active in criticizing criminal law, as will be seen later. Grönqvist was not active in the 
debates on legal scholarship.   
    Critical legal scholarship perspectives were obvious in the report of the committee 
for the reform of the judiciary. Its assumption was that since the courts were part of the 
society and wielded considerable social power, they should reflect social change. Ac-
cording to the committee, the courts should be impartial in individual cases but in gen-
eral conform to the current social politics. It then proposed that the judges should serve 
for a fixed period and should be appointed on political terms to represent the political 
power relations.
254
 A critical perception of the courts was written into the report by re-
viewing their development in the historical and social context and then relating this pro-
cess to the contemporary circumstances. The judiciary was reviewed in a general con-
text, considering its social role and function, and little attention was given to technical 
issues and details.      
   The report ignited a heated response defending the traditional judiciary,
255
 and the 
legal profession at large condemned the report. The conservative part of the profession 
wanted reforms too, but they wanted to maintain the structure of the judiciary. The ma-
jority of the lawyers and judges as well as traditional legal scholars thus criticized the 
report for its ideological statements without due veracity and for trashing the basis of 
Finnish democracy and the administration of justice.
256
 The committee attacked such 
                                               
254 Oikeuslaitostoimikunnan mietintö 1971: B 112, 3–20, 30–31, 38–39, 68–70, 77.   
255 The criticism of both the report and the radical criticism of the judiciary, as well as some of their de-
fenses, are gathered in Erkki Havansi (ed.), Tuomioistuinuudistus ─ millainen? (Porvoo: Werner Söder-
ström osakeyhtiö 1972).    
256 Suomen Lakimiesliitto r.y:n lausunto, 18–19, 22–25, in Havansi (ed.) 1972, supra n. 255 at 18–31; 
Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys r.y:n lausunto, 34–43, in Havansi (ed.) 1972, id. at 32–51; Suomen Asi-
anajajaliiton lausunto, 79–85, in Havansi (ed.) 1972, id. at 76–89; Suomen Tuomarien Liitto r.y:n lausun-
to, 92–98, in Havansi (ed.) 1972, id. at 252 at 90–98; Erkki Havansi, Oikeuslaitostoimikunnan mietinnön 
kritiikkiä, LM 1972, 1–35; Veli Merikoski, Oikeuslaitosuudistus, näkökohtia, LM 1972, 435–446. Arti-
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fundamental aspects of the Finnish legal system that its arguments were not acceptable 
to the traditional profession to any degree. Criticism of legal scholarship on the pages of 
law journals was often mostly ignored or scorned. When the criticism appeared in the 
official report of a reform committee however, a widespread and hostile response fol-
lowed, which illuminates the general opinion of the legal profession about the critical 
legal scholarship. The profession at large was mostly conservative with respect to the 
fundamental elements of the legal system, and considered the critical scholars as being 
too radical.    
   The general rebuttal of the report only meant more fuel on the flames of the crit i-
cal scholars. Aarnio, who was a member of the committee, criticized the critics of the 
report for their conservative notions.
257
 Aarnio was most likely upset because of the 
harsh criticism the committee had received. Otherwise the critical scholars often turned 
the questions of law into questions of politics, because their general perspective on the 
legal problems was political. In this vein, Niklas Bruun argued that the book in which 
the criticism of the report was published was a bourgeois response intended to halt the 
reform.
258
 The elements of ideology and politics were always crucial to the critical legal 
discourse. It sought to demonstrate the conservative nature of traditional scholarship 
and it reflected the fundamental difference in perception between traditional and critical 
approach.  
   The difference in perspective between traditional and critical scholars was perva-
sive. The critical perspective saw politics everywhere because there were structural rela-
tions between class conflict, the state, law, the courts, and the legal profession. Thus, 
the critical scholars argued, there was no impartial justice since it was always biased. 
The traditional view disagreed and had faith in the impartiality of justice. For instance, 
the professor of constitutional law, Paavo Kastari, noted that Finnish courts did not 
make political decisions and that judicial discretion was restricted. The courts in social-
ist countries on the other hand, he argued, did not provide very desirable examples.
259
 
The traditionalists therefore wanted to preserve the fundamental structure of the 
courts.
260
    
  The question of the political nature of the courts, however, appeared completely 
different in a non-traditional perspective. To the critical scholars, since the courts were 
part of the social structures, they were always preconditioned by them and reproduced 
the inequalities within them.
261
 Judicial decision-making required social knowledge, 
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258 Niklas Bruun, Tuomioistuinuudistus ─ millainen? [book review], JFT 1973,74–75.   
259 Kastari 1971, supra n. 126 at 422–436. 
260 See, e.g., Paavo Salervo, Tuomioistuimet valtiokoneistossa, in Oker-Blom (ed.) 1976, supra n. 240 at 
145–173.  
261 Raimo Blom, Tuomioistuimien oikeudenkäytön ─ erityisesti rikostuomioiden tasapuolisuuden ─ tut-
kimus: Tutkimussuuntausten sekundaarianalyysi (Tampere: Tampereen yliopiston sosiologian ja sosiaali-
psykologian laitosten tutkimuksia 1973), 1–3, 9–10, 32–34, 74, 103–105.    
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unawareness of which meant conservatism.
262
 Indeed, the independence of the judiciary 
was a myth for the critical scholars. According to Backman, the courts were not and 
could not have been apolitical. Therefore there could only be discussion about disclos-
ing their already political nature and hence being open about it and change it, not simply 
about the politicization of the courts.
263
 The dialogue between the traditional and the 
critical scholars was difficult because their perceptions differed. Whereas the former 
opined that judicial decision-making should not be politicized and values should not 
have any place in legal scholarship, the latter argued that since politics and values were 
already present in them, the question was completely different.    
   Despite the sharp controversies that marked the early 1970s, the debates on the ju-
diciary also faded as the decade approached its end. The radical notions about democra-
tizing and politicizing the administration of justice faded, and even though the efforts to 
change the courts continued, the arguments became more moderate. The question was 
brought up in the reform of the Constitution, but the committee wanted to preserve the 
independence of the courts.
264
 Kivivuori had argued that the judicial process could be 
democratized through increasing the role of the lay members of the courts in 1974,
265
 
and by the end of the decade even Heinonen wrote that broadening the social basis of 
the recruitment of the judges as well as educating them more about society might be 
appropriate in the effort.
266
    
   The courts were an obvious target of criticism because of their central position in 
the administration of justice. In the radical atmosphere, the courts were regarded as con-
servative bastions that guarded and maintained the prevailing social structures. The 
connection between criticism of legal reasoning and the judiciary was also obvious. The 
critical scholars argued that legal reasoning was ideological and politically biased, and 
the courts were the organs which turned law in books into law in action. Here again the 
radical scholars attacked the roots of the problem and called for a complete change in 
the administration of justice. Their criticism was not merely theory, since they were able 
to put their critical acclaims forward at the committee for judicial reform. And as was 
the case with the reform of the Constitution, the first report was greeted with hostility 
and the debates waned as the 1970s went on. 
 
                                               
262 Klami 1973, supra n. 126 at 1–5, 22–25, 74–75.  
263 Eero Backman in Oikeuslaitoksen politisoiminen, 1972, supra n. 252 at 86, n. 2.  
264 Jyränki 1974, supra n. 225 at 71–76. The committee was unanimous as to the independence of the 
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299 
 
3.3 Concluding remarks 
 
The criticism of constitutional law reflected many aspects of the critical legal scholar-
ship and marked a relationship between legal theory and political practice. Finnish crit i-
cal legal scholars were most actively involved in politics and legal reform of the coun-
tries examined here. They were members of reform committees and political parties and 
worked for the practical realization of their notions. Criticism of the Constitution and 
the judiciary was radical, and the radical proposals found their way into the official re-
ports on reform. However, despite the efforts, the reforms never occurred as the radicals 
envisioned, because reforms are always compromises between conflicting points of 
view, and individuals cannot force their proposals through. In any event, the critical 
legal scholars created a link between theory and practice, despite whether their actions 
were deadly serious or acts of provocation.     
   The fundamental nature of the critical thought became obvious in this respect. For 
critical legal scholars, the Constitution of Finland was based on false premises, estab-
lishing and preserving a capitalist society, but it could have been something else just as 
well. Their examinations of the historical origins of the Constitution and its actual ef-
fects in contemporary society sought to demonstrate the inequalities it caused and main-
tained. The criticism of the judiciary reflected the same arguments. The radical aspect of 
the criticism has been brought up here because it was not simply a few laws that were 
criticized but rather the system on which the Constitution and every individual law was 
based.  
   The relationship between society and critical legal scholarship was also clear. Alt-
hough we should not take everything that was written at face value, it is obvious that the 
criticism reflected the radicalism of the 1960s and the militant leftism of the 1970s, and 
since there were scholars who criticized both jurisprudence and constitutional matters, 
we can conclude that the critical legal scholarship in general reflected the radical think-
ing. To an extent, without depreciating the importance of theory, critical legal scholar-
ship was an expression of the leftist counter-culture that criticized the traditional system 
of social norms, values, and life-style as well as the economic system.  
   The criticism of constitutional law was much more radical and fundamental in Fin-
land than in the United States and Scandinavia. Although the American and Scandinavi-
an critical scholars advanced similar arguments in their general criticism of law, they 
did not grasp the whole idea of the Constitution in the way the Finnish scholars did. 
Furthermore, they were not as detailed and concrete in their criticism of the judiciary. 
Although the same arguments appeared in the criticism of judicial decision-making in 
the United States and Scandinavia, the Finnish scholars were the most explicit and radi-
cal in their critique of the courts and the urge to reform them. Constitutional law and the 
judiciary also highlight the very political nature of the critical legal scholarship in Fin-
land. The scholars used openly political, Marxist, and socialist rhetoric in their crit i-
cism, and on some occasions even tried to realize them in practice. Because of the social 
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polarization, the legacy of the civil war, and the conservative nature of the legal profes-
sion, Finnish critical legal scholars made a radical break from the tradition and attacked 
the very foundations of the legal system. 
   Criticism of constitutional law went hand in hand with critical legal scholarship. It 
began in the latter half of the 1960s and reached its climax at the turn of the decade, and 
the interview with the President gave an additional boost to the debates. Critical schol-
ars attacked the Constitution, constitutional scholarship and the judiciary, which were 
seen as ideological and conservative. The critical scholars opined that the Constitution 
was based on social values which traditional scholarship neglected and therefore pro-
tected. Thus, a reconsideration of the system was needed. Besides illuminating several 
aspects of the critical legal scholarship, the criticism of constitutional law also reflected 
several important aspects of critical and alternative scholarship. Some of the particular 
topics will be examined in the following sections. 
4 Alternative criminal law scholarship, 1965─1979  
 
Scholarship on criminal law and criminology in particular were important elements in 
the development of the alternative legal scholarship in the 1960s. They also formed a 
gateway through which sociological jurisprudence could enter legal scholarship as well 
as a clear connection between Finnish and Scandinavian legal scholarship. Research on 
crime was in close contact with society and had a productive perspective on law in ac-
tion. It proved to be an excellent field for alternative and critical scholars to argue that 
law discriminated against people of the lower social class and preserved the existing 
social structure. Furthermore, crime and its control in particular were hotly debated so-
cial concerns. Crime thus provided relevant issues where alternative methods were es-
pecially important. Although critical criminology was a major factor in the transfor-
mation of Finnish legal scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s and shared many aspects 
with critical legal scholarship, it is important to note that the alternative criminologists 
of these decades represented the alternative front that preceded and surrounded the crit i-
cal enterprise, rather than critical legal scholars.     
   Criminology had made its way into Scandinavian legal scholarship during the 
twentieth century, establishing a secure position in the 1960s.
267
 In Finland, too, the 
tradition of criminology was weak before the 1950s when scholars began to reorient 
criminological research to modern society. During the first part of the 1960s, Finnish 
scholars followed the example of their Scandinavian colleagues and became interested 
in criminology. The rising interest was seen in establishment of the Criminological Re-
                                               
267 See chapter IV section 4 above. The roots of Scandinavian criminology, of course, go beyond the 
1960s, but only then did it become an established discipline.  
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search Institute in 1963.
268
 By the mid-decade, criminological research was about to 
become one of the liveliest forms of legal literature in Finland. 
   The rise of criminology in the 1960s had considerable effects on the conception of 
crime as a social phenomenon and on the methods of researching it, as well as on crimi-
nal policy. However, alternative criminology was also a consequence of the changes in 
politics and social discourse on the rights and legal security of the citizen. Criminology 
encouraged discussions on reforming criminal policy, but social activism also encour-
aged more research on the social causes of crime and criminal policy. In any event, crit-
ical criminology supported the ideas of alternative legal scholarship, as well as the re-
consideration of the causes of crime and the premises of criminal policy.     
   Critical criminology concerned various aspects of crime and its control and pro-
vided alternatives for policy change. Studies on self-reported crime sought to reveal the 
criminality that was not reported in official statistics. The purpose was to point out that 
people were not neatly divided into criminals and law-abiding citizens, but that delin-
quency was more common than usually assumed.
269
 Studies on detention institutions 
also sought to demonstrate that incarceration was not especially effective in controlling 
crime and recidivism. Inkeri Anttila (1916–2013), an important figure in the Finnish 
criminology, investigated juvenile detention centers,
270
 and the sociologist Paavo Uu-
sitalo concluded that prisons were not especially effective from the perspective of gen-
eral deterrence.
271
 The implications of these arguments were that criminals were to be 
treated humanely and that harsh penalties did not have the deterrent effect they were 
assumed to have.   
   The need to reform the administration of criminal justice and criminal policy was a 
hotly debated topic to which the recent research and the interest in Swedish reforms 
gave impetus. In the mid-1960s, the rights of the accused, particularly concerning pre-
trial investigation, were debated.
272
 According to the traditional view, this was an aspect 
of “Americanization”. There was rather a need for “common sense in dealing with crim-
inals” and the police should not be demonized in their work against crime.273 The con-
servative response then stimulated the debate on the improvement of the rights of the 
accused. The majority of the profession recognized the need to improve the rights, but 
the measures to take were open to question.
274
 The majority of the legal profession was 
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aware of the need to improve the status of the accused during the criminal process, but 
there was no general willingness to make the system more lenient or provide the ac-
cused with the opportunity to forestall the investigation. The radical social thought, 
however, turned heavily against the contemporary system in the latter half of the 1960s, 
when criticism of institutionalization and treatment ideology became severe.
275
 Whereas 
the legal professionals were talking about procedural rights, critical social opinion was 
turning against the system. Thus, the basis and direction of criminal policy turned out to 
be one of the most important topics of the period.  
   Alternative criminologists of the late 1960s criticized treatment ideology and harsh 
penalties.
276
 Anttila argued that instead of having a very punitive criminal system, it 
would be more efficient to make people aware of the criminal norms.
277
 The most tradi-
tional scholars, such as Bruno Salmiala, were against the reform efforts because of their 
possible harmful effects on society.
278
 Alternative scholars, however, argued that crimi-
nalization and harsh punishments were major problems of Finnish criminal policy. The 
basis of the reforms should therefore be in the conception of crime as a social phenome-
non, emanating mostly from the social structures.
279
 The sociologist Patrik Törnudd 
depicted the spirit of alternative criminology well in explaining that traditional crimi-
nology could not explain the causes of crime. The interpretation of social phenomena, 
such as crime, was dependent on values and policies which thus had to be included in 
criminological research.
280
 He also defined the purpose of the alternative criminal poli-
cy, which, he declared, should aim at minimizing the costs and damage caused by crim-
inality and allocate them in a just and equitable fashion in society.
281
 The juxtaposition 
between traditional and alternative views greatly concerned the theoretical as well as 
political orientations, the difference between the perspectives being all-encompassing.    
   At the beginning of the 1970s, comprehensive criticism of the criminal policy was 
widespread,
282
 and various problems were tackled in criminological studies. Scholars 
reconsidered the conception of criminal guilt,
283
 examined the development and status 
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of offences in office
284
 as well as crimes against religion,
285
 and analyzed the rules 
against abortion with the intention of clarifying and liberalizing the regulations.
286
 The 
new criminology was closely related to criminal policy because the scholars opined that 
criminological data ought to be used in legislation.
287
 The politicization of scholarship 
was obvious. As Jyrki Tala argued, the division between politics and research was unre-
alistic, and since the Finnish criminal policy was hopelessly outdated, alternative and 
reformist scholarship was needed to change it.
288
 Alternative criminology was scholar-
ship for the society of the future, and it progressed along with the criticism of criminal 
policy. It sought to provide data for reform by pointing out the deficiencies of the sys-
tem and that it failed to meet the social reality. Alternative scholars argued that values 
and policies were always part of research, and thus politics and scholarship were inher-
ently connected in the alternative scholarship. Despite the social and political orienta-
tion of research and the new perspectives on crime and law, alternative criminology was 
not after a complete re-make of the system, seeking rather to modify it.      
   An important political issue in which the scholars could also participate was the 
isolation of dangerous criminals,
289
 which, according to the alternative scholars, was an 
expression of the brutal criminal system and the fact that Finland had the highest incar-
ceration rate in Nordic Countries. The critics argued that the contemporary system was 
arbitrary
290
 and caused institutionalization amongst the offenders.
291
 They argued fur-
ther that isolation followed from the old conception of the criminal as insane, which, 
however, was against the reformist spirit.
292
 The new conception of crime and criminals 
emphasized social structures as the cause of crime. In this vein, criminals were to be 
treated as normal human beings in need of guidance rather than treatment, not consid-
ered as abnormal and therefore hospitalized. The new concept of crime had its effects 
on criminal law scholarship and politics. 
   The concepts of crime and criminal policy were changing in the 1970s. Raimo 
Lahti, a young legal scholar and an enthusiast proponent of legal sociology and crimi-
nology, argued that since criminal policy should aim at general democratization of soci-
ety, social policy measures would be the most appropriate way of tackling criminal pol-
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icy.
293
 The idea of “social policy as the best criminal policy” was, of course, much old-
er, but in Finland it was not seriously advanced until the radicalism and alternative 
scholarship of the 1960s. During the early 1970s, it became a standard argument of the 
alternative scholars who canonized the thesis that criminal policy should aim at mini-
mizing the costs and damage of crime and allocating them equitably in society.
294
 Tradi-
tional scholars such as Havansi criticized the new conception because of its many ambi-
guities,
295
 but the concept nonetheless became stronger in Finland and also attracted 
international interest.
296
  
   Criminology became an established discipline during the 1960s and 1970s. Schol-
ars noted the rise of the new methodologies and their suitability in dealing with contem-
porary problems of crime. Alternative criminology focused on various contemporary 
problems and endeavored to point out the connection between crime and society on the 
one hand and the inappropriateness of the contemporary criminal justice system on the 
other. This then led to the new concepts of crime and criminality. Criminals were no 
longer regarded as insane, but were to be understood in their social context. The chang-
es in the concepts and methods of scholarship corresponded with the changes in the 
general reformist atmosphere of criminal policy, and criminological research was fun-
damentally linked to politics. Several elements of alternative legal scholarship were thus 
obvious in alternative criminology. It applied social science methods, perceived law as a 
tool of social control in a particular social context, was open about values, focused on 
relevant, contemporary topics, and sought to have an effect on politics.  
   In addition to criminology, criminal law scholarship was changing in other ways 
as well. Scholars elaborated alternative models of argumentation and interpretation. 
Although criminal law adjudication is different as compared to private law adjudication, 
in that the interpretation of facts and rules does not play as much role, there nevertheless 
is discretion, and that is which legal scholars debated in the late 1960s. The margin of 
discretion and interpretation and the wide perspective on law and judicial decision-
making formed a subject of criminal law scholarship that provided theoretical and polit-
ical possibilities.    
   The change in the scholarly approach to criminal law adjudication was obvious in 
the late 1960s. One of the topics that the criminal law scholars debated was whether the 
definition of petty crime ought to be in accordance with the legislation or according to a 
case-specific appreciation. The formalist interpretation was that those crimes were to be 
considered as petty in which the maximum penalty was six months of incarceration at 
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most.
297
 There was no general agreement on this, even among traditional scholars,
298
 
and the question was discussed in the 1960s. Some legal scholars thought that the for-
malist definition was insensitive to special characteristics of the misdemeanor, and 
therefore the question ought to be determined individually in each case, without howev-
er compromising the rule of law.
299
 The question was not completely about traditional 
and alternative approaches, since even some traditional scholars endorsed case-specific 
definition.
300
 Nevertheless, the polemic reveals that scholars of criminal law were dis-
tancing themselves from the formalist, conceptualist tradition and moving toward a 
more analytical, or realistic tradition. Traditional scholars often stressed legal certainty 
and the verbatim interpretation of the law. The new trend, however, was to stress the 
circumstances and a more flexible interpretation.  
   Alternative and critical scholars considered traditional law and legal scholarship 
reactionary. Criminal legal scholarship was changing in many ways, and the transfor-
mation did not always require alternative approaches. For instance, conceptualism in 
criminal law was criticized because it formalized judicial decision-making and neglect-
ed the unique characteristics of a special situation.
301
 Even in criminal law, alternative 
scholars began to criticize the myth of the judicial decision as a logical deduction. Ac-
cording to Klami, the fact that there was discretion in criminal law adjudication did not, 
however, mean that it was supposed to be arbitrary. Indeed, more open reasoning would 
bring more consistency into it.
302
  
   For the scholars with reformist views, the sensational criminal cases also demon-
strated the outdated nature of the Finnish criminal law. Lahti commented upon the in-
famous Schüller case, in which lots of people had signed a petition supporting conscien-
tious objection and were tried for a crime. Lahti noted that criminal legislation left much 
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room for interpretation and discretion which created the possibility of political and val-
ue-based decision-making.
303
 The crimes against religion were considered to conflict 
with freedom of expression and religion.
304
 The argument was that decisions were out 
of touch with the contemporary society if the decision-making did not pay attention to 
social considerations. Alternative scholars pointed out that conceptualism made crimi-
nal adjudication too formalist and hindered reasonable solutions.   
   With respect to legal reasoning, alternative scholarship endorsed realistic and case-
specific argumentation. The new, practical definition of petty crime, for instance, suited 
alternative scholarship because it enabled the judge to consider social circumstances. 
The criticism also facilitated making the standards of sentencing practice more humane. 
Anttila and Heinonen argued that the appropriate penalty in the cases of petty crimes 
would be a fine or in exceptional cases a very short prison sentence.
305
 Scholars endors-
ing an alternative or social perspective on sentencing criticized individualist sentences 
based on treatment ideology, arguing that the punishment in general should be measured 
against the level of guilt and the seriousness of the crime,
306
 and that the actual social 
consequences of punishments should also be taken into account.
307
 The criticism of in-
dividual prevention and treatment ideology, and the argument for sentencing according 
to the gravity of the crime followed the criminological observations that the less the 
punishment imposed on the person, the less the possibility of recidivism.
308
 The in-
creased interest in sociological research directed attention towards the social conse-
quences of the crime on the one hand and the punishment on the other. Alternative 
scholars criticized the conceptualist tradition in criminal law for its neglect of the social 
facts and focusing simply on the letter of the law. They thought that even criminal adju-
dication could be more open to society while maintaining its special character as a guar-
antee of legalism and the rule of law.      
   The sociological approach and the criticism of criminal law adjudication were ob-
vious in the studies concerning the equality of sentencing. Raimo Blom’s treatises were 
the best-known in the regard. He had pointed out the lack of national confidence in the 
administration of justice,
309
 and argued that social status had an impact on sentencing.
310
 
He continued the survey studies on criminal sentencing, but did not reveal any signifi-
cant variation based on the social status of the accused. Nevertheless, he argued that 
there was a certain amount of discrimination at every level of the administration of 
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criminal justice, which then accumulated into a more serious inequality.
311
 He also ar-
gued that the selectivity of the criminal process followed and preserved the existing 
social structures and power relations.
312
 Another sociologist, Klaus Mäkelä also pointed 
out the correlation between social status and punishment.
313
 
   These studies marked the increasing interest in sociological and behavioral re-
search on the judiciary,
314
 but they also articulated the criticism of selectivity and dis-
crimination in the criminal process. Critical legal scholars argued that legal reasoning 
was uncertain and arbitrary and that the courts were biased against the lower social clas-
ses. These arguments were also advanced in the studies on criminal adjudication in 
which alternative methods enabled the scholars to go beyond the written decisions and 
analyze the real motives behind them. This literature was, of course, speculative at best 
but it did direct the focus to important topics, such as the motivation of court decisions, 
the rights of the citizen, and equality before the law. These were also the general con-
siderations of alternative scholarship on criminal law. Alternative scholars endeavored 
to demonstrate that criminal law played an important social role and therefore had to be 
understood in its social context. 
   Criminal law scholarship underwent some significant changes in the 1970s. The 
social aspects of crime, the connection between scholarship and politics, and the new 
tradition of criminal law which emphasized general deterrence and the moral building 
function became more pronounced. The pioneer of the sociological movement, Inkeri 
Anttila, and her students wrote a series of text books on criminal law which reflected 
the new trends during the decade. Books dealing with the basics of criminal law,
315
 var-
ious crimes,
316
 and the basics of criminal policy
317
 were published, and a general intro-
duction to all of the issues
318
 appeared as well. All these books naturally reflected the 
opinions of their authors and the alternative, reformist thought in criminal law in gen-
eral. Individual prevention and treatment ideology was condemned and general deter-
rence and the moral building function of criminal law was emphasized. The social basis 
of crime was articulated, and criminal policy was linked to social policy.
319
 The new 
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trends that the liberal thought and the alternative scholars had supported were clarified 
and made explicit.    
   Alternative scholarship was making its way into mainstream jurisprudence, and 
the basis of criminal law scholarship was changing to some extent. Although traditional 
professors did not like Anttila’s liberal, sociologically based lectures, they were appar-
ently quite popular among law students.
320
 Furthermore, Juha Vikatmaa greeted the new 
text books, with which Anttila had played an important role, for updating the studies of 
criminal law warmly, praising the books for being progressive in a realist sense and not 
radical.
321
 By the end of the decade, the new books had made their way into the re-
quirements of the law degree.
322
 Criminal law scholarship did change, but no radical 
alteration of its basis occurred. For instance, the new text books reflected the critical and 
reformist social thought without being radical. They were critical of the tradition but 
kept the criticism within reasonable limits, which is what concerned the change in crim-
inal law scholarship in general. Criminological research and the social perspective 
gained more prominence, and concepts were analyzed more specifically by paying at-
tention to the particular circumstances of actual cases. The conceptual tradition was 
widely abandoned, if it even existed in the 1960s.  
   Despite the fact that alternative scholarship was victorious in the 1970s, critical 
scholarship remained on the margins of criminal law scholarship. Since the reformers of 
criminal scholarship and policy were not critical in a radical sense, the critical legal 
scholars sometimes noted the lack of reformist potential in the alternative scholarship 
and thus criticized the “critical”, alternative school of thought. According to Eriksson, 
the new criminology was utilitarian and functionalist because it saw crime as a neces-
sary part of society, abandoned the concept of the criminal as abnormal, and sought to 
humanize criminal policy. Marxist criminology, on the other hand, perceived crime as a 
reflection of the capitalist mode of production, the aim being to change the structures of 
society, not simply criminal policy.
323
 Klaus Mäkelä also noted that the recent criticism 
of criminal policy had focused on decriminalization and humanization of the policy 
without considering the purposes informing these measures. Crime, however, occurred 
mostly within the lower social classes, not between these and the upper classes. There 
was thus a need to reconsider the criminal policy measures in a wider context and some-
times contemplate whether new forms of criminalization would be necessary to regulate 
the economy.
324
 Per Ole Träskman also stressed the connection between economic 
structure and criminality and the social construction of crime which followed from it.
325
   
   The perspective on crime became more critical when the Marxist element was 
added to it. Here the focus was more on the way the criminal justice system reproduced 
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the prevailing structures than on the methods of controlling and minimizing crime and 
its costs. The point of the Marxist arguments was that alternative criminology had fo-
cused on crime as a social phenomenon but ignored reconsideration of the society that 
produced it. Eriksson was a hard-core Marxist and therefore endorsed a criminology 
that would seek to change the social structures, whereas Mäkelä wanted to analyze the 
causes of criminal control and consider other measures than the “alternatives” that had 
been promoted during the previous decade. Träskman encouraged research on the defi-
nitions of crime and on the dynamic interplay between the controllers and the con-
trolled. The general trend in the 1970s was to change the official course of the system, 
but the more critical insights emerged when the interest in Marxism arose. It is im-
portant to note that the criminologists and “alternative” criminal law scholars were not 
critical scholars in the sense of this study, but rather represented the broader transfor-
mation of Finnish legal scholarship. The more critical notions on crime and criminal 
law aimed at changing the basis of society and the criminal system rather than simply 
the criminal law.   
   Although critical notions on criminal law were rare, the alternative and the socio-
logical view on crime were becoming widespread. There were differences of opinion, 
nevertheless. Around the mid-1970s, Backman and Lahti elaborated theories for the 
study of crime, both of which were based on different, albeit sociological theories. In 
his doctoral thesis, Lahti combined traditional legal scholarship with the recent trends in 
critical scholarship, sociology of law, and alternative criminology. The predominant 
element was to understand the purposes of law in their historical and social context.
326
 
Backman provided another theory that bore a close resemblance to that of Lahti but with 
a Marxist character. Essential for him was to study the connection between law, the 
state, and the society that surrounded them.
327
 He thought that social conflicts and con-
troversies were also important in the history of criminal law.
328
 Although theoretically 
different, the purpose of the scholarship was political, since it sought to understand the 
contemporary situation and provide data for change. Since crime was seen as a funda-
mental part of society in the alternative theory, doctrinal analysis was considered insuf-
ficient for a thorough understanding of the law. Social understanding was important for 
the alternative criminal law scholarship of the 1970s although there were variations in 
the perspective and purposes of the scholarship.     
   Although a unique effort at its time, Backman’s Marxist theory of crime also had 
its problems. Klami criticized Backman for not defining his theory clearly enough,
329
 
and Träskman noted that he had not applied his theory to an actual research.
330
 Back-
man’s book was officially the first part and the second volume was supposed to follow. 
However, it never came. Marxist legal scholarship was difficult because of the ambigui-
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ty of the authentic literature on law and the various possibilities of interpretation that 
followed. As noted in the previous chapter concerning Scandinavian scholarship, Marx-
ist scholars elaborated various theories and often disagreed on what were the most es-
sential aspects. Criminal law was not the most important topic for Marxist scholars, but 
there were nevertheless efforts to provide general theories on it both in Finland and in 
Sweden.  
   In the early 1970s, when the criticism of the criminal system had been going on 
for a while and alternative criminal law scholarship was at the top of its career, the gov-
ernment decided to reform the criminal law completely. The reform was initiated in 
1972 and naturally attracted a lot of attention among scholars of criminal law, who both 
worked on the reform committee and commented on its work. The reform of the crimi-
nal law was a part of the more extensive legal reforms of the 1970s that sought to mod-
ernize the legal system of Finland. 
   Criticism of the criminal law reform began at an early stage, and scholars stressed 
the various ways in which they thought the work had gone wrong. A couple of partial 
reforms had been conducted before the full reform, and there were critical notions re-
garding the measures already implemented and the direction of the forthcoming ones. 
Kauko Aromaa noted that the emphasis should be more on decriminalization and hu-
manization than there had been thus far,
331
 and Backman, commenting on labor crime, 
argued that the proposed reforms did not pay due attention to the social realities behind 
the law.
332
 Marxist legal scholars were sometimes a bit more ambitious about the goals. 
Eriksson argued that mass criminality could be abolished through abandoning capital-
ism, and the concept of criminality ought to be redefined.
333
 Helge Rontu criticized the 
moderate steps the reform had taken.
334
 Since criminal law was an important part of the 
legal system, its reform was not insignificant. The legal scholars who endorsed alterna-
tive or critical insights also emphasized these aspects of the reform, pointing out the 
disparity between the reform and society, or calling for more thorough changes.  
   The total reform of the criminal law took a first major step in 1976 when the re-
form committee published its first report.
335
 Alternative legal scholars had a considera-
ble position on the committee, as was evident in its work. Those included were Antti 
Kivivuori, Inkeri Anttila, Raimo Blom, Olavi Heinonen, Klaus Helminen, Mikko 
Kämäräinen, Klaus Mäkelä, and Patrik Törnudd. As is obvious, there were four alterna-
tive legal scholars, two of whom, Kivivuori and Blom, were also critical, and Heinonen 
had proposed radical changes in the judiciary while working for the reform committee. 
In addition, Törnudd and Mäkelä were sociologists, promoting alternative insights. Al-
ternative legal scholarship was not simply academic action, but it was also socially in-
fluential and provided opportunities for the scholars to participate in governmental jobs, 
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the best example being Antti Kivivuori, who worked as the chief of law drafting from 
the beginning of the 1970s.       
   Alternative legal scholarship had achieved an influential position in criminal law 
in the mid-1970s, as the scholars sat on the committee. They influenced the report and 
the direction of the reform considerably. They wrote in the report that crime was a so-
cial phenomenon, and that the goals and policies that the criminal law was to promote 
had to be analyzed in the context of reform. They rebutted treatment ideology and indi-
vidual prevention and emphasized the importance of social policy in crime prevention. 
Furthermore, they wrote, criminal sanctions should intervene in the rights of the crimi-
nal as little as possible considering the situation.
336
 The arguments that the alternative 
scholars had highlighted since the mid-1960s had found their way into the pages of an 
official report of the government. Criminal law in Finland was about to take several 
steps towards modernization.  
   The publication of the report was an interesting topic for the legal profession, not 
just for alternative scholars although they obviously were especially interested in it be-
cause their scholarship was often politically oriented.
337
 Eriksson, who was known for 
his radical insights, criticized the committee for focusing on liberal ideals and not ana-
lyzing the structure of society critically. Therefore, he argued, the draft was too moder-
ate.
338
 Backman and Takala criticized the committee for not considering criminal law as 
an elementary part of the state in its historical and social context.
339
 Jaakkola and 
Träskman noted that the reform most likely would not have decreased the number of 
inmates.
340
 Raimo Lahti, who mostly was satisfied with the sociological perspective of 
the committee, noted that it had not paid due attention to social policy and decriminali-
zation.
341
 The criticism quite naturally followed the scholarly insights of the commenta-
tors. The more critical scholars argued that the committee had ignored the analysis of 
the social structures while dealing with criminal law. Their emphasis in this regard was 
more thoroughgoing social change because they seemed to have opined that law alone 
could not bring much change. In general, since the reform was a part of the wider recon-
sideration of the legal system, alternative scholars stressed the need to see it in the con-
text of the humanization and democratization of society at large.   
   The reform was obviously not a simple task and many conflicting opinions had to 
be balanced while making it. Kivivuori, who was the chairman of the committee, noted 
this while defending the work of the committee, and criticized Eriksson for not making 
any constructive suggestions about how to conduct the reform.
342
 Törnudd also defend-
ed the work of the committee by noting that the awareness of the relationship between 
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crime and society had increased during the recent years and had been taken into account 
in the work, even if disagreement arose as to the nature of the relation.
343
 On the other 
hand, Blom, who was the most radical representative on the committee, had left a dis-
senting opinion in the report criticizing its superficial historical analysis and its neglect 
of the class conflict and criminal law as a protector of the status quo.
344
 There was of 
course much more disagreement as to the details of the reform, but the fundamental 
difference was in the perception of crime as a social phenomenon. Critical legal scholars 
usually argued that criminal law was a reactionary factor in society and the trend to hu-
manize it was simply another apology for the social structures and their preservation. 
Since the purpose of the critical legal scholarship was to go beyond the law to see its 
ultimate motivation, the critical scholars were not pleased with a reform that was in 
many ways a considerable change.           
    In many respects, the reform of the criminal law conformed to the progressive de-
bates of the 1960s and 1970s, and thus also to the alternative legal scholarship on crimi-
nal law. To the legal scholars who endorsed or sympathized with these, the reform set 
out good guidelines on which to build the future.
345
 The same also concerned the reform 
of imprisonment.
346
 However, the traditional profession was not as convinced about the 
direction of the reform as many scholars were. For instance, the Finnish Bar Association 
thought that the report on the reform was one-sided and overstated in many ways, since 
criminal law was supposed to be a relatively conservative branch of law. Therefore, a 
partial reform might have been better than a total one.
347
 Although the progressive spirit 
was strong in society, the legal profession in general was still conservative. The tradi-
tional profession wanted to maintain the fundamental characteristics of the legal system 
and, even if it realized the need for reforms, it always insisted on moderate and cautious 
progress. The alternative and the more progressive sides of the profession were mani-
fested in the activities of the Association of Democratic Lawyers. The legal profession 
in general was not particularly enthusiastic about social radicalism, which is precisely 
what the alternative scholars attacked.  
   The reform of the criminal law aptly represented the alternative spirit of the 1970s. 
It was not a simple triumphal march of the alternative legal scholars although it con-
formed to their arguments, but a result of varying impulses and conflicting argu-
ments.
348
 Nevertheless, it conformed closely to the alternative scholarship that sought to 
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perceive crime as a social phenomenon and to provide measures for minimizing the 
costs and damage caused by crime and distribute them justly and equally in society. 
Data on alternative criminology was applied in the reform in order to justify and moti-
vate the reforms, which reflected the general critical arguments of the time and aimed at 
making punishment simpler and milder, terminating the effects of treatment ideology 
and individual prevention, and establishing a criminal system that would be based on 
general deterrence and equal and humane treatment of criminals. Much disagreement 
arose as to the details of the reform, and critical legal scholars were dissatisfied with its 
moderation, but in general there was relative unanimity about its goals. The reform was 
not finished until the beginning of the twenty-first century and by then the idea of totali-
ty had been abandoned and the reform was executed in parts.     
   Just as in the United States and Scandinavia, criminal law proved to be an arena in 
which scholars could use the methods of social sciences and present a critique of society 
and legal practice in Finland as well. And as in Scandinavia, criminal law was also one 
of the first branches of law in which the alternative and critical insights began to acquire 
a strong position in Finland in the 1960s. Alternative criminology criticized the old con-
cepts of criminality, criminal law, and criminal policy, and began to pile up data for a 
change of thought. It sought to demonstrate that crime was more common than was usu-
ally assumed, emanating mostly from social structures, and that criminals often were 
not deviant people. Therefore, the alternative scholars argued, criminal policy ought to 
be seen as a part of general social policy, which should promote social equality and de-
mocracy. Criminal law scholarship was also an area in which the arguments for alterna-
tive legal scholarship had significance in the practice of research, in which scholarship 
and politics were closely connected. And because much of the alternative legal scholar-
ship conformed to the general progressive social thought, it had practical relevance. 
Many of the insights of alternative criminology followed the social criticism, but they 
also helped to define and conceptualize it.    
   Criminal law scholarship changed to an extent in the 1970s in Finland. Sociology 
of law and alternative criminology achieved an established position in Scandinavian 
legal scholarship in the 1960s when they also began to have a considerable influence in 
Finland. Because the alternative scholarship fitted well with the critical spirit of the 
1960s, it was easy to adapt to the new circumstances. Nevertheless, alternative crimi-
nologists were not critical scholars, representing the non-radical, alternative thought of 
the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1960s, criminological data was used to support the 
criticism of society. The end of the decade was a time of active social debate and crit i-
cism, and the alternative criminologists found a place within the discourse. By the 
1970s, the new currents of criminal law scholarship were popular among students and 
young scholars, new text books emerged in addition to the massive amount of literature, 
and the alternative scholarship had political significance. The paradigm of criminal law 
                                                                                                                                         
change in criminal policy. (Jukka Kekkonen, Suomalaisen kriminaalipolitiikan menestystarina ─ tarua vai 
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scholarship did change, even if not radically. Although the change of paradigm was 
most obvious in criminal law, other branches, and even legal education, experienced 
similar changes. The following sections should place the rise of the alternative legal 
scholarship in the 1970s in a larger context.    
5 Alternative legal scholarship on private law in the 1970s 
5.1 General remarks 
 
In this section I will analyze the role of alternative and critical legal scholarship on par-
ticular branches of private law; labor law, family law, and contract law respectively. My 
analysis is rather brief and will not provide a thorough account of the changes that oc-
curred. Rather, I will focus on critical notions and alternative scholarship and provide 
sketches of the changes. In addition, legislation in these areas was extensively reformed 
during the 1960s and 1970s, but since my focus is on academic legal scholarship, I will 
not consider the legislative change. Since the 1970s marked a serious number of alterna-
tive approaches to legal research,
349
 a brief account of them will provide insights into 
the development of alternative scholarship and critical thought on law. My analysis will 
further demonstrate that critical legal scholarship was a radical aspect of the transfor-
mation of Finnish legal scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s. Legal scholarship in general 
was embracing towards new ideas, and the radical critique, the critical legal scholarship, 
was an extreme and a counter-cultural academic manifestation of the times.    
  Alternative scholarship and criticism of private law were not especially radical. 
The trend in this respect was more to perceive the problems in a social context and to 
understand the origins and functions of legal rules. Just as was the case in criminal law, 
alternative scholarship on private law was not radical criticism of the tradition, but an 
alternative to traditional scholarship, emphasizing such things as the empirical, social, 
and political aspects of scholarship. This was so because radical scholars put their ar-
guments within a more general criticism of either legal scholarship or constitutional 
law. Thus, for instance, freedom of contract was an essential part of critical scholarship 
even if it was not especially mentioned. Alternative scholars on contract law noted that 
the doctrine on freedom of contract was far more problematic when this was considered 
in law in action instead of law in books. In much of the alternative scholarship on pri-
vate law, however, the sociological approach and the critique of ideology relating to it 
revealed several interesting issues that were close to the radical critique without howev-
er taking the next step.   
                                               
349 Kangas (ed.) 1998, supra n. 20, esp. at 187, 195–197, 265, 271, 316, 320, 374, 393, 400.  
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   By the early 1970s, there were many young scholars at the university who wanted 
a scholarly identity. For one reason or another, the descendants of the 1960s wanted to 
pursue something new in scholarship and adopted an alternative perspective on legal 
scholarship. Alternative legal scholars on private law were thus mostly young, left-
leaning scholars who wanted to participate in contemporary debates on relevant social 
and legal problems, on which their studies mostly focused. These reflected the radical 
thought in many respects without however adopting a particularly radical stance on the 
law or traditional legal scholarship. 
5.2 Labor law 
 
Because critical legal scholarship was essentially Marxist and leftist, labor was obvious-
ly an important topic for it. The industrial working class became more powerful in the 
1960s and 1970s and acquired a sizable representation in the parliament. Hence labor 
legislation was reformed during these years. As we saw, several work-related issues 
were also brought up in the criticism of the Constitution. Scholars argued that political 
democracy without industrial democracy was inadequate and called for a reconsidera-
tion of the concept of property in order to make the rights of the working class more 
efficacious. Problems regarding labor and its legal regulation thus pertained to the re-
form of the Constitution to some degree.
350
 Industrial democracy was an important part 
of acquiring equal rights for the workers,
351
 but this required an alternative perspective 
on the issue because the traditional, bourgeois perspective was considered to distort the 
perception of reality.
352
 In order to be effective in fact, workers’ rights required funda-
mental changes in the Constitution and society.
353
 Labor law had a central position in 
critical legal scholarship, but the scholars often thought about the problems in some 
other connection.    
   The rise of critical legal scholarship in the late 1960s contributed to the emergence 
of structural and critical perspective on the research on labor law. The Marxist emphasis 
on the conflict between labor and capital led many scholars to criticize the law. Work 
accidents, for instance, were considered as structural violence the risk of which was 
distributed unequally to the workers.
354
 Kai Kalima criticized the common notion of 
political strikes as illegal, which, he claimed, followed from the fact that they were a 
threat to the prevailing social order.
355
 Vaajala criticized the identification of strikes and 
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lockouts because the latter was an expression of ruling class power. Thus, for example, 
salaries should be paid during the lockouts.
356
 The alternative perspective of the 1970s 
regarded labor problems differently than the traditional perspective, the alternative con-
ception being that labor problems were not simply questions of law but social problems.      
   The alternative perspective was needed because, according to the critical thought, 
traditional legal consciousness mystified and reified labor relations and thus made them 
seem different than what they in fact were.
357
 While turning the perspective, scholars 
argued that restrictions on the right to strike were not a solution because they did not 
concern the reasons for striking. Rather, the legislator should apply restrictions on lock-
outs,
358
 and stipulate the right to strike and its scope in the Constitution.
359
 Even if the 
perspective was not radical in the sense that it sought to alter the basis of the society or 
legal scholarship, it nevertheless drilled down to the core of the problem. Alternative 
scholarship regarded labor law as a reflection of the society and therefore pursued a 
more comprehensive image of it.  
   A Marxist perspective on labor law also emerged alongside the alternative view. 
The most prominent Finnish Marxist labor law scholar was Niklas Bruun, who had al-
ready published noteworthy writings in his mid-twenties, and who was the Finnish con-
tact person for the Nordic Marxist law journal, Retfaerd. A key to his work was the no-
tion that since labor law had developed into a special branch of law emanating from the 
conflict between capital and labor, it concerned special problems and was to be exam-
ined in accordance with its special characteristics.
360
 The Marxist approach brought a 
useful perspective to research on labor law, but this did not mean that labor relations 
were seen as completely determined by the class conflict, or that there was to be a com-
plete alteration in the structure of labor. As the example of Bruun demonstrates, Marx-
ism could be applied as constructive criticism of the prevailing law and as a tool for 
politically oriented legal scholarship.   
   Bruun’s studies were alternative legal scholarship, seeking to provide alternative 
interpretations of the existing system and contemplate the potential for reform. He ex-
amined the right of an employee to abstain from work in cases in which the employer 
had violated certain regulations. In a realistic and social analysis of the law, he conclud-
ed in favor of the employee in practically every situation.
361
 He also analyzed the right 
to salary of an employee who was willing to work during a strike,
362
 the problem of 
company housing in the context of housing production in Finnish capitalism,
363
 and 
pointed out why there had to be a specific consent to do overtime at work on every oc-
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casion.
364
 By analyzing the facts of the matter and the effects of the law realistically, 
alternative scholars criticized the prevailing law and legal scholarship and argued for 
better protection for the employee. Whereas traditional scholarship focused on concepts 
and rules, alternative scholarship examined their social functions and the effects on the 
people they concerned.   
   The alternative approach to labor law had become more common in the late 1970s. 
Bruun summarized his critical scholarship in his doctoral thesis on the influence of ide-
ology on collective agreements. He sought to demonstrate that the conflicting ideologies 
of the labor parties were incorporated into collective agreements, were reified by legal 
concepts, influenced the practice of labor law, and were missed by traditional legal 
scholarship.
365
 The treatise was a particular study on the general argument of critical 
legal scholarship that ideologies affected law and created structural limitations on its 
application. In the case of collective agreements, Bruun argued, the employer as the 
stronger side could create the ideological context and hence prevent change. Therefore, 
labor law scholarship had to account for the ideological element of law and analyze the 
structural and systemic relevance of values in addition to open argumentation.
366
    
   The impact of values on law was also evident in the doctoral thesis by Matti Mik-
kola who analyzed the terms of unemployment benefits from the perspective of values 
and policies and argued that they affected the practice of granting benefits. Thus, he too 
encouraged research on values in order to explicate the law in action.
367
 This was also a 
study on a then relevant social problem, pointing out the inadequacies of traditional le-
gal scholarship as well as the problems of law in the welfare context. Unemployment 
was a pressing problem in the late 1970s, and its handling within the context of the wel-
fare state, which was also being criticized, was a further problem. The studies by Bruun 
and Mikkola, alternative legal research on the labor law issues in the late 1970s, reflect-
ed the critical thought and the political orientation of alternative legal scholarship. They 
both encouraged more open research on values, policies, and ideologies, and sought to 
reveal problems relating to both legal practice and scholarship.    
   Alternative legal scholarship was partly work on new social and legal problems re-
lating to the development of the modern welfare state in the 1960s and 1970s as well as 
inter-disciplinary scholarship applying new approaches and methods in dealing with 
legal problems. Although labor had a central position in the critical thought, there were 
not particularly many specific critical examinations of it. Critical legal scholars were 
more concerned with general problems and their relations to labor law, whereas scholars 
who wanted to pursue a career in the field were concerned about more traditional 
measures, although from an alternative perspective. 
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5.3 Family law 
 
Family law provides an interesting perspective on alternative legal scholarship and the 
transformation of Finnish legal scholarship in the 1970s in general. Since it was Aar-
nio’s major field, his analytical hermeneutics had a significant influence on scholarship 
in this area. Furthermore, as a young professor in the early 1970s, he established a study 
group on law and philosophy, known as “Aarnio’s Circle”, where law students and 
young legal scholars discussed legal philosophy and the practices of sociological juris-
prudence.
368
 Aarnio and Ahti Saarenpää had noted in 1969 that lawyers had lamented 
the fact that legal literature was often theoretically oriented even though more practical 
research was needed,
369
 and the 1970s witnessed several studies on practical problems 
and on law in action.
370
 Family law thus proved to be in a significant position for a real-
istic and sociologically oriented legal scholarship.  
   Part of alternative scholarship was to perceive law in action in its social context. 
This was evident in much of the alternative scholarship on family law. In an empirical 
analysis based on statistics applying to typical situations, Rauno Halttunen explored 
how inheritance functioned in practice. His study was politically oriented and provided 
data for reforms intended to modernize law.
371
 In an empirical analysis of court deci-
sions and social functions and the effects of alimony, Markku Helin renounced the use 
of the logical syllogism in this area.
372
 The studies did not simply systematize and inter-
pret legal rules, but sought to comprehend their functions and effects. Sometimes they 
had more of a comprehension purpose, and sometimes they sought to have an impact on 
law. In any event, they kept apart from traditional scholarship in the endeavor to see law 
in context.    
   The new text books also marked the transformation of legal scholarship on family 
law. Aarnio wrote a book on wills with the intention of providing a contextualized, real-
istic account. He also emphasized the significance of subjective interpretations in prac-
tice and criticized the conceptualist tradition.
373
 In a book on custody, Ahti Saarenpää, 
Heikki Mattila, and Matti Mikkola criticized the traditional text books for their norma-
tive approach, as well as for neglect of social circumstances and their systemic signifi-
cance for law. They examined custody in its historical development and discussed its 
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social functions.
374
 While the book was a progressive text book applying alternative 
approaches on custody,
375
 to radical scholars it merely extended the basis of scholarship 
but was traditional in its substance.
376
 The book thus reflected several aspects of alterna-
tive legal scholarship, but was not critical in a radical sense. It rather aimed at examin-
ing the historical origins and social functions of legal institutions in order to understand 
them, and to bring legal scholarship closer to social sciences.  
   Seeking to understand law in its social context provided the potential for slightly 
more critical arguments. Referring to the Marxist conception of society, Mikkola argued 
that the western concept of marriage was an economic institution, based on male-
dominance and aiming at maintaining social hierarchies, whereas the socialist concep-
tion was based on equality and reciprocal love.
377
 In a treatise on the position of illegit-
imate children he concluded that the Finnish law was totally outdated and ineffectual. 
He argued that the law was structured to protect the existing social structures and that 
scholarship on it focused on the concepts and neglected the reality behind them.
378
 He 
also criticized the new legislation on child support because it treated illegitimate chil-
dren unequally and did not guarantee public responsibility for taking care of children in 
need.
379
    
   The comprehensive account of law in its historical and socio-economic context 
was also used to criticize the contemporary legal system. Mikkola used this approach on 
some occasions to criticize the basis and structure of law. His book on the position of 
illegitimate children was a realistic study of empirical data, based on a historical and 
social context, and analyzing values and policies openly. The emphasis on history, so-
cial sciences, and values marked a clear connection with alternative and even critical 
legal scholarship, but the book was interesting to legal scholars with a less critical per-
spective as well.
380
 Furthermore, he focused on the form, content, and basis of the law 
in his criticism of the law on child support. The critique thus emanated from the crit i-
cism of the structure and the basis of law.  
   The interest in understanding the system was expressed in several ways. Sami 
Mahkonen, for instance, studied the history of child protection,
381
 and Heikki Mattila 
compared child law in socialist and Western countries.
382
 Mattila’s comparative analysis 
aimed at understanding the law in different social structures, which was important be-
cause law reflected its social connections. Comparative studies helped to understand the 
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differences in law because they could be seen in relation to their origins and purposes. It 
also brought an aspect of alternative to the analysis by presenting socialist legal system 
as a possible point of reference. By reviewing socialist law as a possible alternative to 
the Finnish legal system, alternative legal scholars sought to demonstrate the humane 
aspects of socialism.  
   The alternative pursuit of understanding and criticizing law was clearly evident in 
Markku Helin’s study on divorce law, which analyzed its development as a series of 
compromises between the church and the state on the one hand and between conserva-
tive and liberal notions on the other. He then examined the law in action, emphasizing 
the purposes and effects of law which, seemed to him to have been to forestall di-
vorce.
383
 The obvious purpose of the book was to promote liberal notions on marriage 
and divorce. It aimed at an egalitarian society where divorce would not have been a ta-
boo, but where its consequences would have been evenly distributed on every account. 
Its methodology, nevertheless, was a manifestation of alternative scholarship. History 
and society were important, and legal rules were scorned whereas legal practice was 
stressed.  
   As has been demonstrated above, family law was a fertile ground for alternative 
legal scholarship in the 1970s, providing important contemporary topics to study and on 
which to take a stand and provide data for reforms. Aarnio’s interest in philosophy and 
comprehensive legal scholarship was obviously important in this regard, and he also 
managed to gather several young scholars who were enthusiastic about alternative ap-
proaches to research and liberal about society. The liberalization of the society, the 
struggle for equality between the sexes, the pursuit of the welfare state, as well as the 
interest in analytical hermeneutics and sociological and critical jurisprudence all paved 
the way for family law to be a significant area for alternative legal scholarship. 
5.4 Contract law 
 
Critical legal scholars did not pay particular attention to special problems of contract 
law because their criticism of freedom of contract and its consequences for the legal 
system was manifested through their general critique of law and legal scholarship. Nev-
ertheless, contract law scholarship also moved from traditional scholarship and towards 
alternative approaches in the 1970s. Whereas the traditional jurisprudence emphasized 
the contract as a free, binding instrument which executed the combination of the indi-
vidual will of the parties, the alternative approach of the 1970s began to see contract as 
a social instrument fulfilling social purposes as well.   
   Alternative scholars were particularly interested in the social aspects of contract 
law. In the 1970s, scholarship was changing to the extent that the contract was being 
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detached from its conceptual background and seen as a social institution,
384
 and alterna-
tive scholars began to view particular problems in their special contexts.
385
 Scandinavi-
an scholarship had moved towards a more social perspective on contract ever since the 
time of realism of the 1930s, and particularly during the postwar years. Finnish juris-
prudence, however, had remained closer to the conceptualist tradition. In the 1970s, 
Finnish scholars also began to take alternative approaches, partly because of the Scan-
dinavian influences. This meant that contract law was linked to its social and economic 
background and more flexible methods of argument were applied.    
   The emphasis on discretion and interpretation followed partly from the increased 
use of standard contracts and general clauses in legislation on contractual relations. The 
openness of legal rules had been recognized before of course,
386
 but the thinking of the 
1970s on consumer protection and the weaker party in general attracted the interest of 
increasing numbers of scholars of the problem. For instance, Pirkko Aro noted that both 
legal practice and the common opinion of the scholars favored the interpretation that 
there was a general principle on adjusting contracts even if there was no special provi-
sion.
387
 General clauses and their interpretation and application were particular prob-
lems of the 1970s.
388
 For alternative legal scholars, however, they presented a problem 
of promoting social values through law. Thomas Wilhelmsson argued that since general 
clauses created an illusion of equality, there was a need to elaborate doctrines guaran-
teeing that the open clauses would be interpreted in favor of the weaker party.
389
 An 
aspect of alternative legal scholarship was to integrate policies into sociological juris-
prudence, and general clauses on contract law provided an interesting subject. Here one 
could analyze the reality between contractual relations and argue for case-specific ar-
gumentation in which the needs of the parties would be taken into account while mak-
ing sure that the weaker party’s interests were protected.    
   The changes in society and contractual relations in the 1960s and 1970s changed 
the law as well as legal scholarship. The 1970s was a time of much progressive legisla-
tion on contractual relations,
390
 and the new problems also encouraged a considerable 
amount of research. While comparative studies between Finland and the Soviet Union 
were important in this respect as well,
391
 most of the alternative research was concerned 
                                               
384 Lars Erik Taxell, Avtal och rättsskydd (Åbo: Åbo akademi 1972).   
385 Thomas Wilhelmsson, Några synpunkter på bensinbranschens dealeravtal, JFT 1973, 375–416. 
386 L.E. Taxell, Norm och prövning, JFT 1964, 369–379.  
387 Pirkko-Liisa Aro, On tillämpning av SBL § 8 ─ några reflexioner med anledning av et rättsfall, JFT 
1974, 179–185.  
388 Terttu Apala-Arlander, Yleislausekkeista: Oikeussäännösten muotoamiseen ja soveltamiseen liittyviä 
kysymyksiä (Helsinki: Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys 1972). The problem of general clauses was, of 
course, noted at least in the early 1950s. (T.M. Kivimäki, Yleislausekkeet oikeusvarmuutta heikentävinä 
tekijöinä, LM 1950, 302–318.) In this article, however, the concern was their possible harmful impacts on 
legal certainty.   
389 Thomas Wilhelmsson, Kontrakträttens generalklausuler, Oikeus 2/1975, 12.  
390 See, e.g., the proposal for the consumer protection law (Oikeusministeriön lainsäädäntöosaston julka-
isu 12/1974).    
391 Juha Tolonen, De rättsliga grunderna för licensiering, särskilt i handeln mellan Finland och Sovjetun-
ionen, JFT 1974, 336–353.  
322 
 
with contemporary domestic problems, particularly concerning the changed social cir-
cumstances, standard contracts, and freedom of contract.
392
 Consumer protection was of 
special importance since such problems had increased, and the first consumer protection 
law was enacted in 1978. Alternative scholars noted many problems with respect to 
consumer protection, since courts, which were often a very conservative element in so-
ciety, had an especially large margin of discretion in this area.
393
 Furthermore, Tala 
stressed that legislation might have had different influences on different people, and this 
was an important aspect to take into account.
394
 The notion of flexible argumentation 
and legal reasoning that would pay particular attention to the special needs of the parties 
was often elaborated in the late 1970s. It was an outcome of the earlier critical legal 
scholarship and of the fact that consumer problems and standard contracts had become 
pressing legal problems. In this respect, both sociological jurisprudence and alternative 
reasoning suited the case.   
   The politicization of research and the endeavor to have an impact on social reform 
were obvious in the alternative legal scholarship, which often aimed to explicate the 
purposes and functions of law and then to provide data with arguments on values and 
policies in order to influence the possible reforms. Thus, the late 1970s was an obvious 
continuation of the critical scholarship of the late 1960s. A notable scholar was Thomas 
Wilhelmsson, who encouraged research on the motives of the legislator.
395
 In his doc-
toral dissertation, he examined the possible dissonance between the goals and the con-
sequences of insurance law, concluding that the law left great scope for interpretation 
and discretion and that the goals of the legislator were not often achieved in practice.
396
 
The purpose here was to point out the uncertainty of law and the gap between law in 
books and law in action that followed. The emphasis on behavioral and political aspects 
of law was also apparent in the study.   
   Besides the methodological aspects, Wilhelmsson also pointed out that the free-
dom of contract was problematic in insurance contracting. According to him, if this 
freedom was understood as the power of the individual to govern the terms of the con-
tract, then an individual consumer had no such freedom in contracting with an insurance 
company because the terms were determined by the insurer by and large.
397
 This then 
raised the problem of the actual non-freedom of contract and the possibility of control-
ling it.
398
 This was also a problem which consumer protection was meant to regulate.
399
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Wilhelmsson argued that because of the actual inequality of the parties, freedom of con-
tract could sometimes function as a guardian of the prevailing power relations.
400
 The 
problem of freedom of contract was seen as a structural problem relating to society and 
thus causing further problems for regulating it in action. It was noted that the inequali-
ties in power to negotiate the terms of the contract whittled the content of the freedom 
away to the extent that in some cases there was no such thing.  
   Freedom of contract was also brought up in the criticism of the absolute protection 
of private property, since it was often understood that the protection also covered con-
tractual freedom.
401
 Jyränki argued that freedom of contract had escaped the economic 
regulation of property, but there ought to be consideration of limitations with respect to 
this as well.
402
 Critical legal scholars thus brought up the problem of freedom of con-
tract in their general criticism of legal scholarship as well as in the criticism of the con-
stitutional protection of private property, whereas alternative scholars paid attention to it 
in specific cases, such as standard contracts. It indeed was an essential element of the 
legal system, but it was not in any special position in the critical legal scholarship. Crit i-
cal scholars were more interested in general problems, such as jurisprudence, the Con-
stitution, or criminal law, probably because these were more pressing social problems 
and easier to relate to the social deficiencies, and the problems of contracts were dealt 
with in passing. Moreover, contract law was not the most essential aspect of Finnish 
legal thought, because the Finnish legal system was diversified into specific branches, 
all with their unique characteristics. The most radical scholars attacked the social struc-
ture underlying law, whereas alternative scholars dealt with specific problems.   
   Several interesting problems arose out of contract law in the 1970s that required 
new research methodologies and more dynamic argumentation to be dealt with appro-
priately. Consumer protection, standard contracts, and general clauses formed a fertile 
area in which to promote new insights. Alternative scholarship on contract law focused 
on the contemporary problems and advocated sociological methods in analyzing them. 
Problems were to be understood in their social context. Furthermore, scholars often took 
a stand on the potential policy change. Sociological jurisprudence and the protection of 
the underdog were the explicit catch-phrases of the alternative scholarship. Hence it was 
possible to participate in contemporary political debates, promote material equality and 
welfare, and point out the usefulness of the alternative scholarship. This was essential 
because their expertise and writings could then be used in political decision-making as 
well as in legal education. 
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6 Criticism and reform of legal education, 1968─1979 
 
Legal education was an essential objective for critical legal scholarship because that was 
where the lawyers of the future were taught and where the theoretical scholarship was 
put to practical use. Legal education thus provides an overall perspective on critical 
scholarship. In the previous sections, we have seen the criticism of law and legal schol-
arship as well as the changes that occurred in legal research. The criticism of education 
and its reform in the 1970s will provide a point of view in which this all can be summa-
rized and concluded.  
   The 1960s were times of change, indeed. Various societal and legislative reforms 
took place, and the backward Finnish society was transformed into a modern, industrial 
society. The optimism in planning and reform also involved higher education, which 
was in a state of turmoil because of the massive expansion of the student population. At 
the mid-decade, the discussion about the need to reform the university intensified, and 
the government decided to initiate the reform.
403
 Students were also becoming anxious 
about the problems at the universities, and law students criticized the conservative na-
ture of their education and called for a more socially oriented curriculum.
404
 In 1968, 
Jyränki wrote that to overcome the degradation of legal scholarship, legal education 
must change as well.
405
 By the end of the decade, the reform of legal education was in 
motion.
406
 The need to reform higher education in Finland was general, and the course 
of the reform followed well-worn paths. The actual reform of each individual discipline, 
however, was conducted individually, which meant that scholars at the academy had a 
considerable say in the process.    
   The late 1960s was a time of radicalization of the Finnish universities as well as of 
legal scholarship. The manifestation of this radicalism was the occupation of the Old 
Student House in November 1968, an event in which even law students participated. 
The students had called for, among other things, democratization of the university ad-
ministration and extension of the ideological basis of the curriculum.
407
 In 1969, radical 
law students founded the journal Contra to contribute to the alternative and critical in-
sights on law, legal education, society, and politics.
408
 Radicalization of law students 
was a part of the change in atmosphere since, as noted, the late 1960s had in general 
been time of criticism of legal scholarship and activation of the alternative profession. 
Criticism of legal education became more intense in 1969, once the process of reform 
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had been initiated. Radical students and critical legal scholars often argued that law was 
the most conservative discipline and therefore in serious need of reform.
409
 The young 
scholars Aulis Aarnio and Matti Savolainen forwarded their proposal for reform in 
which social science had a strong position at the beginning of the course, but the pro-
posal was quickly turned down.
410
 The arguments about the conservative nature of the 
legal education were not completely groundless, but scholars speaking for a more thor-
oughgoing change were facing a difficult task.  
   The criticism of legal education and the process of reform were launched in the 
1960s and the interview with the President Kekkonen in 1970 gave further impetus for a 
more thorough change in the basis of legal education. As we saw, the interview was 
conducted by legal scholars who favored critical and alternative views of legal scholar-
ship, and with respect to education, the President once again supported their cause.
411
 
He chided the law professors for their conservative attitude, arguing that students did 
not acquire a decent knowledge of social sciences or law in action.
412
 Kekkonen criti-
cized both the traditional legal profession and education. Whether his arguments were 
influenced by the scholars who conducted the interview or not, they obviously had a 
significant impact on the course of the reform.  
   The debates on the reform intensified at the beginning of the 1970s. There was 
unanimity about the need for reform but disagreement arose about its content and struc-
ture. Although the need to update study materials and to provide relevant contemporary 
lessons for the students was recognized,
413
 the precise purpose of the reform was the 
point of controversy. The criticism of legal scholarship was already widespread and 
intense, and the same arguments were advanced in the context of education. It was gen-
erally argued that law students needed more information about the social reality, as 
Matti Louekoski noted, and in order to achieve this he called for cross-disciplinary 
courses. He also opined that the freedom of the students should be increased.
414
 Ilmari 
Ojanen argued that contemporary education incorporated the dominant bourgeois ideol-
ogy and was thus ideologically one-sided. Therefore, different social systems and ideo-
logies had to be taught.
415
 Students had complained about the lack of social material and 
freedom for a couple of years, and as the alternative thinking spread among the legal 
profession, more scholars promoted these arguments. In accordance with the alternative 
scholarship, the reformist scholars argued that the methods of legal scholarship and its 
                                               
409 Reijo Lehtinen, Nyt se alkaa, Contra 1/1969, 24; Juha Vikatmaa, Juristit yhteiskuntakeskustelussa, 
Contra 2/1969, 35; Pertti Lammi, Eräs asennetutkimus, Contra 4/1969, 26; Markku Uomola, Opintojen 
uudistuksesta, Contra 1/1970, 22–23; Patrick Zilliacus, Undervisning i juridik/politisk konservatism i 
misstag, Contra 3/1970, 20–23. 
410 Aulis Aarnio, Vastahankaan: Muistikuvia (Helsinki: Siltala 2009), 362–363. According to Aarnio, the 
reason for the failure was the fact that they had quoted Mao Zedong on the cover of the draft, although the 
draft itself was in fact based on the Yale Law School curriculum.      
411 On the interview in more detail, see section 2.2 above.   
412 Kekkonen 1970, supra n. 72 at xii–xiii.  
413 Aulis Pöyhönen, Missä viipyy oikeustieteellisten opintojen uudistus, Lakimiesuutiset 12/1970, 5–8. 
414 Matti Louekoski, Eräitä näkökohtia oikeustieteellisen tiedekunnan tutkintojen uudistamisesta, Laki-
miesuutiset 12/1970, 12–14. 
415 Ilmari Ojanen, Oikeudesta ja oikeuden tekemisestä, Lakimiesuutiset 1/1971, 19–21. 
326 
 
relation to social values and ideologies had to be apparent in the courses. The idea be-
hind the revision was to educate the students to understand the social significance of 
their profession.    
   The task of revising the law school curriculum was far from simple, however. 
Aarnio criticized the pointlessness of the debates. According to him, since the reform 
had to begin from deliberation on what kind of jurists society needed, there was a need 
for a fundamental change in both the substance and structure of legal education. How-
ever, non-legal material should not be over-emphasized.
416
 The traditional profession 
also recognized the need for reform, but wanted to maintain the basic aspects of tradi-
tional education and did not want to give too much stress to non-legal material,
417
 espe-
cially not wanting to include any ideological elements.
418
 A particular problem was pro-
cedural law, which the radical students and alternative scholars often regarded as the 
most conservative subject,
419
 some scholars thought about eliminating it as a separate 
subject and integrating it into other courses.
420
 This was unthinkable for the professor of 
procedural law of course.
421
 Procedural law was probably the most difficult course in 
law school and not very popular among the students.
422
 It is therefore no surprise that 
the junior faculty often suggested that it should be dropped as an individual subject.
423
 
Although the reform was inevitable, the conflict between the traditional and the critical 
profession was pervasive. Everyone seems to have acknowledged the need for the “law-
yers for the future”, but there was no consensus on what they might be like.    
   The pressure to reform legal education was particularly pressing at the University 
of Helsinki, the capital of Finland. It had been the sole academy for legal education in 
Finland till the beginning of the 1960s, when another law school was opened in Turku. 
The purpose of the new school was to have a broader base for legal education, but the 
pressure from the practical profession watered down any noteworthy educational inno-
vations.
424
 Nevertheless, a need was felt to revise the course at the University of Helsin-
ki in order to maintain its prestige and modernity. In addition, since the poor situation of 
legal post-graduate studies had become evident in the lack of resources for research and 
education,
425
 the pressure of change was immediate. There was a large number of stu-
dents demanding reform, and the transformation of society set new requirements for law 
and the legal profession. The times of change were obvious in the thoughts of the alter-
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native and critical legal scholars, who considered themselves as the representatives of 
future legal scholarship.    
   As was society, the university was in a turbulent situation in the early 1970s. Stu-
dents had been a major motor of the radicalism of the 1960s, and the division between 
the traditional world-view and the new, radical one was seen at the faculty level as well. 
Young radical scholars considered traditional scholarship and university administration 
as reactionary and conservative, supporting the bourgeois hegemony and capitalist 
mode of production. At the beginning of the 1970s, then, the university was divided 
between the traditional and the radical bloc,
426
 and the controversies over academic 
power were manifested on many occasions. The radicals criticized the politics of tenure 
nominations for their secrecy and conservative nature,
427
 and academic research was 
criticized for its commercial dependence and lack of responsibility. Critical scholars 
opined that scholarship should be independent and focus on relevant social problems.
428
 
The academic conflict over the methods and policies of research was obvious in the two 
simultaneous research projects on democracy and equality. Whereas DETA represented 
the traditional research, the TANDEM project represented the critical and radical 
thought. It approached the causes and consequences of social inequality from the Marx-
ist perspective in order to demonstrate the deficiencies of Finnish society. Needless to 
say, the traditional bloc criticized the research for its one-sided, ideological point of 
view.
429
 It was evident in the conflict that every aspect of academic life was colored by 
the conflict over traditional and alternative points of view.   
   The radical students who were among the most enthusiastic reformers of the uni-
versity also criticized the capitalist education ideology and wanted to increase critical 
thinking and freedom of scholarship.
430
 With respect to law, they conformed to the ideas 
of the alternative scholars and the Association of Democratic Lawyers.
431
 The rise of 
Marxism and critical scholarship both followed and contributed to the controversies at 
the university. They represented the critical thinking that, according to the radical schol-
ars, transcended the bourgeois hegemony and provided an alternative perspective on 
social structures, institutions, and consciousness. This all-encompassing conflict took 
more or less radical forms, but it was everywhere. Alternative scholars sought to modify 
the tradition, whereas radical scholars wanted to abandon it. With respect to the univer-
sity administration, critical scholars wanted to open up the old hierarchies and increase 
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democracy in decision-making and independence in research. The split within the uni-
versity was pervasive, which was obvious in the reform of legal education.            
   This reform took a step forward in 1973 when the reform committee published its 
report. The committee had worked from September 1971, and more than twenty people 
had worked in it, including Aulis Aarnio, Raimo Blom, Olavi Heinonen, Antero Jyrän-
ki, Lars D Eriksson, and Kaarlo Tuori.
432
 Alternative and critical scholars were well 
represented on the committee, which was apparent in its work. The committee spent 
over three hundred pages in analyzing the status of legal education. In short, it explained 
that one purpose of higher education was to train critical thinking. Since concepts, theo-
ries, and methods were often based on values, law students should be made aware of the 
connection between law, legal scholarship, and society, as well as critical of it. There-
fore, the committee proposed courses in social science and general jurisprudence in the 
first semester, as well as a new subject division in which subjects were classified and 
named in accordance with the social problems the law regulated. Procedural law as an 
individual subject was removed and integrated into the other courses.
433
 
   The proposal for reform complied with the critical and reformist side of the acad-
emy and thus conformed to the agenda of alternative and critical legal scholarship. 
Since it would have been a considerable change, it was no surprise that the traditional 
profession rejected it quite bluntly. Traditional scholars, judges, and lawyers were unan-
imous that the new subject division was disorganized and meant a serious break in an 
international tradition.
434
 Furthermore, the traditional profession was also unanimous 
that the committee had over-emphasized social material at the expense of legal materi-
al.
435
 The professor of procedural law, Tauno Tirkkonen, argued that the committee was 
ideologically one-sided and that it proposal would lead to fragmented and impractical 
courses which would be very difficult to realize.
436
  
    The gulf between the traditional and the critical perspective on law was obvious 
in the reception of the report, and the most essential reforms were thus immediately shot 
down. The scholars behind the reform were obviously promoting their academic inter-
ests, as well as reflecting the trends of the time. Although they did not alter the basis of 
legal education, but rather adjusted it to suit the interests of alternative scholarship, the 
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proposal for reform deviated from the tradition too far to be uncritically accepted. The 
traditional profession was aware of their professional prestige and was therefore hesitant 
to accept any such thoroughgoing changes, even if the proposal merely broadened the 
basis of education and did not turn it into ideological preaching. For the traditional pro-
fession, legal rules and principles were more important to the jurist than social data.    
   Despite the reformist character, the report was a compromise between alternative 
and traditional insights. Its main focus was still on the education of a jurist, even though 
the structure of the curriculum was revised and non-legal material was increased. Radi-
cals thus criticized it for not being reformist enough.
437
 Bruun, on the other hand, noted 
that the report was simply a proposal for a reform that was to be realized in practice, and 
he worried that the reform would be torpedoed because the law faculty and the profes-
sion were against it.
438
 The opposition to the reform was fierce, so the worries about it 
being watered down were not unfounded. Therefore, too, the committee could not have 
seriously made any more a radical proposal. General trends followed the politics of the 
time, but the legal profession at large remained loyal to the tradition. The final say in 
the execution of the reform was left to the faculty, which in general was not especially 
well-disposed towards alternative scholarship. 
   The conflict between the traditional and the alternative factions of the faculty be-
came apparent in 1975 with a conflict over a text book. Several alternative scholars had 
participated in writing the book, which was meant to be used in the admission tests. The 
authors included Blom, Eriksson, Jyränki, and Tuori.
439
 The authors stated that legal 
rules were contingent, emanating from material social relations, and that their ultimate 
purpose was to preserve the existing social power structures. Furthermore, the role of 
discretion and interpretation were emphasized in judicial decision-making.
440
 In many 
ways, the book was a summary of alternative legal scholarship. Its disposition complied 
with the new subject division proposed by the legal education reform committee, and its 
substance conformed for the most part to the alternative and critical insights. It gave a 
realistic, or critical, perspective on law and legal scholarship and often stressed the al-
ternative views and arguments. Legal rules were often in the background and the em-
phasis was on the social functions of law.  
   The faculty, however, rejected the book, which was divided into two parts in the 
hope that at least the second part, which was much less critical than the first, would be 
accepted. Eventually, however, both parts were turned down, which naturally upset the 
authors.
441
 The book was a continuation of the series of legal text books with the alter-
native approach that had been published during the 1970s in criminal,
442
 constitution-
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al,
443
 and family law,
444
 for example. Many of these had been included in the law school 
requirements but here the faculty drew the line. A general introduction to the legal sys-
tem meant to be used in admission tests must have been too much because of its signifi-
cance for the law students. Besides the rejection of the book, the reform was going 
down in other ways as well. The Association for Legal and Social Sciences complained 
that the faculty had markedly reduced the books on philosophy, history, and society in 
the general phase of legal studies.
445
 The ambitious reform was coming to a halt as it 
faced the educational realities. Legal tradition could not have been changed in a short 
time, and traditional scholars were still the majority in the faculty. The viability of al-
ternative scholarship was tested when the reform was taken from principle to practice.  
   At the end of the decade, the intense debates over legal education began to fade. 
The reform was being executed and scholars still disagreed over the details, but the ma-
jor course was determined and the demagogic criticism was losing its impetus. Once the 
hero of alternative legal scholars, Kaarle Makkonen, who over decade before had reject-
ed the traditional ideas on legal reasoning, was now speaking for a more traditional edu-
cation. He argued that superficial knowledge of theory and philosophy would not be of 
much practical use or interest to the students, and therefore the amount of non-legal 
material should be kept to a minimum.
446
 Toivo Holopainen also noted that since stu-
dents needed practical skills, legal rules should be the core of education.
447
 Klami, on 
the other hand, defended the position of legal history,
448
 and also argued that education 
should focus on the goals and consequences of law.
449
 Although the struggle over edu-
cation was not completely over, the majority of the profession had realized that legal 
education was brief and that its major purpose was to train lawyers, and that it was not 
possible to include much extra-legal material in the curriculum. Even if the social sci-
ences in legal education were not criticized per se, their impracticality had been widely 
recognized.    
   As was the case in the general criticism of jurisprudence, the problem was also 
about the nature of the social relations of law. For Eriksson, the struggle over the reform 
was like whistling in the wind since the traditional scholars could not understand the 
point. He criticized Makkonen and Holopainen for promoting a legalist and extremely 
positivist view on law that neglected the ideological use of rules and did not train the 
students to assess the relationship between law and society critically.
450
 Holopainen 
responded that the emphasis on rules did not mean extreme legalism but simply the 
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practicalities of the profession,
451
 but for Eriksson, this view did not pay due attention to 
the ideological justification of law.
452
 To the critical scholars, the problem was not 
simply about interpretation or discretion, but rather about the factors behind them. In 
their view, legal reasoning and decision-making always promoted some further goal that 
was unseen in most situations, which was why law had to be critically analyzed. This 
point of view, however, was in such radical conflict with the traditional perspective, that 
it did not have a chance even in the political atmosphere of the 1970s.  
   Legal education was reformed before the end of the 1970s. It has been argued that 
the reform succeeded in general quite well in Helsinki, although many of the younger 
scholars were displeased with the fact that the extra-legal material was not increased as 
much as expected, and although students were divided on the issue.
453
 The structure of 
the education changed and materials of philosophy and social sciences were added to 
the first year of the studies. Some of the alternative text books made their way into the 
requirements, but the substance in general remained rather traditional.
454
     
   In the end it seems that the reform was tamed because of practical problems. Crit i-
cal scholars often had overly radical ideas without considering how they would function 
in practice. Scholars who reviewed the reform immediately after its execution noted that 
the criticism of the traditional education and the proposals for reform concentrated too 
much on the goals without paying enough attention to the methods of achieving them,
455
 
and that the goals were too ambitious.
456
 The faculty also wanted to maintain the tradi-
tional subject division, and had to give up on many reforms because of lack of re-
sources.
457
 Some of the reforms were too radical for the traditional profession to accept, 
while others failed because of the educational realities. The reform was not a complete 
failure, but for many alternative scholars, and especially critical scholars, it was disap-
pointingly moderate.  
   The struggle over legal education lasted for a decade and ended in a compromise 
based on traditional thought. The problems regarding legal education were acknowl-
edged in the late 1950s, and the discussion on reform began. In the 1960s, students 
complained about the education and the government deliberated on the general course 
of reform of the university, which was also initiated. Reformist scholars began to argue 
for a more thorough alteration of the form and substance of the law school curriculum in 
the late 1960s, and the interview with the President gave the final push to the debates. 
The reform committee, which was manned mostly by young, reformist people, proposed 
                                               
451 Toivo Holopainen, Taistelusta tuulimyllyjä vastaan, Oikeus 3/1978, 183–185. 
452 Lars D. Eriksson, Med anledning av ovanstående muller, Oikeus 3/1978, 186. 
453 Korpiola 2010, supra n. 86 at 222–223.  
454 One can see this by comparing the study guides of the law school of the University of Helsinki be-
tween the early and late 1970s.  
455 Kauko Wikström, Piirteitä viimeaikaisesta oikeustieteellisestä keskustelusta Suomessa, LM 1979, 467. 
456 Heikki Halila, Eräitä oikeustieteellisestä tutkinnosta annetusta asetuksesta aiheutuvia ongelmia, LM 
1980, 425, n. 16.  
457 Edward Andersson, Oikeustieteiden tutkinnonuudistuksen tausta ja toteuttaminen, 46–47, in Häikiö et 
al. (eds.) 1977, supra n. 403 at 44–51.  
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relatively major changes in the curriculum, but these were moderated in practice. Legal 
education was reformed but not to a major extent.         
   The criticism of legal education shows the magnitude of alternative and critical le-
gal scholarship and its connections with university politics and research in the 1960s 
and 1970s. With respect to legal education, alternative and critical scholars naturally 
endorsed the insights they had on law and sought to promote them in the curriculum. 
They argued, alongside the radical students, that the connection between law and socie-
ty should be critically analyzed, the ideological basis of education ought to be exposed, 
and more materials on social sciences and philosophy should be included. These were 
the arguments the scholars advanced in their particular subjects. Education was the field 
where scholarship could be put to practical use and where its academic significance was 
partly determined. The question was also about the power over scholarship and admin-
istration at the university. The alternative bloc was against the traditional hierarchies 
and politics of research which they wanted to dethrone and replace with their own ways. 
Critical legal scholarship thus involved several aspects of the 1960s and 1970s. And 
although it reflected the reformist spirit of the time, its ideas were not to be inserted into 
legal education without compromises, since its perspective on law deviated fundamen-
tally from that of the tradition.    
7 Alternative legal scholarship at the end of the 1970s: From radical 
criticism to alternative analysis of law    
 
The time from the late 1960s to the last quarter of the 1970s was a continuing battle 
over the dominance of jurisprudence. Critical scholars fought to strip the credibility and 
viability from traditional scholarship. At first, critical legal scholarship had been pas-
sionate trashing of the traditional methods of scholarship and conceptions about law, 
and later it matured into more theoretical and sophisticated literature. Besides scholar-
ship, the criticism also concerned the corner-stones of the Finnish legal system, such as 
the Constitution, the judiciary, criminal law, and legal education, which were all under 
pressure of change, as the critical scholars manned the reform committees and worked 
towards a radical alteration of the law. The late 1970s, however, marked a period of 
change. Society was becoming more conservative, the optimism in the welfare state was 
waning, the conflict between labor and capital became less pronounced, and student 
radicalism was fading. Despite the intense criticism, many things were either the same 
or had changed but not as much as the critics had hoped for. At the end of the 1970s, 
critical legal scholarship was facing new problems.     
   The critical enterprise had not been a failure, however, for Finnish legal scholar-
ship had been transformed to some extent. Empirical material and value-based analysis 
were typically excluded in traditional scholarship, but the heated debates on jurispru-
dence and the changes in the policy of scholarship and research had encouraged alterna-
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tive approaches in legal scholarship. In addition to the studies on criminal law,
458
 collec-
tive agreements,
459
 and unemployment benefits,
460
 which were obvious expressions of 
alternative and critical legal scholarship, methodology and perspective changed in the 
more traditional scholarship as well. Matti Niemivuo applied an historical, empirical, 
and realistic approach in his study on the state subsidies,
461
 criticism of ideology and a 
sociological approach prevailed in Timo Konstari’s treatise on the publicity of docu-
ments in the state administration,
462
 and the study by Kirsti Rissanen on trademarks was 
clearly cross-disciplinary.
463
 Kauko Wikström’s analysis of legal reasoning was an at-
tempt to revise legal realism in Finland as well as the criticism of analytical jurispru-
dence,
464
 and there was still interest in analyzing the “scientific” basis of legal scholar-
ship and its potential as an empirical science.
465
  
   As the various treatises at the end of the decade show, alternative legal scholarship 
had become practically a commonplace in Finnish jurisprudence. Several textbooks 
with an alternative approach had also been published and included in the law school 
curricula. The waning of critical legal scholarship, on the other hand, was seen in the 
text-book on constitutional law, where the radical second edition had been revised in 
1979 to create a far more traditional book.
466
 The methodological basis of legal scholar-
ship had broadened nevertheless. Empirical analysis was now more common and doc-
trinal analysis less dominant, although it was still the most common form of legal schol-
arship. Alternative legal scholarship had become less of an “alternative” and more of a 
sub-paradigm. Critical legal scholarship, then, had to find new ways to revive its rele-
vance in the ever-changing social and academic atmosphere.    
   The optimism in social planning and reform had faded significantly by 1978, when 
scholars contemplated their achievements in legal policy in a symposium on the 
“change of the legal policy”. By then, the debates on legal policy had faded to a large 
extent, and alternative scholars disagreed on their consequences. They noted that the 
three most important aspects of the critical debates of the 1960s and the 1970s were the 
criticism of legal scholarship and education, the reconsideration of the Constitution, 
legislation, and the courts, and the revival of the Association of Democratic Lawyers, 
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but the actual reforms had been moderate, and now the criticism was muted.
467
 The leg-
islative reforms of the 1970s were respected although some were disappointed with 
their inadequacies, as well as with the current state of the legislation.
468
 In the symposi-
um, the fact that the scholars still endorsed alternative scholarship and political activism 
but the society around them had changed was revealing.   
    In spite of the changes in the social atmosphere, some things were the same. Rai-
mo Blom, for example, continued his empirical analyses on the impartiality of the ad-
ministration of justice. He had been unable to point out any systematic discrimination in 
the criminal process, yet he still argued that it existed at every stage of the process and 
thus produced inequality in the administration of criminal justice.
469
 The fact that more 
people refused to reply to his survey studies in the changed situation because they 
thought that the study was prejudiced against the legal system and social order of Fin-
land was revealing, however. One person, for instance, replied that “I did not reply be-
cause a study that clearly aims at a predetermined and ready-made goal is not science to 
my knowledge, but rather a badly concealed promotion of the ideological purposes of 
the scholar,” and another one commented that “I have talked with about twenty people 
who have all received your letter, and without exception each and every one of them has 
been of the opinion that once again the legal and social order of Finland is under at-
tack.”470 The radical attack at the late 1960s was still in the minds of the legal profes-
sionals, and they did not want that to happen again now. Critical legal scholarship had 
obviously irritated the majority of the profession despite reactions to it being few. The 
traditional profession tried not to be bothered by it, and traditional scholars responded 
whenever they felt a need for it. The colorful decade and a half that had passed had left 
a mark on the profession, and at the end of the 1970s, it wanted to go back to normalcy.  
   Critical legal scholarship was going out of fashion but it was not over. As the ideo-
logical enthusiasm of the 1960s had turned towards the realities of the late 1970s, Eriks-
son recalled the need for thorough discussion about the fundamental principles of law 
and the legal system, lest the noble ideas be buried under bureaucracy and technical 
corrections.
471
 As the decade approached its close, however, the tone had changed. In 
the opening to the first issue of Oikeus in 1977, he wrote that the political atmosphere 
had changed and the time of total reform was over. Now it was time to consider the pos-
sibility of change and to develop a new kind of legal argumentation.
472
 Many things had 
indeed changed. The optimism over the welfare state had dissipated and society in gen-
eral had become more conservative. Besides the moderation of politics, there was a 
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strong rightist trend in student politics.
473
 The great plans to reform the constitution, 
criminal law, and legal education were over; while the first had been temporarily halted, 
the second was split into various partial reforms, and the last was receiving its final 
touch with a compromise between conservative and radical opinions. And although 
methodologies had expanded and arguments had become more flexible, Finnish juris-
prudence was still mainly normative. Radicalism was over but alternative legal scholar-
ship was alive and kicking.    
   Eriksson’s opening is illustrative of the jurisprudential situation of the latter half of 
the 1970s. The radicals of the 1960s had grown and found jobs in the administration or 
at the universities, and their time was now consumed by their responsibilities. Their 
youthful enthusiasm for radical criticism had dissipated, their theoretical sophistication 
had grown, and their world-view had become less idealistic. Moreover, as the time in 
general had become more conservative, students were not all that interested in critical 
scholarship. The age of radical criticism was over, and alternative legal scholarship had 
to find new ways to maintain its viability without repeating the old ideas or being ab-
sorbed into the mainstream. Alongside the changed circumstances, Eriksson’s opening 
also referred to his article in the journal.  
   The focus of critical scholarship thus moved from general jurisprudence and the 
Constitution toward legal argumentation in practical cases. In the late 1970s, Eriksson 
was the scholar who most enthusiastically elaborated new thoughts of critical and alter-
native legal scholarship. In the pursuit of developing an alternative model for argumen-
tation, he found new influences from Italian jurisprudence. He re-stated that legal rules 
withheld value choices, adjudication was political in the last resort, law was not auton-
omous, and that the traditional doctrine on the separation of state powers did not corre-
spond to reality. The new element in the theory was, however, that these points were to 
be linked to judicial decision-making, which was to be based on the sovereignty of the 
people. The political nature of adjudication was to be recognized, and the courts were 
not to become guardians of the ruling class. By contrast, law was to be adjusted to reali-
ty in order to promote equality.
474
  
   This could be seen as the beginning of the Finnish alternative analysis of law, alt-
hough similar arguments had been put earlier in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the purpose 
here was to provide models of argumentation and interpretation of law which would 
promote material equality. The idea of the alternative jurisprudence of the late 1970s 
was that social equality could be promoted through argument in actual cases instead of 
pursuing fundamental changes in the Constitution. Eriksson’s theory was also a fore-
runner in the application of Italian legal theory in the Finnish and Scandinavian con-
texts. By noting that alternative solutions could be made by a non-traditional mode of 
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reasoning, the purpose was to elaborate a theory of reasoning that could transcend for-
malism without any radical alteration.   
   The times also required changes in adjudication. Eriksson noted that fundamental 
rights had become important and that courts were their main executors and protectors. 
Because legal problems often concerned conflicts of interest which required being 
weighed against each other, the traditional forms of reasoning did not correspond with 
the reality. This required frank consideration of values, interests, and goals in judicial 
decision-making, as well as integrating the courts more closely with society.
475
 Alt-
hough the reform of the judiciary still lurked within the article, the main point was in 
the alteration of legal argumentation. Since the rights of the citizen had become critical 
in law and society during the 1970s, it was important to attend them in legal theory be-
cause, it was argued, the execution of rights could not be left to logic but required a 
comprehensive understanding of the situation.   
   Indeed, a new model of legal argumentation was needed to solve the complex 
problems of modern society. Eriksson had also noted the Scandinavian debate on the 
distinction between legal rules and principles, as well as Dworkin’s formulation of the 
problem.
476
 He argued that to understand the dynamics of legal argumentation, one had 
to be familiar with its historical dimensions, because legal ideology and culture restrict-
ed the margin of error. It was important to consider what circumstances were relevant in 
the case. In this regard, Eriksson provided a goal-rational model of argumentation in 
which the judicial decision-maker took the goals of law as well as the goals and needs 
of the parties to the case into account. The purpose was to decide legal cases according 
to a comprehensive assessment of the relevant data and the consequences of the deci-
sion.
477
 Eriksson’s alternative analysis developed greatly in a couple of years. By fo l-
lowing the debates on legal principles, he could find a method of flexible legal reason-
ing in which all the relevant issues could be taken into account, and where the decision 
could be based on consideration of consequences and policies.    
   In general, then, alternative legal scholarship was moving from radical criticism 
towards alternative analysis of law and legal argumentation. The basic themes were still 
the same, but the radical enthusiasm had changed into theorizing on more practical mat-
ters. The basis for alternative analysis was laid in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Now, 
however, the older critical scholars were elaborating new theories as were the younger 
scholars, who were not particularly Marxist albeit influenced by it. Alternative legal 
scholarship had become widespread and accepted in the 1970s, although the radical 
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claims were never approved. The critical debates had contributed to the rise of methodo-
logical eclecticism and balanced realism in jurisprudence.   
   Despite the fact that the focus was on a new style of argumentation, there still was 
a need for thorough changes in legal scholarship. For example, the emphasis on values 
and policies in legal scholarship and practice was evident in the Mikkola’s treatise of 
1979. He encouraged examination of the values within law as one aspect of legal schol-
arship because a critical inquiry into the values was considered necessary in order to 
contemplate reform.
478
 The theory was a combination of traditional and alternative legal 
scholarship, because the social problems of the 1970s still required an analysis of the 
policies that lurked behind law and thus also influenced legal practice. Alternative legal 
scholarship had long pursued a comprehensive image of law in society, and various 
studies had opened up various parts of the legal system, but a major theory of critical 
legal scholarship was still lacking.    
   Eriksson was also reaching the point where he could synthesize his ideas into a 
comprehensive theory. There was a need to reconsider the basis of legal scholarship 
because, as he argued, the positivism that dominated Finnish jurisprudence ignored the 
values which nevertheless played a significant role in adjudication. This drive towards 
rationality in scholarship, however, led to irrationality in judicial decision-making. The 
connection between social interests and the legal system was to be analyzed because it 
was the only way to criticize and develop law in the struggle for equality.
479
 Eriksson 
had worked on critical legal theory for over a decade, and his philosophical sophistica-
tion as well as his familiarity with Marxism had increased greatly during that time.
480
  
   By the end of the 1970s, the time was ripe for a Marxist theory of law that would 
meet the needs of both scholarship and practice. Eriksson defined these fundamentals in 
an article in 1979 in which he sketched the context for a more comprehensive theory. 
Law, he argued, was both a means of directing social behavior and an ideology for so-
cial structures, and Marxist legal scholarship sought a thorough understanding of socie-
ty and law. The focus of legal scholarship was legal reality, meaning the various ways 
law was used as a social tool as well as the complex relationship between law, politics, 
and the economy.
481
 The purpose was thus not to analyze law but its actual functions in 
society. There was also a practical function. Legal argumentation was also important 
because social structures and ideology defined its rationality. Therefore one should 
study the possibilities between the “is” and the “ought” of judicial decision-making in 
order to emancipate it from its ideological boundaries.
482
 Marxist legal scholarship set 
out to reveal the reality of law both as a system and in action, and to analyze the poten-
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tial for reform. In this sense, jurisprudence served not merely the needs of theory or 
legal practice but also the needs of political change.  
   In 1980, Eriksson summarized his theory in his doctoral dissertation, which con-
sisted of thirteen articles published in 1966–1979 and a summary part of one hundred 
and thirty six pages in which he adumbrated the theory of Marxist legal scholarship.
483
 
There was, however, a problem. The University of Helsinki did not want to approve it 
because it was not a typical dissertation but a collection of articles and a summary. 
Thus, Eriksson decided to defend his thesis at the University of Turku which had a rec-
ord of producing dissertations on legal philosophy and theory.
484
 The fact that the Uni-
versity of Helsinki declined to grant permission to defend the thesis probably does not 
say much about the state of jurisprudence at that time or that there was some kind of 
hostility towards Marxism. It seems that the University wanted to maintain its standards 
on doctoral thesis, which were conservative to an extent.  
   In any event, Eriksson’s thesis was approved in 1980, the first systematic analysis 
of Marxist legal scholarship in Finland. The premises of the theory were those that had 
been emphasized for a decade; now they were presented in a more systematic and so-
phisticated fashion. According to Eriksson, the purposes of Marxist legal scholarship 
were to seek structural connections and conflicts within law, reveal its interest-bound 
nature, and present emancipatory alternatives. It investigated the tendencies of the de-
velopment of law in its historical, political, and social context. And while recognizing 
the relative autonomy of law and legal scholarship, the main focus was on their social 
connections.
485
 In its historical-materialist sense, Marxist theory perceived law as a so-
cial construct for particular purposes, which were to be analyzed. Through this kind of 
research one could obtain a realistic image of law in order to proceed to the next phase 
which was the critical analysis of law in action. 
   The purpose of the critique of ideology was to show how ideology masked the real 
relations and restrained practice. Critical analysis of law redefined the traditional legal 
concepts, such as freedom and equality, and reconsidered their meaning and purpose in 
contemporary society. The ultimate goal was to create a sketch for the concept of jus-
tice, which was always linked to society. In this sense, legal scholarship was practical 
activity on practical cases.
486
 Marxist legal scholarship was not merely criticism of law, 
but was critical analysis of law in action, searching for alternatives for the contempora-
neous law. It also sought to demonstrate that the gap between law in books and law in 
action followed a purpose and then to reveal that purpose. The argument that legal con-
cepts masked and legitimized this gap was fundamental; concepts had to be re-
considered and re-defined. Just as the critical legal scholars in the United States argued 
that law protected certain values which could have been something else just as well, the 
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Finnish Marxist legal scholarship pointed out that legal concepts protected the values 
and interests of capitalist society, although they could protect some other values as well. 
The emancipatory and alternative aspect of critical legal scholarship was to point out the 
ideological limitations of law, of which people often were unconscious, and then to 
demonstrate that law could be something else.   
   Eriksson’s thesis was indeed the most systematic and comprehensive demonstra-
tion of the practical use of critical legal scholarship in Finland thus far. It also marked 
the culmination of the alternative analysis of law,
487
 which created the basis for the later 
alternative legal scholarship. At the beginning of the 1980s, the demagogic criticism 
was over and the alternative scholars of the previous twenty years were either working 
outside the academy or making a career in it. In the latter case, their aging and their 
mounting academic responsibilities forced them to do something else besides criticize. 
Eriksson’s dissertation is a perfect example of turning a long career of critical scholar-
ship into a systematic piece of legal theory. Meanwhile, critical scholars had to find new 
inspiration. Time and the generation had changed, and new trends were ahead. Legal 
scholarship had changed, but not markedly. However, critical legal scholarship was not 
over. The new decade proved to be a good time for it although in a different way than 
before. 
8 Conclusions  
8.1 A historical perspective on critical legal scholarship 
 
As I noted in the previous chapter, I applied the analysis of the history of CLS on the 
history of Scandinavian critical legal scholarship, because it reflected the same issues 
and involves the same problems. In this section, I will apply that same analysis to the 
Finnish critical legal scholarship for the same reasons and because there is no research 
on the subject. In the following, I will point out that various aspects have to be included 
in this history, and that it should not be reduced simply to one factor.    
   Finland experienced a relatively late but radical debate on the nature and purposes 
of legal scholarship in the late 1960s. In the middle of the decade, Finnish jurisprudence 
was already in a state of change. The old conceptualism was being pushed aside, the 
analytical school was gaining ground, and legal scholars began to pay more attention to 
the particular meanings of legal concepts. The analytical school reflected realism in its 
criticism and analysis of legal concepts, but it was not particularly realistic regarding 
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judicial decision-making. The Finnish legal scholars were aware of judicial discretion 
and the personal input of the judge in the decisions, but these were not emphasized, and 
legal theory in general tried to minimize the impact of extra-legal factors and present 
legal reasoning as being as rational and neutral as possible. The later analytical school 
brought aspects of hermeneutics and linguistic philosophy into the picture and focused 
on the verbal phrasing of legal rules. However, the formalist elements of legal reasoning 
were important and the attention was given to legal rules and principles. Moreover, the 
majority of the profession remained more or less loyal to the traditional conceptualism. 
It was this relative formalism and conceptualism which the critical scholars attacked.  
   Critical legal scholarship emerged in the latter half of the 1960s, and developed 
within a few years into a critical front of legal scholars. Legal discretion and interpreta-
tion were well known facts, but Eriksson began to focus on the utter indeterminacy and 
the structural biases of legal reasoning. Eriksson’s criticism of legal reasoning was soon 
accompanied by the sociological approaches of Jyränki and Kivivuori, who worked on 
the gap between law in books and law in action and sought to demonstrate the irrele-
vance of traditional scholarship. According to them, legal scholarship needed a broader 
methodological basis and openness on the values and policies that were inherent in law. 
Jyränki took this direction during the 1960s, and by the end of the decade, he declared 
the rebellion on methods. Kivivuori, on the other hand, pursued a behavioral account of 
law. The turn of the decade then witnessed the transformation of the alternative and 
critical legal scholarship into a mood of legal scholarship that sought to replace the tra-
dition.   
   The interview with the President of Finland gave an impetus to the debates on law 
and legal scholarship. The interview was indeed a curious case. As we saw, critical legal 
scholars drafted the questions and prepped the President, whose answers then complied 
precisely with their critical agenda. The critical notions that were brought up in the in-
terview were not, of course, inventions by the scholars, but reflected the social radical-
ism and criticism of the 1960s. These ideas already existed, but the statements of the 
President made the legal profession hear them loud and clear. Social radicalism was 
thus officially translated into legal discourse. Kekkonen would not have participated in 
the occasion without a personal cause, which means that he obviously wanted to stir the 
political pot and provoke discussion. The legal scholars, on the other hand, acquired an 
authoritative statement for their cause and also provoked discussion.          
   The 1970s was then the time of widespread alternative and critical scholarship. 
Critical legal scholarship was elaborating into a philosophical criticism of legal reason-
ing, and alternative legal scholarship became relatively popular among young scholars 
who studied contemporary social problems and wrote legal treatises from sociological 
and empirical points of view. In many respects, the alternative approach was accepted 
as a sub-paradigm within the tradition, and despite the relative popularity of the alterna-
tive scholarship, the mainstream remained traditional. By the end of the decade, much 
of the radical criticism had waned, as had any major scale utopian reforms of the legal 
system.    
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   A close connection between theory and practice, between jurisprudence and poli-
tics existed in Finland. Since the alternative and critical legal scholars also participated 
in legal politics, their scholarship was not simply academic theory. They worked on the 
reform of the Constitution, criminal law, and legal education, and promoted their in-
sights in these areas. Their scholarship was politically oriented, and because it con-
formed to the radical social thought of the 1960s and 1970s, it had social relevance. 
Furthermore, a vast amount of progressive legislation was enacted during the 1970s, 
which was a consequence of the critical and alternative scholarship to a certain extent.     
   The debate on the nature of legal scholarship sparked a series of events which 
transformed the basis of Finnish legal scholarship. However, the debate itself was more 
a symptom of the wider transformation of society, scholarship, and culture, than an in-
dividual event within jurisprudence. The debate was a consequence of the transfor-
mation of the legal epistemology that the critical scholars adopted. Thus, the changes in 
legal scholarship need to be understood in the context of the wider social and cultural 
changes and as related to the cultural nature of critical scholarship.  
   Critical legal scholarship was an academic counter-culture, reflecting the changes 
in society and culture. The 1960s was a time of the rise of social and cultural radicalism 
in Finland as well as elsewhere. Finnish society changed dramatically in the 1960s, fol-
lowing the massive growth of population, and the industrialization and urbanization that 
followed the migration from the country side to the cities. Youth culture began to 
bloom, the working class and unions became powerful political players, and social insti-
tutions and structures were criticized. Critical legal scholars of the 1960s were young 
scholars, who for one reason or another, though not always, often adopted a leftist per-
spective on society. Leftist ideology of the 1960s was an ideology of criticism and re-
form, and thus the critical scholars began to point out the connection between social 
problems and law in their scholarship. Social radicalism emphasized these problems and 
saw them as consequences of the structures of the economy and power. Scholarship was 
politicized and adopted these notions.  
   In many ways, critical legal scholarship was an aspect of the cultural radicalism of 
the 1960s. Critical scholars questioned traditional hierarchies and institutions and want-
ed to replace them with new ones which, they thought, were more democratic and real-
istic. Critical legal scholars were mostly young, searching for a position in the universi-
ty structures during the turbulent 1960s, and they therefore sympathized and identified 
with the radical students. The generation of the 1970s was obviously a consequence of 
the radicals of the 1960s acquiring a position, but the earlier generation simply identi-
fied with the radical thought or considered it the most appropriate in the changing aca-
demia. Thus, they attacked the old structures and elaborated alternatives to replace 
them.  
   The fact that the critical legal scholarship was both theoretically and practically 
relatively radical in Finland can be understood against the social and academic context. 
First, Finnish society had been polarized since the civil war, and in the 1960s the previ-
ously marginalized left became powerful. There were thus many things to criticize in 
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society. The cold war situation gave powerful arguments to the left which they could 
apply as socialist rhetoric in the criticism. Second, there had not been a realist tradition 
in Finnish jurisprudence which was more or less conceptualist despite the few realist 
influences. It was therefore easier to attack the traditional scholarship. These social and 
academic circumstances then provided the context for the international currents of crit i-
cal scholarship.   
   The theoretical basis of critical and alternative scholarship followed the rise of phi-
losophy and cross-disciplinary research in the 1960s. The critical scholars did not share 
a theoretical basis, and were not influenced by any one single theory, but they all gath-
ered up various strands of influences that suited their purposes and elaborated theories 
and arguments. Influences came from recent philosophical trends, Scandinavian alterna-
tive legal scholarship, American legal realism and political jurisprudence, and European 
Marxist literature. In addition, philosophical interest in the theory of science also inter-
ested legal scholars in reflecting on the “criteria of science” of their profession. These 
general trends led to a variety of critical legal theories, all emphasizing different as-
pects. To mention the most productive scholars, Eriksson was a philosopher and a 
Marxist scholar, and his literature was the closest to the American critical legal scholar-
ship although there was no direct connection between them. Jyränki, Kivivuori, and 
Riepula were sociological jurisprudents with more or less Marxist elements, emphasiz-
ing historical, sociological, behavioral, and empirical aspects to various extents, To-
lonen was a theoretical scholar with similar emphases to the previous three, and Blom 
was a critical empiricist and a realist. Yet there were many more, and even more ap-
peared in the 1970s when legal scholars became more interested in and aware of Marx-
ism and its potential and debated its theories. The critical theory of the Frankfurt School 
was not especially influential in Finnish jurisprudence, and Scandinavian influences 
were the most obvious in alternative criminal law scholarship and in encouraging meth-
odological eclecticism in legal scholarship. Of course, here too the influences were also 
usually of an indirect kind. Nordic scholars, for instance, participated in seminars and 
held study sessions, which obviously influenced the elaboration of the critical thought.   
   Despite the close connection between scholarship and politics, critical and alterna-
tive legal scholarship emerged in university in the middle of social and cultural turmoil. 
Thus, the most important aspect was the scholar’s pursuit of academic fame. Although 
much of the alternative scholarship aimed sincerely at revealing the social failures, the 
ultimate motive of the scholars was obviously to transcend the tradition and to be 
unique. Critical scholarship was an indirect consequence of the social transformation 
and turmoil. It was an expression of individuality and academic antagonism, a way of 
self-realization and counter-culture, a method of provoking, criticizing, and creating 
something new. In its most extreme forms, it was a total discarding of the tradition. In 
Finland, the scholars had the opportunity to promote their cause and acquire actual aca-
demic significance in the reform of legal education, but succeeded only to some extent. 
In any event, many of the alternative legal scholars did acquire academic capital and 
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tenure, and continued their careers. Some of them remained to alternative scholarship, 
whereas others moved closer to traditional scholarship.      
   Critical legal scholarship was also a marginal phenomenon, and the majority of the 
profession remained relatively traditional. Alternative legal scholarship centering on the 
critical enterprise was much wider. It emanated from the same sources as the critical 
legal scholarship, but its individual motives were more modest. Moreover, it was not a 
specific school or movement, but a new mood, a way of thinking about law and legal 
scholarship. Critical legal scholarship was simply the radical aspect of the alternative 
branch. Of course, critical scholarship was more than simply the published literature, 
being also a mood, including seminars and study groups. It was a legal thought, a criti-
cal consciousness of legal phenomena. The critical scholars perceived legal phenomena 
differently than the traditional scholars. They were left in the minority because their 
perspective was too radical for the mainstream of the profession to accept. The far more 
moderate alternative strand was more popular because it did not threaten the basis of 
law, but simply extended the scope and methodology of legal scholarship.   
   Finnish law did change in the 1970s, largely because of the alternative and critical 
scholarship. It is curious how effectively the critical and alternative scholars were repre-
sented on the reform committees. Indeed, they infiltrated the various committees and 
had a considerable impact on the course of the reforms. However, because they alone 
could not implement the reforms, these did not materialize according to the critical 
views in the end. Many laws were, however, reformed to conform to the critical thought 
of the time. Alternative views had also a considerable impact on criminal law, but that 
was because these notions reflected the general reformist social thought the most. 
8.2 The 1980s and critical legal scholarship  
 
Radical criticism and the insistence on altering the basis of the Finnish legal system and 
legal scholarship came to an end as the 1970s approached their close. By then, alterna-
tive legal scholarship had a firm position in Finnish jurisprudence, and education had 
changed and criminal law was changing. However, no radical break from the tradition 
had occurred. Whatever the motives of the critical legal scholars, it seems that the wan-
ing of their scholarship was a consequence of many things. Critical legal scholarship 
lacked a uniform theoretical basis and was therefore fragmented into various sub-
disciplines. In addition, the times had changed by the late 1970s, and there were few 
young scholars willing to continue the demagoguery of critical scholarship, which thus 
fell out of fashion. Finally, the critical scholars of the 1960s and 1970s were making 
their careers at the university or elsewhere and became fatigued by their responsibilities. 
The utopian idealism of youth was over, and the realism of adulthood prevailed. The 
time of great reforms was over. Critical legal scholarship did not disappear altogether, 
however, but it changed.   
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   Indeed, there was no “rise and fall” of critical legal scholarship, even if the radical 
criticism came to an end as the 1980s progressed. Although the radical criticism was 
over, “critical legal scholarship” was still considered useful in pointing out the inequi-
ties in law,
488
 and scholars still debated the nature of legal scholarship.
489
 Furthermore, 
Finnish legal scholars became more interested in the American Critical Legal Studies 
Movement and its potential influences on Finnish jurisprudence.
490
 In general, the inter-
est moved towards the rights of the citizen,
491
 alternative interpretation of legal sources, 
and alternative argumentation. Old issues remained important and several new problems 
appeared. The emergence of the social private law in the late 1980s was the most obvi-
ous consequence of the alternative and critical legal scholarship of the 1970s. In this 
regard, legal scholars applied alternative analysis and argumentation to make the private 
law correspond with the actual circumstances of the parties,
492
 and to place the doctrines 
of contract law into the context of reasonability.
493
 The purpose was to elaborate alter-
native methods of reasoning and argumentation that could help promote material equali-
ty through law, not to point out the irrationality of law. Radical criticism was missing, 
but critical consciousness was in the background of the research.    
   The critical scholarship of the 1980s would be another story completely because of 
the new orientation, and thus falls beyond the scope of this study. In any event, the radi-
cal criticism of the earlier decades faded away, and new methods of critical and alterna-
tive scholarship arose instead. Critical legal scholarship in the 1960s and the 1970s did 
change the basis of Finnish legal scholarship and law, although not to any radical ex-
tent. These decades were, nevertheless, the liveliest time of debate on legal scholarship 
in Finland and were important for the way legal scholarship is understood today.  
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VI Conclusions  
1 A theoretical perspective on critical legal scholarship  
 
In this final chapter I will conclude the arguments of the book and respond to the ques-
tions asked in the introduction. First, I will assess the nature of the critical legal scholar-
ship theoretically and thus demonstrate its essence. I will point out that critical legal 
scholarship ought to be viewed as a wide, cultural phenomenon, not reduced to a single 
factor. Second, I will compare the critical scholarship of the United States, Scandinavia, 
and Finland. I will first compare the Nordic Countries and the United States and then 
the Scandinavian countries and Finland. By analyzing the substance and the influences 
of these movements, I will show the similarities and differences of the critical legal 
scholarship in these countries. Third, I will reconstruct the historical development of 
critical legal scholarship. I will point out that it was a product of many currents of the 
postwar era, and rather a continuation than a break in the development of the jurispru-
dential tradition, although it meant intensification in the dynamic of that development. 
This historical reconstruction will further illuminate the essence of critical scholarship.     
   The central argument of this book is that the critical legal scholarship of the 1960s 
and 1970s can best be described as a cultural movement. It is precisely the neglect of 
the cultural and epistemological aspects of critical legal scholarship that has prevented 
the previous studies from seeing it in a perspective which would allow a thorough un-
derstanding of the movement. Since critical legal scholarship represented a counter cul-
ture to the traditional legal scholarship, not simply politics or radicalism, it differed 
from the tradition in fundamental respects. At the heart of the critical legal scholarship 
was a different kind of perception and comprehension of legal phenomena. Because this 
was so, critical legal scholars argued for fundamental changes in law and legal scholar-
ship. This also meant that the dialogue between traditional and critical scholars was ex-
tremely difficult. There was a collision between two fundamentally different views of 
law, set in the specific context of academic legal scholarship.   
   The difference in epistemology was the most significant aspect of critical legal 
scholarship. As we saw, this study uses the concept of alternative legal scholarship in 
referring to the effort to make the basis of traditional legal scholarship more sociologi-
cal, empirical, and philosophical. Critical legal scholarship, on the other hand, refers to 
jurisprudence which attempts to demonstrate the fundamental flaws in law and tradi-
tional legal scholarship. Although no strict division can be made, these conceptions help 
us to understand critical scholarship. The alternative legal scholarship that surrounded 
the critical enterprise emanated from the same sources but had more modest goals. Al-
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ternative scholarship was quite common during the 1960s and 1970s, critical scholar-
ship being a radical expression of the alternative thought. Alternative scholars noted that 
there were problems the traditional legal scholarship could not resolve, but they were 
not after fundamental change, rather seeking to expand the methodology of legal schol-
arship. The critical legal scholars, on the other hand, argued that since law was tied to 
the fundamental social controversies, minor changes would not suffice. Rather, a com-
plete change in society, law, and consciousness was needed. The situation can also be 
seen in the context of the theory of science, using the examples and concepts provided 
in the introduction to this book. If a thought collective is the common intellectual back-
ground of a profession, and thought styles are the methods of observation, then a para-
digm is the model of research and argumentation between the thought collective and 
thought styles. Thus, the alternative legal scholars were after a paradigmatic change, 
whereas the critical scholars sought to change the thought collective and thought styles.    
   The critical conception of perception also illuminates the difference in epistemolo-
gy. For the critical scholars, empirical observations as such were neither true nor false, 
but were understood in accordance with values, conceptions, and presuppositions, 
which, however, were contingent. They were subjective to a certain extent, but often 
restricted by the social and legal consciousness. The emphasis on the structural connec-
tions of knowledge was important for critical scholarship, because social and legal con-
sciousness was seen to impose presuppositions on perception and comprehension and 
determined the validity of values and concepts. Personal knowledge and consciousness 
were thus structurally conditioned. The critical scholars sought to demonstrate the re-
strictive and hidebound character of modern legal thought, as well as its impact on law 
and the knowledge of law.      
   In a sense, then, the controversy was about differences in epistemology and con-
sciousness. Since the thought styles of the critical legal scholars were different than 
those of the traditional scholars, their images of legal phenomena differed fundamental-
ly. The critical scholars thought that the traditional thought collective had been driven 
into a crisis because its thought styles could not access the true essence of law. Critical 
legal scholarship followed this realization and sought to expose the fallacies of the tradi-
tional scholarship and reveal the true essence of law beneath the ideological surface. 
Since the ultimate goal was to alter the fundamental notions about law, the critical 
scholars attacked the fundamentals of law, legal scholarship, the rule of law, and legal 
education, and sought the causes of the modern deficiencies in the roots of the prob-
lems. Because of this ambitious endeavor, a complete change was needed, which is why 
their criticism was so comprehensive. 
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2 Comparative perspectives on the United States, Scandinavia, and Finland        
 
Realist legal scholarship and sociological jurisprudence had a firm position in the Unit-
ed States in the early 1960s. The legal realism of the 1920s and 1930s had pointed out 
the discretionary nature of law and the importance of the gap between law in books and 
law in action, even if realism was stripped of its most extreme elements and submerged 
into the elements of traditional scholarship during the postwar years. At the beginning 
of the 1960s, there already was a realist and to a certain extent even critical tradition, 
which the debate on neutral principles demonstrated. In the 1960s, then, the majority of 
the profession was traditional, but there were also alternative legal scholars emphasizing 
more critical notions.    
   The growth of critical legal scholarship followed basically the same path in the 
United States and the Nordic Countries. Legal scholarship was oriented towards social 
and political sciences and philosophy during the postwar years, and critical scholarship 
was a radicalization of the alternative perspectives that emerged before and during the 
1960s. The 1960s also witnessed the emergence of critical legal literature, to which 
more philosophical and theoretical elements were added during the 1970s, making the 
criticism more fundamental. After the mid-1970s, the critical scholarship had become so 
popular that organizations were needed and established for it. The United States did not 
witness such an attack on legal scholarship as occurred in Finland, even if scholars 
talked about the crisis in law. This was so because alternative legal scholarship was 
more familiar in the United States in the 1960s. Legal realists had already launched an 
attack on jurisprudence, and their legacy persisted. Although the criticism toward law 
and legal scholarship increased in the late 1960s, there was no need to repeat the realist 
attack.   
   Critical scholarship was furthered by the cooperation between the critical scholars 
in all of the countries. In a certain sense, the Nordic Countries were quicker than their 
American colleagues in establishing organizations and law reviews for their cause, since 
by 1977, when the first conference of critical legal studies was held, every Nordic 
Country had a law journal for critical legal scholarship. This probably follows from fact 
that the United States is a large country where cooperation between scholars is more 
difficult than in the Nordic Countries where cooperation had been going on for decades. 
However, Scandinavian movements such as the Democratic Lawyers in Finland or the 
FiB-Jurists in Sweden were closer to the National Lawyers Guild than to CLS, the Ret-
færd being the closest to CLS. In a sense, then, the Scandinavian critical scholars orga-
nized faster but to a lesser degree than their American counterparts.   
   The fundamental characteristics of critical legal scholarship were similar in the 
United States and the Nordic Countries. The emphasis was on the social construction of 
law and legal consciousness, the conservative character of traditional legal scholarship, 
the historical analysis of the development of law, and the indeterminacy and irrationali-
ty of legal reasoning. The criticism of legal education in the United States and Finland 
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serves as an example. Despite the differences in legal culture and education, the Ameri-
can and Finnish scholars promoted relatively similar arguments regarding education, the 
Americans during the 1960s, and the Finns in the late 1960s and the 1970s. In short, 
they both argued for more social data and social sciences in legal education and for a 
functional, problem-centered approach. Furthermore, both the American and the Scan-
dinavian studies on access to justice and legal aid pointed out that law was systematical-
ly biased toward the rich. The arguments emanated from the basic aspects of alternative 
legal scholarship, namely, the emphasis on the gap between law in books and law in 
action and the cross-disciplinary methods in legal scholarship. Alternative and critical 
legal literature was substantially the same but differed in both form and detail in many 
senses. Critical legal scholarship claimed to expose the politics in law and legal scholar-
ship and thus demystify law in all of the countries studied here. For the traditional view, 
this meant politicization of legal scholarship, but the critical scholars considered it 
simply as acknowledging an already existing situation.  
   The similarities in the fundamental premises reflect the similarities in the deep 
background and the theoretical basis of critical legal scholarship. Critical jurisprudential 
movements always aim at demonstrating the incompatibility of the traditional scholar-
ship with the social reality. Thus, reflecting their times, alternative and critical legal 
scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s articulated the arguments about the flaws in the cap-
italist order and emphasized the nascent human rights rhetoric. At the bottom of the 
critical thought was the idea of the structural inequality of society and law, the most 
essential argument being that the traditional legal scholarship could neither grasp the 
reality of the problems of law and society nor help to improve the existing circumstanc-
es.  
   In the pursuit of grasping the legal reality, critical legal scholarship reflected simi-
lar trends. The use of the social sciences in legal analysis represented a renewed interest 
in legal realism. However, since critical legal scholarship was also a response to the 
criticism of realism that emerged after the Second World War, it extended the methods 
and reconsidered the arguments of realism. Unlike realism, however, critical legal 
scholarship was openly political, and brought structural elements as well as the consid-
eration of values into legal analysis. In this vein, critical scholarship was an attack on 
the value-neutrality and positivism of traditional scholarship as well. The critical schol-
ars emphasized the position of values and policies in legal scholarship and questioned 
their traditional basis. These fundamental tenets reflected the rise of the critical academ-
ic scholarship and social criticism. Critical scholars represented the counter-culture of 
the tradition both in scholarly and social-political fashion. Thus, too, critical legal 
scholarship was part of the polarization of academia in the 1960s and 1970s. Critical 
scholars rebelled against the tradition intellectually, politically, and with respect to 
scholarship and academic hierarchies.  
   The sources of alternative and critical legal scholarship were also basically the 
same in the United States and the Nordic Countries. The emergence of alternative legal 
scholarship followed the rise of cross-disciplinary research and the development of so-
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ciology of law and criminology. These new trends encouraged an understanding of law 
in context. The rise of critical legal scholarship in the late 1960s and during the 1970s 
reflected the radicalization of the alternative movements. The radicalization of the crit i-
cism followed the adoption of the Marxist and Weberian theories as well as the recent 
trends in Western philosophy in legal analysis. During the 1970s in particular, legal 
scholars began to apply various forms of philosophy to an increasing extent, the influ-
ences varying between the scholars, of course. On the basis of philosophy and social 
theories, critical scholars claimed to have found a fruitful way to analyze law and its 
relation to society. Critical scholars distanced themselves from the simple empirical 
analysis of law and began to analyze its essence and its connections with ideologies, 
values, and politics.      
   The critical legal scholarship movements in the United States and the Nordic 
Countries did not influence each other, although they derived relatively from the same 
sources. With respect to the rise of alternative scholarship, the Nordic Countries fol-
lowed the American example, and American sociology of law and critical criminology 
had an impact in Scandinavia. American political jurisprudence also influenced the con-
stitutional scholarship in Finland, and some Scandinavian scholars, such as Aubert, 
Eckhoff, and Andenæs, were occasionally read in the United States. The rise of the al-
ternative legal scholarship in the Nordic Countries thus reflected the extension of the 
basis of sources of legal scholarship, as well as the turn towards American influences. 
The rise of the critical legal scholarship, however, mostly reflected the interest in phi-
losophy and the radicalization of society, and the critical legal movements of the conti-
nents were not in touch with each other before the 1980s. Nordic legal scholars, of 
course, held conferences and read each other’s literature, the foundation of Retfærd be-
ing the culmination of the Nordic cooperation.  
    Even if the American critical scholars did not explicitly build on Marxism and 
some Nordic scholars did not refer to it, the basic tenets and arguments of critical legal 
scholarship relate it to the tradition of Western Marxism. Critical and Marxist legal 
scholarship of the 1970s was a continuation of the expansion of Western Marxism into 
the new fields of research, and it was also an attempt to bridge the gap between theory 
and politics. The cooperation between theory and practice was closest in Finland. It was 
a bit more problematic in Scandinavia, since there were serious efforts to close the gap 
between theory and political practice, yet the scholars were not as active politically as 
their Finnish colleagues. In the United States, the critical scholars implemented some 
measures to put their theoretical thoughts into practice but they were not politically as 
active as the Nordic scholars. As contradictory as it may seem, then, critical legal schol-
arship both opened and closed the gap between theory and politics. Some scholars 
worked actively with practical matters in order to fulfill their theoretical ambitions, 
whereas others were more interested in constructing theory than changing society.    
   Considering critical legal scholarship as a cultural phenomenon, we find another 
unifying element in the deep background of critical thought. The critical scholars 
brought the element of the unification of the interpreting subject and the interpreted 
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object into the picture. The critical legal scholars sought to point out that the law was 
being constructed by the scholars who interpreted it. As the critical scholars realized the 
possibility of transcending the tradition, they took the task of transforming it as the pur-
pose of legal scholarship. Since the critical legal scholars emphasized the position of 
legal scholars as parts of the tradition in both the United States and the Nordic Coun-
tries, they argued that the purpose of the scholars should be to unravel and change the 
tradition.  
   A major difference between the critical legal scholarship in the Nordic Countries 
and the United States was that the American critical scholars in general put more em-
phasis on the philosophical analysis and criticism of law, whereas the Nordic scholars 
were more interested in the political use of scholarship. The explanation is that the polit-
ical culture of the Nordic countries was more hospitable to socialism and the connection 
between political radicalism and legal scholarship was thus easier to achieve. American 
critical legal scholars did cooperate with the National Lawyers Guild but the tone of 
their radicalism and activism was less socialist than in the Nordic countries. This does 
not mean that all Nordic critical legal scholarship was politically motivated. Rather, it 
simply means that the political rhetoric was more familiar to the Nordic scholars than to 
the American scholars. In any event, the connection between social and political activ-
ism on the one hand and academic scholarship on the other was closer in the Nordic 
Countries than in the United States.  
   Furthermore, critical legal scholars in the United States did not have much faith in 
empirical legal scholarship, whereas the Nordic scholars were more prone to see the 
usefulness of empiricism. This can be explained through the development of the critical 
legal scholarship. In the United States, critical legal scholarship was a radical counter 
reaction to the sociological jurisprudence that had been on the rise since the late fifties. 
In the Nordic Countries, however, critical legal scholarship was more a radical exten-
sion of the sociological jurisprudence, which had much shorter roots in Scandinavia 
than in the United States. In the Nordic Countries, critical legal scholars were closer to 
the development of the sociology of law than their American colleagues who matured 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s in an environment in which sociology of law al-
ready had a firm ground and was not as powerful tool of criticism as it had been. Be-
cause critical legal scholarship was an expression of cultural radicalism and individual-
ism against the grain, the American critical legal scholars turned towards philosophical 
criticism of law instead of empirical research. In the Nordic Countries, empirical and 
politically oriented research had more potential as a tool of criticism. Of course, Nordic 
critical scholars did question the usability of empiricism without an analysis and crit i-
cism of ideology. This supports the conclusion that Scandinavian Marxist scholarship 
and American CLS were the most radical expressions of the critical legal scholarship 
and can be seen as equivalents. 
   Another major difference, or similarity depending on the point of view, was the 
exiguity of Marxist and socialist rhetoric in the American critical scholarship. At a fun-
damental level, however, the American critical legal scholarship could be characterized 
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as neo-Marxist. Nevertheless, no major Marxist front arose in the United States, where-
as the opposite was the case in the Nordic Countries, since almost every critical legal 
scholar advanced some aspect of Marxism, major Marxist fronts arising to stand up 
against the tradition. The Nordic scholars debated the various versions of Marxism as 
well as its precise meaning, whereas the Americans used various philosophical literature 
and theoretical approaches. And although the basis of critical legal scholarship rested on 
Marxism, scholars developed various theories, came to different conclusions, and crit i-
cized each other’s works. Moreover, Marxism was a background on which critical theo-
ries were raised, and no scholar besides Eriksson elaborated a systematic legal theory 
based on it. Thus, even if the premises of critical scholarship were shared, scholars dif-
fered in several respects.   
   The differences in theories and arguments as well as the differences in the use of 
Marxism in the United States and the Nordic Countries can be explained if we under-
stand critical legal scholarship as a cultural phenomenon. Because the criticism emanat-
ed from the same sources, and because the general aim of the criticism was the same, 
critical scholarship was the same at its most basic level. Its arguments were basically the 
same as was its image of the law, society, and legal scholarship. However, when the 
general characteristics are seen in more detail, the differences become clear. Marxism 
lacked a strong basis in the United States, becoming a tool of the critical academy only 
in the 1970s. Thus, even critical scholars wanted to look for other directions while pur-
suing a critical method. Even the American New Left was neither Marxist nor Com-
munist. In the Nordic Countries, however, both Marxism and socialism had stronger 
roots than in the United States, and thus the critical scholars were readier to use Marxist 
rhetoric. Moreover, the approach of the scholars was basically the same since they 
shared the perspective on the law and the world, but the differences in their theories 
followed their interests and scholarly facilities.  
   The differences in emphasis followed the national circumstances as well. For ex-
ample, since race discrimination was a particular problem in the United States, much of 
the early alternative legal scholarship focused on racial problems, and a specific branch 
of scholarship developed for that cause later. Crime and its control were problems eve-
rywhere, and scholars tackled it in each of the countries and brought up problems that 
were domestically relevant. The similar fundamental basis of alternative and critical 
legal scholarship thus differed depending on the personal interests of the scholars and 
the local circumstances. Stressing the differences of the scholarship in the countries, one 
might argue that the movements were more different than similar, but in general terms it 
seems that the critical legal scholarship in each country had a relatively similar basis. 
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3 Scandinavia v. Finland    
 
Alternative and critical legal scholarship in Scandinavia and Finland originated from the 
same basis but were shaped by the specific social, cultural, and scholarly circumstances 
of the individual countries. Roots always go further back, but sufficient is to say that the 
theoretical basis of alternative legal scholarship was created in postwar philosophy and 
social and political sciences. Many Scandinavian scholars studied in the United States 
and brought the methodologies of sociological jurisprudence with them. Scholars such 
as the Norwegians Vilhem Aubert and Thomas Mathiesen were pioneers in promoting 
sociological jurisprudence and cross-disciplinary legal research in Scandinavia, and 
sociology of law eventually became a strong discipline. During the 1960s, legal scholars 
became more interested in the social functions and effects of law, and in the causes of 
the gap between law in books and law in action. Besides the theoretical influences, the 
changes in society during the late 1950s and early 1960s encouraged more sociological 
jurisprudence. Criminology in particular provided a fertile ground for alternative legal 
research. By the beginning of the 1970s, there was a strong alternative criminology and 
sociology of law establishment in Scandinavia. Critical legal scholarship arose when 
elements of philosophy and the counter-culture of the 1960s were mingled with the al-
ternative mood. It was then further molded by the strong left ideology and the rise of 
Marxism in the early 1970s. 
   The basic features of alternative and critical legal scholarship in Finland and Scan-
dinavia were the same. Alternative legal scholars used social science in legal scholar-
ship, advocated empirical and sociological approaches, and concentrated on the social 
functions and effects of the law. Scholars often also worked in practice and tried to fur-
ther their arguments by improving the legal status of the less privileged social classes. 
Similarities in scholarship were obvious in criminology, since this was the field in 
which the cooperation was the most marked. Critical legal scholarship, on the other 
hand, sought to demonstrate the inevitable connection between social structures and 
law. During the 1970s, Marxism made a strong entrance into legal scholarship and had a 
significant impact on Scandinavian critical legal scholarship. Scholars of course disa-
greed on the details but shared the theoretical basis.   
   The most striking difference was that critical legal scholarship was more radical 
and political in Finland than in Scandinavia. In addition, Finnish scholars participated 
more actively in political matters. Although Scandinavian critical legal scholars spoke 
for socialism and social change, they were not as radical and enthusiastic as their Finn-
ish colleagues, who advocated the establishment of a Soviet government in Finland and 
subjecting the courts to parliamentary control. Scandinavian legal scholars were not as 
concerned about the establishment of a socialist regime, although they did, particularly 
in Norway, argue for industrial democracy and a social conception of private property. 
In short, Scandinavian critical legal scholarship focused more on Marxist analysis of 
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law and on the means to adjust society, whereas the Finns were more radical and were 
apparently after a more thorough social and legal change.  
   What might explain the radical character of critical legal scholarship in Finland? 
First, there was the scholarly tradition. Legal realism was on firmer ground in Scandi-
navia than in Finland. Sociological jurisprudence began to make its way in the early 
twentieth century, and during the 1920s and 1930s it made a serious breakthrough in 
Scandinavian legal scholarship. Thus, at the beginning of the 1960s, traditional legal 
scholarship was quite realist and, furthermore, it had already faced a radical attack. In 
Finland, however, realism had not had such an impact. The efforts to introduce realist 
elements into Finnish legal scholarship in the first half of the century were largely re-
jected or ignored, and in the mid-1960s, although realist elements were brought to Finn-
ish jurisprudence, traditional legal scholarship in Finland was more conceptualist and 
normative than in Scandinavia where methodological eclecticism was far more com-
mon. Furthermore, there had not been any radical attack on the jurisprudential tradition 
in Finland, and thus the field was ripe for one. The radical attack on the traditional 
methods of legal scholarship and law that began in the late 1960s was therefore an ex-
pression of frustration with a relatively old-fashioned and conservative legal culture.   
   The scholarly situation provides, however, only a partial explanation since it is al-
so in need of explanation. In explaining the situation of traditional scholarship in the 
1960s, we will have to shift our historical perspective to the time of Finnish independ-
ence and the civil war, which had divided the society and suppressed leftist tendencies. 
By the 1960s, then, Finnish society was polarized. The social circumstances, as well as 
the fact that the Finnish Constitution was drafted in the aftermath of the civil war, pro-
vided a rhetorical field for the scholars where the legal profession could be related to the 
dominant class on which all the blame for the social shortcomings could be put. The 
leftist rhetoric was, of course, a feature of the counter-culture everywhere, but in Fin-
land it had a unique position because of the historical circumstances. The historical and 
geo-political relationship with the Soviet Union and the Cold War rhetoric that followed 
provided further impetus for the Finnish scholars. In this respect, too, anti-capitalism 
and pro-socialism were common features of the critical rhetoric, but in Finland the his-
torical-political circumstances gave them further weight.                 
   In spite of the differences, it is important not to exaggerate the Finnish uniqueness. 
The fundamentals were basically the same. In all of the Nordic Countries, critical legal 
scholars stressed the structural connections between social power structures and law, the 
importance of historical analysis of the construction of law, and the indeterminacy and 
the structural limitations of legal reasoning. The central argument was that law was a 
social construct, reflecting the structures of the economy and power, and therefore non-
autonomous and non-neutral. Different scholars had different emphases, and there were 
differences between the Scandinavian countries and between them and Finland, but the 
basic ideas were the same.    
   The development of the alternative scholarship also showed similar traits. Scandi-
navian countries were the pioneers in sociology of law and alternative criminology, and 
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Finland followed them in this, acquiring most of its direct influences from them. How-
ever, regarding critical legal scholarship, the development was parallel, depending on 
the perspective. Norwegian scholars had debated the relation between law and politics 
since the mid-1960s, and in 1968, the Swedish scholar Bolding and the Norwegian 
scholar Fleischer published their jeremiads on critical legal scholarship. In Finland, 
Eriksson had been developing a critical theory of law since 1966, and the rebellion on 
methods burst out at the end of the decade, which was a time of intense debate on the 
nature of legal scholarship. The dissertations by Kivivuori and Blom were especially 
important in intensifying the debates that continued in the pages of law journals. The 
Finnish critical scholars were also the first to publish a manifesto on the wrongs of the 
control policy in 1967 and the first to found a critical law journal in 1972. However, 
such matters had been discussed in Scandinavia since the beginning of the 1960s at 
least, and the association for penal reform was founded earlier in Sweden than in Fin-
land. In many ways, the movements overlapped, and it is therefore difficult, and point-
less, to argue about who was first. 
4 Critical legal scholarship as a historical phenomenon        
 
Critical legal scholarship was an academic manifestation of the counter-culture of the 
1960s, molded and transformed by the events of the 1970s. The social transformation 
thus provides the basis for the analysis. The 1960s was a time of social turbulence. The 
society was industrialized and urbanized to the extent that the industrial working class 
became stronger and the problems within the urban proletariat became more obvious. 
Counter-cultures had made their way since the war, and by the 1960s, the time was ripe 
for a radical break with the past. There was a large generation of young people, many of 
whom were not adapted to the social norms, an obvious gap between the official poli-
cies of the state and the social reality, and a super-power conflict at the global level, the 
leader of the Western world storming a poor country far away in Asia. Youth people 
thought that there was something amiss with the world-order, and resistance was about 
to arise.   
   Besides the social changes, academia also witnessed dramatic events. Scholarship 
had changed since the war, and by the 1960s, alternative legal scholarship such as soci-
ology of law and political jurisprudence were popular. In addition, the universities 
boomed with students, some of whom identified with and contributed to the counter-
culture. These students read critical scholarship, Marxism, existentialism, philosophy, 
and Beat, and talked about these things and what was wrong with the world and society. 
They adopted the identity of a misfit, of a person who antagonized the traditional au-
thorities, fought for a better society, and pursued authenticity. The New Left was a po-
litical expression of the counter culture, a product of the youth frustration with the 
world, and an effort to make a difference in politics. Since the economic and social or-
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der was capitalist, the political left became a notion and rhetoric of criticism and alter-
native solutions.       
   The leftist perspective of alternative and critical legal scholarship was linked to 
their reformist aims. Although one did not have to be a leftist in order to become an 
alternative or a critical scholar, most of them were, since leftism was the critical thought 
of the time, representing the social, political, and cultural counter-culture. And since 
critical scholarship often resembled leftism and counter-culture, many of the critical 
legal scholars adopted a leftist perspective whether they originally sympathized with it 
or not. This then led to the revitalization of Marxism. The young people of the 1960s 
generation took Marxism as their own, whether they actually read it or not, and took 
much inspiration from it. The pattern of the development of the critical thought was 
basically the same in the United States and the Nordic Countries, but every nation had 
its own unique characteristics that influenced the particular elements and details of the 
critical scholarship.  
   Critical legal scholarship thus emanated in the latter half of the 1960s out of and as 
a reaction to the sociological jurisprudence that had become widespread during the dec-
ade. The alternative legal scholarship prior to the 1960s had sought to point out that law 
was unable to solve social problems as well as legal flaws. The aim was to improve the 
law so that it could be used as a tool to organize society. Some parts of the alternative 
legal scholarship were more critical than others, but the overall impression was the same 
nevertheless. The alternative scholars wanted to integrate the elements of the social sci-
ences into legal scholarship. By the end of the decade, however, a more critical branch 
of scholars emerged who thought that the simple sociological analysis did not suffice 
because it could not grasp the problems behind the observable reality. These scholars 
then began to pay attention to the structures of law and society as well as to legal con-
sciousness.  
   The critical turn in jurisprudence occurred in the first half of the 1970s. In the 
United States, this meant that scholars began to emphasize the utter irrationality of legal 
reasoning as well as the way observation was structured by social consciousness. Be-
cause of these notions, the critical scholars argued, even the realist movements were 
unable to fathom the problems of law and society. In Scandinavia, the 1970s meant the 
Marxist turn, meaning that legal scholars began to use Marxism in analyzing the empir-
ical data on law. These scholars stressed that despite the efforts that were made to im-
prove social equality, the problems continued because the legal and social structures 
prevented any serious changes from occurring. Thus they began to critically analyze the 
structures within which law operated, so that they could understand the social functions 
and effects of law in a more critical sense than their sociological predecessors. 
   The basis of the critical legal scholarship was thus laid in the 1960s, but its theo-
ries and arguments were elaborated and shaped during the 1970s. Legal scholars were 
generally exploring alternatives to the traditional scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and critical legal scholarship was the most radical and critical expression of this reform-
ist thought. Critical legal scholarship was an intensification of change, a radical exten-
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sion of the criticism that already existed, not a radical break from the postwar develop-
ment of legal scholarship, although it meant a greater move away from the tradition in 
Finland than in the United States and Scandinavia. Nevertheless, critical legal scholar-
ship was more philosophical and political than any of the critical movements that pre-
ceded it, and its tenets and arguments were too radical for the tradition to approve.  
   In a scholarly sense, critical legal scholarship was a mixture of postwar develop-
ments. The emergence of empirical social sciences on the one hand, and the philosophi-
cal interest in the metaphysics beyond observable reality on the other coalesced in the 
development of critical legal scholarship. The alternative legal scholarship that devel-
oped during the 1950s and 1960s was an empirical movement, following the trends of 
empirical science and cross-disciplinary research. The emergence of the critical legal 
scholarship in the late 1960s and during the 1970s, on the other hand, was a radicaliza-
tion of the alternative movement, following the radicalization of society and the trans-
formation of scholarship. It was then more philosophical and cynical than its predeces-
sors, and it sought to analyze the “truth” beneath the observable reality.   
   The changes in society and academia that occurred parallel with the scholarly 
changes were also important. The general democratization of society, the rise of the 
human rights rhetoric, and the recognition of the poor status of the social underdog all 
encouraged a more social approach to legal research. They also provided new career 
opportunities in the academy. The social changes facilitated the rise of the alternative 
and critical legal scholarship in the 1960s. As we saw, these were all common traits in 
the development of the critical scholarship, which sought to demonstrate the inequality 
of the modern system and the law within it. Academic scholarship responded to the 
many changes in society, and the student explosion accelerated the transformation of 
academia. The orientation toward social sciences and the interest in promoting social 
rights were apparent. The development of critical scholarship marked the rise of the 
radical left and the radical criticism of the capitalist order, the Marxist-Weberian criti-
cism of society, and the rise of the student radicalism and the counter-culture, which 
abandoned the existing lifestyle, authorities and hierarchies, and sought to establish a 
complete alternative to the modern system.  
   It is precisely the academic arena where all the other elements of the critical schol-
arship are gathered. Although there was much diversification regarding the theories and 
arguments of the critical legal scholars, the unifying character was often leftism. How-
ever, this does not mean that we should reduce the whole critical enterprise to politics. 
Even though the political aspect was significant in the formation of the scholarly identi-
ty of the critical scholars, it was not the only reason for the rise of the critical scholar-
ship, which was a gathering of those with similar ideas about law, society, politics, and 
scholarship. Although they often pursued political ends, these could not have been their 
sole purpose, because then it would have been more obvious for them to act in practice. 
Leftism was also rhetoric, not simply politics.   
   Factors in the changes of scholarship were thus the scholarly tradition, the changes 
in society, culture, politics, and science, and the world view of the scholar. The political 
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biases of the scholar did not determine the direction of his or her work, because a schol-
ar had to balance between the scholarly tradition and his or her world view. Some 
scholars wanted to engage in changing the world and thus in politically oriented schol-
arship, while others wanted to put their personal preferences aside and concentrate on 
more traditional scholarship, and yet others wanted to alter the scholarly tradition with-
out any extra-scholarly reason. Thus, critical legal scholarship should not be reduced to 
a single factor, but has to be understood as a collection of ideas manifested in academic 
scholarship and the theoretical enterprise.    
   Critical legal scholarship was partially a sincere attempt to reveal legal and social 
problems and to revise them in order to create a better society. It was also an academic 
enterprise of scholars who were, for one reason or another, frustrated with the university 
or the law faculty and wanted to have their say on the issues. Thus, they tried to acquire 
academic reputation, which was not necessarily of immediate benefit to them. They 
were rather after an original and authentic self as a legal scholar. In the most fundamen-
tal sense, critical and radical thought was an academic life-style, and critical legal 
scholarship was an academic counter-culture.  
   Fundamentally, critical legal scholarship emanated from the same sources in the 
United States and Scandinavia. On the one hand, critical legal scholarship was a re-
sponse to the social and political problems which were identified in the radical upheaval 
and in the demands of participatory and economic democracy. On the other hand, it was 
a response to the epistemological criticism of the liberal capitalist state, which took the 
values of the contemporary society as given and excluded all consideration of alterna-
tive values. The critical scholars sought to demonstrate that social values and institu-
tions were conventional and contingent and these impulses were then realized within 
academia in the critical pursuit to transcend the tradition.     
   The motives of the scholars to engage in critical activities might have varied to a 
significant extent. Some wanted to pursue a just society, whereas others were interested 
in revising legal scholarship and elaborating a more competent theory. Yet, for some the 
whole enterprise was simply for the sake of criticizing the academic and scholarly tradi-
tions. To analyze the personal motives of each scholar would require thorough bio-
graphical examination, but for our purposes a more general analysis will suffice. Critical 
scholarship originated in the realization of the discrepancy between legal education and 
the personal world view of the scholars. It is therefore the academic field that provides 
the common background of the alternative and critical legal scholarship and helps us to 
understand them as related to the general social and scholarly context and to the person-
al motives of the scholars.  
   In the Nordic Countries, the signs of the fading of the critical scholarship were ev-
ident in the late 1970s, whereas in the United States the critical scholarship was becom-
ing more popular. Critical scholarship slowly waned when the original scholars became 
too preoccupied with their professional responsibilities or otherwise lost their interest in 
the critical enterprise, and when society changed to the point where the criticism of the 
fundamental basis of social values and institutions became less interesting and signifi-
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cant. Of course, new generations of critical scholars emerged but these were not of the 
same magnitude as the one studied here. Critical legal scholarship continued but not at 
the same level. In the United States, however, the 1980s registered the zenith of CLS 
which lost its momentum only when the scholars were unable to find a unified basis for 
their theory and when the critical scholarship began to lose its significance. Critical 
scholarship of course still continues, but in a more marginal form and subsumed under 
the general paradigm. Alternative legal scholarship that was a wider response to the 
social and cultural change, and the critical legal scholarship which was a more extreme 
manifestation of the period, did change the character of legal scholarship by opening it 
up towards methodological eclecticism, even if no radical transformation occurred.    
   The rise and development of critical legal scholarship reflected various social 
traits, but the movements should not be seen simply in the light of the social and polit i-
cal changes. It is important to take the scientific and scholarly changes into account as 
well. Besides the social and political changes, and besides the expansion of the method-
ology of legal scholarship into the social sciences, philosophy, and Marxism, critical 
legal scholarship also represented a new kind of epistemology and world view. The 
problem of the previous accounts of CLS has been that they have focused on one aspect 
of the movement and neglected the encompassing, cultural aspect.        
   Thus, the historical reconstruction of critical legal scholarship also answers the 
question concerning the essence of the criticism. Critical legal scholarship is best under-
stood as a cultural phenomenon, because it grasps all of the aspects and brings them 
together in a way that creates a synthesis of the various currents of change. Critical legal 
scholarship was a counter culture that embraced the alternative lifestyle, the promotion 
of the rights of the citizen, the transformation of the basis of legal scholarship, the urge 
to develop new theories, philosophical interests, and intellectual criticism of the social 
order. The personal motives of the scholars varied, but the overall theme was the same 
for them. They wanted to pursue a counter-cultural identity in general and some indi-
vidual element within it in particular.   
   A problem of looking back to the 1960s and interpreting the critical scholarship is 
that the perspective often determines the outcome. Some see critical scholarship simply 
as political agitation, whereas others want to emphasize its theoretical and philosophical 
implications. For some, the critics were rebels without a cause, whereas others claim 
that they created the basis of modern legal scholarship. As my analysis demonstrates, 
however, critical legal scholarship was a broad cultural phenomenon incorporating vari-
ous aspects, and only through an extensive analysis can we understand the essence of 
the movement. Critical legal scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s was a part of the wider 
transformation of culture, society, scholarship, and jurisprudence. It was an endeavor of 
scholars within a historical period, aspiring after an academic career, and responding to 
the changes that surrounded them. We may never fully comprehend the motives of each 
scholar, but a thorough understanding is possible through a comprehensive historical 
analysis. As my historical analysis demonstrates, irrational motives may sometimes be 
the reasons for historical change. Furthermore, retrospective views may change our 
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conceptions of the epochs of the past, and villains of the past may become heroes in the 
future and vice versa. Thus, the evaluation of the critical scholarship depends on the 
perspective of the interpreter. I have demonstrated that the critical legal scholarship of 
the 1960s and 1970s was a sum of various and complex factors, and that the critical 
scholars were neither anarchists nor heroes. I hope I have done justice to my subject and 
encouraged the reader to seek the truth. For it does not matter whether the truth is “out 
there” or something we construct; what matters is that we keep searching for it. 
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